A History of Rome, Vol 1 by A H.J. Greenidge

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Jugurtha had on his part framed a plan of resistance complete in every
detail. The site in which the attempt was to be made was visited and its
military features were appraised in all their bearings; the events which
would succeed each other in a few short hours could be predicted as
surely as one could foretell the regular movements of a machine; the
Roman general was walking into a trap from which there should be no
escape but death. The framing of Jugurtha's scheme necessarily depended
on his knowledge of Metellus's line of march. We do not know how soon
the requisite data came to hand; but there is little reason for
believing that his plan was a resolution of despair or forced on him as
a last resort, except in the sense that he would always rather treat
than fight, and that to inflict disaster on a Roman army was no part of
the policy which he deemed most desirable. But, since his ideal plan had
stumbled on the temperament of Metellus, a check to the invading army
became imperative.[1008] The sacrifice of Vaga could scarcely have
weighed heavily on his mind, for it was an integral element in any
rational scheme of defence; but, even apart from the obvious
consideration that a king must fight if he cannot treat for his crown,
the thought of his own prestige may now have urged him to combat.
Unbounded as the faith of his Numidian subjects was, it might not
everywhere survive the impression made by the unimpeded and triumphant
march of the Roman legions.

Metellus when he quitted Vaga had continued to operate in the eastern
part of Numidia. The theatre of his campaign was probably to be the
territory about the plateau of Vaga and the Great Plains, its ultimate
prizes perhaps were to be the important Numidian towns of Sicca Veneria
and Zama Regia to the south. The nature of the country rendered it
impossible for him to enter the defiles of the Bagradas from the
north-west, while it was equally impossible for him to march direct from
Vaga to Sicca, for the road was blocked by the mountains which
intervened on his south-eastern side. To reach the neighbourhood of
Sicca it was necessary to turn to the south-west and follow for a time
the upward course of the river Muthul (the Waed Mellag). By this route he
would reach the high plateaux, which command on the south-east the
plains of Sicca and Zama, on the north-west those of Naraggara and
Thagaste, on the south those of Thala and Theveste.[1009] Metellus's
march led him over a mountain height which was some miles from the
river.[1010] The western side of this height, down which the Roman army
must descend, although of some steepness at the beginning of its
declivity, did not terminate in a plain, but was continued by a swelling
rise, of vast and even slope, which found its eastern termination on the
river's bank. The greater portion of this great hill, and especially
that part of it which lay nearest to the mountain, was covered by a
sparse and low vegetation, such as the wild olive and the myrtle, which
was all that the parched and sandy soil would yield. There was no water
nearer than the river, and this had made the hill a desert so far as
human habitation was concerned. It was only on its eastern slope which
touched the stream that the presence of man was again revealed by
thick-set orchards and cattle grazing in the fields. [1011]

Jugurtha's plan was based on the necessity which would confront the
Romans of crossing this arid slope to reach the river. Could he spring
on them as they left the mountain chain and detain them in this torrid
wilderness, nature might do even more than the Numidian arms to secure a
victory; meanwhile measures might be taken to close the passage to the
river, and to bring up fresh forces from the east to block the desired
route while the ambushed army was harassed by attacks from the flank
and rear.

Jugurtha himself occupied the portion of the slope which lay just
beneath the mountain. He kept under his own command the whole of the
cavalry and a select body of foot-soldiers, probably of a light and
mobile character such as would assist the operations of the horse. These
he placed in an extended line on the flank of the route that must be
followed by an army descending from the mountain. The line was continued
by the forces which he had placed under the command of Bomilcar. These
consisted of the heavier elements of the Numidian army, the elephants of
war and the major part of the foot soldiers. It is, however, probable
that there was a considerable interval between the end of Jugurtha's and
the beginning of Bomilcar's line.[1012] The latter on its eastern side
extended to a point at no great distance from the river; and according
to the original scheme of the ambush the function assigned to Bomilcar
must have been that of executing a turning movement which would prevent
the Roman forces from gaining the stream. As it was expected that the
impact of the heavy Roman troops would be chiefly felt in this
direction, the sturdier and less mobile portions of the Numidian army
had been placed under Bomilcar's command.

Metellus was soon seen descending the mountain slope,[1013] and there
seemed at first a chance that the Roman column might be surprised along
its length by the sudden onset of Jugurtha's horse. But the vigilant
precautions which Metellus observed during his whole line of march,
although they could not in this case avert a serious danger, possibly
lessened the peril of the moment. His scouts seem to have done their
work and spied the half-concealed Numidians amongst the low trees and
brushwood. The superior position of the Roman army must in any case soon
have made this knowledge the common property of all, unless we consider
that some ridge of the chain concealed Jugurtha's ambush from the view
of the Roman army until they should have almost left the mountain for
the lower hill beneath it. Jugurtha must in any case have calculated on
the probability of the forces under his own command soon becoming
visible to the enemy, for perfect concealment was impossible amidst the
stunted trees which formed the only cover for his men.[1014] The
efficacy of his plan did not depend on the completeness or suddenness of
the surprise; it depended still more on Jugurtha's knowledge of the
needs of a Roman army, and on the state of perplexity into which all
that was visible of the ambush would throw the commander. For the little
that was seen made it difficult to interpret the size, equipment and
intentions of the expectant force. Glimpses of horses and men could just
be caught over the crests of the low trees or between the interlacing
boughs. Both men and horses were motionless, and the eye that strove to
see more was baffled by the scrub which concealed more than it revealed,
and by the absence of the standards of war which might have afforded
some estimate of the nature and size of the force and had for this
reason been carefully hidden by Jugurtha.

But enough was visible to prove the intended ambush. Metellus called a
short halt and rapidly changed his marching column to a battle formation
capable of resistance or attack. His right flank was the one immediately
threatened. It was here accordingly that he formed the front of his
order of battle, when he changed his marching column into a fighting
line.[1015] The three ranks were formed in the traditional manner; the
spaces between the maniples were filled by slingers and archers; the
whole of the cavalry was placed on the flanks. It is possible that at
this point the line of descent from the mountain would cause the Roman
army to present an oblique front to the slope and the distant
river,[1016] and the cavalry on the left wing would be at the head of
the marching column, if it descended into the lower ground.[1017] Such a
descent was immediately resolved on by Metellus. To halt on the heights
was impossible, for the land was waterless; an orderly retreat was
perhaps discountenanced by the difficulties of the country over which he
had just passed and the distance of the last watering-place which he had
left, while to retire at the first sight of the longed-for foe would not
have inspired his newly remodelled army with much confidence in
themselves or their general.

When the army had quitted the foot of the mountain, a new problem faced
its general. The Numidians remained motionless,[1018] and it became
clear that no rapid attack that could be as suddenly repulsed was
contemplated by their leader. Metellus saw instead the prospect of a
series of harassing assaults that would delay his progress, and he
dreaded the fierceness of the season more than the weapons of the enemy.
The day was still young, for Jugurtha had meant to call in the alliance
of a torrid sun, and Metellus saw in his mind's eye his army, worn by
thirst, heat and seven miles of harassing combat, still struggling with
the Numidian cavalry while they strove to form a camp at the river which
was the bourne of their desires. It was all important that the extreme
end of the slope which touched the river should be seized at once, and a
camp be formed, or be in process of formation, by the time that his
tired army arrived. With this object in view he sent on his legate
Rutilius with some cohorts of foot soldiers in light marching order and
a portion of the cavalry. The movement was well planned, for by the
nature of the case it could not be disturbed by Jugurtha. His object was
to harry the main body of the army and especially the heavy infantry,
and his refusal to detach any part of his force in pursuit of the
swiftly moving Rutilius is easily understood, especially when it is
remembered that Bomilcar was stationed near to the ground which the
Roman legate was to seize. An attack on the flying column would also
have led to the general engagement which Metellus wished to provoke. The
presence of Bomilcar and his force was probably unknown to the Romans.
He in his turn must have been surprised, and may have been somewhat
embarrassed, by Rutilius's advance; but the movement did not induce him
to abandon his position. To oppose Rutilius would have been to surrender
the part assigned him in the intended operations against the main Roman
force; and, if this part was now rendered difficult or impossible by the
presence of the Romans in his rear, he might yet divide the forces of
the enemy, and assist Jugurtha by keeping Rutilius and his valuable
contingents of cavalry in check. He therefore permitted the legate to
pass him[1019] and waited for the events which were to issue from the
combat farther up the field.

Metellus meanwhile continued his slow advance, keeping the marching
order which had been observed in the descent from the mountain. He
himself headed the column, riding with the cavalry that covered the left
wing, while Marius, in command of the horsemen on the right, brought up
the rear.[1020] Jugurtha waited until the last man of the Roman column
had crossed the beginning of his line, and then suddenly threw about two
thousand of his infantry up the slope of the mountain at the point where
Metellus had made his descent. His idea was to cut off the retreat of
the Romans and prevent their regaining the most commanding position in
the field. He then gave the signal for a general attack. The battle
which followed had all the characteristic features of all such contests
between a light and active cavalry force and an army composed mainly of
heavy infantry, inferior in mobility but unshakable in its compact
strength. There was no possibility of the Numidians piercing the Roman
ranks, but there was more than a possibility of their wearing down the
strength of every Roman soldier before that weary march to the river had
even neared its completion. The Roman defence must have been hampered by
the absence of that portion of the cavalry which had accompanied
Rutilius; it was more sorely tried by the dazzling sun, the floating
dust and the intolerable heat. The Numidians hung on the rear and either
flank, cutting down the stragglers and essaying to break the order of
the Roman ranks on every side. It was of the utmost difficulty to
preserve this order, and the braver spirits who preferred the security
of their ranks to reckless and indiscriminate assault, were maddened by
blows, inflicted by the missiles of their adversaries, which they were
powerless to return. Nor could the repulse of the enemy be followed by
an effective pursuit. Jugurtha had taught his cavalry to scatter in
their retreat when pursued by a hostile band; and thus, when unable to
hold their ground in the first quarter which they had selected for
attack, they melted away only to gather like clouds on the flank and
rear of pursuers who had now severed themselves from the protecting
structure of their ranks. Even the difficulties of the ground favoured
the mobile tactics of the assailants; for the horses of the Numidians,
accustomed to the hill forests, could thread their way through the
undergrowth at points which offered an effective check to the
pursuing Romans.

It seemed as though Jugurtha's plan was nearing its fulfilment. The
symmetry of the Roman column was giving place to a straggling line
showing perceptible gaps through which the enemy had pierced. The
resistance was becoming individual; small companies pursued or retreated
in obedience to the dictates of their immediate danger; no single head
could grasp the varied situation nor, if it had had power to do so,
could it have issued commands capable of giving uniformity to the
sporadic combats in which attack and resistance seemed to be directed by
the blind chances of the moment. But every minute of effectual
resistance had been a gain to the Romans. The ceaseless toil in the
cruel heat was wearing down the powers even of the natives; the
exertions of the latter, as the attacking force, must have been far
greater than those of the mass of the Roman infantry; and the Numidian
foot soldiers in particular, who were probably always of an inferior
quality to the cavalry and had been obliged to strain their physical
endurance to the utmost by emulating the horsemen in their lightning
methods of attack and retreat, had become so utterly exhausted that a
considerable portion of them had practically retired from the field.
They had climbed to the higher ground, perhaps to join the forces which
Jugurtha had already placed near the foot of the mountain, and were
resting their weary limbs, probably not with any view of shirking their
arduous service but with a resolution of renewing the attack when their
vigour had been restored. This withdrawal of a large portion of the
infantry was a cause, or a part, of a general slackening of the Numidian
attack; and it was the breathing space thus afforded which gave Metellus
his great chance. Gradually he drew his straggling line together and
restored some order in the ranks; and then with the instinct of a true
general he took active measures to assail his enemy's weakest point.
This point was represented by the Numidian infantry perched on the
height. Some of these were exhausted and perhaps dispirited, others it
is true were as yet untouched by the toil of battle; but as a body
Metellus believed them wholly incapable of standing the shock of a Roman
charge. The confidence was almost forced on him by his despair of any
other solution of the intolerable situation. The evening was closing in,
his army had no camp or shelter; even if it were possible to guard
against the dangers of the night, morning would bring but a renewal of
the same miserable toil to an army worn by thirst, sleeplessness and
anxiety. He, therefore, massed four legionary cohorts against the
Numidian infantry,[1021] and tried to revive their shattered confidence
by appealing at once to their courage and to their despair, by pointing
to the enemy in retreat and by showing that their own safety rested
wholly on the weapons in their hands. For some time the Roman soldiers
surveyed their dangerous task and looked expectantly at the height that
they were asked to storm. The vague hope that the enemy would come down
finally disappeared; the growing darkness filled them with resolute
despair; and, closing their ranks, they rushed for the higher ground. In
a moment the Numidians were scattered and the height was gained. So
rapidly did the enemy vanish that but few of them were slain; their
lightness of armour and knowledge of the ground saved them from the
swords of the pursuing legionaries.

The conquest of the height was the decisive incident of the battle, and
it was clearly a success that, considered in itself, was due far more to
radical and permanent military qualities than to tactical skill. It may
seem wholly a victory of the soldiers, in which the general played no
part, until we remember that strategic and tactical considerations are
dependent on a knowledge of such permanent conditions, and that Metellus
was as right in forcing his Romans up the height as Jugurtha was wrong
in believing that his Numidians could hold it. With respect to the
events occurring in this quarter of the field, Metellus had saved
himself from a strategic disadvantage by a tactical success; but even
the strategic situation could not be estimated wholly by reference to
the events which had just occurred or to the position in which the two
armies were now left. Had Bomilcar still been free to bar the passage to
the river and to join Jugurtha's forces during the night, the position
of the Romans would still have been exceedingly dangerous. But the
mission of Rutilius had successfully diverted that general's attention
from what had been the main purpose of the original plan. His leading
idea was now merely to separate the two divisions of the Roman army, and
the thought of blocking the passage of Metellus, although not
necessarily abandoned, must have become secondary to that of checking
the advance of Rutilius when the legate should have become alarmed at
the delay in the progress of his commander. Bomilcar, after he had
permitted the Roman force to pass him, slowly left the hill where he had
been posted and brought his men into more level ground,[1022] while
Rutilius was making all speed for the river. Quietly he changed his
column into a line of battle stretching across the slope which at this
point melted into the plain, while he learnt by constant scouting every
movement of the enemy beyond. He heard at length that Rutilius had
reached his bourne and halted, and at the same time the din of the
battle between Jugurtha and Metellus came in louder volumes to his ear.
The thought that Rutilius's attention was disengaged now that his main
object had been accomplished, the fear that he might seek to bring help
to his labouring commander, led Bomilcar to take more active measures.
His mind was now absorbed with the problem of preventing a junction of
the Roman forces. His mistrust of the quality of the infantry under his
command had originally led him to form a line of considerable depth;
this he now thought fit to extend with the idea of outflanking and
cutting off all chance of egress from the enemy. When all was ready he
advanced on Rutilius's camp.[1023]

The Romans were suddenly aware of a great cloud of dust which hung over
the plantations on their landward side; but the intervening trees hid
all prospect of the slope beyond: and for a time they looked on the
pillar of dust as one of the strange sights of the desert, a mere
sand-cloud driven by the wind. Then they thought that it betrayed a
peculiar steadiness in its advance; instead of sweeping down in a wild
storm it moved with the pace and regularity of an army on the march;
and, in spite of its slow progress, it could be seen to be drawing
nearer and nearer. The truth burst upon their minds; they seized their
weapons and, in obedience to the order of their commander, drew up in
battle formation before the camp. As Bomilcar's force approached, the
Romans shouted and charged; the Numidians raised a counter cheer and met
the assault half-way. There was scarcely a moment when the issue seemed
in doubt. The Romans, strong in cavalry, swept the untrained Numidian
infantry before them, and Bomilcar had by his incautious advance thrown
away the utility of that division of his army on which he and his men
placed their chief reliance. His elephants, which were capable of
manoeuvring only on open ground, had now been advanced to the midst of
wooded plantations, and the huge animals were soon mixed up with the
trees, struggling through the branches and separated from their
fellows.[1024] The Numidians made a show of resistance until they saw
the line of elephants broken and the Roman soldiers in the rear of the
protecting beasts; then they threw away their heavy armour and vanished
from the spot, most of them seeking the cover of the hills and nearly
all secure in the shelter of the coming night. The elephants were the
chief victims of the Roman pursuit; four were captured and the forty
that remained were killed.

It had been a hard day's work for the victorious division. A forced
march had been followed by the labour of forming a camp and this in turn
by the toil of battle. But it was impossible to think of rest. The delay
of Metellus filled them with misgivings, and they advanced through the
darkness to seek news of the main division with a caution that bespoke
the prudent view that their recent victory had not banished the evil
possibilities of Numidian guile.[1025] Metellus was advancing from the
opposite direction and the two armies met. Each division was suddenly
aware of a force moving against it under cover of the night; with nerves
so highly strung as to catch at any fear each fancied an enemy in the
other. There was a shout and a clash of arms, as swords were drawn and
shields unstrung. It was fortunate that mounted scouts were riding in
advance of either army. These soon saw the welcome truth and bore it to
their companions. Panic gave place to joy; as the combined forces moved
into camp, the soldiers' tongues were loosed, and pent up feelings found
expression in wonderful stories of individual valour.

Metellus, as in duty bound, gave the name of victory to his salvation
from destruction. He was right in so far as an army that has vanished
may be held to have been beaten; and his compliments to his soldiers
were certainly well deserved; for the triumph, such as it was, had been
mainly that of the rank and file, and the Roman legionary had not merely
given evidence of the old qualities of stubborn endurance which
Metellus's training had restored, but had proved himself vastly superior
to anything in the shape of a soldier of the line that Jugurtha could
put into the field. The commendation and thanks which the general
expressed in his public address to the whole army, the individual
distinctions which he conferred on those whose peculiar merit in the
recent combats was attested, were at once an apology for hardship, a
recognition of desert and a means of inspiring self-respect and future
efficiency. If it is true that Metellus added that glory was now
satisfied, and plunder should be their reward in future,[1026] he was at
once indulging in a pardonable hyperbole and veiling the unpleasant
truth that combats with Jugurtha were somewhat too expensive to attract
his future attention. His own private opinion of the recent events was
perhaps as carefully concealed in his despatches to the senate. It was
inevitable that a populace which had learnt to look on news from Numidia
as a record of compromise or disaster, should welcome and exaggerate the
cheering intelligence; should not only glory in the indisputable fact of
the renewed excellence of their army, but should regard Jugurtha as a
fugitive and Metellus as master of his land.[1027] It was equally
natural that the senate should embrace the chance of shaking off the
last relics of suspicion which clung to its honour and competency by
exalting the success of its general. It decreed supplications to the
immortal gods, and thus produced the impression that a decisive victory
had been won. Everywhere the State displayed a pardonable joy mingled
with a less justifiable expectation that this was the beginning of
the end.

The man who raises extravagant hopes is only less happy than the man who
dashes them to the ground. The days that followed the battle of the
Muthul must have been an anxious time for Metellus; for he had been
taught that it was necessary to change his plan of campaign into a shape
which was not likely to secure a speedy termination of the war. For four
days he did not leave his camp--a delay which may have had the
ostensible justification of the necessity of caring for his wounded
soldiers,[1028] and may even have been based on the hope that
negotiations for surrender might reach him from the king, but which also
proved his view that the pursuit of Jugurtha was wholly impracticable,
and that in the case of a Numidian army capture or destruction was not a
necessary consequence of defeat. He contented himself with making
inquiries of fugitives and others as to the present position and
proceedings of the king, and received replies which may have contained
some elements of truth. He learnt that the Numidian army which had
fought at the Muthul had wholly broken up in accordance with the custom
of the race, that Jugurtha had left the field with his body-guard alone,
that he had fled to wild and difficult country and was there raising a
second army--an army that promised to be larger than the first, but was
likely to be less efficient, composed as it was of shepherds and
peasants with little training in war.[1029] We cannot say whether
Metellus accepted the strange view that the vanished army, which had now
probably returned to the peaceful pursuits of agriculture and pasturage,
would not be reproduced in the new one; but certainly the news of the
future weakness of Jugurtha's forces did not seem to him to justify an
advance into Western Numidia, then as ever the stronghold of the king
and the seat of that treasure of human life which was of more value than
gold and silver. The Roman general, while recognising that the
belligerent aspect of the king made a renewal of the war inevitable, was
fully convinced that pitched battles were not the means of wearing down
Numidian constancy. The pursuit of Jugurtha was impossible without
conflicts, from which the vanquished emerged less scathed than the
victors,[1030] and even this primary object of the expedition was for
the time abandoned. He was forced to adopt the circuitous device of
attracting the presence of the king, and weakening the loyalty of his
subjects, by a series of mere plundering raids on the wealthiest
portions of the country. It was a plan that in default of a really
effective occupation of the whole country, especially of some occupation
of Western Numidia, implied a certain amount of self-contradiction and
inconsistency. The plunder of the land was intended to secure the end
which Metellus wished to avoid--a conflict with the king; and the
mobility which he so much dreaded could find no fairer field for its
exercise than the rapid marches across country which might secure a town
from attack, undo the work of conquest which had just been effected in
some other stronghold, or harass the route of the Roman forces as they
moved from point to point. Metellus was making himself into an admirable
target for the most effective type of guerilla warfare; but the whole
history of the struggle down to its close proves that this helplessness
was due to the situation rather than to the man. The Roman forces were
wholly inadequate to an effective occupation of Numidia; and a general
who despaired of pushing on in an aimless and dangerous pursuit, had to
be content with the chances that might result from the capture of towns,
the plunder of territories, and secret negotiations which might bring
about the death or surrender of the king.