The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80 by Archibald Forbes

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An Afghan who had sat at Kaufmann's feet, Abdurrahman was not wholly a
guileless man; and the truth probably was that he mistrusted the Greeks
of Simla and the gifts they tendered him with so lavish protestation that
they were entirely for his own interest. There was very little finesse
about the importunity of the British that he should constitute himself
their bridge of extrication, so that they might get out of Afghanistan
without the dangers and discredit of leaving chaos behind them. But
Abdurrahman had come to know himself strong enough to reduce to order
that legacy of chaos if it should be left; and in view of his future
relations with his fellow Afghans he was not solicitous to be beholden to
the foreigners to any embarrassing extent. He knew, too, the wisdom of
'masterly inactivity' in delicate conditions. And, again, he had no
confidence in our pledges. On the 4th of August, the day after the
meeting between him and Mr Griffin at Zimma, the latter wrote: 'They
(Abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our intention was to rid
ourselves of a formidable opponent, and dreaded that if he had come
straight into Cabul he would have been arrested, and deported to India.'

A Liberal Government was now in office in England, and was urgent for the
speedy evacuation of Afghanistan. Lord Lytton had resigned and had been
succeeded as Viceroy by the Marquis of Ripon. Lieutenant-General Sir
Donald Stewart was in chief command at Cabul. A great number of letters
from Abdurrahman to chiefs and influential persons throughout Afghanistan
were being intercepted, the tone of which was considered objectionable.
He was reported to be in close correspondence with Mahomed Jan, who had
never ceased to be our bitter enemy. The fact that negotiations were in
progress between the British Government and Abdurrahman had become matter
of general knowledge throughout the country, and was occasioning
disquietude and excitement. So clear were held the evidences of what was
termed Abdurrahman's bad faith, but was probably a combination of genuine
mistrust, astute passivity, and shrewd playing for his own hand, that it
became a serious question with the Indian Government on the arrival of
the new Viceroy, whether it was good policy to have anything more to do
with him. It was resolved that before breaking off intercourse the
suggestion of Sir Donald Stewart and Mr Griffin should be adopted, that a
peremptory although still friendly letter, demanding a definite
acceptance or refusal of the proffers made, within four days after the
receipt, should be sent to Abdurrahman, with a detailed explanation of
the arrangements into which we were prepared to enter with regard to him
and the future of Afghanistan. A letter was forwarded from Cabul on 14th
June, in which Mr Griffin informed the Sirdar that since the British
Government admitted no right of interference by foreign powers in
Afghanistan, it was plain that the Cabul ruler could have no political
relations with any foreign power except the English; and if any foreign
power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such
interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Cabul ruler,
then the British Government would be prepared to aid him, if necessary,
to repel it. As regarded limits of the territory, the latter stated that
the whole province of Candahar had been placed under a separate ruler,
except Sibi and Pisheen, which were retained in British possession.
Consequently the British Government was unable to enter into any
negotiations on those points, or in respect to arrangements in regard to
the north-western frontier which were settled by the treaty of Gundamuk.
Subject to those reservations, the British Government was willing that
Abdurrahman should establish over Afghanistan--including Herat when he
should have conquered it--as complete and extensive authority as was
swayed by any previous Ameer. The British Government would exercise no
interference in the internal government of those territories nor would it
demand the acceptance of an English Resident anywhere within Afghanistan,
although for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse it might be
agreed upon that a Mahommedan Agent of the British Government should be
stationed at Cabul.

Abdurrahman's reply to this communication was vague and evasive, and was
regarded by Sir Donald Stewart and Mr Griffin as so unsatisfactory that
they represented to the Government of India, not for the first time,
their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdurrahman, the imprudence of
delaying immediate action, and the necessity of breaking off with him and
adopting other means of establishing a government in Cabul before the
impending evacuation. Lord Ripon, however, considered that 'as matters
stood an arrangement with Abdurrahman offered the most advisable
solution, while he doubted whether it would not be found very difficult
to enter into any alternative arrangement.' His Excellency's decision was
justified by the event. Meanwhile, indeed, Abdurrahman had started on
June 28th for the Kohistan. He crossed the Hindoo Koosh and arrived on
July 20th at Charikar, where he was welcomed by a deputation of leading
chiefs, while the old Mushk-i-Alum, who for some time, thanks to Mr
Griffin's influence, had been working in the interests of peace,
intimated on behalf of a number of chiefs assembled in Maidan that they
were ready to accept as Ameer the nominee of the British Government.

So propitious seemed the situation that it was considered the time had
come for formally acknowledging Abdurrahman as the new Ameer, and also
for fixing approximately the date of the evacuation of Cabul by the
British troops. The ceremony of recognition was enacted in a great durbar
tent within the Sherpur cantonment on the afternoon of July 22d. The
absence of Abdurrahman, and the notorious cause of that absence,
detracted from the intrinsic dignity of the occasion so far as concerned
the British participation in it; nor was the balance restored by the
presence of three members of his suite whom he had delegated to represent
him. A large number of sirdars, chiefs, and maliks were present, some of
whom had fought stoutly against us in December. Sir Donald Stewart, who
presided, explained to the assembled Afghans that their presence and that
of the officers of the British force had been called for in order that
the public recognition by the British Government of the Sirdar
Abdurrahman Khan as Ameer of Cabul should be made known with as much
honour as possible. Then Mr Griffin addressed in Persian a short speech
to the 'sirdars, chiefs, and gentlemen' who constituted his audience.
Having announced the recognition of Abdurrahman by 'the Viceroy of India
and the Government of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen Empress,' he
proceeded: 'It is to the Government a source of satisfaction that the
tribes and chiefs have preferred as Ameer a distinguished member of the
Barakzai family, who is a renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. His
sentiments towards the British Government are most friendly; and so long
as his rule shows that he is animated by these sentiments, he cannot fail
to receive the support of the British Government.' Mr Griffin then
intimated that the British armies would shortly withdraw from
Afghanistan; and in his formal farewell there was a certain appropriate
dignity, and a well-earned tribute to the conduct of our soldiers during
their service within the Afghan borders. 'We trust and firmly believe,'
said Mr Griffin, 'that your remembrance of the English will not be
unkindly. We have fought you in the field whenever you have opposed us;
but your religion has in no way been interfered with; the honour of your
women has been respected, and every one has been secure in possession of
his property. Whatever has been necessary for the support of the army has
been liberally paid for. Since I came to Cabul I have been in daily
intercourse with you, but I have never heard an Afghan make a complaint
of the conduct of any soldier, English or native, belonging to Her
Majesty's army.' The durbar was closed by an earnest appeal by Sir Donald
Stewart to all the sirdars and chiefs that they should put aside their
private feuds and unite to support the new Ameer.

On August 3d Abdurrahman and Mr Griffin at length met, about sixteen
miles north of Cabul. His adherents were still full of excitement and
suspicion; but the Ameer himself was calm, cheerful, and dignified. The
conference between him and Mr Griffin lasted for three hours and was
renewed on the following day. 'He appeared,' wrote Mr Griffin, 'animated
by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the British Government,
and although his expectations were larger than the Government was
prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous
insistence, and the result of the interview may be considered on the
whole to be highly satisfactory.' The tidings of the Maiwand disaster had
reached Sherpur by telegraph, and the Ameer was informed that a necessity
might occur for marching a force from Cabul to Candahar. His reply was
that the tribes might be hostile, but that if no long halts were made by
the way he would have no objections to such a march. In this he showed
his astuteness, since the defeat of Ayoub Khan by a British army would
obviously save him a contest. So willing to be of service on this matter
was he that when the march was decided on he sent influential persons of
his party in advance to arrange with the local maliks to have supplies
collected for the column. The arrangements made with him were that he was
to fall heir to the thirty guns of Shere Ali's manufacture which the
out-marching army was to leave in Sherpur, and was to receive 19-1/2
lakhs of rupees (£190,500); ten lakhs of which were given as an earnest
of British friendship, and the balance was money belonging to the Afghan
State, which had gone into the commissariat chest and was now restored.
At the Ameer's earnest and repeated request the forts which had been
built around Cabul by the British army, were not destroyed as had been
intended, but were handed over intact to the new Ameer.

It seemed that Sir Donald Stewart, who was to evacuate Sherpur on the
11th August, would leave Cabul without seeing Abdurrahman. But at the
last moment Mr Griffin succeeded in arranging an interview. It was held
early in the morning of the evacuation, in a tent just outside the
Sherpur cantonment, was quite public, and lasted only for quarter of an
hour. Abdurrahman was frank and cordial. He said that his heart was full
of gratitude to the British, and desired that his best thanks should be
communicated to the Viceroy. At the close of the interview he shook hands
with all 'who cared to wish him good-bye and good luck,' and sent his
principal officer to accompany the General on his first day's march,
which began immediately after the parting with Abdurrahman. Sir Donald
Stewart's march down the passes was accomplished without incident, quite
unmolested by the tribes. Small garrisons were temporarily left in the
Khyber posts, and the war-worn regiments were dispersed through the
stations of North-Western India.

CHAPTER VIII: MAIWAND AND THE GREAT MARCH

When in the early spring of 1880 Sir Donald Stewart quitted Candahar with
the Bengal division of his force, he left there the Bombay division, to
the command of which General Primrose acceded, General Phayre assuming
charge of the communications. The province during the early summer was
fairly quiet, but it was known that Ayoub Khan was making hostile
preparations at Herat, although the reports as to his intentions and
movements were long uncertain and conflicting. Shere Ali Khan, who had
been Governor of Candahar during Stewart's residence there, had been
nominated hereditary ruler of the province with the title of 'Wali,' when
it was determined to separate Candahar from North-Eastern Afghanistan. On
June 21st the Wali, who had some days earlier crossed the Helmund and
occupied Girishk with his troops, reported that Ayoub was actually on the
march toward the Candahar frontier, and asked for the support of a
British brigade to enable him to cope with the hostile advance. There was
reason to believe that the Wali's troops were disaffected, and that he
was in no condition to meet Ayoub's army with any likelihood of success.
After Stewart's departure the strength of the British forces at Candahar
was dangerously low--only 4700 of all ranks; but it was important to
thwart Ayoub's offensive movement, and a brigade consisting of a troop of
horse-artillery, six companies of the 66th, two Bombay native infantry
regiments, and 500 native troopers, in all about 2300 strong, under the
command of Brigadier-General Burrows, reached the left bank of the
Helmund on July 11th. On the 13th the Wali's infantry, 2000 strong,
mutinied _en masse_ and marched away up the right bank of the river,
taking with them a battery of smooth bore guns, a present to Shere Ali
Khan from the British Government. His cavalry did not behave quite so
badly, but, not to go into detail, his army no longer existed, and
Burrows' brigade was the only force in the field to resist the advance of
Ayoub Khan, whose regular troops were reported to number 4000 cavalry,
and from 4000 to 5000 infantry exclusive of the 2000 deserters from the
Wali, with thirty guns and an irregular force of uncertain strength.

[Illustration: ACTION AT MAIWAND. 27th. July 1880.]

Burrows promptly recaptured from the Wali's infantry the battery they
were carrying off, and punished them severely. The mutineers had removed
or destroyed the supplies which the Wali had accumulated for the use of
the brigade, and General Burrows therefore could no longer remain in the
vicinity of Girishk. The Helmund owing to the dry season was passable
everywhere, so that nothing was to be gained by watching the fords. It
was determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nakhud, a point distant thirty
miles from Girishk and forty-five from Candahar, where several roads from
the Helmund converged and where supplies were plentiful. At and near
Khushk-i-Nakhud the brigade remained from the 16th until the morning of
the 27th July. While waiting and watching there a despatch from army
headquarters at Simla was communicated to General Burrows from Candahar,
authorising him to attack Ayoub if he thought himself strong enough to
beat him, and informing him that it was considered of the greatest
political importance that the force from Herat should be dispersed and
prevented from moving on toward Ghuznee. Spies brought in news that Ayoub
had reached Girishk, and was distributing his force along the right bank
between that place and Hydrabad. Cavalry patrols failed to find the enemy
until the 21st, when a detachment was encountered in the village of
Sangbur on the northern road about midway between the Helmund and
Khushk-i-Nakhud. Next day that village was found more strongly occupied,
and on the 23d a reconnaissance in force came upon a body of Ayoub's
horsemen in the plain below the Garmao hills, about midway between
Sangbur and Maiwand.

Those discoveries were tolerably clear indications of Ayoub's intention
to turn Burrows' position by moving along the northern road to Maiwand
and thence pressing on through the Maiwand pass, until at Singiri Ayoub's
army should have interposed itself between the brigade and Candahar.
There was certainly nothing impossible in such an endeavour, since
Maiwand is nearer Candahar than is Khushk-i-Nakhud. Why, in the face of
the information at his disposal and of the precautions enjoined on him to
hinder Ayoub from slipping by him toward Ghuznee through Maiwand and up
the Khakrez valley, General Burrows should have remained so long at
Khushk-i-Nakhud, is not intelligible. He was stirred at length on the
afternoon of the 26th, by the report that 2000 of Yakoub's cavalry and a
large body of his ghazees were in possession of Garmao and Maiwand, and
were to be promptly followed by Ayoub himself with the main body of his
army, his reported intention being to push on through the Maiwand pass
and reach the Urgundab valley in rear of the British brigade. Later in
the day Colonel St John, the political officer, reported to General
Burrows the intelligence which had reached him that the whole of Ayoub's
army was at Sangbur; but credence was not given to the information.

The somewhat tardy resolution was taken to march to Maiwand on the
morning of the 27th. There was the expectation that the brigade would
arrive at that place before the enemy should have occupied it in force,
and this point made good there might be the opportunity to drive out of
Garmao the body of Yakoub's cavalry reported in possession there. There
was a further reason why Maiwand should be promptly occupied; the brigade
had been obtaining its supplies from that village, and there was still a
quantity of grain in its vicinity to lose which would be unfortunate. The
brigade, now 2600 strong, struck camp on the morning of the 27th. The
march to Maiwand was twelve miles long, and an earlier start than 6.30
would have been judicious. The soldiers marched fast, but halts from time
to time were necessary to allow the baggage to come up; the hostile state
of the country did not admit of anything being left behind and the column
was encumbered by a great quantity of stores and baggage. At Karezah,
eight miles from Khushk-i-Nakhud and four miles south-west of Maiwand,
information was brought in that the whole of Yakoub's army was close by
on the left front of the brigade, and marching toward Maiwand. The spies
had previously proved themselves so untrustworthy that small heed was
taken of this report; but a little later a cavalry reconnaissance found
large bodies of cavalry moving in the direction indicated and inclining
away toward Garmao as the brigade advanced. A thick haze made it
impossible to discern what force, if any, was being covered by the
cavalry. About ten A.M. the advance guard occupied the village of
Mundabad, about three miles south-west of Maiwand. West of Mundabad,
close to the village, was a broad and deep ravine running north and
south. Beyond this ravine was a wide expanse of level and partially
cultivated plain across which, almost entirely concealed by the haze,
Ayoub's army was marching eastward toward Maiwand village, which covers
the western entrance to the pass of the same name. If General Burrows'
eye could have penetrated that haze, probably he would have considered it
prudent to take up a defensive position, for which Mundabad presented
many advantages. But he was firm in the conviction that the enemy's guns
were not up, notwithstanding the reports of spies to the contrary; he
believed that a favourable opportunity presented itself for taking the
initiative, and he resolved to attack with all possible speed.

Lieutenant Maclaine of the Horse-Artillery, a gallant young officer who
was soon to meet a melancholy fate, precipitated events in a somewhat
reckless fashion. With the two guns he commanded he crossed the ravine,
galloped across the plain, and opened fire on a body of Afghan cavalry
which had just come within view. General Nuttall, commanding the cavalry
and horse-artillery, failing to recall Maclaine, sent forward in support
of him the four remaining guns of the battery. Those approached to within
800 yards of the two advanced pieces, and Maclaine was directed to fall
back upon the battery pending the arrival of the brigade, which General
Burrows was now sending forward. It crossed the ravine near Mundabad,
advanced on the plain about a mile in a north-westerly direction, and
then formed up. There were several changes in the dispositions; when the
engagement became warm about noon the formation was as follows:--The 66th
foot was on the right, its right flank thrown back to check an attempt
made to turn it by a rush of ghazees springing out of the ravine in the
British front; on the left of the 66th were four companies of Jacob's
Rifles (30th Native Infantry) and a company of sappers, the centre was
occupied by the horse-artillery and smooth bore guns, of which latter,
however, two had been moved to the right flank; on the left of the guns
were the its Grenadiers somewhat refused, and on the extreme left two
companies of Jacob's Rifles. The cavalry was in the rear, engaged in
efforts to prevent the Afghans from taking the British infantry in
reverse. The position was radically faulty, and indeed invited disaster.
Both flanks were _en l'air_ in face of an enemy of greatly superior
strength; almost from the first every rifle was in the fighting line, and
the sole reserve consisted of the two cavalry regiments. The baggage had
followed the brigade across the ravine and was halted about 1000 yards in
rear of the right, inadequately guarded by cavalry detachments.

For half-an-hour no reply was made to the British shell fire, and an
offensive movement at this time might have resulted in success. But
presently battery after battery was brought into action by the Afghans,
until half-an-hour after noon the fire of thirty guns was concentrated on
the brigade. Under cover of this artillery fire the ghazees from the
ravine charged forward to within 500 yards of the 66th, but the rifle
fire of the British regiment drove them back with heavy loss, and they
recoiled as far as the ravine, whence they maintained a desultory fire.
The enemy's artillery fire was well sustained and effective; the infantry
found some protection from it in lying down, but the artillery and
cavalry remained exposed and suffered severely. An artillery duel was
maintained for two hours, greatly to the disadvantage of the brigade,
which had but twelve guns in action against thirty well-served Afghan
pieces. The prostrate infantry had escaped serious punishment, but by two
P.M. the cavalry had lost fourteen per cent, of the men in the front
line, and 149 horses; the Afghan horsemen had turned both flanks and the
brigade was all but surrounded, while a separate attack was being made on
the baggage. Heat and want of water were telling heavily on the sepoys,
who were further demoralised by the Afghan artillery fire.

A little later the smooth bore guns had to be withdrawn for want of
ammunition. This was the signal for a general advance of the Afghans.
Their guns were pushed forward with great boldness; their cavalry
streamed round the British left; in the right rear were masses of mounted
and dismounted irregulars who had seized the villages on the British line
of retreat. Swarms of ghazees soon showed themselves threatening the
centre and left; those in front of the 66th were still held in check by
the steady volleys fired by that regiment. At sight of the ghazees, and
cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of their officers, the two
companies of Jacob's Rifles on the left suddenly fell into confusion, and
broke into the ranks of the Grenadiers. That regiment had behaved well
but it caught the infection of demoralisation, the whole left collapsed,
and the sepoys in utter panic, surrounded by and intermingled with the
ghazees, rolled in a great wave upon the right. The artillerymen and
sappers made a gallant stand, fighting the ghazees hand-to-hand with
handspikes and rammers, while the guns poured canister into the advancing
masses. Slade reluctantly limbered up and took his four guns out of
action; Maclaine remained in action until the ghazees were at the muzzles
of his two guns, which fell into the enemy's hands. The torrent of
mingled sepoys and ghazees broke in upon the 66th, and overwhelmed that
regiment. The slaughter of the sepoys was appalling--so utterly cowed
were they that they scarcely attempted to defend themselves, and allowed
themselves without resistance to be dragged out of the ranks and killed.
A cavalry charge was ordered in the direction of the captured guns, but
it failed and the troopers retired in disorder. The infantry, assailed by
hordes of fierce and triumphant ghazees, staggered away to the right, the
66th alone maintaining any show of formation, until the ravine was
crossed, when the broken remnants of the sepoy regiments took to flight
toward the east and the General's efforts to rally them were wholly
unavailing. The 66th with some of the sappers and grenadiers, made a
gallant stand round its colours in an enclosure near the village of Khig.
There Colonel Galbraith and several of his officers were killed, and the
little body of brave men becoming outflanked, continued its retreat,
making stand after stand until most were slain. The Afghans pursued for
about four miles, but were checked by a detachment of rallied cavalry,
and desisted. The fugitives, forming with wounded and baggage a
straggling column upwards of six miles long, crossed the waterless desert
sixteen miles wide, to Hanz-i-Madat, which was reached about midnight and
where water was found. From Asu Khan, where cultivation began, to Kokoran
near Candahar, the retreat was harassed by armed villagers and the troops
had to fight more or less all the way. Officers and men were killed,
Lieutenant Maclaine was taken prisoner, and five of the smooth bore guns
had to be abandoned because of the exhaustion of the teams. About midday
of the 28th the broken remnants of the brigade reached Candahar. When the
casualties were ascertained it became evident how disastrous to the
British arms had been the combat of Maiwand. Out of a total of 2476
engaged no fewer than 964 were killed. The wounded numbered 167; 331
followers and 201 horses were killed and seven followers and sixty-eight
horses wounded. Since Chillianwallah the British arms in Asia had not
suffered loss so severe.

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