American Institutions and Their Influence by Alexis de Tocqueville et al

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The practical part of a government must not be judged by the theory of
its constitution. The president of the United States is in the
possession of almost royal prerogatives, which he has no opportunity of
exercising; and those privileges which he can at present use are very
circumscribed: the laws allow him to possess a degree of influence which
circumstances do not permit him to employ.

On the other hand, the great strength of the royal prerogative in France
arises from circumstances far more than from the laws. There the
executive government is constantly struggling against prodigious
obstacles, and exerting all its energies to repress them; so that it
increases by the extent of its achievements, and by the importance of
the events it controls, without, for that reason, modifying its
constitution. If the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as
it is in the Union, its influence would very soon become much greater.

* * * * *

WHY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT REQUIRE THE MAJORITY OF
THE TWO HOUSES IN ORDER TO CARRY ON THE GOVERNMENT.

It is an established axiom in Europe that a constitutional king cannot
persevere in a system of government which is opposed by the two other
branches of the legislature. But several presidents of the United States
have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body, without
being obliged to abandon the supreme power, and without inflicting a
serious evil upon society. I have heard this fact quoted as an instance
of the independence and power of executive government in America: a
moment's reflection will convince us, on the contrary, that it is a
proof of its extreme weakness.

A king in Europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him
to perform the duties imposed upon him by the constitution, because
those duties are enormous. A constitutional king in Europe is not merely
the executor of the law, but the execution of its provisions devolves so
completely upon him, that he has the power of paralyzing its influence
if it opposes his designs. He requires the assistance of the legislative
assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies stand in need of his
aid to execute it: these two authorities cannot subsist without each
other, and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at
variance.

In America the president cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor
can he evade the obligation of enforcing it. His sincere and zealous
co-operation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable in the
carrying on of public affairs. All his important acts are directly or
indirectly submitted to the legislature; and where he is independent of
it he can do but little. It is therefore his weakness, and not his
power, which enables him to remain in opposition to congress. In Europe,
harmony must reign between the crown and the other branches of the
legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in
America, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is
impossible.

* * * * *

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

Dangers of the elective System increase in Proportion to the Extent of
the Prerogative.--This System possible in America because no powerful
executive Authority is required.--What Circumstances are favorable to
the elective System.--Why the Election of the President does not cause a
Deviation from the Principles of the Government.--Influence of the
Election of the President on secondary Functionaries.

The dangers of the system of election applied to the head of the
executive government of a great people, have been sufficiently
exemplified by experience and by history; and the remarks I am about to
make refer to America alone. These dangers may be more or less
formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power
occupies, and to the importance it possesses in the state; and they may
vary according to the mode of election, and the circumstances in which
the electors are placed. The most weighty argument against the election
of a chief-magistrate is, that it offers so splendid a lure to private
ambition, and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power, that
when legitimate means are wanting, force may not unfrequently seize what
right denies.

It is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority
are, the greater is the temptation; the more the ambition of the
candidates is excited, the more warmly are their interests espoused by a
throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has
won the prize. The dangers of the elective system increase, therefore,
in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in
the affairs of state. The revolutions of Poland are not solely
attributable to the elective system in general, but to the fact that the
elected magistrate was the head of a powerful monarchy. Before we can
discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system, we must make
preliminary inquiries as to whether the geographical position, the laws,
the habits, the manners, and the opinions of the people among whom it is
to be introduced, will admit of the establishment of a weak and
dependent executive government; for to attempt to render the
representative of the state a powerful sovereign, and at the same time
elective, is, in my opinion, to entertain two incompatible designs. To
reduce hereditary royalty to the condition of an elective authority, the
only means that I am acquainted with are to circumscribe its sphere of
action beforehand, gradually to diminish its prerogatives, and to
accustom the people to live without its protection. Nothing, however, is
farther from the designs of the republicans of Europe than this course:
as many of them only owe their hatred of tyranny to the sufferings which
they have personally undergone, the extent of the executive power does
not excite their hostility, and they only attack its origin without
perceiving how nearly the two things are connected.

Hitherto no citizen has shown any disposition to expose his honor and
his life, in order to become the president of the United States; because
the power of that office is temporary, limited, and subordinate. The
prize of fortune must be great to encourage adventurers in so desperate
a game. No candidate has as yet been able to arouse the dangerous
enthusiasm or the passionate sympathies of the people in his favor, for
the very simple reason, that when he is at the head of the government he
has but little power, but little wealth, and but little glory to share
among his friends; and his influence in the state is too small for the
success or the ruin of a faction to depend upon the elevation of an
individual to power.

The great advantage of hereditary monarchies is, that as the private
interest of a family is always intimately connected with the interests
of the state, the executive government is never suspended for a single
instant; and if the affairs of a monarchy are not better conducted than
those of a republic, at least there is always some one to conduct them,
well or ill, according to his capacity. In elective states, on the
contrary, the wheels of government cease to act, as it were of their own
accord, at the approach of an election, and even for some time previous
to that event. The laws may indeed accelerate the operation of the
election, which may be conducted with such simplicity and rapidity that
the seat of power will never be left vacant; but, notwithstanding these
precautions, a break necessarily occurs in the minds of the people.

At the approach of an election the head of the executive government is
wholly occupied by the coming struggle; his future plans are doubtful;
he can undertake nothing new, and he will only prosecute with
indifference those designs which another will perhaps terminate. "I am
so near the time of my retirement from office," said President Jefferson
on the 21st of January, 1809 (six weeks before the election), "that I
feel no passion, I take no part, I express no sentiment. It appears to
me just to leave to my successor the commencement of those measures
which he will have to prosecute, and for which he will be responsible."

On the other hand, the eyes of the nation are centred on a single point;
all are watching the gradual birth of so important an event. The wider
the influence of the executive power extends, the greater and the more
necessary is its constant action, the more fatal is the term of
suspense; and a nation which is accustomed to the government, or, still
more, one used to the administrative protection of a powerful executive
authority, would be infallibly convulsed by an election of this kind. In
the United States the action of the government may be slackened with
impunity, because it is always weak and circumscribed.

One of the principal vices of the elective system is, that it always
introduces a certain degree of instability into the internal and
external policy of the state. But this disadvantage is less sensibly
felt if the share of power vested in the elected magistrate is small. In
Rome the principles of the government underwent no variation, although
the consuls were changed every year, because the senate, which was an
hereditary assembly, possessed the directing authority. If the elective
system were adopted in Europe, the condition of most of the monarchical
states would be changed at every new election. In America the president
exercises a certain influence on state affairs, but he does not conduct
them; the preponderating power is vested in the representatives of the
whole nation. The political maxims of the country depend therefore on
the mass of the people, not on the president alone; and consequently in
America the elective system has no very prejudicial influence on the
fixed principles of the government. But the want of fixed principles is
an evil so inherent in the elective system, that it is still extremely
perceptible in the narrow sphere to which the authority of the president
extends.

The Americans have admitted that the head of the executive power, who
has to bear the whole responsibility of the duties he is called upon to
fulfil, ought to be empowered to choose his own agents, and to remove
them at pleasure: the legislative bodies watch the conduct of the
president more than they direct it. The consequence of this arrangement
is, that at every new election the fate of all the federal public
officers is in suspense. Mr. Quincy Adams, on his entry into office,
discharged the majority of the individuals who had been appointed by his
predecessor; and I am not aware that General Jackson allowed a single
removeable functionary employed in the federal service to retain his
place beyond the first year which succeeded his election. It is
sometimes made a subject of complaint, that in the constitutional
monarchies of Europe the fate of the humbler servants of an
administration depends upon that of the ministers. But in elective
governments this evil is far greater. In a constitutional monarchy
successive ministers are rapidly formed; but as the principal
representative of the executive power does not change, the spirit of
innovation is kept within bounds; the changes which take place are in
the details rather than in the principles of the administrative system;
but to substitute one system for another, as is done in America every
four years by law, is to cause a sort of revolution. As to the
misfortunes which may fall upon individuals in consequence of this state
of things, it must be allowed that the uncertain situation of the public
officers is less fraught with evil consequences in America than
elsewhere. It is so easy to acquire an independent position in the
United States, that the public officer who loses his place may be
deprived of the comforts of life, but not of the means of subsistence.

I remarked at the beginning of this chapter that the dangers of the
elective system applied to the head of the state, are augmented or
decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people which adopts it.
However the functions of the executive power may be restricted, it must
always exercise a great influence upon the foreign policy of the
country, for a negotiation cannot be opened or successfully carried on
otherwise than by a single agent. The more precarious and the more
perilous the position of a people becomes, the more absolute is the want
of a fixed and consistent external policy, and the more dangerous does
the elective system of the chief magistrate become. The policy of the
Americans in relation to the whole world is exceedingly simple; and it
may almost be said that no country stands in need of them, nor do they
require the co-operation of any other people. Their independence is
never threatened. In their present condition, therefore, the functions
of the executive power are no less limited by circumstances, than by the
laws; and the president may frequently change his line of policy without
involving the state in difficulty or destruction.

Whatever the prerogatives of the executive power may be, the period
which immediately precedes an election, and the moment of its duration,
must always be considered as a national crisis, which is perilous in
proportion to the internal embarrassments and the external dangers of
the country. Few of the nations of Europe could escape the calamities of
anarchy or of conquest, every time they might have to elect a new
sovereign. In America society is so constituted that it can stand
without assistance upon its own basis; nothing is to be feared from the
pressure of external dangers; and the election of the president is a
cause of agitation, but not of ruin.

* * * * *

MODE OF ELECTION.

Skill of the American Legislators shown in the Mode of Election adopted
by them.--Creation of a special electoral Body.--Separate Votes of these
Electors.--Case in which the House of Representatives is called upon to
choose the President.--Results of the twelve Elections which have taken
Place since the Constitution has been established.

Beside the dangers which are inherent in the system, many other
difficulties may arise from the mode of election, which may be obviated
by the precaution of the legislator. When a people met in arms on some
public spot to choose its head, it was exposed to all the chances of
civil war resulting from so martial a mode of proceeding, beside the
dangers of the elective system in itself. The Polish laws, which
subjected the election of the sovereign to the veto of a single
individual, suggested the murder of that individual, or prepared the way
to anarchy.

In the examination of the institutions, and the political as well as the
social condition of the United States, we are struck by the admirable
harmony of the gifts of fortune and the efforts of man. That nation
possessed two of the main causes of internal peace; it was a new
country, but it was inhabited by a people grown old in the exercise of
freedom. America had no hostile neighbors to dread; and the American
legislators, profiting by these favorable circumstances, created a weak
and subordinate executive power, which could without danger be made
elective.

It then only remained for them to choose the least dangerous of the
various modes of election; and the rules which they laid down upon this
point admirably complete the securities which the physical and political
constitution of the country already afforded. Their object was to find
the mode of election which would best express the choice of the people
with the least possible excitement and suspense. It was admitted in the
first place that the _simple_ majority should be decisive; but the
difficulty was to obtain this majority without an interval of delay
which it was most important to avoid. It rarely happens that an
individual can at once collect the majority of the suffrages of a great
people; and this difficulty is enhanced in a republic of confederate
states, where local influences are apt to preponderate. The means by
which it was proposed to obviate this second obstacle was to delegate
the electoral powers of the nation to a body of representatives. The
mode of election rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the
electors are, the greater is the chance of their coming to a final
decision. It also offered an additional probability of a judicious
choice. It then remained to be decided whether this right of election
was to be intrusted to the legislative body, the habitual representative
assembly of the nation, or whether an electoral assembly should be
formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the nomination of a
president. The Americans chose the latter alternative, from a belief
that the individuals who were returned to make the laws were incompetent
to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief
magistrate; and that as they are chosen for more than a year, the
constituency they represented might have changed its opinion in that
time. It was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the
head of the executive power, its members would, for some time before the
election, be exposed to the manoeuvres of corruption, and the tricks of
intrigue; whereas, the special electors would, like a jury, remain mixed
up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would appear for the
sole purpose of giving their votes.

It was therefore established that every state should name a certain
number of electors,[138] who in their turn should elect the president;
and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of a
chief magistrate had been intrusted in elective countries, inevitably
became the centres of passion and of cabal; that they sometimes usurped
an authority which did not belong to them: and that their proceedings,
or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so
much as to endanger the welfare of the state, it was determined that the
electors should all vote upon the same day, without being convoked to
the same place.[139] This double election rendered a majority probable,
though not certain; for it was possible that as many differences might
exist between the electors as between their constituents. In this case
it was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures; either to
appoint new electors, or to consult a second time those already
appointed, or to defer the election to another authority. The first two
of these alternatives, independently of the uncertainty of their
results, were likely to delay the final decision, and to perpetuate an
agitation which must always be accompanied with danger. The third
expedient was therefore adopted, and it was agreed that the votes should
be transmitted sealed to the president of the senate, and that they
should be opened and counted in the presence of the senate and the house
of representatives. If none of the candidates has a majority, the house
of representatives then proceeds immediately to elect the president; but
with the condition that it must fix upon one of the three candidates who
have the highest numbers.[140]

Thus it is only in case of an event which cannot often happen, and which
can never be foreseen, that the election is intrusted to the ordinary
representatives of the nation; and even then they are obliged to choose
a citizen who has already been designated by a powerful minority of the
special electors. It is by this happy expedient that the respect due to
the popular voice is combined with the utmost celerity of execution and
those precautions which the peace of the country demands. But the
decision of the question by the house of representatives does not
necessarily offer an immediate solution of the difficulty, for the
majority of that assembly may still be doubtful, and in this case the
constitution prescribes no remedy. Nevertheless, by restricting the
number of candidates to three, and by referring the matter to the
judgment of an enlightened public body, it has smoothed all the
obstacles[141] which are not inherent in the elective system.

In the forty years which have elapsed since the promulgation of the
federal constitution, the United States have twelve times chosen a
president. Ten of these elections took place simultaneously by the votes
of the special electors in the different states. The house of
representatives has only twice exercised its conditional privilege of
deciding in cases of uncertainty: the first time was at the election of
Mr. Jefferson in 1801; the second was in 1825, when Mr. John Quincy
Adams was chosen.

* * * * *

CRISIS OF THE ELECTION.

The election may be considered as a national Crisis.--Why?--Passions of
the People.--Anxiety of the President.--Calm which succeeds the
Agitation of the Election.

I have shown what the circumstances are which favored the adoption of
the elective system in the United States, and what precautions were
taken by the legislators to obviate its dangers. The Americans are
accustomed to all kinds of elections; and they know by experience the
utmost degree of excitement which is compatible with security. The vast
extent of the country, and the dissemination of the inhabitants, render
a collision between parties less probable and less dangerous there than
elsewhere. The political circumstances under which the elections have
hitherto been carried on, have presented no real embarrassments to the
nation.

Nevertheless, the epoch of the election of a president of the United
States may be considered as a crisis in the affairs of the nation. The
influence which he exercises on public business is no doubt feeble and
indirect; but the choice of the president, which is of small importance
to each individual citizen, concerns the citizens collectively; and
however trifling an interest may be, it assumes a great degree of
importance as soon as it becomes general. The president possesses but
few means of rewarding his supporters in comparison to the kings of
Europe; but the places which are at his disposal are sufficiently
numerous to interest, directly or indirectly, several thousand electors
in his success. Moreover, political parties in the United States, as
well as elsewhere, are led to rally around an individual, in order to
acquire a more tangible shape in the eyes of the crowd, and the name of
the candidate for the presidency is put forth as the symbol and
personification of their theories. For these reasons parties are
strongly interested in gaining the election, not so much with a view to
the triumph of their principles under the auspices of the president
elected, as to show, by the majority which returned him, the strength of
the supporters of those principles.

For a long while before the appointed time is at hand, the election
becomes the most important and the all-engrossing topic of discussion.
The ardor of faction is redoubled; and all the artificial passions which
the imagination can create in the bosom of a happy and peaceful land are
agitated and brought to light. The president, on the other hand, is
absorbed by the cares of self-defence. He no longer governs for the
interest of the state, but for that of his re-election; he does homage
to the majority, and instead of checking its passions, as his duty
commands him to do, he frequently courts its worst caprices. As the
election draws near, the activity of intrigue and the agitation of the
populace increase; the citizens are divided into several camps, each of
which assumes the name of its favorite candidate; the whole nation glows
with feverish excitement; the election is the daily theme of the public
papers, the subject of private conversation, the end of every thought
and every action, the sole interest of the present. As soon as the
choice is determined, this ardor is dispelled; and as a calmer season
returns, the current of the state, which has nearly broken its banks,
sinks to its usual level; but who can refrain from astonishment at the
causes of the storm?

* * * * *

RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

When the Head of the executive Power is re-eligible, it is the State
which is the Source of Intrigue and Corruption.--The desire of being
re-elected, the chief Aim of a President of the United States.--
Disadvantage of the System peculiar to America.--The natural Evil of
Democracy is that it subordinates all Authority to the slightest Desires
of the Majority.--The Re-election of the President encourages this Evil.

It may be asked whether the legislators of the United States did right
or wrong in allowing the re-election of the president. It seems at first
sight contrary to all reason to prevent the head of the executive power
from being elected a second time. The influence which the talents and
the character of a single individual may exercise upon the fate of a
whole people, especially in critical circumstances or arduous times, is
well known: a law preventing the re-election of the chief magistrate
would deprive the citizens of the surest pledge of the prosperity and
the security of the commonwealth; and, by a singular inconsistency, a
man would be excluded from the government at the very time when he had
shown his ability in conducting its affairs.