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Lendas e Narrativas (Tomo I) by Alexandre Herculano

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This e-text is transcribed from the 1858 2nd edition of Lendas e
Narrativas (Tomo I).




LENDAS E NARRATIVAS (Tomo I)




ADVERTENCIA


A Advertencia que precedia a anterior edicao, e que adiante vae
repetida, explica sobejamente porque as primeiras tentativas de um
genero de escriptos, que so muito tarde foi cultivado em Portugal,
se publicaram em volumes, quando talvez nao devessem sair das
columnas dos jornaes, onde viram a luz publica. Consideramo-los
entao, e consideramo-los agora apenas como balisas no campo da
nossa historia litteraria, balisas que nos parecem ainda mais
toscas actualmente; porque ao passo que a reflexao e o tempo
nos amaduram o espirito, os defeitos de composicao e de estylo
cada vez se vao avolumando mais aos olhos da nossa consciencia
retrospectiva. Reputando-os, todavia, hoje como ha oito annos,
simples marcos milliarios, a presente edicao absolve-se pelos
mesmos titulos porque devia ser absolvida a edicao anterior.

Esperavamos, e dissemo-lo sinceramente, que estas desadornadas
tentativas esqueceriam em breve offuscadas pelas brilhantes
composicoes que comecavam a avultar no caminho que haviamos aberto.
O publico enleodeu de outro modo. Sem deixar de apreciar o melhor,
nao esqueceu estes mal delineados esbocos, que ficaram na sua
memoria como nos ficam para a saudade os dias do nosso balbuciar
infantil.

Quinze a vinte annos sao decorridos desde que se deu um passo,
bem que debil, decisivo, para quebrar as tradicoes do Alivio
de Tristo e do Feliz Independente, tyrannos que reinavam sem
emulos e sem conspiracoes na provincia do romance portugues.
Nestes quinze ou vinte annos creou-se uma litteratura e pode
dizer-se que nao ha anno que nao lhe traga um progresso. Desde
as Lendas e Narrativas ate o livro Onde esta a Felicidade? que
vasto espaco transposto! E todavia, apesar do immenso talento
que se revela nas mais recentes composicoes, quem sabe se entre
os nomes que despontam apenas nos horisontes litterarios, nao
vira em breve algum que offusque os que nos deixaram para nos
somente um bem modesto logar?

Oxala que assim seja. Os que nos venceram n'esta lucta gloriosa
saberao resignar-se como nos nos resignamos.

Ajuda, maio de 1858.



ADVERTENCIA DA PRIMEIRA EDICAO


Os breves romances e narrativas contidos neste volume foram
impressos, em epochas mais ou menos remotas, nas duas publicacoes
periodicas o Panorama e a Illustracao, bem como o foram nestes
ou em outros jornaes os que tem de formar o segundo volume das
Lendas e Narrativas, colleccao que, se trabalhos mais arduos o
consentirem, sera continuada com alguns outros, apenas esbocados
ou ineditos no todo ou em parte, que ainda restam entre os
manuscriptos do auctor. Corrigindo-os e publicando-os de novo,
para se ajunctarem a composicoes mais extensas e menos imperfeitas,
que ja viram a luz publica em volumes separados, elle quiz apenas
preservar do esquecimento, a que por via de regra sao condemnados
mais cedo ou mais tarde os escriptos inseridos nas columnas das
publicacoes periodicas, as primeiras tentativas do romance historico
que se fizeram na lingua portuguesa. Monumentos dos esforcos
do auctor para introduzir na litteratura nacional um genero
amplamente cultivado, nestes nossos tempos, em todos os paizes
da Europa, e este o principal, ou talvez o unico merecimento
delles; o titulo de que podem valer-se para nao serem entregues
de todo ao esquecimento. A singeleza da invencao, a pouca firmeza
nos contornos de alguns caracteres, o menos bem travado do dialogo,
imperfeicoes que nem sempre foi possivel remediar nesta nova
edicao, revelam a mao inexperiente. Na historia dos progressos
litterarios de Portugal, desde que a liberdade politica trouxe
a liberdade do pensamento, e que o engenho pode apparecer a luz
do dia sem os anginhos de uma censura tao absurda na sua indole,
como estupida na sua applicacao e esterilisadora nos seus effeitos;
nessa historia, dizemos, esta nova edicao deve ser julgada
principalmente com attencao ao seu motivo, a prioridade das
composicoes nella insertas, e a precisao em que, ao escreve-las,
o auctor se via de crear a substancia e a forma; porque para o
seu trabalho faltavam absolutamente os modelos domesticos.

A critica para ser justa nao ha-de, porem, attender so a essas
circumstancias: ha-de considerar tambem os resultados destas
tentativas, que, a principio, e licito suppor inspiraram outras
analogas, como por exemplo os "Irmaos Carvajales" e "O que foram
Portuguezes" do Sr. Mendes Leal, e gradualmente incitaram a maioria
dos grandes talentos da nossa litteratura a emprehenderem composicoes
analogas de mais largas dimensoes, e melhor delineadas e vestidas.
Todos conhecem o "Arco de Sanct'Anna", cujo ultimo volume acaba
de imprimir o primeiro poeta portugues deste seculo, o "Um ano na
Corte" do Sr. Corvo, cuja publicacao se aproxima do seu termo, e
o "Odio Velho Nao Cansa" do Sr. Rebello da Silva, ensaio que, se
as eloquencias parvoas e semsabores dos dicursos academicos nao
tivessem tornado indecentes as allusoes mythologicas, se poderia
comparar ao combate com o leao de Citheron, que revelou a Grecia
no moco Hercules o futuro semideus; porque no Odio Velho comeca
a manifestar-se o auctor da "Mocidade de D. Joao V", romance de
que ja se imprimiram algumas paginas admiraveis, mas que na parte
inedita, que e quasi tudo, nos promete um emulo de Walter-Scott.
Emfim o "Conde de Castella" do Sr. Oliveira Marreca, vasta concepcao,
posto que ainda incompleta, foi porventura inspirado pelo exemplo
destas fracas tentativas, e das que, em dimensoes maiores, o
auctor emprehendeu no Eurico e no Monge de Cister. Caracter grave
e austero, dignos dos tempos antigos, e que a providencia collocou
em meio de uma sociedade gasta e definhada por muitos generos
de corrupcoes, como uma condemnacao muda; homem sobre tudo de
sciencia e consciencia, o Sr. Marreca trouxe estes seus dotes
eminentes para o campo do romance historico, onde ninguem, talvez,
como elle poderia fazer a Portugal o servico que DuMonteil fez
a Franca, isto e, popularisar o estudo daquela parte da vida
publica e privada dos seculos semi-barbaros, que nao cabe no
quadro da historia social e politica.

Taes foram, entre outros, os mais importantes resultados da
introduccao do genero. No meio deste amplo desenvolvimento de uma
literatura nova no paiz, o auctor das seguintes paginas merecera
talvez desculpa de recordar que estes ensaios, inferiores as
publicacoes que se lhe seguiram, foram a sementinha d'onde proveio
a floresta. Seja-lhe pois licito consolar-se na sua inferioridade
com haver precedido na ordem dos tempos aquelles que, na affeicao
do publico, devem provavelmente faze-lo esquecer. Persuadido de
ter por isso direito a indulgencia, resolveu-se a transportar
para o livro aquillo que, considerado em si, nao mereceria talvez
sair nunca das columnas do fugitivo jornal, salvando assim, nao
escriptos cuja apreciacao exija largas paginas na historia
litteraria, mas um marco humilde e tosco, que, nesta especie de
litteratura, indique o ponto d'onde se partiu.





O ALCAIDE DE SANTAREM (950--961)




I


O guadamellato e uma ribeira que, descendo das solidoes mais
agras da Serra Morena, vem atraves de um territorio montanhoso
e selvatico desaguar no Guadalquivir pela margem direita, pouco
acima de Cordova. Houve tempo em que nestes desvios habitou uma
populacao numerosa: foi nas eras do dominio sarraceno em Hespanha.
Desde o governo do amir Abul-Khatar o districto de Cordova fora
distribuido as tribus arabes do Yemen e da Syria, as mais nobres
e mais numerosas entre todas as racas da Africa e da Asia, que
tinham vindo residir na Peninsula por occasiao da conquista ou
depois della. As familias que se estabeleceram naquellas encoslas
meridionaes das longas serranias chamadas pelos antigos Montes
Marianos, conservaram por mais tempo os habitos erradios dos
povos pastores. Assim no meiado decimo seculo, posto que esse
districto fosse assas povoado, o seu aspecto assemelhava-se ao
de um deserto; porque nem se descortinavam por aquelles cabecos e
valles vestigios alguns de cultura, nem alvejava um unico edificio
no meio das collinas rasgadas irregularmente pelos algares das
torrentes, ou cubertas de selvas bravias e escuras. Apenas um
ou outro dia se enxergava na extrema de algum almargem virente a
tenda branca do pegureiro, que no dia seguinte nao se encontraria
alli, se porventura se buscasse.

Havia, comtudo, povoacoes fixas naquelles ermos; havia habitacoes
humanas, porem nao de vivos. Os arabes collocavam os cemiterios
nos logares mais saudosos dessas solidoes, nos pendores meridionaes
dos outeiros, onde o sol, ao por-se, estirasse de soslaio os seus
ultimos raios pelas lagens lisas das campas, por entre os raminhos
floridos das sarcas acoutadas do vento. Era alli que, depois
do vaguear incessante de muitos annos, elles vinham deitar-se
mansamente uns ao pe dos outros, para dormirem o longo somno
sacudido sobre as suas palpebras das asas do anjo Azrael.

A raca arabe, inquieta, vagabunda e livre, como nenhuma outra
familia humana, gostava de espalhar na terra aquelles padroes,
mais ou menos sumptuosos, do captiveiro e immobilidade da morte,
talvez para avivar mais o sentimento da sua independencia illimitada
durante a vida.

No recosto de um teso, elevado no extremo de extensa gandra que
subia das margens do Guadamellato para o nordeste, estava assentado
um desses cemiterios pertencente a tribu Yemenita dos Beni-Homair.
Subindo pelo riu, viam-se alvejar ao longe as pedras das sepulturas
como um vasto estendal, e tres unicas palmeiras, plantadas na coroa
do outeiro, lhe tinham feito dar o nome de cemiterio de al-tamarah.
Transpondo o cabeco para o lado oriental, encontrava-se um desses
brincos da natureza, que nem sempre a sciencia sabe explicar:
era um cubo de granito de desconforme dimensao, que parecia ter
sido posto alli pelos esforcos de centenares d'homens, porque
nada o prendia ao solo. Do cimo desta especie de atalaia natural
descortinavam-se para todos os lados vastos horisontes.

Era um dia a tarde: o sol descia rapidamente, e ja as sombras
principiavam do lado de leste a empastar a paisagem ao longe em
negrumes confusos. Assentado na borda do rochedo quadrangular
um arabe dos Beni-Homair, armado da sua comprida lanca, volvia
olhos attentos, ora para o lado do norte, ora para o de oeste:
depois sacudia a cabeca com um signal negativo, inclinando-se
para o lado opposto da grande pedra. Quatro sarracenos estavam
alli tambem assentados em diversas posturas e em silencio, o
qual so era interrompido por algumas palavras rapidas, dirigidas
ao da lanca, e a que elle respondia sempre do mesmo modo com o
seu menear de cabeca.

"Al-barr,"--disse por fim um dos sarracenos cujo trajo e gestos
indicavam uma grande superioridade sobre os outros--"parece que
o kaid de Chantoryu[1] esqueceu a sua injuria como o wali de
Zarkosta[2] a sua ambicao d'independencia; e ate os partidarios
de Hafsun, esses guerreiros tenazes, tantas vezes vencidos por
meu pae, nao podem acreditar que Abdallah realise as promessas
que me induziste a fazer-lhes."

"Amir-al-melek[3],"--replicou Al-barr--"ainda nao e tarde: os
mensageiros podem ter sido retidos por algum successo imprevisto.
Nao creias que a ambicao e a vinganca adormecam tao facilmente
no coracao humano. Dize, Al-athar, nao te juraram elles pela
sancta Kaaba[4] que os enviados com a noticia da sua revolta e
da entrada dos christaos chegariam hoje a este logar aprazado,
antes do anoitocer?"

"Juraram--respondeu Al-athar--; mas que fe merecem homens que
nao duvidam de quebrar as promessas solemnes feitas ao kalifa,
e alem d'isso de abrir o caminho aos infieis para derramarem o
sangue dos crentes? Amir, nestas negras tramas tenho-te servido
lealmente; porque a ti devo quanto sou; mas oxala que falhassem
as esperancas que poes nos tens occultos alliados. Oxala nao
tivesse de tingir o sangue as ruas de Korthoba, e nao houvera
de ser o suppedaneo do throno que ambicionas o tumulo de teu
irmao!"

Al-athar cobriu a cara com as maos, como se quizesse esconder a
sua amargura. Abdallah parecia commovido por duas paixoes oppostas.
Depois de se conservar algum tempo em silencio, exclamou:

"Se os mensageiros dos revoltosos nao chegarem ate o anoitecer,
nao falemos mais n'isso. Meu irmao Al-hakem acaba de ser reconhecido
successor do kalifado: eu proprio o acceitei por futuro senhor
poucas horas antes de vir ter comvosco. Se o destino assim o
quer, faca-se a vontade de Deus! Al-barr, imagina que os teus
sonhos ambiciosos e os meus foram uma kassideh[5] que nao soubeste
acabar, como aquella que debalde tentaste repetir na presenca
dos embaixadores do Frandjat[6], e que foi causa de cahires no
desagrado de meu pae e de Al-hakem, e de conceberes esse odio
que alimentas contra elles, o mais terrivel odio deste mundo,
o do amor proprio offendido."

Ahmed Al-athar e o outro arabe sorriram ao ouvirem estas palavras
de Abdallah. Os olhos, porem, de Al-barr faiscaram de colera.

"Pagas mal, Abdallah,--disse elle com a voz presa garganta--os
riscos que tenho corrido para te obter a heranca do mais bello
e poderoso imperio do Islam. Pagas com allusoes affrontosas aos
que jogam a cabeca com o algoz para te por na tua uma coroa. Es
filho de teu pae! ... Nao importa. So te direi que e ja tarde
para o arrependimento. Pensas acaso que uma conspiracao sabida
de tantos ficara occulta? No ponto a que chegaste, retrocedendo
e que has-de encontrar o abysmo!"

No rosto de Abdallah pintava-se o descontentamento e a incerteza.
Ahmed ia a falar, talvez para ver de novo se divertia o principe
da arriscada empresa de disputar a coroa a seu irmao Al-hakem. Um
grito, porem, de atalaia o interrompeu. Ligeiro como relampago
um vulto saira do cemiterio, galgara o cabeco, e se aproximara
sem ser sentido: vinha involto n'um albornoz escuro, cujo capuz
quasi lhe encobria as feicoes, vendo-se-lhe apenas a barba negra
e revolta. Os quatro sarracenos puseram-se em pe de um pulo, e
arrancaram as espadas.

Ao ver aquelle movimento, o que chegara nao fez mais do que estender
para elles a mao direita e com a esquerda recuar o capuz do albornoz:
entao as espadas abaixaram-se como se uma corrente electrica
tivesse adormecido os bracos dos quairo sarracenos. Al-barr
exclamara:--"Muulin[7] o propheta! Muulin o sancto!..."

"Muulin o peccador:--interrompeu o novo personagem--Muulin, o
pobre fakih[8] penitente e quasi cego de chorar as proprias culpas
e as culpas dos homens, mas a quem Deus por isso illumina as
vezes os olhos da alma para antever o futuro ou ler no fundo
dos coracoes. Li no vosso, homens de sangue, homens de ambicao!
Sereis satisfeitos! O senhor pesou na balanca dos destinos a ti,
Abdallah, e a teu irmao Al-hakem. Elle foi achado mais leve. A
ti o throno; a elle o sepulchro. Esta escripto. Vae; nao pares
na carreira, que nao te e dado parar! Volta a Kortheba. Entra no
teu palacio Merwan; e o palacio dos kalifas da tua dynastia. Nao
foi sem mysterio que teu pae t'o deu por morada. Sobe ao sotam[9]
da torre. Ahi acharas cartas do kaid de Chantarya, e dellas veras
que nem elle, nem o wali de Zarkosta, nem os Beni-Hafsun faltam
ao que te juraram!"

"Sancto fakih--replicou Abdallab, credulo como todos os musulmanos
daquelles tempos de fe viva, e visivelmente perturbado--creio o
que dizes, porque nada para ti e occulto. O passado, o presente,
o futuro domina-los com a tua intelligencia sublime. Asseguras-me
o triumpho; mas o perdao do crime podes tu assegura-lo?"

"Verme, que te cres livre!--atalhou com voz solemne o fakih.--Verme,
cujos passos, cuja vontade mesma, nao sao mais do que frageis
instrumentos nas maos do destino, e que te cres auctor de um
crime! Quando a frecha despedida do arco fere mortalmente o
guerreiro, pede ella acaso a Deus perdao do seu peccado? Atomo
varrido pela colera de cima contra outro atomo, que vaes aniquilar,
pergunta antes se nos thesouros do Misericordioso ha perdao para
o orgulho insensato!"

Fez entao uma pausa. A noite descia rapida. Ao lusco-fusco ainda
se viu sair da manga do albornoz um braco felpudo e mirrado, que
apontava para as bandas de Cordova. Nesta postura a figura do
fakih fascinava. Coando pelos labios as syllabas, elle repeliu
tres vezes:

"Para Merwan!"

Abdallah abaixou a cabeca, e partiu vagarosamente, sem olhar
para traz. Os outros sarracenos seguiram-no. El-Muulin ficou so.

Mas quem era este homem? Todos o conheciam em Cordova; se vivesseis,
porem, naquella epocha e o perguntasseis nessa cidade de mais
de um milhao de habitantes, ninguem vo-lo saberia dizer. Era
um mysterio a sua patria, a sua raca, donde viera. Passava a
vida pelos cemiterios ou nas mesquitas. Para elle o ardor da
canicula, a neve ou as chuvas do inverno eram como se nao existissem.
Raras vezes se via que nao fosse lavado em lagrymas. Fugia das
mulheres como de um objecto de horror. O que, porem, o tornava
geralmente respeitado, ou antes temido, era o dom de prophecia, o
qual ninguem lhe disputava. Mas era um propheta terrivel, porque
as suas prediccoes recahiam unicamente sobre futuros males. No
mesmo dia em que nas fronteiras do imperio os christaos faziam
alguma correria, ou destruiam alguma povoacao, elle annunciava
publicamente o successo nas pracas de Cordova: qualquer membro
da familia numerosa dos Beni-Umeyyas cahia debaixo do punhal de
um assassino desconhecido, na mais remota provincia do imperio,
ainda das do Moghreb ou Mauritania, na mesma hora, no mesmo instante
as vezes, elle o pranteava redobrando os seus choros habituaes.
O terror que inspirava era tal, que no meio do maior tumulto
popular a sua presenca bastava para tudo cair em mortal silencio.
A imaginacao exaltada do povo tinha feito delle um sancto, sancto
como o islamismo os concebia; isto e, um homem cujas palavras
e aspecto gelavam de terror.

Ao passar por elle, Al-barr apertou-lhe a mao, dizendo-lhe em
voz quasi imperceptivel:

"Salvaste-me!"

O fakih deixou-o affastar, e fazendo um gesto de profundo despreso,
murmurou:

"Eu?! Eu teu cumplice, miseravel?!"

Depois, alevantando ambas as maos abertas para o ar, comecou
a agitar os dedos rapidamente, e rindo com um rir sem vontade,
exclamou:

"Pobres titeres!"

Quando se fartou de representar com os dedos a idea de escarneo
que lhe sorria la dentro, dirigiu-se, ao longo do cemiterio,
tambem para as bandas de Cordova, mas por diverso atalho.

[1] Santarem.

[2] Governador do Districto de Saragoca.

[3] Principe real.

[4] O famoso templo de Mekka.

[5] Poema de trinta versos, muito usado entre os arabes,
e que correspondia de certo muilo as nossas odes.

[6] Os reinos christaos alem dos Pyreneus.

[7] Muulin significa o triste.

[8] Fakih ou faquir, especie de frade mendicante entre
os musulmanos.

[9] Sotuko--o andar mais alto. Os nossos escriptores
tomavam esta palavra n'um sentido evidentemente errado, servindo-se
delia para indicar o aposento inferior ou terreo.



II


Nos pacos de Azzahrat, o magnifico alcacar dos kalifas de Cordova,
ha muitas horas que cessou o estrepito de uma grande festa. O
luar de noite serena d'abril bate pelos jardins que se dilatam
desde o alcacar ate o Guad-al-kebir, e alveja tremulo pelas fitas
cinzentas dos caminbos tortuosos, em que parecem enredados os
bosquesinhos de arbustos, os macissos de arvores silvestres, as
veigas de flores, os vergeis embalsamados, onde a larangeira, o
limoeiro, e as demais arvores fructiferas, trazidas da Persia, da
Syria e do Cathay, espalham os aromas variados das suas flores.
La ao longe Cordova, a capital da Hespanha mussulmana, repousa
da lida diurna, porque sabe que Abdu-r-rahman III, o illustre
kalifa, vela pela seguranca do imperio. A vasta cidade repousa
profundamente; e o ruido mal distincto que parece revoar por
cima della, e apenas o respiro lento dos seus largos pulmoes,
o bater regular das suas robustas arterias. Das almadenas de
seiscentas mesquitas nao soa uma unica voz de almuhaden, e os
sinos das igrejas mosarabes guardam tambem silencio. As ruas,
as pracas, os azokes, ou mercados, estao desertos. Somente o
murmurio das novecentas fontes ou banhos publicos, destinados
as ablucoes dos crentes, ajuda o zumbido nocturno da sumptuosa
rival de Bagdad.

Que festa fora essa que expirara algumas horas antes de nascer
a lua, e de tingir com a brancura pallida de sua luz aquelles
dois vultos enormes de Azzahrat e de Cordova, que olhavam um
para o outro, a cinco milhas de distancia, como dois phantasmas
gigantes involtos em largos sudarios? Na manhan do dia que findara,
Al-hakem, o filho mais velho de Abdu-r-rahman, fora associado ao
throno. Os walis, wasires e khatehs da monarchia dos Beni-Umeyyas
tinham vindo reconhece-lo Wali-al-ahdi; isto e, futuro kalifa
do Andalus e do Moghreb. Era uma idea affagada longamente pelo
velho principe dos crentes que se realisara, e o jubilo de
Abdu-r-rahman se havia espraiado n'uma dessas festas, por assim
dizer fabulosas, que so sabia dar no seculo decimo a corte mais
polida da Europa, e talvez do mundo, a do soberano sarraceno
de Hespanha.

O palacio Merwan, juncto dos muros de Cordova, distingue-se a
claridade duvidosa da noite pelas suas formas macissas e
rectangulares, e a sua cor tisnada, bafo dos seculos que entristece
e sanctifica os monumentos, contrasta com a das cupulas aereas e
douradas dos edificios, com a das almadenas esguias e leves das
mesquitas, e com a dos campanarios christaos, cuja tez docemente
pallida suavisa ainda mais o brando raio de luar que se quebra
naquelles estreitos pannos de pedra branca, d'onde nao se reflecte,
mas cabe na terra preguicoso e dormente. Como Azzahrat e como
Cordova, calado e apparentemente tranquillo, o palacio Merwan,
a antiga morada dos primeiros kalifas, suscita ideas sinistras,
emquanto o aspecto da cidade e da villa imperial unicamente inspiram
um sentimento de quietacao e paz. Nao e so a negridao das suas vastas
muralhas a que produz essa apertura do coracao que experimenta
quem o considera assim solitario e carrancudo; e tambem o clarao
avermelhado que resumbra da mais alta das raras frestas abertas
na face exterior da sua torre albarran, a maior de todas as que
o cercam, a que atalaia a campanha. Aquella luz, no ponto mais
elevado do grande e escuro vulto da torre, e como um olho de
demonio, que contempla colerico a paz profunda do imperio, e que
espera ancioso o dia em que renascam as luctas e as devastacoes
de que por mais de dois seculos fora theatro o solo ensanguentado
de Hespanha.

Alguem vela, talvez, no paco de Merwan. No de Azzahrat, posto que
nenhuma luz bruxulee nos centenares de varandas, de miradouros,
de porticos, de balcoes, que lhe arrendam o immenso circuito,
alguem vela por certo.

A sala denominada do Kalifa, a mais espacosa entre tantos aposentos
quantos encerra aquelle rei dos edificios, devera a estas horas
mortas estar deserta, e nao o esta. Dois lampadarios de muitos
lumes pendem dos artesoes primorosamente lavrados, que, cruzando-se
em angulos rectos, servem de moldura ao almofadado de azul e
ouro, que reveste as paredes e o tecto. A agua de fonte perenne
murmura cahindo n'um tanque de marmore construido no centro do
aposento, e no topo da sala ergue-se o throno de Abdu-r-rahman,
alcatifado dos mais ricos tapetes do paiz de Fars. Abdu-r-rahman
esta ahi sosinho. O kalifa passeia de um para outro lado, com
olhar inquieto, e de instante a instante para e escuta, como
se esperasse ouvir um ruido longinquo. No seu gesto e meneios
pinta-se a mais viva anciedade; porque o unico ruido que lhe
fere os ouvidos e o dos proprios passos sobre o xadrez variegado,
que forma o pavimento da immensa quadra. Passado algum tempo,
uma porta, escondida entre os brocados que forram os lados do
throno, abre-se lentamente, e um novo personagem apparece. No rosto
de Abdu-r-rahman, que o ve aproximar, pinta-se uma inquietacao
ainda mais viva.

O recem-chegado offerecia notavel contraste no seu gesto e vestiduras
com as pompas do logar em que se introduzia, e com o aspecto
magestoso de Abdu-r-rahman, ainda bello apesar dos annos e das
cans que comecavam a misturar-se-lhe na longa e espessa barba
negra. Os pes do que entrara apenas faziam um rumor sumido no
chao de marmore. Vinha descalco. A sua aljarabia ou tunica era
de lan grosseiramente tecida, o cincto uma corda de esparto.
Divisava-se-lhe, porem, no despejo do andar e na firmeza dos
movimentos que nenhum espanto produzia nelle aquella magnificencia.
Nao era velho; e todavia a sua tez tostada pelas injurias do tempo
estava sulcada de rugas, e uma orla vermelha circulava-lhe os
olhos, negros, encovados e reluzentes. Chegando ao pe do kalifa,
que ficara immovel, cruzou os bracos e poz-se a contempla-lo
calado. Abdu-r-rahman foi o primeiro em romper o silencio:

"Tardaste muito, e foste menos pontual do que costumas, quando
annuncias a tua vinda a hora fixa, Al-muulin! Uma visita tua
e sempre triste como o teu nome. Nunca entraste a occultas em
Azzahrat senao para me saciares de amargura; mas apesar disso eu
nao deixarei de abencoar a tua presenca, porque Algafir--dizem-no
todos e eu o creio--e um homem de Deus. Que vens annunciar-me,
ou que pretendes de mim?"

Pages:
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Under the Sun: The Letters of Bruce Chatwin

We all want to be happy, we want our children to be happy, and there are countless books advising us how to achieve happiness. But is this really what we should be aiming for?

"A fly bothers me, I kill it: you kill what bothers you. If I had not killed the fly, it would have been out of pure liberalism: I am liberal in order not to be a killer."

Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes

'He was not to be described as a happy person," Diana Trilling wrote in a memoir about her husband, the critic Lionel Trilling. "Indeed, he thought poorly of happiness and of people who claimed to be happy or desired happiness above other gratifications in life . . . seriousness was the desirable condition of man." It is easy to make all sorts of assumptions about why an unhappy person would not value happiness; and indeed why seriousness might be seen as an alternative to happiness; or just to say that it was seriousness that made Trilling happy. One of the ways in which happiness is made to seem like an inclusive ideal – the ways it charms us – is by our asserting that by definition the things that matter most to us must make us happy, that that is how we know they are good. It's as though one word could do the work of the moral imagination.

Or can we just say that if happiness is one's aspiration, then learning about the history of the slave trade, say, or watching the news, or indeed ageing are all to be avoided. And yet learning about the terrible things people can do to each other, and the history of the terrible things people have done to each other, is important – we can't imagine a life without it – and gives some people a great deal of pleasure; pleasure, as psychoanalysts might say, of various kinds. Anyone who has or knows children, or remembers being a child, will know how happy it can make them tormenting their siblings. And so if we value happiness we can't help but wonder what morality it entails, what kind of morality it might involve us in.

It is not surprising, in other words, that happiness has always had rather a mixed reception. No one in their right minds we might think, especially now, would be promoting unhappiness; and yet the promotion, the preferring of happiness – the assumption of a right to happiness – brings with it a lot of things we might not like. And the desire for happiness may reveal things about ourselves that we like even less. "A people who conceive life to be the pursuit of happiness must be chronically unhappy," the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins wrote.

What are we going to have to do, what are we going to have to become, what are we going to have to renounce or ignore if we want to be happy? Or if we are to propose happiness, or its pursuit, as some kind of right? We tend to make rights of things we assume to be in short supply, things perpetually under threat. Wherever there is scarcity now human rights are asserted; and the assertion of rights is reactive to a sense of scarcity deemed to be needless. Or, to put it slightly differently, calling something a right can be a way of rhetorically enforcing an important wish, a way of making a wish sound important.

I want to begin with three fairly obvious propositions that are also misgivings about the right to happiness or its pursuit. And I'd like to suggest that the right to frustration may be more useful and interesting – more enlivening – than the right to happiness. That's to say I want to waylay the common, all-too-plausible idea that the solution to frustration is satisfaction, or that happiness is the answer to unhappiness, or that if we get rid of the bad things, the good things will start happening. Happiness and the right to pursue it are sometimes wildly unrealistic as ideals; and, because wildly unrealistic, unconsciously self-destructive.

Because happiness is not always the kind of thing that can be pursued, we should view it, more often than not, as a lucky side effect but not a calculable or calculated end. Making it such an end all too easily brings out the worst in us. If this is a version, to rewrite John Lennon's famous line, of "happiness is what happens to you when you are doing something else", it also suggests that scarcity is integral to a sense of reality; that we should be thinking of what Philip Larkin in "Born Yesterday" called "a skilled, / Vigilant, flexible, / Unemphasised, enthralled / Catching of happiness" rather than the engineering of it.

Our relation to happiness often betrays an unconscious desire for disillusionment. The wanting of it and the having of it can seem like two quite different things. And this is what makes wishing so interesting; because wishing is always too knowing. When we wish we are too convinced of our pleasures, too certain that we know what we want. The belief that we can arrange our happiness – as though happiness were akin to justice, which we can work towards – may be to misrecognise the very thing that concerns us.

My three fairly obvious propositions are: first, in Freud's formulation from Civilisation and its Discontents, "happiness is something essentially subjective" (subjective I take it, in the sense of being not only personal but idiosyncratic). We can be surprised by what makes us happy, and it will not necessarily be something that makes other people happy. This has significant consequences not least in the area of our lives that is sometimes conducive to happiness, sexuality. And this makes happiness as a social or communal pursuit complicated. We have only to imagine what it would be for someone to propose that we had a right to sexual satisfaction to imagine both how we might contrive this and what terrible things might be done in its name.

Second, bad things can make us happy – and by bad things I mean things consensually agreed to be unacceptable. It clearly makes some people happy to live in a world without Jews, or homosexuals, or immigrants, and so on. There are also what we might call genuinely bad things, like seriously harming people and other animals, that gives some people the pleasure they most crave. I remember a very unhappy boy of 10 telling me in a psychotherapy session that he was only happy when he was cutting the feet off rats that he had caught. He said it made him feel "really awake", that it was like "turning on the light in your favourite room in the world". Cruelty and humiliation make some people happy, perhaps lots of people happy some of the time; and this issue is not dealt with merely by saying that they are not really happy or that they are in some way perverse or sick. We tend to pathologise the forms of happiness we cannot bear. If we are to have a right to happiness or to its pursuit – two different things – we must then acknowledge the full range of things that make people happy. This means taking them at their word. Cruelty can make people happy. And we might then want to think about what problem, or rather problems, happiness is deemed to be the solution to. It is not, for example, incidental to our predicament that so many of our pleasures are, or are felt to be, forbidden (this is what Freud's account of the Oedipus complex is a way of thinking about). So put briefly – as every child and therefore every adult knows – being bad can make you happy. Happiness is subjective, it takes many forms, and one of its forms is immorality.

Last but not least – though the least exciting – is the third point: some people like being unhappy. Indeed for some people their lives can be construed as the pursuit of unhappiness. It is astounding the lengths to which some people will go to be unhappy, to contrive their own misery, as though happiness itself were a phobic object and held terrors. And we don't talk of the right to be unhappy, when we should. Unhappiness can, after all, among many other things, be the registration of injustice or loss. At its best, a culture committed to the pursuit of happiness might be committed, say, to the diminishing of injustice; but at its worst, the culture of happiness may proscribe a whole range of feelings and perceptions.

It is sometimes said that psychoanalysis is one of the last places in the culture where people are allowed to be unhappy. And clearly psychoanalysis protects, if it does not actually foster, a person's right to be unhappy. The subjectivity of happiness, what it is that the individual really loves and gets pleasure from, the immorality of pleasures and the lure of transgression, happiness as a perversion, the fear of pleasure and the masochistic solution – all this is the material of psychoanalysis, and not only of psychoanalysis.

Yet, historically, psychoanalysis is the inheritor of a set of political propositions it would seem to be at odds with; or at least at a very odd angle to. If Freud and happiness doesn't sound like a very promising subject, Freud and rights seems even less so (there's only one reference to the rights of man in Freud's work). Rights, like class, have never really been the thing for psychoanalysis; omissions, one would think, of some significance. Don't have much confidence in the so-called rights of man, Freud seems to say in his New Introductory Lectures; they are no match for the ferocity of inner morality – the super-ego, or "conscience". The whole business of rights only turns up when the individual, the melancholic individual, is briefly released from his internal regime ("For after a certain number of months the whole moral fuss is over, the criticism of the superego is silent, the ego is rehabilitated and again enjoys all the rights of man till the next attack.") Morality, at least in these patients, is periodic, as are the rights of man, the gift, as it were of a higher power.

"Our normal sense of guilt," Freud writes, "is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego". This translates as: our happiness depends on the distance between who we are and who we should be according to the dictates of our internalised morality. We are mostly unhappy because we are rarely as we should be. When the internal authorities are so implacable and sadistic β€” over-severe, abusive, humiliating, as Freud writes β€” what are the possibilities for happiness?

The right to happiness, or to its pursuit, would mean the right to a generous super-ego, the right to a super-ego that was on the side of one's pleasure: one that promoted the view that feeling alive was more important than being right or good. It is one of Freud's more horrifying ironies that the pursuit of pleasure incites, calls up, the super-ego. And, of course, when and if pleasure is forbidden its pursuit requires punishment. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Virtue has to be its own reward. To pursue pleasure is to be pursued by punishment. There is no one more moralistic, more coercive, than a hedonist.

As the right to happiness or its pursuit is my subject, and I am by training a child psychotherapist, all this is by way of a lengthy preamble to putting together the famous sentence from Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence with something from the paediatrician and psychoanalyst DW Winnicott's story about child development. I want to ask what, if anything, the right to happiness or its pursuit has to do with the child's development; whether Jefferson's founding declaration has anything to do with the declaration of independence that is the child's personal development.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness". Some of us might not believe in the Creator part now, and some of us might find more and more difficult the idea that people are born equal when the conditions in which they are born are manifestly so unequal; and most of us would want to assume that by "men" Jefferson meant "people". And yet, as many people have noted, the pursuit of happiness – something not mentioned in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, nor in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – seems peculiarly salient; it is the only one of the things listed that is a pursuit.

What exactly might it mean to have an "unalienable right" to "the pursuit of happiness", given that it is fairly obvious that the pursuit of happiness is so morally equivocal – could be, among other things, a threat to the society that promoted it? At first sight it seems to be a pretty good idea; if we are convinced of anything now we are convinced that we are pleasure-seeking creatures, who want to minimise the pain and frustration of our lives. Or at least a "we" could be consolidated around these beliefs. We are the creatures who, possibly unlike any other animal, pursue happiness. But the pursuit of happiness, like the pursuit of liberty – the utopian political projects of the 20th century – has legitimated some of the worst crimes of contemporary history across the political spectrum.

In Jefferson's Declaration, the art critic Dave Hickey has noted, "Happiness is not assured, but its pursuit is protected . . . the government will act to ensure our safety, and it will stand back as we act on our own behalf in the 'pursuit of happiness'. When that pursuit putatively threatens our safety the government invariably steps in. Safety trumps happiness, the government always wins." It is not too much of a stretch here to see, in this account, the government as the parents, and the citizens as adolescent children; the governmental parents protect the pursuit of happiness, but prioritise safety. The developing child pursues his own happiness under the rules and conditions provided by the adults. Children cannot bring themselves up, and children cannot bring up children (in Lord of the Flies the question recurs: "are there any adults?").

If it is said, or written, that we have a right to be happy or to pursue happiness, it is assumed that happiness is something we are capable of, something that is available, if certain obstacles are removed. If liberty is there when tyranny is taken away, happiness is there when whatever makes us unhappy is removed. From a pragmatic point of view the art of a good life involves removing the obstacles to happiness; the picture, if we visualise it, is of something looked for, something looked forward to, and of there being something in the way. And this something in the way could be called an unavailable mother, a prohibitive father, competing sibling, not having enough brains or beauty, or charm, or money, or education, or luck. We would get closer to our happiness were these things acquired; and a reality sense would be something to do with acknowledging which of these things cannot be acquired. It is all about, in short, our relation to obstacles; our distinguishing the intractable from the changeable, what we have to acknowledge from what we can influence; whether our desire is forbidden or not – whether we want a cream cake or another man's wife. It is, in pragmatic terms, about knowing what is possible. And everybody, it seems, is shadowed by an imaginary other person, a lucky counterpart, who gets all the happiness going; Lacan writes of "the jealousy born in a subject in his relation to an other, insofar as this other is held to enjoy a certain form of jouissance or superabundant vitality". This other person presumably enjoys his happiness, his super-abundant vitality with no conflict, with no thought of safety, with no consideration of the rules and conditions required by the good of the rest.

A right to the pursuit of happiness must be a right to remove the obstacles to happiness. This, at least, is the logic of the case. The man called the happiness tsar, Lord Layard, says we now know what makes children happy (the book he co-authored last year is called A Good Childhood). What, then, are the obstacles to the child's happiness, and why can't we set about trying to remove them? And some of them we can remove. But what if the so-called obstacles to happiness are, or sometimes are, among the things that matter most to us? If, say, we love both luxury and justice? What if two mutually exclusive things make us happy, and one has to be abrogated? And what if some obstacles are immovable, untransformable into anything other than obstacles?

There is something about the sexual drive, Freud suggested, that makes it intrinsically unsatisfiable. There are not infinite resources of food, of energy, of medicine. It is, for example, true, as every mother knows, that the mother cannot give the child everything that he wants, and that if she could it wouldn't be what he wanted. That everyone feels left out of something. It is misleading to think that one's parents have been the obstacle to one's happiness, even if they have radically thwarted it. Indeed we might end up thinking that a right to irresolvable conflict might be the most realistic right we could come up with. That the attempt to resolve at least some conflicts was a distraction from finding better ways of living them; that the right to pursue happiness has seduced us into pursuing happiness when we could have been doing something better.

If the alternative to happiness is not, in the binary way, unhappiness; and if happiness has become so insidious, so hypnotic a single end for a good life, why have we wanted this strange narrowing of our intent? What have we lost, or forgotten, or ignored, or paid insufficient attention to, or protected ourselves from by wanting happiness? Happiness, it would seem, is the most plausible of our aims in life. But what psychoanalysis can chip in with here is that we are at our most defensive when we are at our most plausible.

One of the other things we most want is to be able to feel frustrated; to register what we feel deprived of. Frustration issues in many things only one of which is happiness; and happiness can be, at its worst, a pre-emptive strike against frustration, a refuge from it rather than any kind of productive, unpredictable transformation of it. If we want to talk of a right to pursue happiness there needs to be a prior right, as it were, to feel frustration; to be able to bear and to bear with a sense of what is lacking in one's life. And not simply because frustration makes satisfaction possible in the way that hunger can make a meal delicious. But because frustration and satisfaction do not only or always have a logical, a causal, a pragmatic relationship with one another. Or to put it rather more obviously, what we are lacking when we are unhappy is not always happiness, any more than what an alcoholic is lacking is a drink. And proposing a right to the pursuit of happiness may seduce us, by a kind of word-magic, into thinking that happiness is just the thing.

It is of interest that when Winnicott writes about deprivation in children he too talks about rights. "Let us consider the meaning of the anti-social act," he writes in a paper called "The Deprived Child": "for instance, stealing. When a child steals what is sought . . . is not the object stolen; what is sought is the person, the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother. In fact every infant at the start can truly claim the right to steal from the mother because the infant invented the mother, thought her up, created her out of an innate capacity to love."

For Winnicott, the child makes the mother he needs and gradually, through disillusionment and hatred, disentangles her, to some extent, from the mother she happens to be. But it is "the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother" that I want to consider. Because the thing stolen is not quite or even nearly the thing wanted – which is not a thing, but a mother – it can never satisfy. What we have is a picture of the right to pursue happiness getting stuck, something I think it is prone to do; as though there is something about the pursuit of happiness that sponsors and endorses addiction. In this sense, consumer capitalism is a system tailor-made for deprived children.

The theft requires communicable translation; it requires, as it were, someone to be able to say, or otherwise communicate what it is that is really being pursued. In Winnicott's declaration the child has a right to the pursuit of a mother to get what he needs for his development. He is entitled to a mother; she belongs to him in the sense that his own development belongs to him. A good-enough mother or parents might give you the wherewithal for your pursuit of happiness; they might have backed your desire, helped you to believe in and not only be fearful of your pleasures. But it is more complicated than this. Lives are not the kind of things that can be guaranteed by mothers. And this is where the idea of a right to pursue one's own happiness becomes more interesting.

Do children want to be happy? And if they don't want to be happy what else might they want to be? This would seem to be of some importance because they are growing up in a world in which their parents mostly want them to be happy, or at least don't like them being unhappy, admittedly for a variety of different reasons. And by a world I mean the particular cultures for whom happiness has become the preferred object, or the preferred fetish. Children are supposed to be anti-depressants for their parents.

Happiness is something parents often demand of their children; we, as we say, want our children to be happy; we were once children who's parents wanted us to be happy. And that means the whole spectrum, from not being a worry to them, not making their lives more difficult, being curative of their woes, to the pleasure our parents could take in our pleasure and our wellbeing. We are more dependent on our children than they are on us; and we are dependent, in brief, on their happiness. What makes the child happy is not going to be unlinked to what makes the parents happy. Clearly if a parent lives as if their child has a right to happiness, or a right to its pursuit, and that they are the guardians of this right, they are going to have a difficult, an even more difficult, task on their hands. Lovers often feel that they should be making each other happy when they are in fact making themselves a problem to each other.

So by way of conclusion I want to suggest that a right to the pursuit of happiness is asserted when a capacity for absorption has been sabotaged, when there is a loss of confidence in people's passions. Happiness becomes important when the possibility for absorption is under threat. That the child does not want to be happy – or perhaps, more exactly, the child doesn't want only to be happy – the child wants first to be safe, and then to be absorbed. There are, for example, only two reasons for children to go to school – apart, that is, from acquiring the werewithal to earn a living: to make friends, and to see if they can find something of absorbing interest to themselves.

There is an interesting moment in Lord of the Flies when Henry, one of the "littluns", wanders away from the main group of children. "He went down to the beach and busied himself at the water's edge." William Golding writes: "There were creatures that lived in this last fling of the sea, tiny transparencies that came questing in with the water over the hot, dry sand. With impalpable organs of sense they examined this new field. Perhaps food had appeared where the last incursion there had been none . . . This was fascinating to Henry. He poked about with a bit of stick, that itself was wave-worn and whitened and a vagrant, and tried to control the motions of the scavengers . . . He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things."

The adult narrator can see Henry as in some way identified with these rudimentary scavengers; and the narrator intimates that without adults the children feel how much is out of control or under-controlled. And then there is the remarkable sentence: "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things." He feels himself exercising control, but he is not, and his absorption is beyond, in excess of, mere happiness. Something else is wanted more than happiness by Henry, and it seems to be the exercise of control over living things, one of which is himself. It would be easy, and partly true, to say that what Henry is absorbed by here, what is beyond mere happiness, is power, control over living things. But Golding is clear about two things; it is an illusion of power – Golding refers to Henry having "the illusion of mastery" – and it is also the absorption itself that is beyond mere happiness. "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness." It is an illusion that absorbs him beyond happiness; in other words, he is playing. Absorption is not in and of itself a moral good; in the novel the tyrannical, sadistic Jack absorbs the attention of a lot of the children who do his bidding. But in proposing, in the context of the novel, that there is a beyond to mere happiness, something else or further that is wanted; and that indeed happiness may be a poor substitute for something else, that happiness may be something that can get in the way of whatever is beyond it; by proposing this Golding is saying something about what can override the pursuit of happiness, and what may be lost in its pursuit. For better and for worse, being able to feel our frustration is the precondition for becoming absorbed. When this is impossible the pursuit of happiness tends to take over. The right to pursue happiness may be, at its worst, the right not to feel frustrated. And if frustration is not allowed to take its course, to take its time, there is no absorption, only refuges from unhappiness. The child is fobbed off with happiness when what she really wants is to get her appetite back. The right to the pursuit of happiness can be a cover story for the wish to hide.


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Author, author: Sue Townsend aka Adrian Mole

Gabriel Josipovici's essay is a welcome counterblast in conservative times, says Tom McCarthy

That modernism represents one of the great seismic shifts in the history of western literature wouldn't be disputed by any literary professors who know their onions. What they find it harder to agree on is when that shift begins and what exactly it consists of – in short, what modernism, properly speaking, is. Gabriel Josipovici, former Weidenfeld professor of comparative literature at Oxford and currently a star turn in the graduate school of humanities at Sussex, eschews both the definitions usually proffered by cultural historians of a Marxist bent (that it was a reaction to industrialisation or to a crisis among the bourgeoisie) and the humanist ones given by liberals (that it was an era of unbridled self-expression), not to mention the dismissive ones put out by conservatives (that it was all a bit of silliness we've thankfully got over now). In their stead he ventures, at the outset of this book-length essay, a more essential formula: that modernism should be understood as "a coming into awareness by art of its precarious status and responsibilities".

Herein lie both the strength and weakness of the argument that follows. The disadvantage of such a general characterisation is that these terms apply as much to Shakespeare as to Joyce: think of the self-reflectiveness of so much of the former's work, from Hamlet's disruptive (and disrupted) play-within-a-play to the sonnets' constant awareness of form and its limits. They apply even to Ovid: what do the "Pygmalion" or "Orpheus" sequences of Metamorphoses enact if not allegories of art's fragile status and responsibilities? The advantage is that Josipovici knows this, and uses the knowledge as a cue to drag the cursor way back, tracing the tendency that comes to a head in the "high" modernist period (the early 20th century) through the Romantics to the reformation and beyond.

Thus Cervantes's Don Quixote is, both lucidly and utterly correctly, identified as a far more "modern" work than many more recent offerings – modern in the fraught relationship it maintains with its own narrative modes, the way it orchestrates a sense of disenchantment or erosion of the sacred, and, most of all, the way its main "adventure" becomes one of reading and writing. Aeschylus's Oresteia is held up – again in spot-on fashion – as a template for an anti-humanist worldview: what matters is not the individual but the house, or oikos, from which he emerges and of which he forms no more than an iteration. It's an insight that helps us to understand (although Josipovici doesn't mention him) why that arch-modernist William Faulkner delves, in Attic style, through generations of the Compson family, trawling their dwindling estate for residues of buried history. From that other Greek unit of measure, the polis or city-state, Josipovici derives a modern aesthetic of interconnectedness, of man as a diminished agent operating within systems that exceed him.

Interconnectedness is a feature of this book, providing not only one of its central themes but also its discursive method. A typical paragraph will zap us from DΓΌrer to Mann to Flaubert to Dostoevsky in order to make a point about Kierkegaard. It can disorient at times, but the associative or digressive approach is the right one for the task. What I'm not so sure about is the overall "pitch". Josipovici is a formidable scholar whose The World and the Book I remember being a landmark text when I was studying literature. But there he was writing in academic mode, with a certain critical framework and its attendant permissions taken for granted; here, he's shifted into a more populist mode, and it doesn't always play to his advantage. Adopting the vocabulary of the middlebrow in order to legitimise the vanguard merely robs it of what animates it most. Rather than celebrate the subversive energies of Luigi Nono's opera Prometeo, for example, he tries to sell it to the Glyndebourne crowd by claiming that it leaves us "with a sense of sorrow and of wonder and, at an even deeper level, a sense of having bathed in the waters of life". The sentiment is just that: sentimental. While the impetus behind it is profound, it ends up sounding trite.

Josipovici has never been a fellow traveller of any school or fashion. His points of contact here, as in his other work, are original, at times idiosyncratic. To use Kierkegaard rather than the more obvious Nietzsche to explain the vertiginous, abyss-gazing disposition of most modernist works is refreshing. To choose Wordsworth as a historical model for what a truly modernist-inspired contemporary literature might be seems odd, to say the least; wouldn't Laurence Sterne or Gerard Manley Hopkins make much better heroes? And to trot out the old canard that equates Flaubert with naturalist realism is just wrong. The Flaubert who wrote Bouvard and PΓ©cuchet, in which two Quixotic figures re-enact gestures from book illustrations in vain bids for imagined authenticity, before the narrative gives over to a "dictionary of received ideas" whose authorship is never clear? The Flaubert who wrote The Temptation of Saint Anthony, in which phantasms shake and rivet a disintegrating consciousness that yearns "to become matter"? Come on.

What can't be faulted is the plaintive logic running through this book. In cultural terms, we live in deeply conservative times. Editors at several major publishing houses have to run novels' synopses past reader focus groups before being allowed to publish them; "literary" festivals feature newsreaders and other media personalities. We shouldn't imagine, though, that things were that different in the golden age of modernism. Ulysses was printed, in 1922, on a small, private press in Paris, in a run of 1,000; Kafka's Metamorphosis, on its small-press publication in 1915, sold 11 copies – of which 10 were bought by Kafka. Yet can anyone, now, name the successful middlebrow writers of 1922 or 1915? Of course not. That alone should give Josipovici comfort.

Tom McCarthy's C (Cape) is on the Booker longlist.


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David Grossman and the new publishing season

'I read Tony Blair A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males'

Wednesday 1st September

Dear Diary,

Woken early by an employee of Parcel Force. He was a Chinese bloke and asked if I was "Mr Occupier!" I said I was Mr Adrian Albert Mole. He was holding a squarish, heavy-looking parcel. I hoped it was the wooden Japanese neck-pillow I had ordered from Innovations many months ago.

After a chilly doorstep wrangle (the wind was blowing through the fly of my pyjamas, directly on to my prostate), I managed to persuade him to hand the package over and went inside. When I opened it at the kitchen table I was shocked to find Tony Blair's face staring up at me with the words, Tony Blair A Journey. Inside was a House of Commons acknowledgments slip from Pandora:

Aidy darling,

Had a brief disastrous affair with a bookshop manager – he left his wife and turned up at my apartment with his ghastly suitcases and a hyperactive boy-child called Plato. He has promised me free books for life. I know you are obsessed with TB so enjoy this advance copy.

After a struggle to control my jealous rage I started to read.

As I ploughed through the acknowledgments I could not help but reflect that, had I had 26 people to help me with my own books I might have had at least one published by now.

My own semi-autobiographical novel, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland has been with Hutchinson for two and a half years.

At 11am my mother came in from next door to "borrow" yet more teabags (she already owes me 17). On seeing Mr Blair's cover photograph she began to sniffle: "He was so full of promise," she said, "And look at him now, he's a broken bulrush in the River Nile of life."

I went to the lavatory and was in there for some time. When I returned my mother was engrossed in the book and my father had let himself into the house and was rummaging through my fridge (God! I should never have installed those wheelchair ramps which allow him easy access to my house).

I went into my bedroom to get dressed and came back to find my father eating the cold custard from last night's dinner. My mother looked up from A Journey and said: "He writes that he came very near to having a drinking problem."

My father said: "A pisshead yeah? What was he on?"

My mother said: "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine over dinner."

My father sneered. "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine? He's a bleedin' amateur." He put the empty custard jug back in the fridge and lit a cigarette.

He said: "Now, if he was crawling in the gutter in Downing Street, screaming at the moon and trying to fight a policeman on the door of Number 10, then yes, I'd agree he did have a drink problem."

He tapped cigarette ash into the ashtray that had been welded on to the arm of his wheelchair.

Thursday 2nd September

Dear Diary,

I read A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males: Alastair Campbell, Gordon Brown, John Prescott, Margaret Beckett, Philip Gould, Jonathan Powell and Peter Mandelson, yet he was not an Alpha Male himself. He was a receptacle and a conduit of their wishes and opinions. Mr Blair had as much self-belief as a chameleon.

I remembered that when he returned to London after a long period in the United States he had an American accent, much like that of his fellow Christian and friend, Sir Cliff Richard.

I am not a trained psychologist but I am wise beyond my 40 years and think that I have discovered why Mr Blair was so keen to become a war leader and to swagger alongside George Bush. He thought it would give him another pair of testicles and would promote him to Alpha Maleness.

At 1.30pm I took A Journey round to my parents' house and said: "I've finished it."

"What?" said my mother, "You've read all 718 pages? It's impossible."

I reminded her that I was a speed reader and had read War and Peace in two days.

"What's your method?" she said suspiciously.

"I skip over the adverbs and adjectives," I said.

I left them fighting over who was to read A Journey first and went to my desk to write a stern letter to Hutchinson, demanding that my own book, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland, be published tout suite:

Dear Hutchinson,

My friend and confidante Dr Pandora Braithwaite BA, MA, D phil, advanced me a copy of Tony Blair A Journey (incidentally I notice with sorrow that Dr Braithwaite's name does not appear in the index, though she has spoken to me at length many times about the long and intimate conversations she had with Mr Blair into the early hours). I congratulate you on your sales of the above book, which brings me to the subject of Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland. Apart from an acknowledgment slip some time in 2007 which said: 'Your manuscript arrived at our office today. However, it may be sometime before we can get back to you', I have heard nothing from you and warn you that unless you promise me a publication date, I will take the manuscript back and offer it to Penguin.

Yours,

Adrian A Mole

PS Mr Blair uses too many emotive adjectives and he could do with taking a red pen to his adverbs also.


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