A History of Rome, Vol 1 by A H.J. Greenidge

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As things were, the Roman army presented no one point that seemed more
assailable than another, and Jugurtha determined to engage with the
Roman cavalry on the right, probably with the idea that by diverting
that portion of the Roman force which was under the circumstances its
strongest protecting arm, he might give an opportunity to his ally to
lead that attack upon the rear which was to be the crowning movement of
the day. His assault, which was directed near to the angle which the
right flank made with the van, was anticipated rather than received by
Sulla, who rapidly formed his force into two divisions, one for attack,
the other for defence. The first he massed in dense squadrons, and at
the head of these he charged the Moorish horse; the second stood their
ground, covering themselves as best they could from the clouds of
missiles that rose from the enemy's ranks, and slaughtering the daring
horsemen that rode too near their lines. For a time it seemed as if the
right flank and the van were to bear the brunt of the battle; the king
was known to be there in person: and Marius, knowing what Jugurtha's
presence meant, himself hastened to the front.

But suddenly the chief point of the attack was changed. Bocchus had been
joined by a force of native infantry, which his son Volux had just
brought upon the field. It was a force that had not yet known defeat,
for some delay upon the route had prevented it from taking part in the
former battle. With this infantry, and probably with a considerable body
of Moorish horse,[1159] Bocchus threw himself upon the Roman rear.
Neither the general nor his chief officers were present with the
division that was thus attacked; Marius and Sulla were both engrossed
with the struggle at the other end of the right wing, and Manlius seems
still to have kept his position on the left flank; the absence of an
inspiring mind amongst the troops assailed, their ignorance of the fate
of their distant comrades, moved Jugurtha to lend the weight of his
presence and his words to the efforts of his fellow king. With a handful
of horsemen he quitted the main force under his command and galloped
down the whole length of the right wing, until he wheeled his horse
amidst the front ranks of the struggling infantry. He raised a sword
streaming with blood and shouted in the Latin tongue that Marius had
already fallen by his hand, that the Romans might now give up the
struggle. The suggestion conveyed by his words shook the nerves even of
those who did not credit the horrifying news,[1160] while the presence
of the king, here as everywhere, stirred the Africans to their highest
pitch of daring. They pressed the wavering Romans harder than before,
the battle at this point had almost become a rout, when suddenly a large
body of Roman horse was seen to be bearing down on the right flank of
the Moorish infantry. They were led by Sulla, whose vigorous attacks had
scattered the enemy on the right wing; he could now employ his cavalry
for other purposes, and the Moorish infantry shook beneath the flank
attack, Jugurtha refused to see that the tide of victory had turned;
with a reckless courage he still strove to weld together the shattered
forces of the Moors and to urge them against the Roman lines; his own
escape was a miracle; men fell to left and right of him, he was pressed
on both sides by the Roman horse; at times he seemed almost alone amidst
his foes; yet at the last moment he vanished, and the capture which
would have ended the war was still beyond the reach of Roman skill and
prowess.[1161] Sulla had saved the day, the advent of Marius was but
needed to put the final touches to the victory. He had seen the cavalry
on the right scatter beneath the charges of the Roman horse, and almost
at the same moment news was brought him that his men were being driven
back upon the rear. His succour was scarcely needed, but his presence
gave an impulse to pursuit. The sight of the field when that pursuit was
at its height, lived ever in the minds of those who shared in its glory
and its horror. The sickening spectacle which a hard fought battle
yields, was protracted in this instance by the vast vista of the plains.
Wherever the eye could reach there were prostrate bodies of men and
horses, whose only claim to life was the writhing agony of their wounds;
on a stage dyed red with blood and strewn with the furniture of
shattered weapons little moving groups could be seen. The figures of
these puppets showed all the phases of helpless flight, violent pursuit,
and pitiless slaughter.

In spite of the carnage of this battlefield, victory here, as elsewhere
throughout the war, meant little more than driving off the foe. We
possess but a fragmentary record of this terrible retreat to Cirta, but
it is certain that its dangers and losses were by no means exhausted in
two pitched battles. A chance notice torn from its context[1162] tells
of a third great contest which closed a long period of harassing
attacks. Close to the walls of Cirta the Roman army was met by the two
kings at the head of sixty thousand horse. The combatants were swathed
in a cloud raised by the dust of battle, the Roman soldiers massed in a
narrow space were such helpless victims of the missiles of the enemy
that the Numidian and Moorish horsemen ceased to single out their
targets, and threw their javelins at random into the crowded ranks with
the certainty that each would find its mark. For three days was the
running fight continued. A charge was impossible against the volleys of
the foe, and retreat was cut off by the multitude of light horsemen that
hemmed the army in on every side. In the last desperate effort which
Marius made to free himself from the meshes of the kings, even the
centre of his column shook under the hail of missiles that assailed it,
and to the weapons of the enemy were soon added the terrors of blinding
heat and intolerable thirst. Suddenly a storm broke over the warring
hosts. It cooled the throats of the Romans and refreshed their limbs,
while it lessened the power of their foes. The strapless javelins[1163]
of the Numidians could not be hurled when wet, for they slipped from the
hands of the thrower; their shields of elephants' hide absorbed water
like a sponge and weighed down the arms on which they hung. The Moors
and Numidians, seeing that even their means of defence had failed them,
took to flight: but only to appear on another day with their army raised
to ninety thousand and to repeat the attempt to surround the Roman host.
This last effort ended in a signal victory for Marius. The forces of the
two kings were not only defeated but almost destroyed.

The events thus recorded can scarcely be regarded as mere variants of
the two battles which we have previously described. Vague and rhetorical
as is the account which sets them forth, it shows that there were
traditions of suffering and loss endured by the army of Marius such as
found no parallel in the campaign of his predecessor. Marius had
attempted what Metellus had never dared--a campaign in the far west of
Numidia. Its results were fruitless successes of the paladin type
followed by a burdensome and disastrous retreat. The west was lost, the
east was threatened, yet the lesson was not without its fruit. The
general when he reached the walls of Cirta had lost something of his
hardy faith in the use of blood and iron; he was more ready to appeal to
the motives which make for peace, to pretend a trust he did not feel, to
make promises which might induce the fluid treachery of Bocchus to
harden into a definite act of treason to his brother king, above all, to
lean on some other man who could play the delicate game of diplomatic
fence with a cunning which his own straightforward methods could not
attain. Everything depended on the attitude of the King of Mauretania;
and here again the campaign had not been without some healthful
consequences. If the Romans had gained no material advantage, Bocchus
had suffered some very material losses. His forces had been cut up, the
stigma of failure attached (perhaps for the first time) to their leader,
the first contact with the Romans had not been encouraging to his
subjects. And the campaign may also have revealed the difficulty, if not
the hopelessness, of Jugurtha's cause. The plan of driving the Romans
from Africa could not be perfected even with the combined forces of the
two kingdoms at their fullest strength; however much they might harass,
they had proved themselves utterly unable to attain such a success as
even the most complacent patriotism could name a victory; while the
sturdiness of the resistance of Rome seemed to banish the hypothesis
that Jugurtha would be included in any terms that might be made. Yet the
campaign had left Bocchus in an excellent position for negotiation. He
had shown that Mauretania was a great make-weight in the scale against
Rome; he had advertised his power as an enemy, his value as an ally; now
was the time to see whether the power and the value, so long ignored,
would be appreciated by Rome.

But five days are said to have elapsed since the last great conflict
with the Moors when envoys from Bocchus waited on Marius in his winter
quarters at Cirta.[1164] The request which they brought was that "two of
the Roman general's most trusty friends should wait on the king, who
desired to speak with them on a matter of interest to himself and the
Roman people".[1165] Marius forthwith singled out Sulla and Manlius, who
followed the envoys to the place of meeting that had been arranged. On
the way it was agreed by the representatives of Rome that they should
not wait for the king to open the discussion. Hitherto every proposal
had come from Bocchus; he had been played with, but never given a
straightforward answer, still less a sign of real encouragement. Yet no
good could be gained by expecting the king to assume a grovelling
attitude, by forcing him to begin proposals for peace with a confession
of his own humiliation. It would be far wiser if the commissioners
opened with a few spontaneous remarks which might restore rest and
dignity to the royal mind. Manlius the elder readily yielded the place
of first speaker to the more facile Sulla. If the words which history
has attributed to the quaestor[1166] were really used by him, they are a
record of one of those rare instances in which a diplomatist is able to
tell the naked truth. Sulla began by dwelling on the joy which he and
his friends derived from the change in Bocchus's mind--from the
heaven-sent inspiration which had taught the king that peace was
preferable to war. He then dwelt on the fact, which he might have
adduced the whole of his country's history to prove, that Rome had been
ever keener in the search for friends than subjects, that the Republic
had ever deemed voluntary allegiance safer than that compelled by force.
He showed that Roman friendship might be a boon, not a burden, to
Bocchus; the distance of his kingdom from the capital would obviate a
conflict of interests, but no distance was too great to be traversed by
the gratitude of Rome. Bocchus had already seen what Rome could do in
war; all that he needed to learn was the still greater lesson that her
generosity was as unconquerable as her arms. Sulla's words were a
genuine statement of the whole theory of the Protectorate, as it was
held and even acted on at this period of history. As a proof of the
ruinous lengths to which Roman generosity might proceed, he could have
pointed to the Numidian war now in the sixth year of its disastrous
course. The darker side of the Protectorate--the rapacity of the
individual adventurer--was no creation of the government, and needed not
to be reproduced on the canvas of the bright picture which he drew. The
hopes held out to Bocchus were genuine enough; the burden of his
alliance was but slight, its security immense.

The king seemed impressed by the gracious overtures of the
commissioners. His answer was not only friendly, but apologetic.[1167]
He urged that he had not taken up arms in any spirit of hostility to
Rome, but simply for the purpose of defending his own frontiers. He
claimed that the territory near the Muluccha, which had been harried by
Marius, did not belong to Jugurtha at all. He had expelled the Numidian
king from this region and it was his by the right of war. He appealed
finally to the fact of his own former embassy to Rome: he had made a
genuine effort to secure her friendship, but this had been
repulsed.[1168] He was, however, willing to forget the past; and, if
Marius permitted, he would like to send a fresh embassy to the senate.
This last request was provisionally granted by the commissioners;
Bocchus, in making it, showed a wise and, in consideration of some of
the events of this very war, a natural sense of the insecurity of the
promises made by Roman commanders, at the same time as he exhibited a
justifiable faith in a word once given by the great organ of the
Republic. Yet, when the commissioners had taken their departure, his old
hesitancy seemed to revive. He consented at least to listen to those of
his advisers who still urged the claims of Jugurtha.[1169] They had
raised their voices again, either at the time when the Roman
commissioners were waiting on Bocchus, or immediately after their
departure; for Jugurtha had no sooner learnt of his father-in-law's
renewed negotiations with Rome than he had used every means (amongst
others, we are told, that of costly gifts) to induce his Mauretanian
supporters to advocate his cause.

A further stage in the negotiations was reached before the winter season
was over, although it is probable that, at the time when this next step
was taken by the Mauretanian king, the new year had been passed and the
advent of spring was not far off. Marius, who was not fettered in his
operations by respect for the traditional seasons which were deemed
suitable to a campaign, had started with some flying columns of infantry
and a portion of the cavalry to some desert spot, with a view to besiege
a fortress still held by Jugurtha, and garrisoned by all the deserters
from the Roman army who were now in the king's service. Sulla had been
left with the usual title of pro-praetor to represent his absent
commander. To the headquarters of the winter camp[1170] Bocchus now sent
five of his closest friends, men chosen for their approved loyalty and
ability.[1171] His last access of hesitancy, if it were more than a
semblance, had certainly been shortlived, and the envoys were given full
powers to arrange the terms of peace. They had set out with all speed to
reach the Roman winter camp, but their journey had been long and
painful. They had been seized and plundered on the route by Gaetulian
brigands, and now appeared panic-stricken and in miserable plight before
the representative of Rome. Stripped of their credentials and the
symbols of their high office, they expected to be treated as vagrant
impostors from a hostile state; Sulla received them with the lavish
dignity that might be the due of princes. The simple nomads felt the
charm and the surprise of this first glimpse of the public manners of
Rome. Was it possible that these kindly and courteous men were the
spoilers of the world? The rumour must be the false invention of the
enemies of the bounteous Republic. The untrained mind rapidly argues
from the part to the whole, and Sulla's tact had done a great service to
his country. He had also established a claim on the Mauretanian
king,[1172] and this personal tie was not to be without its
consequences.

The envoys revealed to the quaestor the instructions of their master,
and asked his help and advice in the mission that lay before them. They
dwelt with pardonable pride on the wealth, the magnificence, and the
honour of their king, and dilated on every point in which the alliance
with such a potentate was likely to serve the cause of Rome.[1173] Sulla
promised them the plenitude of his help; he instructed them in the mode
in which they should address Marius, in which they should approach the
senate, and continued to be their host for forty days, until his
commander was ready to listen to their proposals and forward them on
their way. When Marius returned to Cirta after the successful completion
of his brief campaign, and heard of the arrival of the envoys, he asked
Sulla to bring them[1174] to his quarters, and made preparations for
assembling as formal a council as the resources of the province
permitted. A praetor happened to be within its limits and several men of
senatorial rank. All these sat to listen to the proposals made by
Bocchus. The verdict of the council was in favour of the genuineness of
the king's appeal, and the proconsul granted the envoys permission to
make their way to Rome. They asked an armistice for their king[1175]
until the mission should be completed. Loud and angry voices were heard
in protest--the voices of the narrow and suspicious men who are haunted
by the fixed conviction that a request for a cessation of hostilities is
always a treacherous attempt at renewed preparations for war. But Sulla
and the majority of the board supported the request of the envoys, and
the wiser counsel at length prevailed. The embassy now divided; two of
its members returned to their king, while three were escorted to Rome by
Cnaeus Octavius Ruso, a quaestor who had brought the last instalment of
pay for the army and was ready for his return homewards. The language of
the envoys before the Roman senate assumed the apologetic tone which had
been suggested by Sulla. Their king, they said, had erred; Jugurtha had
been the cause of this error. Their master asked that Rome should admit
him to treaty relations with herself, that she should call him her
friend. It is not impossible that these negotiations had a secret
history; that Bocchus was told of some very material reward that he
might expect, if Jugurtha were surrendered. But the assumption is not
necessary. The magic of the name of Rome had fired the imagination of
the African king at the commencement of the struggle; now that his fears
were quieted, the end, in whatever form it was attained, may have seemed
supremely desirable in itself. His envoys had been schooled by Sulla to
expect much more than was promised and to read the senate's words
aright. Certainly, if a prize had been offered for Bocchus's fidelity,
the offer was carefully concealed. The official form in which the
government accepted the petitioner's request, granted a free pardon and
expressed a cold probation. "The senate and Roman people (so ran the
resolution) are used to be mindful of good service and of wrongs. Since
Bocchus is penitent for the past, they excuse his fault. He will be
granted a treaty and the name of friend, when he has proved that he
deserves the grant." [1176]

When Bocchus received this answer, he despatched a letter to Marius
asking that Sulla should be sent to advise with him on the matters that
touched the common interests of himself and Rome.[1177] It was tolerably
clear what the subject of interest was. If it could be made "common,"
the end of the war had been reached. Sulla was despatched, and the final
triumph, if attained, would be that of the diplomatist, not of the
soldier. The quaestor was accompanied by an escort of cavalry, slingers,
and archers, and a cohort of Italians bearing the weapons of a
skirmishing force; for the adventures of Bocchus's envoys had shown the
insecurity of the route. On the fifth day of the march, a large body of
horse was seen approaching from a distance--a force that looked larger
and more threatening than it afterwards proved to be; for it rode in
open order, and the wild evolutions of the horsemen seemed to be the
preliminary to an attack. Sulla's escort sprang to their arms; but the
returning scouts soon removed all sense of fear. The approaching band of
cavalry proved to be but a thousand strong and their leader to be Volux
the son of Bocchus. The prince saluted Sulla and told him that he had
been sent to meet and escort him to the presence of the king. For two
days the combined forces advanced together, and there were no adventures
by the road; but on the evening of the second day, when their resting
place had been already chosen, the Moorish prince came hastily to Sulla
with a look of perplexity on his face. He said that his scouts had just
informed him that Jugurtha was close at hand, he entreated Sulla to join
him in flight from the camp while it was yet night.[1178] The request
was met by an indignant refusal; Sulla pointed to his men, whose lives
might be sacrificed by the disgraceful disappearance of their leader.
But, when Volux shifted his ground and merely insisted on the utility of
a march by night from the dangerous neighbourhood, the quaestor yielded
assent. He ordered that the soldiers should take their evening meal, and
that a large number of fires should be lit which were to be left burning
in the deserted camp. At the first watch the Moors and Romans stole
silently from the lines. The dawn found them jaded, heavy with sleep,
and longing for rest. Sulla was supervising the measurement of a camp,
when some Moorish horsemen galloped up with the news that Jugurtha was
but two miles in advance of their position. It was clear that the
anxious Numidian was watching their every movement; the question to be
answered was "Was Prince Volux in the plot?" The facts seemed dark
enough to justify any suspicion. The nerves of the Romans had been
shaken by the unknown danger which had forced them to leave their camp,
by the night of sleepless watchfulness which had followed its
abandonment. A panic was the inevitable result, and panic leads to fury.
Voices were raised that the Moorish traitor should be slain, and that,
if the fruit of his treason was reaped, he at least should not be
allowed to see it. Sulla himself was weighed down with the same
suspicion that animated his men, but he would not allow them to lay
violent hands on the Moor.[1179] He encouraged them as best he might,
then he turned with a passionate protest on his dubious companion. He
called the protecting god of his own race, the guardian of its
international honour, Jupiter Maximus, to witness the crime and perfidy
of Bocchus, and he ordered Volux to leave his camp. The unhappy prince
was probably in a state of genuine terror of Jugurtha, of complete
uncertainty as to the intentions of that jealous kinsman and ally. Even
had Volux known that his father Bocchus wished to play a double game, to
balance the helplessness of Sulla against that of Jugurtha, to hold two
valuable hostages in his hands at once, how could he be certain that
Jugurtha would be content to play the part of a mere pawn in the king's
game, to be dependent for his safety on the passing whim of a man whom
he distrusted? Jugurtha might have everything to gain by massacring the
Romans and seizing Sulla. The act would compromise Bocchus hopelessly in
the eyes of the Roman government. There was hardly a man that would not
believe in his treason, and from that time forth Bocchus would have no
choice but to be the firm ally of Numidia against the vengeance of Rome.
Yet, if Volux acted or spoke as though he believed in the possibility of
this issue, he might seem to be incriminating his father and himself, he
might seem to deserve the stern rebuke of Sulla and the order of
expulsion from the Roman camp. His fears must therefore be concealed and
he must profess a confidence which he did not feel. With tears which may
have expressed a genuine emotion, he entreated Sulla not to harbour the
unworthy suspicion. There had been no preconcerted treachery; the danger
was at the most the product of the cunning of Jugurtha, who had
discovered their route. Volux implied that the object of the Numidian's
movement was to compromise the Moorish government in the eyes of Sulla;
but he stated his emphatic belief that Jugurtha would, or could, do no
positive hurt to the Roman envoy or his retinue. He pointed out that the
king had no great force at his command, and (what was more important
still) that he was now wholly dependent on the favour of his
father-in-law. It was incredible, he maintained, that Jugurtha would
attempt any overt act of hostility, when the son of Bocchus was present
to be a witness to the crime. Their best plan would be to show their
indifference to his schemes, to ride in broad daylight through the
middle of his camp. If Sulla wished, he would send on the Moorish
escort, or leave it where it was and ride with him alone.

It was one of those situations which are the supreme tests of the
qualities of a man. Sulla knew that his life depended on the caprice, or
the momentary sense of self-interest, of a barbarian who was believed to
have shrunk from no crime and on whose head Rome had put a price. Yet he
did not hesitate. He passed with Volux through the lines of Jugurtha's
camp, and the desperate Numidian never stirred. What motive held his
hand was never known; it may have been that Jugurtha never intended
violence; yet the failure of his plan of compromising Bocchus might well
have stirred such a ready man to action; it may have been that he still
relied on his influence with the Mauretanian king, which was perpetuated
by his agents at the court. But some believed that his inaction was due
to surprise, and that the transit of Sulla through the hostile camp was
one of those actions which are rendered safe by their very
boldness.[1180]