The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80 by Archibald Forbes

A >> Archibald Forbes >> The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21

CHAPTER VI: AHMED KHEL

While Sir Frederick Roberts had been fighting hard in North-Eastern
Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart had been experiencing comparative
tranquillity in his Candahar command. As soon as the news reached him of
the destruction of Cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated his
troops, and so early as the third week of September (1879) he was in a
position to carry out his orders to create a diversion in aid of Roberts'
advance on Cabul by making a demonstration in the direction of Ghuznee
and placing a garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. No subsequent movements of
importance were undertaken in Southern Afghanistan during the winter, and
the province enjoyed almost unbroken quietude. In Herat, however,
disturbance was rife. Ayoub Khan, the brother of Yakoub Khan, had
returned from exile and made good his footing in Herat, of which formerly
he had been conjoint governor with Yakoub. In December he began a hostile
advance on Candahar, but a conflict broke out between the Cabul and Herat
troops under his command, and he abandoned for the time his projected
expedition.

[Illustration: ACTION AT AHMED KHEL. 20 Miles from GHUZNEE. 19th. April
1880.]

In the end of March Sir Donald Stewart began the march toward Cabul which
orders from India had prescribed. He left behind him in Candahar the
Bombay division of his force under the command of Major-General Primrose,
whose line of communication with the Indus valley was to be kept open by
Phayre's brigade, and took with him on the northward march the Bengal
division, consisting of two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. The
first infantry brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Barter, the
second by Brigadier-General Hughes, and the cavalry brigade, which
divisional headquarters accompanied, by Brigadier-General Palliser.
Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reached on 6th April; the Bengal portion of its
garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed on the following
day. Until Shahjui, the limit of the Candahar province, the march was
uneventful; but beyond that place extreme difficulties were experienced
in procuring supplies, for the villages were found deserted and the
inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or hidden their stores of grain.
The force was embarrassed by a horde of Hazaras, who swarmed in wild
irregularity on its flanks, plundering and burning with great
vindictiveness, eager to wreak vengeance on their Afghan foes. And it had
another although more distant companionship, in the shape of several
thousand hostile tribesmen and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas
had been assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day parallel with
the British right flank along the foothills at a distance of about eight
miles. Their attitude was threatening but it was not thought wise to
meddle with them, since their retreat over the hills could not well be
cut off, and since the policy of non-interference would tend to encourage
them to venture on a battle. The soundness of this reasoning was soon to
be made manifest.

On the night of April 18th the division was encamped at Mushaki, about
thirty miles south of Ghuznee. The spies that evening brought in the
information that the enemy had resolved on fighting on the following
morning, and that the position they intended to take up was the summit of
a low spur of the Gul Koh mountain ridge, bounding on the west the valley
followed by the road. This spur was said to project in a north-easterly
direction toward the Ghuznee river, gradually sinking into the plain.
During a great part of its length it flanked and overhung the road, but
near where it merged into the plain the road passed over it by a low
saddle at a point about six miles beyond Mushaki. At dawn of the 19th the
column moved off, Palliser leading the advance, which Sir Donald Stewart
accompanied, Hughes commanding the centre, Barter bringing up the rear
and protecting the baggage. An hour later the enemy were visible in great
strength about three miles in advance, presenting the aspect of a vast
body formed up on the spur and on the saddle crossed by the road, and
thus threatening Stewart at once in front and on both flanks. The British
general at once made his dispositions. His guns were on the road in
column of route. The three infantry regiments of Hughes' brigade came up
to the left of and in line with the leading battery, the cavalry took
ground on the plain on its right, and a reserve was formed consisting of
an infantry regiment, two companies sappers and miners, and the General's
escort of a troop and two companies. Orders were sent back to Barter to
send forward without delay half the infantry of his brigade. In the
formation described the force resumed its advance until within striking
distance. Then the two batteries came into action on either side of the
road; the horse-battery on the right, the flat ground to its right being
covered by the 2d Punjaub Cavalry; the field-battery on the left. Sir
Donald Stewart's proper front thus consisted of the field and
horse-batteries with their supports, but since it was apparent that the
greatest strength of the enemy was on the higher ground flanking his
left, it behoved him to show a front in that direction also, and for this
purpose he utilised Hughes' three infantry regiments, of which the 59th
was on the right, the 2d Sikhs in the centre, and the 3d Goorkhas on the
left. Part of the reserve infantry was sent to make good the interval
between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry.

The guns had no sooner come into action than the enemy in great masses
showed themselves on spur and saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an
attempt to envelop the position held by the British. 'Suddenly,' writes
Hensmen, 'a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the
opposing army; the moullas could be seen haranguing the irregular host
with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then
as if by magic waves on waves of men--ghazees of the most desperate
type--poured down upon the plain, and rushed upon General Stewart's
force. The main body of the Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch
the ghazees in their reckless onslaught, and take advantage of any
success they might gain. The fanaticism of the 3000 or 4000 men who made
this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had 500 or
600 yards to cover before they could come to close quarters, and yet they
made nothing of the distance. Nearly all were well armed with tulwars,
knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and matchlocks, while a few--and
those must have been resolute fanatics indeed--had simply pikes made of
bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long shafts. Their
attack broke with greatest violence on our flanks. On our left flank the
19th Bengal Lancers were still moving into position when the ghazees
rushed in among them. In an instant they were hidden in the cloud of dust
and smoke, and then they galloped toward the right rear, and struck into
the reserve in rear of the Lieutenant-General and his staff. All was
confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and with the
riderless horses of the lancers killed or wounded in the _mêlée_, dashed
into the headquarter staff. The ghazees had continued their onward rush,
and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some of them
penetrated to within twenty yards of the knoll on which the staff were
watching the action, and so critical was the moment that Sir Donald
Stewart and every man of his staff drew their swords and prepared for
self-defence.' The hurried retirement of the lancers had left the left
flank bare. It was turned by the fierce rush of the fanatics, who were
actually in rear of the leftward infantry regiment and in the heart of
the British position. The Goorkhas had been thrown into momentary
confusion, but their colonel promptly formed them into rallying squares,
whose fire mowed down the ghazees and arrested the headlong vehemence of
their turning movement. But it was not the British left only which was
temporarily compromised by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. Their
enveloping charge broke down the defence of the weakly-manned interval
between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry. The
detachments holding that interval were forced back, righting hand-to-hand
as the sheer weight of the assault compelled them to give ground; the
59th, in its effort to throw back its right to cover the interval and
protect the guns, was thrown into confusion and gave ground; and the
guns, their case shot exhausted and the Afghans within a few yards of
their muzzles, had to be retired. The onslaught on the right front of the
horse-battery was delivered with great determination, but was held at bay
and finally crushed by the repeated charges of the 2d Punjaub cavalry.

Every man of the reserves was hurried into the fighting line; the
soldiers were steadied by the energetic efforts of their officers and
settled down to a steady and continuous fire from their breechloaders;
the guns poured their shells into the hostile masses; and the fire of the
forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the attempt of the Afghan
horse to move round that flank. The hard-fought combat lasted for an
hour; at ten o'clock the 'cease fire' sounded, and the British victory
was signal. The enemy was dispersing in full flight, and the cavalry was
chasing the fugitives across the plain on the right. How reckless had
been the whirlwind charges of the ghazees was evidenced by the
extraordinary number of their dead whose corpses strewed the battlefield.
In no previous conflict between our troops and the Afghans had the latter
suffered nearly so heavily. More than 1000 dead were counted on the
field, and many bodies were carried away; on a moderate computation their
total loss must have been between 2000 and 3000, and that in an estimated
strength of from 12,000 to 15,000. The casualties of the British force
were seventeen killed and 124 wounded, of whom four died of their wounds.
The injuries consisted almost wholly of sword slashes and knife stabs
received in hand-to-hand encounters. The pursuit was soon recalled, but
the Hazaras took up the chase with ardour and in the rancour of vengeance
slew and spared not.

Sir Donald Stewart tarried on the field only long enough to bury his dead
and have his wounded attended to; and soon after noon his force resumed
its march. Ghuznee was reached on the 21st, where there was a halt of
three days. It had been reported that the indomitable Mushk-i-Alum was
raising the tribesmen of Zurmut and Shilgur to avenge the defeat of Ahmed
Khel, and a cavalry reconnaissance made on the 22d had found a gathering
of 2000 or 3000 men about the villages of Urzoo and Shalez, six miles
south-east of Ghuznee. On the morning of the 23d a strong column
commanded by Brigadier-General Palliser moved on the villages, which were
found occupied in considerable force. They were too solidly built to be
much injured by artillery fire, and the Afghans lay close in the shelter
they afforded. Palliser hesitated to commit his infantry to an attack.
Sir Donald Stewart having arrived, ordered the infantry to carry the
villages without delay, and the affair was soon over, the tribesmen
suffering severely from the rifle fire as they evacuated the villages,
and later in the pursuit made by the cavalry and horse-artillery. On the
following day the march toward Cabul was resumed.

On the 16th April Major-General Ross had been despatched from Cabul by
Sir Frederick Roberts on the mission of joining hands with Stewart's
division. On the 20th Ross opened heliographic communication with Sir
Donald, and was informed of the latter's victory at Ahmed Khel. But the
junction of the two forces was not accomplished until the 27th; and in
the interval the force commanded by General Ross had received
considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal levies gathered by local
chiefs. The tribesmen interfered with the roadmaking operations of his
sappers in the vicinity of Sheikabad, and some fighting occurred in very
rugged country on the 23d. Trivial loss was experienced by his command,
but the demonstrations of the tribesmen evinced with what inveterate
determination, notwithstanding so many severe lessons, the Afghans
persisted in their refusal to admit themselves conquered. Driven away
with severe loss on the 25th, those indomitable hillmen and villagers
were back again on the following morning on the overhanging ridges; nor
were they dispersed by the 'resources of civilised warfare' until more of
them had paid with their lives the penalty of their obstinate hostility.
On the 28th, at Sheikabad, Sir Donald Stewart took leave of the division
which he had led from Candahar, and proceeded to Cabul with General Ross'
force to assume the chief command in North-Eastern Afghanistan. His
division turned aside into the Logur valley, where it remained at until
the final concentration about Cabul in anticipation of the evacuation. By
the reinforcement brought by Stewart the Cabul field force was increased
to a strength of about 18,000 men.

CHAPTER VII: THE AMEER ABDURRAHMAN

The occupation of Afghanistan by the British troops had been prolonged
far beyond the period originally intended by the authorities. But the
strain of that occupation was great, and although it had to be maintained
until there should be found a ruler strong enough to hold his own after
the evacuation, the decision was definitely arrived at to withdraw from
the country before the setting in of another winter. Mr Lepel Griffin, a
distinguished member of the political department of the Indian Civil
Service, reached Cabul on 20th March, his mission being to further the
selection and acceptance of a capable ruler to be left in possession. The
task was no easy one. There was little promise in any of the Barakzai
pretenders who were in Afghanistan, and in the address which Mr Griffin
addressed in Durbar to a number of sirdars and chiefs in the middle of
April, he preserved a tone at once haughty and enigmatical. One thing he
definitely announced, the Viceroy's decision that Yakoub Khan was not to
return to Afghanistan. The State was to be dismembered. As to the future
of Herat the speaker made no allusion; but the province of Candahar was
to be separated from Cabul and placed under an independent Barakzai
prince. No decision could for the present be given in regard to the
choice of an Ameer to rule over Cabul. The Government desired to nominate
an Ameer strong enough to govern his people and steadfast in his
friendship to the British; if those qualifications could be secured the
Government was willing and anxious to recognise the wish of the Afghan
people, and nominate an Ameer of their choice.

But in effect the choice, so far as the English were concerned, had been
already virtually made. On the 14th of March Lord Lytton had telegraphed
to the Secretary of State advocating the 'early public recognition of
Abdurrahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and the despatch of a
deputation of sirdars, with British concurrence, to offer him the throne,
as sole means of saving the country from anarchy'; and the Minister had
promptly replied authorising the nomination of Abdurrahman, should he be
found 'acceptable to the country and would be contented with Northern
Afghanistan.' Abdurrahman had known strange vicissitudes. He was the
eldest grandson of the old Dost; his father was Afzul Khan, the elder
brother of Shere Ali. After the death of the Dost he had been an exile in
Bokhara, but he returned to Balkh, of which province his father had been
Governor until removed by Shere Ali, made good his footing there, and
having done so advanced on Cabul, taking advantage of Shere Ali's absence
at Candahar. The capital opened its gates to him in March 1866; he fought
a successful battle with Shere Ali at Sheikabad, occupied Ghuznee, and
proclaimed his father Ameer. Those were triumphs, but soon the wheel came
round full circle. Afzul had but a short life as Ameer, and Abdurrahman
had to retire to Afghan Turkestan. Yakoub, then full of vigour and
enterprise, defeated him at Bamian and restored his father Shere Ali to
the throne in the winter of 1868. Abdurrahman then once more found
himself an exile. In 1870, after much wandering, he reached Tashkend,
where General Kaufmann gave him permission to reside, and obtained for
him from the Czar a pension of 25,000 roubles per annum. Petrosvky, a
Russian writer who professed to be intimate with him during his period of
exile, wrote of him that, 'To get square some day with the English and
Shere Ali was Abdurrahman's most cherished thought, his dominant,
never-failing passion.' His hatred of Shere Ali, his family, and
supporters, was intelligible and natural enough, but why he should have
entertained a bitter grudge against the English is not very apparent; and
there has been no overt manifestation of its existence since he became
Ameer. To Mr Eugene Schuyler, who had an interview with him at Tashkend,
he expressed his conviction that with £50,000 wherewith to raise and
equip an army he could attain his legitimate position as Ameer of
Afghanistan. Resolutely bent on an effort to accomplish this purpose, he
was living penuriously and saving the greater part of his pension, and he
hinted that he might have Russian assistance in the prosecution of his
endeavour. The selection of a man of such antecedents and associations as
the ruler of a 'buffer' state in friendly relations with British India
was perhaps the greatest leap in the dark on record. Abdurrahman came
straight from the position of a Russian pensionary; in moving on
Afghanistan he obeyed Russian instructions; his Tashkend patrons had
furnished him with a modest equipment of arms and money, the value of
which he undertook to repay if successful. It is of course possible that
those functionaries of a notoriously simple and ingenuous government
started and equipped him in pure friendly good nature, although they had
previously consistently deterred him. But there was not a circumstance in
connection with Abdurrahman that was not suspicious. Three distinct
hypotheses seem to present themselves in relation to this selection as
our nominee; that Lord Lytton had extraordinary, almost indeed
preternatural foresight and sagacity; that he was extremely fortunate in
his leap in the dark; that he desired to bring to the naked _reductio ad
absurdum_ the 'buffer state' policy. When Abdurrahman began his movement
is uncertain. So early as the middle of January it was reported at
Sherpur that he had left Tashkend, and was probably already on the Afghan
side of the Oxus. In a letter of February 17th Mr Hensman speaks of him
as being in Badakshan, where his wife's kinsmen were in power, and
describes him as having a following of 2000 or 3000 Turcoman horsemen and
possessed according to native report of twelve lakhs of rupees. On the
17th of March Lord Lytton telegraphed to the Secretary of State that he
was in possession of 'authentic intelligence that the Sirdar was in
Afghan Turkestan, having lately arrived there from Badakshan.'

[Illustration: The Ameer Abdurrahman.]

It was regarded of urgent importance to ascertain definitely the
disposition of Abdurrahman, and whether he was disposed to throw in his
lot with the British Government, and accept the position of its nominee
in Northern Afghanistan. The agent selected by Mr Griffin to open
preliminary negotiations was a certain Mohamed Surwar, Ghilzai, who had
been all his life in the confidential service of the Sirdar's family.
Surwar was the bearer of a formal and colourless letter by way simply of
authentication; but he also carried full and explicit verbal
instructions. He was directed to inform the Sirdar that since he had
entered Afghan Turkestan and occupied places there by force of arms, it
was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and
whether actuated by friendly or hostile feelings toward the British
Government, which for its part had no ill-feeling toward him because of
his long residence within the Russian Empire and his notoriously close
relations with that power. That the British Government was able to
benefit him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and that
wisdom and self interest alike suggested that he should at once open a
friendly correspondence with the British officers in Cabul. That his
opportunity was now come, and that the British Government was disposed to
treat him with every consideration and to consider most favourably any
representations he might make. It had no intention of annexing the
country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established
at Cabul; and that consequently the present communication was made solely
in Abdurrahman's own interest, and not in that of the British Government.
He was desired to send a reply by Surwar, and later to repair to Cabul,
where he should be honourably received.

Surwar returned to Cabul on 21st April, bringing a reply from Abdurrahman
to Mr Griffin's letter. The tone of the reply was friendly enough, but
somewhat indefinite. In conversation with Surwar as reported by the
latter, Abdurrahman was perfectly frank as to his relations with the
Russians, and his sentiments in regard to them. It had been reported that
he had made his escape clandestinely from Tashkend. Had he cared to stand
well with us at the expense of truth, it would have been his cue to
disclaim all authority or assistance from the Russian Government, to
confirm the current story of his escape, and to profess his anxiety to
cultivate friendly relations with the British in a spirit of opposition
to the power in whose territory he had lived so long virtually as a
prisoner. But neither in writing nor in conversation did he make any
concealment of his friendliness toward the Russians, a feeling which he
clearly regarded as nowise incompatible with friendly relations with the
British Government. 'If,' said he to Surwar, 'the English will in
sincerity befriend me, I have no wish to hide anything from them'; and he
went on to tell how the Russians had forbidden him for years to make any
effort to interfere in Afghan affairs. This prohibition stood until
information reached Tashkend of the deportation of Yakoub Khan to India.
Then it was that General Kaufmann's representative said to him: 'You have
always been anxious to return to your country; the English have removed
Yakoub Khan; the opportunity is favourable; if you wish you are at
liberty to go.' The Russians, continued Abdurrahman, pressed him most
strongly to set out on the enterprise which lay before him. They lent him
33,000 rupees, and arms, ammunition, and supplies; he was bound to the
Russians by no path or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude. 'I
should never like,' said he, 'to be obliged to fight them. I have eaten
their salt, and was for twelve years dependent on their hospitality.'

Surwar reported Abdurrahman as in fine health and possessed of great
energy. He had with him a force of about 3000 men, consisting of four
infantry and two cavalry regiments, with twelve guns and some irregulars.
He professed his readiness, in preference to conducting negotiations
through agents, to go himself to Charikar in the Kohistan with an escort,
and there discuss matters with the English officers in person. Surwar
testified that the Sirdar had with him in Turkestan no Russian or Russian
agent, and this was confirmed through other sources. He had sent forward
to ascertain which was the easiest pass across the Hindoo Koosh, but
meanwhile he was to remain at Kondooz until he should hear again from Mr
Griffin.

While the wary Sirdar waited on events beyond the Hindoo Koosh he was
sending letters to the leading chiefs of the Kohistan and the Cabul
province, desiring them to be ready to support his cause. That he had an
influential party was made clear at a durbar held by Mr Griffin on April
21st, when a considerable gathering of important chiefs united in the
request that Abdurrahman's claim to the Ameership should be favourably
regarded by the British authorities. In pursuance of the negotiations a
mission consisting of three Afghan gentlemen, two of whom belonged to Mr
Griffin's political staff, left Cabul on May 2nd carrying to Abdurrahman
a letter from Mr Griffin intimating that it had been decided to withdraw
the British army from Afghanistan in the course of a few months, and that
the British authorities desired to leave the rulership in capable and
friendly hands; that they were therefore willing to transfer the
Government to him, recognise him as the head of the State, and afford him
facilities and even support in reorganising the Government and
establishing himself in the sovereignty. The mission found the attitude
of Abdurrahman scarcely so satisfactory as had been reported by Surwar,
and its members were virtual prisoners, their tents surrounded by
sentries. Abdurrahman's explanation of this rigour of isolation was that
he could not otherwise ensure the safety of the envoys; but another
construction conveyed to them was that they were kept prisoners that they
might not, by mixing with the people, learn of the presence on the right
bank of the Oxus of a Russian officer with whom Abdurrahman was said to
be in constant communication and on whose advice he acted. Their belief
was that Abdurrahman was entirely under Russian influence; that Mr
Griffin's letter after it had been read in Durbar in the camp was
immediately despatched across the Oxus by means of mounted relays; and
that Russian instructions as to a reply had not been received when they
left Turkestan to return to Cabul. They expressed their belief that the
Sirdar would not accept from British hands Cabul shorn of Candahar. They
had urged him to repeat in the letter they were to carry back to Cabul
the expression of his willingness to meet the British representative at
Charikar which had been contained in his letter sent by Surwar; but he
demurred to committing himself even to this slight extent. The letter
which he sent by way of reply to the weighty communication Mr Griffin had
addressed to him on the part of the Government of India that official
characterised as 'frivolous and empty, and only saved by its special
courtesy of tone from being an impertinence.'

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21