A History of Rome, Vol 1 by A H.J. Greenidge

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The destruction of Capsa was followed by other successes of a similar
though less arduous kind. The event had served the purpose of Marius
well in so far as it spread before him a name of terror which caused
some of the Numidian garrisons to flee their strong places without a
struggle. In the few cases where resistance was met, it was beaten down,
and the fortified places which Jugurtha's soldiers were not rash enough
to defend, were utterly destroyed by fire.[1129] Marius left a
wilderness behind him on his return march to winter quarters,[1130] and
perhaps renewed his devastating course in the south-eastern parts of
Numidia during the spring of the following year, before his attention
was suddenly called to another point in the vast area of the war. This
easy triumph which cost little Roman blood and enriched the soldiers
with the spoils of war, created in his men a belief in his foresight and
prowess which seemed sufficient to stand the severest strain.[1131] A
great effort had now to be made in a quarter of Numidia which lay not
less than seven hundred miles from the recent scene of operations. As
neither the site of Marius's recent winter quarters nor the base which
he chose for his spring campaign are known to us, we cannot say whether
the expedition which he now directed to the extreme west of Numidia was
an unpleasant diversion from a scheme already in operation, or whether
it was the result of a plan matured in the winter camp; but in either
case this conviction of the necessity for sweeping the country in such
utterly diverse directions proves the full success of the plan which
Jugurtha was pursuing. It is more difficult to determine whether Marius
increased the success of this plan by a political blunder of his own.
The point at which he is now found operating was near the river Muluccha
or Molocath,[1132] the dividing line between the kingdoms of Numidia and
Mauretania. If the incursion which he made into this region was
unprovoked, it was a challenge to King Bocchus and an impolitic
disturbance of the recent attitude of quiescence that had been assumed
by that hesitating monarch; but it is possible that news had reached
Marius that a Mauretanian attack was impending, and that the same motive
which had impelled Metellus to hasten from the south to the defence of
Cirta, now urged his successor to push his army more than five hundred
miles farther to the west up to the very borders of Mauretania. The
movement seems to have been defensive, for at the moment when we catch
sight of his efforts he had not attempted to cross the admitted
frontier,[1133] but was endeavouring to secure a strong position that
lay within what he conceived to be the Numidian territory. A giant rock
rose sheer out of the plain, tapering into the narrow fortress which
continued by its walls an ascent so smoothly precipitous that it seemed
as though the work of nature had been improved by the hand of man.[1134]
But one narrow path led to the summit and was believed to be the only
way, not merely to a position of supreme value for defensive purposes,
but also to one of those rich deposits which the many-treasured king was
held to have laid up in the strongest parts of his dominions. The
difficulties of a siege were almost insurmountable. The garrison was
strong and well supplied with food and water; the only avenue for a
direct assault upon the walls was narrow and dangerous; the site was as
ill-suited as it could be for the movement of the heavier engines of
war. When the attack was made, the mantlets of the besiegers were easily
destroyed by fire and stones hurled from above; yet the soldiers could
not leave cover, nor get a firm hold on the steeply sloping ground; the
foremost amongst the storming party fell stricken with wounds, and a
panic seemed likely to prevail amidst the ever-victorious army if it
were again urged to the attack. While Marius was brooding over this
unexpected check, and his mind was divided between the wisdom of a
retreat and the chances that might be offered by delay, an accident
supplied the defects of strength and counsel.[1135] A Ligurian in quest
of snails was tempted to pursue his search from ridge to ridge on that
side of the hill which lay away from the avenue of attack and had
hitherto been deemed inaccessible. He suddenly found that he had nearly
reached the summit; a spirit of emulation urged him to complete the work
which he had unconsciously begun, and the branches of a giant holmoak,
which twisted amongst the rocks, gave him a hold and footing when the
perpendicular walls of the last ascent seemed to deny all chance of
further progress. When at length he craned over the edge of the highest
ridge, the interior of the fort lay spread before him. No member of the
garrison was to be seen, for every man was engaged in repelling the
assault which had been renewed on the opposite side. A prolonged survey
was therefore possible, and all the important details of the fortress
were imprinted on the mind of the Ligurian before he began his leisurely
descent. The features of the slope he traversed were also more
cautiously observed; the next ascent would be attempted by more than
one, and every irregularity that might give a foothold must be noted by
the man who would have to prove and illustrate his tale. When the story
was told to Marius he sent some of his retinue to view the spot; their
reports differed according to the character of their minds; some of the
investigators were sanguine, others more than doubtful; but the consul
eventually determined to make the experiment. The escalade was to be
attempted by a band of ten; five of the trumpeters and buglemen were
selected and four centurions, the Ligurian was to be their guide. With
head and feet bare, their only armour a sword and light leathern shield
slung across their backs, the soldiers painfully imitated the daring
movements of their active leader. But he was considerate as well as
daring. Sometimes he would weave a scaling ladder of the trailing
creepers; at others he would lend a helping hand; at others again he
would gather up their armour and send them on before him, then step
rapidly aside and pass with his burden up and down their struggling
line. His cheery boldness kept them to their painful task until every
man had reached the level of the fort. It was as desolate as when first
seen by the Ligurian, for Marius had taken care that a frontal attack
should engage the attention of the garrison. The climb had been a long
one, and the battle had now been raging many hours when news was brought
to the anxious commander that his men had gained the summit.[1136] The
assault was now renewed with a force that astonished the besieged, and
soon with a recklessness that led them to think the besiegers mad. They
could see the Roman commander himself leaving the cover of the mantlets
and advancing in the midst of his men up the perilous ascent under a
tortoise fence of uplifted shields. Over the heads of the advancing
party came a storm of missiles from the Roman lines below. Confident as
the Numidians were in the strength of their position, scornful as were
the gibes which a moment earlier they had been hurling against the foe,
they could not think lightly of the serried mass that was moving up the
hill and the rain of bullets that heralded its advance. Every hand was
busy and every mind alert when suddenly the Roman trumpet call was heard
upon their rear. The women and boys, who had crept out to watch the
fight, were the first to take the alarm and to rush back to the shelter
of the fort; most of the men were fighting in advance of their outer
walls; those nearest to the ramparts were the first to be seized with
the panic; but soon the whole garrison was surging backwards, while
through and over it pressed the long and narrow wedge of Romans, cutting
their way through the now defenceless mass until they had seized the
outworks of the fort.

It is difficult to gauge the positive advantages secured by this feat of
arms; but it is probable that the capture of this particular
hill-fortress, although its difficulty gave it undue prominence in the
annals of the war, was not an isolated fact, but one of a series of
successful attempts to establish a chain of posts upon the Mauretanian
border, which might bring King Bocchus to better counsels and interrupt
his communications with Jugurtha. The enterprise may have been followed
by a tolerably long campaign in these regions. This campaign has not
been recorded, but that it was contemplated is proved by the fact that
Marius had ordered an enormous force of cavalry to meet him near the
Muluccha.[1137] The force thus summoned actually served the purpose of
covering a retirement that was practically a retreat; but this could not
have been the object which it was intended to fulfil when its presence
was commanded. A large force of horse was essential, if Bocchus was to
be paralysed and the border country swept clear of the enemy. The cloud
that was to burst from Mauretania was not the only chance that could be
foretold; it was the issue to be dreaded, if all plans at prevention
failed; but it was one that might possibly be averted by the presence of
a commanding force in the border regions.

It had taken nearly a year to collect and transport from Italy the
cavalry force that now entered the camp of Marius. The reason why Italy
and not Africa was chosen as the recruiting ground is probably to be
found in the lack of confidence which the Romans felt even in those
Numidians who professed a friendly attitude; otherwise cheapness and
even efficiency might seem to have dictated the choice of native
contingents, although it is possible that, as a defensive force, the
tactical solidarity of the Italians gave them an advantage even over the
Numidian horse. The Latins and Italian allies had furnished the troopers
that had lately landed on African soil,[1138] perhaps not at the port of
Utica, but at some harbour on the west, for the time consumed by Marius
in the march to his present position, even had not his campaign been
planned in winter quarters, would have given him an opportunity to send
notice of his whereabouts to the leader of the auxiliary force. This
leader was Lucius Cornelius Sulla, who had spent nearly the whole of the
first year of his quaestorship in beating up on Italian soil the troops
of horsemen which he now led into the camp. In comparison with the
arrival of the force that of the quaestor was as nothing; yet the advent
of such a subordinate was always a matter of interest to a general.
Tradition had determined that the ties between a commander and his
quaestor should be peculiarly close; the superior was responsible for
every act of the minor official whom the chance of the lot might thrust
upon him; if his subordinate were capable, he was the chosen delegate
for every delicate operation in finance, diplomacy, jurisdiction, or
even war: if he were incapable, he might be dismissed,[1139] but could
not be neglected, for he was besides the general the only man in the
province holding the position of a magistrate, and was in titular rank
superior even to the oldest and most distinguished of the legates.[1140]
It was a matter of chance whether a government or a campaign was to be
helped or hindered by the arrival of a new quaestor; and Marius, when he
first heard of the man whom destiny had brought to his side, was
inclined to be sceptical as to the amount of assistance which was
promised by the new appointment.[1141] Apart from a remarkable personal
appearance--an impression due to the keen blueness of the eyes, the
clear pallor of the face, the sudden flush that spread at moments over
the cheeks as though the vigour of the mind could be seen pulsing
beneath the delicate skin[1142]--there was little to recommend Sulla to
the mind of a hard and stern man engaged in an arduous and disappointing
task. The new lieutenant had no military experience, he was the scion of
a ruined patrician family, and, if the gossip of Rome were true, his
previous life suggested the light-hearted adventurer rather than the
student of politics or war. In his early youth he seemed destined to
continue the later traditions of his family--those of an unaspiring
temper or a careless indolence, which had allowed the consulship to
become extinct in the annals of the race and had been long content with
the minor prize of the praetorship. Even this honour had been beyond the
reach of the father of Sulla; the hereditary claim to office had been
completely broken, and the family fortune had sunk so low that there
seemed little chance of the renewal of this claim. The present bearer of
the name, the elder son of the house, had lived in hired rooms, and such
slender means as he could command seemed to be employed in gratifying a
passion for the stage.[1143] Yet this taste was but one expression of a
genuine thirst for culture;[1144] and, whatever the opinion of men might
be, this youth whose most strenuous endeavours were strangely mingled
with a careless geniality and an appetite that never dulled for the
pleasures of the senses and the flesh, had a wonderful faculty for
winning the love of women. His father had made a second marriage with a
lady of considerable means; and the affection of the step-mother, who
seems to have been herself childless, was soon centred on her husband's
elder son.[1145] At her death he was found to be her heir, and the
fortune thus acquired was added to or increased by another that had also
come by way of legacy from a woman. This benefactress was Nicopolis, a
woman of Greek birth, whose transitory loves, which had Brought her
wealth, were closed by a lasting passion for the man to Whom this wealth
was given.[1146] The possession of this competence, which might have
completed the wreck of the nerveless pleasure-seeker that Sulla seemed
to be, proved the true steel of which the man was made. The first steps
in his political career gave the immediate lie to any theory of wasted
opportunities. He had but exceeded by a year or two the minimum age for
office when he was elected to the quaestorship; he was but thirty-one
when he was scouring Italy for recruits;[1147] a year later he had
entered Marius's camp near the Muluccha with his host of cavalry. A very
brief experience was sufficient to convert the general's prejudice into
the heartiest approval of his new officer. Any spirit of emulation which
Sulla possessed was but shown in action and counsel; none could outstrip
him in prowess and forethought, yet all that he did seemed to be the
easy outcome either of opportunity or of a ready wit which charmed
without startling: and he was never heard to breathe a word which
reflected on the conduct of the pro-consul or his staff. Over the petty
officers and the soldiers he attained the immediate triumph which
attends supreme capacity combined with a facile temper and a sense of
humour. His old companions of the stage had been perhaps his best
instructors in the art of moulding the will of the common man. He had
the right address for every one; a grumble was met by a few kind words;
a roar of laughter was awakened by a ready jest, and its recipient was
the happier for the day. When help was wanted, his resources seemed
boundless; yet he never gave as though he expected a return, and the
idea of obligation was dismissed with a shrug and a smile.[1148] Sulla
was not one of the clumsy intriguers who laboriously lay up a store of
favour and are easily detected in the attempt. He was a terrible man
because his insight and his charm were a part of his very nature, as
were also the dark current of ambition, scarcely acknowledged even by
its possessor, and the surging tides of passion, carefully dammed by an
exquisitely balanced intellect into a level stream, on which crowds
might float and believe themselves to be victims or agents of an
overmastering principle, not of a single man's caprice.

The capacity of every officer in Marius's army was soon to be put to an
effective test; for the coalition of Jugurtha and Bocchus, which the
campaign might have been meant to prevent, turned out to be its
immediate result. The Moor was still hesitating between peace and
war--looking still, it may be, for another bid from the representative
of Rome, and waiting for the moment when he might compel the attention
of Metellus's rude successor, who preferred the precautions of war to
those of diplomacy--when the Numidian king, in despair at this ruinous
passivity and at the loss of the magnificent strategic chance that was
being offered by the enemy, approached his father-in-law with the
proposal that the cession of one-third of Numidia should be the price of
his assistance. The cession was to take effect, either if the Romans
were driven out of Africa, or if a settlement was reached with Rome
which left the boundaries of Numidia intact.[1149] Bocchus may not have
credited the likelihood of the realisation of the first alternative; but
combined action might render the second possible, and even if that
failed, his chances of a bargain with Rome were not decreased by
entering on a policy of hostility which might be closed at the opportune
moment. For the time, however, he played vigorously for Jugurtha's
success. His troops of horsemen poured over the border to join the
Numidian force, and the combined armies moved rapidly to the east to
encompass the columns of Marius, that had just begun their long march to
the site which had been chosen for winter quarters.

The object of the Roman general was to keep in touch with the sea for
the purpose of facilitating the supply of his army. But we cannot say
whether his original choice was a station so distant as the
neighbourhood of Cirta,[1150] or whether his movement in this direction,
which severed him by some hundreds of miles from the region which he had
lately commanded, was a measure forced on him by the danger to which his
army was exposed in the distant west from the overwhelming forces of the
enemy. He had at any rate covered a great stretch of territory before he
actually came into touch with the combined forces of Bocchus and
Jugurtha; for the almost continuous fighting that ensued, when once the
armies had come into contact, seems all to have been confined to the
last few days before Cirta was reached and to a period of time which
could have formed but a small fraction of the whole duration of the
march. The first attack was planned for the closing hours of the
day.[1151] The advent of night would be of advantage to the native force
whether they were victorious or defeated. In the first case their
knowledge of the ground would enable them to follow up their success, in
the second their retreat would be secured. Under all circumstances a
struggle in the darkness must increase the difficulties of the Romans. A
complete surprise was impossible, for Marius's scouting was good, and
from all directions horsemen dashed up to tell him the enemy was at
hand. But the quarter from which such an attack would be aimed could not
be determined, and so incredibly rapid were the movements of the Moorish
and Gaetulian horse that scarcely had the last messenger ridden up when
the Roman column was assailed on every side. The Roman army had no time
to form in line, and anything approaching battle array was scorned by
the enemy. They charged in separate squadrons, the formation of which
seemed to be due to chance as much as to design; this desultory mode of
attack enabled them to assail the Roman forces at every point and to
prevent any portion of the men from acquiring the stability that might
save the helplessness of the others; they harried the legionaries as
they shifted their heavy baggage, drew their swords and hurried into
line, and the cavalry soldiers as they strove to mount their frightened
horses. Horse and foot were inextricably mixed, and no one could tell
which was the van and which the rear of the surrounded army. The general
fought like a common soldier, but he did not forget the duties of a
commander. With his chosen troop of horse he rode up and down the field,
detecting the weak points of his own men, the strong points of the
enemy, lending a timely succour to the first and throwing his weight
against the second.[1152] But it was the experience of the well-trained
legionaries that saved the day. Schooled in such surprises, they began
to form small solid squares, and against these barriers the impact of
the light horsemen beat in vain.[1153] But night was drawing on--the
hour which the allied kings had chosen as the crowning moment of their
attack--and Marius was as fully conscious as his enemies how helpless
the Roman force would be if such a struggle were protracted into the
darkness. Fortunately the place of the attack had been badly chosen; the
neighbouring ground did not present a wholly level expanse on which
cavalry could operate at will. But a short distance from the scene of
the fight two neighbouring hills could be seen to rise above the plain;
the smaller possessed an abundant spring of water, the larger by its
rugged aspect seemed to promise an admirable rampart for defence.[1154]
It was impossible to withdraw the whole army to the elevation which
contained the welcome stream, for its space did not permit of an
encampment; but Marius instructed Sulla to seize it with the cavalry. He
then began to draw his scattered infantry together, taking advantage of
the disorder in the enemy which the last sturdy stand of the veterans
had produced, and when the divisions were at last in touch with one
another, he led the whole force at a quick march to the place which he
had chosen for its retreat. The kings soon recognised that this retreat
was unassailable; their plan of a night attack had failed; but they did
not lose the hope that they held the Romans at their mercy. The fight
had become a blockade; they would coop the Romans within their narrow
limits, or force them to straggle on their way under a renewal of the
same merciless assault. To have withstood the legions and occupied their
ground, was itself a triumph for Gaetulians and Moors. They spread their
long lines round either hill and lighted a great ring of watchfires; but
their minds were set on passing the night in a manner conducive neither
to sleep nor vigilance. They threw away their victory in a manner common
to barbarism, which often lacks neither courage nor skill, but finds its
nemesis in an utter lack of self-restraint. From the silent darkness of
the ridge above the Romans could see, in the circles of red light thrown
by the blazing watch-fires, the forms of their enemies in every attitude
of careless and reckless joy; while the delirious howls of triumph which
reached their ears, were a source, not of terror, but of hope. In the
Roman camp no sound was heard; even the call of the patrol was hushed by
the general's command.[1155] As the night wore on, the silence spread to
the Plain below, but here it was the silence of the deep and profound
sleep that comes on men wearied by the excesses of the night. Suddenly
there was a terrific uproar. Every horn and trumpet in the Roman lines
seemed to be alive, every throat to be swelling the clamour with
ear-piercing yells. The Moors and Gaetulians, springing from the ground,
found the enemy in their very midst. Where the slaughter ended, the
pursuit began. No battle in the war had shown a larger amount of slain;
for flight, which was the Numidian's salvation and the mockery of his
foe, had been less possible in this conflict than in any which had
gone before.

Marius continued his march, but with precautions even greater than those
which he had previously observed. He formed his whole army into a
"hollow square" [1156]--in fact, a great oblong, arranged equally for
defence on front, flanks, and rear, while the baggage occupied the
centre. Sulla with the cavalry rode on the extreme right; on the left
was Aulus Manlius with the slingers and archers and some cohorts of
Ligurians; the front and rear were covered by light infantry selected
from the legions under the command of military tribunes. Numidian
refugees scoured the country around, their knowledge of the land giving
them a peculiar value as a scouting force. The camp was formed with the
same scrupulous care; whole cohorts formed from legionaries kept watch
against the gates, fortified posts were manned at short distances along
the enclosing mound, and squadrons of auxiliary cavalry moved all night
before the ramparts. Marius was to be seen at all points and at all
hours, a living example of vigilance not of distrust, a master in the
art of controlling men, not by terror but by sharing in their toils.
Four days had the march progressed and Cirta was reported to be not far
distant, when suddenly an ominous but now familiar sight was seen.
Scouts were riding in on every hand; all reported an enemy, but none
could say with certainty the quarter from which he might appear.[1157]
The present disposition of the Roman troops had made the direction of
the attack a matter of comparatively little moment, and Marius called a
halt without making any change in the order of his march. Soon the enemy
came down, and Jugurtha, when he saw the hollow square, knew that his
plan had been partly foiled. He had divided his own forces into four
divisions; some of these were to engage the Roman van; but some at least
might be able to throw themselves at the critical moment on the
undefended rear of the Roman column, when its attention was fully
engaged by a frontal attack.[1158]