American Institutions and Their Influence by Alexis de Tocqueville et al

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WHAT ARE THE CHANCES IN FAVOR OF THE DURATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION, AND
WHAT DANGERS THREATEN IT.

Reasons why the preponderating Force lies in the States rather than in
the Union.--The Union will only last as long as all the States choose to
belong to it.--Causes which tend to keep them united.--Utility of the
Union to resist foreign Enemies, and to prevent the Existence of
Foreigners in America.--No natural Barriers between the several
States.--No conflicting Interests to divide them.--Reciprocal Interests
of the Northern, Southern, and Western States.--Intellectual ties of
Union.--Uniformity of Opinions.--Dangers of the Union resulting from the
different Characters and the Passions of its Citizens.--Character of the
Citizens in the South and in the North.--The rapid growth of the Union
one of its greatest Dangers.--Progress of the Population to the
Northwest.--Power gravitates in the same Direction.--Passions
originating from sudden turns of Fortune.--Whether the existing
Government of the Union tends to gain strength, or to lose it.--Various
signs of its Decrease.--Internal Improvement.--Waste Lands.--
Indians.--The Bank.--The Tariff.--General Jackson.

The maintenance of the existing institutions of the several states
depends in some measure upon the maintenance of the Union itself. It is
therefore important in the first instance to inquire into the probable
fate of the Union. One point may indeed be assumed at once; if the
present confederation were dissolved, it appears to me to be
incontestable that the states of which it is now composed would not
return to their original isolated condition; but that several Unions
would then be formed in the place of one. It is not my intention to
inquire into the principles upon which these new Unions would probably
be established, but merely to show what the causes are which may effect
the dismemberment of the existing confederation.

With this object I shall be obliged to retrace some of the steps which I
have already taken, and to revert to topics which I have before
discussed. I am aware that the reader may accuse me of repetition, but
the importance of the matter which still remains to be treated is my
excuse; I had rather say too much, than say too little to be thoroughly
understood, and I prefer injuring the author to slighting the subject.

The legislators who formed the constitution of 1789 endeavored to confer
a distinct and preponderating authority upon the federal power. But they
were confined by the conditions of the task which they had undertaken to
perform. They were not appointed to constitute the government of a
single people, but to regulate the association of several states; and,
whatever their inclinations might be, they could not but divide the
exercise of sovereignty in the end.

In order to understand the consequences of this division, it is
necessary to make a short distinction between the affairs of government.
There are some objects which are national by their very nature, that is
to say, which affect the nation as a body, and can only be intrusted to
the man or the assembly of men who most completely represent the entire
nation. Among these may be reckoned war and diplomacy. There are other
objects which are provincial by their very nature, that is to say, which
only affect certain localities, and which can only be properly treated
in that locality. Such, for instance, is the budget of municipality.
Lastly, there are certain objects of a mixed nature, which are national
inasmuch as they affect all the citizens who compose the nation, and
which are provincial inasmuch as it is not necessary that the nation
itself should provide for them all. Such are the rights which regulate
the civil and political condition of the citizens. No society can exist
without civil and political rights. These rights therefore interest all
the citizens alike; but it is not always necessary to the existence and
the prosperity of the nation that these rights should be uniform, nor
consequently, that they should be regulated by the central authority.

There are, then, two distinct categories of objects which are submitted
to the direction of the sovereign power; and these categories occur in
all well-constituted communities, whatever the basis of the political
constitution may otherwise be. Between these two extremes, the objects
which I have termed mixed may be considered to lie. As these objects are
neither exclusively national nor entirely provincial, they may be
attained by a national or a provincial government, according to the
agreement of the contracting parties, without in any way impairing the
contract of association.

The sovereign power is usually formed by the union of separate
individuals, who compose a people; and individual powers or collective
forces, each representing a very small portion of the sovereign
authority, are the sole elements which are subjected to the general
government of their choice. In this case the general government is more
naturally called upon to regulate, not only those affairs which are of
essential national importance, but those which are of a more local
interest; and the local governments are reduced to that small share of
sovereign authority which is indispensable to their prosperity.

But sometimes the sovereign authority is composed of preorganized
political bodies, by virtue of circumstances anterior to their union;
and in this case the provincial governments assume the control, not only
of those affairs which more peculiarly belong to their province, but of
all, or of a part of the mixed affairs to which allusion has been made.
For the confederate nations which were independent sovereign states
before their Union, and which still represent a very considerable share
of the sovereign power, have only consented to cede to the general
government the exercise of those rights which are indispensable to the
Union.

When the national government, independently of the prerogative inherent
in its nature, is invested with the right of regulating the affairs
which relate partly to the general and partly to the local interest, it
possesses a preponderating influence. Not only are its own rights
extensive, but all the rights which it does not possess exist by its
sufferance, and it may be apprehended that the provincial governments
may be deprived of their natural and necessary prerogatives by its
influence.

When, on the other hand, the provincial governments are invested with
the power of regulating those same affairs of mixed interest, an
opposite tendency prevails in society. The preponderating force resides
in the province, not in the nation; and it may be apprehended that the
national government may in the end be stripped of the privileges which
are necessary to its existence.

Independent nations have therefore a natural tendency to centralization,
and confederations to dismemberment.

It now only remains for us to apply these general principles to the
American Union. The several states were necessarily possessed of the
right of regulating all exclusively provincial affairs. Moreover these
same states retained the right of determining the civil and political
competency of the citizens, of regulating the reciprocal relations of
the members of the community, and of dispensing justice; rights which
are of a general nature, but which do not necessarily appertain to the
national government. We have shown that the government of the Union is
invested with the power of acting in the name of the whole nation, in
those cases in which the nation has to appear as a single and undivided
power; as, for instance, in foreign relations, and in offering a common
resistance to a common enemy; in short, in conducting those affairs
which I have styled exclusively national.

In this division of the rights of sovereignty, the share of the Union
seems at first sight to be more considerable than that of the states;
but a more attentive investigation shows it to be less so. The
undertakings of the government of the Union are more vast, but their
influence is more rarely felt. Those of the provincial government are
comparatively small, but they are incessant, and they serve to keep
alive the authority which they represent. The government of the Union
watches the general interests of the country; but the general interests
of a people have a very questionable influence upon individual
happiness; while provincial interests produce a most immediate effect
upon the welfare of the inhabitants. The Union secures the independence
and the greatness of the nation, which do not immediately affect private
citizens; but the several states maintain the liberty, regulate the
rights, protect the fortune, and secure the life and the whole future
prosperity of every citizen.

The federal government is very far removed from its subjects, while the
provincial governments are within the reach of them all, and are ready
to attend to the smallest appeal. The central government has upon its
side the passions of a few superior men who aspire to conduct it; but
upon the side of the provincial governments are the interests of all
those second-rate individuals who can only hope to obtain power within
their own state, and who nevertheless exercise the largest share of
authority over the people because they are placed nearest to its level.

The Americans have therefore much more to hope and to fear from the
states than from the Union; and, in conformity with the natural tendency
of the human mind, they are more likely to attach themselves to the
former than to the latter. In this respect their habits and feelings
harmonize with their interests.

When a compact nation divides its sovereignty, and adopts a confederate
form of government, the traditions, the customs, and the manners of the
people are for a long time at variance with their legislation; and the
former tend to give a degree of influence to the central government
which the latter forbids. When a number of confederate states unite to
form a single nation, the same causes operate in an opposite direction.
I have no doubt that if France were to become a confederate republic
like that of the United States, the government would at first display
more energy than that of the Union; and if the Union were to alter its
constitution to a monarchy like that of France, I think that the
American government would be a long time in acquiring the force which
now rules the latter nation. When the national existence of the
Anglo-Americans began, their provincial existence was already of long
standing; necessary relations were established between the townships and
the individual citizens of the same states; and they were accustomed to
consider some objects as common to them all, and to conduct other
affairs as exclusively relating to their own special interests.

The Union is a vast body, which presents no definite object to patriotic
feeling. The forms and limits of the state are distinct and
circumscribed, since it represents a certain number of objects which are
familiar to the citizens and beloved by all. It is identified with the
very soil, with the right of property and the domestic affections, with
the recollections of the past, the labors of the present, and the hopes
of the future. Patriotism, then, which is frequently a mere extension of
individual egotism, is still directed to the state, and is not excited
by the Union. Thus the tendency of the interests, the habits, and the
feelings of the people, is to centre political activity in the states,
in preference to the Union.

It is easy to estimate the different forces of the two governments, by
remarking the manner in which they fulfil their respective functions.
Whenever the government of a state has occasion to address an
individual, or an assembly of individuals, its language is clear and
imperative; and such is also the tone of the federal government in its
intercourse with individuals, but no sooner has it anything to do with a
state, than it begins to parley, to explain its motives, and to justify
its conduct, to argue, to advise, and in short, anything but to command.
If doubts are raised as to the limits of the constitutional powers of
each government, the provincial government prefers its claims with
boldness, and takes prompt and energetic steps to support it. In the
meanwhile the government of the Union reasons, it appeals to the
interests, to the good sense, to the glory of the nation; it temporizes,
it negotiates, and does not consent to act until it is reduced to the
last extremity. At first sight it might readily be imagined that it is
the provincial government which is armed with the authority of the
nation, and that congress represents a single state.

The federal government is, therefore, notwithstanding the precautions of
those who founded it, naturally so weak, that it more peculiarly
requires the free consent of the governed to enable it to subsist. It is
easy to perceive that its object is to enable the states to realize with
facility their determination of remaining united; and, as long as this
preliminary consideration exists, its authority is great, temperate, and
effective. The constitution fits the government to control individuals,
and easily to surmount such obstacles as they may be inclined to offer,
but it was by no means established with a view to the possible
separation of one or more of the states from the Union.

If the sovereignty of the Union were to engage in a struggle with that
of the states at the present day, its defeat may be confidently
predicted; and it is not probable that such a struggle would be
seriously undertaken. As often as steady resistance is offered to the
federal government, it will be found to yield. Experience has hitherto
shown that whenever a state has demanded anything with perseverance and
resolution, it has invariably succeeded; and that if a separate
government has distinctly refused to act, it was left to do as it
thought fit.[258]

But even if the government of the Union had any strength inherent in
itself, the physical situation of the country would render the exercise
of that strength very difficult.[259] The United States cover an immense
territory; they are separated from each other by great distances; and
the population is disseminated over the surface of a country which is
still half a wilderness. If the Union were to undertake to enforce the
allegiance of the confederate states by military means, it would be in a
position very analogous to that of England at the time of the war of
independence.

However strong a government may be, it cannot easily escape from the
consequences of a principle which it has once admitted as the foundation
of its constitution. The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of
the states; and, in uniting together, they have not forfeited their
nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one and the
same people. If one of the states chose to withdraw its name from the
compact, it would be difficult to disprove its right of doing so; and
the federal government would have no means of maintaining its claims
directly, either by force or by right. In order to enable the federal
government easily to conquer the resistance which may be offered to it
by any one of its subjects, it would be necessary that one or more of
them should be especially interested in the existence of the Union, as
has frequently been the case in the history of confederations.

If it be supposed that among the states which are united by the federal
tie, there are some which exclusively enjoy the principal advantages of
union, or whose prosperity depends on the duration of that union, it is
unquestionable that they will always be ready to support the central
government in enforcing the obedience of the others. But the government
would then be exerting a force not derived from itself, but from a
principle contrary to its nature. States form confederations in order to
derive equal advantages from their union; and in the case just alluded
to, the federal government would derive its power from the unequal
distribution of those benefits among the states.

If one of the confederated states have acquired a preponderance
sufficiently great to enable it to take exclusive possession of the
central authority, it will consider the other states as subject
provinces, and will cause its own supremacy to be respected under the
borrowed name of the sovereignty of the Union. Great things may then be
done in the name of the federal government, but in reality that
government will have ceased to exist.[260] In both these cases, the
power which acts in the name of the confederation becomes stronger, the
more it abandons the natural state and the acknowledged principles of
confederations.

In America the existing Union is advantageous to all the states, but it
is not indispensable to any one of them. Several of them might break the
federal tie without compromising the welfare of the others, although
their own prosperity would be lessened. As the existence and the
happiness of none of the states are wholly dependent on the present
constitution, they would none of them be disposed to make great personal
sacrifices to maintain it. On the other hand, there is no state which
seems, hitherto, to have its ambition much interested in the maintenance
of the existing Union. They certainly do not all exercise the same
influence in the federal councils, but no one of them can hope to
domineer over the rest, or to treat them as its inferiors or as its
subjects.

It appears to me unquestionable, that if any portion of the Union
seriously desired to separate itself from the other states, they would
not be able, nor indeed would they attempt, to prevent it; and that the
present Union will only last as long as the states which compose it
choose to continue members of the confederation. If this point be
admitted, the question becomes less difficult; and our object is not to
inquire whether the states of the existing Union are capable of
separating, but whether they will choose to remain united.

[The remarks respecting the inability of the federal government to
retain within the Union any state that may choose "to withdraw its name
from the contract," ought not to pass through an American edition of
this work, without the expression of a dissent by the editor from the
opinion of the author. The laws of the United States must remain in
force in a revolted state, until repealed by congress; the customs and
postages must be collected; the courts of the United States must sit,
and must decide the causes submitted to them; as has been very happily
explained by the author, the courts act upon individuals. If their
judgments are resisted, the executive arm must interpose, and if the
state authorities aid in the resistance, the military power of the whole
Union must be invoked to overcome it. So long as the laws affecting the
citizens of such a state remain, and so long as there remain any
officers of a general government to enforce them, these results must
follow not only theoretically but actually. The author probably formed
the opinions which are the subject of these remarks, at the commencement
of the controversy with South Carolina respecting the tariff. And when
they were written and published, he had not learned the result of that
controversy, in which the supremacy of the Union and its laws was
triumphant. There was doubtless great reluctance in adopting the
necessary measures to collect the customs, and to bring every legal
question that could possibly arise out of the controversy, before the
judiciary of the United States, but they were finally adopted, and were
not the less successful for being the result of deliberation and of
necessity. Out of that controversy have arisen some advantages of a
permanent character, produced by the legislation which it required.
There were defects in the laws regulating the manner of bringing from
the state courts into those of the United States, a cause involving the
constitutionality of acts of congress or of the states, through which
the federal authority might be evaded. Those defects were remedied by
the legislation referred to; and it is now more emphatically and
universally true, than when the author wrote, that the acts of the
general government operate through the judiciary, upon individual
citizens, and not upon the states.--_American Editor._]

Among the various reasons which tend to render the existing Union useful
to the Americans, two principal causes are peculiarly evident to the
observer. Although the Americans are, as it were, alone upon their
continent, their commerce makes them the neighbors of all the nations
with which they trade. Notwithstanding their apparent isolation, the
Americans require a certain degree of strength, which they cannot retain
otherwise than by remaining united to each other. If the states were to
split, they would not only diminish the strength which they are now able
to display toward foreign nations, but they would soon create foreign
powers upon their own territory. A system of inland custom-houses would
then be established; the valleys would be divided by imaginary boundary
lines; the courses of the rivers would be confined by territorial
distinctions and a multitude of hindrances would prevent the Americans
from exploring the whole of that vast continent which Providence has
allotted to them for a dominion. At present they have no invasion to
fear, and consequently no standing armies to maintain, no taxes to levy.
If the Union were dissolved, all these burdensome measures might ere
long be required. The Americans are then very powerfully interested in
the maintenance of their Union. On the other hand, it is almost
impossible to discover any sort of material interest which might at
present tempt a portion of the Union to separate from the other states.

When we cast our eyes upon the map of the United States, we perceive the
chain of the Allegany mountains, running from the northeast to the
southwest, and crossing nearly one thousand miles of country; and we are
led to imagine that the design of Providence was to raise, between the
valley of the Mississippi and the coasts of the Atlantic ocean, one of
those natural barriers which break the mutual intercourse of men, and
form the necessary limits of different states. But the average height of
the Alleganies does not exceed 2,500 feet; their greatest elevation is
not above 4,000 feet; their rounded summits, and the spacious valleys
which they conceal within their passes, are of easy access from several
sides. Beside which, the principal rivers that fall into the Atlantic
ocean, the Hudson, the Susquehannah, and the Potomac, take their rise
beyond the Alleganies, in an open district, which borders upon the
valley of the Mississippi. These streams quit this tract of
country,[261] make their way through the barrier which would seem to
turn them westward, and as they wind through the mountains, they open an
easy and natural passage to man.

No natural barrier exists in the regions which are now inhabited by the
Anglo-Americans; the Alleganies are so far from serving as a boundary to
separate nations, that they do not even serve as a frontier to the
states. New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, comprise them within their
borders and extend as much to the west as to the east of the line.

The territory now occupied by the twenty-four states of the Union, and
the three great districts which have not yet acquired the rank of
states, although they already contain inhabitants, covers a surface of
1,002,600 square miles,[262] which is about equal to five times the
extent of France. Within these limits the qualities of the soil, the
temperature, and the produce of the country, are extremely various. The
vast extent of territory occupied by the Anglo-American republics has
given rise to doubts as to the maintenance of the Union. Here a
distinction must be made; contrary interests sometimes arise in the
different provinces of a vast empire, which often terminate in open
dissensions; and the extent of the country is then most prejudicial to
the power of the state. But if the inhabitants of these vast regions are
not divided by contrary interests, the extent of the territory may be
favorable to their prosperity; for the unity of the government promotes
the interchange of the different productions of the soil, and increases
their value by facilitating their consumption.

It is indeed easy to discover different interests in the different parts
of the Union, but I am unacquainted with any which are hostile to each
other. The southern states are almost exclusively agricultural; the
northern states are more peculiarly commercial and manufacturing; the
states of the west are at the same time agricultural and manufacturing.
In the south the crops consist of tobacco, of rice, of cotton, and of
sugar; in the north and the west, of wheat and maize; these are
different sources of wealth; but union is the means by which these
sources are opened to all, and rendered equally advantageous to the
several districts.