The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80 by Archibald Forbes

A >> Archibald Forbes >> The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21

The spirit of the Candahar force suffered materially from the Maiwand
disaster, and it was held that there was no alternative but to accept the
humiliation of a siege within the fortified city. The cantonments were
abandoned, the whole force was withdrawn into Candahar, and was detailed
for duty on the city walls. The effective garrison on the night of the
28th numbered 4360, including the survivors of the Maiwand brigade. So
alert were the Afghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on the morning
of the 29th, found the cantonments plundered and partly burned and the
vicinity of Candahar swarming with armed men. The whole Afghan population
amounting to about 12,000 persons, were compelled to leave the city, and
then the work of placing it in a state of defence was energetically
undertaken. Buildings and enclosures affording cover too close to the
enciente were razed, communication along the walls was opened up, and gun
platforms were constructed in the more commanding positions. The walls
were both high and thick, but they were considerably dilapidated and
there were gaps and breaks in the bastions and parapet. The weak places
as well as the gates were fronted with abattis, the defects were made
good with sandbags, and wire entanglements and other obstructions were
laid down outside the walls. While this work was in progress the covering
parties were in daily collision with the enemy, and occasional sharp
skirmishes occurred.

On the 8th August Ayoub opened fire on the citadel from Picquet hill, an
elevation north-westward of the city, and a few days later he brought
guns into action from the villages of Deh Khoja and Deh Khati on the east
and south. This fire, steadily maintained though it was day after day,
had little effect, and the return fire gave good results. It was not easy
to invest the city since on the west and north there was no cover for the
besiegers, but in Deh Khoja on the east there was ample protection for
batteries, and the ground on the south-west was very favourable. Its
advantages were improved so skilfully that it was at one time believed
there was a European engineer in Ayoub's camp. Deh Khoja was
inconveniently near the Cabul gate, and was always full of men. So
menacing was the attitude of the Afghans that a sortie was resolved on
against the village, which was conducted with resolution but resulted in
utter failure. The attempt was made on the morning of the 16th. The
cavalry went out to hinder reinforcements from entering the village from
the eastward. An infantry force 800 strong commanded by Brigadier-General
Brooke and divided into three parties, moved out later covered by a heavy
artillery fire from the city walls. The village was reached, but was so
full of enemies in occupation of the fortress-like houses that it was
found untenable, and the three detachments extricated themselves
separately. In the course of the retirement General Brooke and Captain
Cruickshank were killed. The casualties were very heavy; 106 were killed
and 117 were wounded.

The tidings of the Maiwand disaster reached Cabul on the 29th July by
telegram from Simla. The intention of the military authorities had
already been intimated that the Cabul force should evacuate Afghanistan
in two separate bodies and by two distinct routes. Sir Donald Stewart was
to march one portion by the Khyber route; the other under Sir Frederick
Roberts was to retire by the Kuram valley, which Watson's division had
been garrisoning since Roberts had crossed the Shutargurdan in September
1879. But the Maiwand news interfered with those arrangements. Stewart
and Roberts concurred in the necessity of retrieving the Maiwand disaster
by the despatch of a division from Cabul. Roberts promptly offered to
lead that division, and as promptly the offer was accepted by Stewart. By
arrangement with the latter Roberts telegraphed to Simla urging that a
force should be despatched from Cabul without delay; and recognising that
the authorities might hesitate to send on this errand troops already
under orders to return to India, he took it on himself to guarantee that
none of the soldiers would demur, providing he was authorised to give the
assurance that after the work in the field was over they would not be
detained in garrison at Candahar. The Viceroy's sanction came on the 3d
August. The constitution and equipment of the force were entrusted to the
two generals; and in reply to questions His Excellency was informed that
Roberts would march on the 8th and expected to reach Candahar on 2d
September. Sir Donald Stewart gave his junior full freedom to select the
troops to accompany him, and placed at his disposal the entire resources
of the army in transport and equipment. It cannot truly be said that it
was the _elite_ of the Cabul field force which constituted the column led
by Roberts in his famous march to Candahar. Of the native infantry
regiments of his own original force which he had mustered eleven months
previously in the Kuram only two followed him to Candahar, the 5th
Goorkhas and 23d Pioneers, and the second mountain battery adhered to him
staunchly, Of his original white troops the 9th Lancers, as ever, were
ready for the march. His senior infantry regiment, the 67th, would fain
have gone, but the good old corps was weak from casualties and sickness,
and the gallant Knowles denied himself in the interests of his men. The
two Highland regiments, the 72d and 92d, had done an infinity of fighting
and marching, but both had received strong drafts, were in fine
condition, and were not to be hindered from following the chief whom,
though not of their northern blood, the stalwart sons of the mist swore
by as one man.

Sir Frederick Roberts had already represented that it would be impolitic
to require the native regiments to remain absent from India and their
homes for a longer period than two years. In the case of many of the
regiments that term was closely approached, and the men after prolonged
absence and arduous toil needed rest and were longing to rejoin their
families. 'It was not,' in the words of General Chapman, 'with eager
desire that the honour of marching to Candahar was sought for, and some
commanding officers of experience judged rightly the tempers of their men
when they represented for the General's consideration the claims of the
regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field
service.... The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts' force
with exceptional rapidity to Candahar was an after-growth evolved by the
enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unfailing spirit which
animated the leader himself.' The constitution of the force was made
known by the general orders published on 3d August. It consisted of three
batteries of artillery commanded by Colonel Alured Johnson; of a cavalry
brigade of four regiments commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough; and
of an infantry division of three brigades commanded by Major-General John
Ross. The first brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Herbert
Macpherson, the second by Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, and the third by
Brigadier-General Charles Macgregor. Colonel Chapman, R.A., who had
served in the same capacity with Sir Donald Stewart, was now Roberts'
chief of staff. The marching out strength of the column was about 10,000
men, of whom 2835 were Europeans. Speed being an object and since the
column might have to traverse rough ground, no wheeled artillery or
transport accompanied it; the guns were carried on mules, the baggage was
severely cut down, the supplies carried were reduced to a minimum, and
the transport animals, numbering 8590, consisted of mules, ponies, and
donkeys. It was known that the country could supply flour, sheep, and
forage.

The time specified for the departure of the force from Sherpur was kept
to the day. On the 8th the brigades moved out a short distance into camp,
and on the following morning the march begun in earnest. The distance
from Cabul to Candahar is about 320 miles, and the march naturally
divides itself into three parts; from Cabul to Ghuznee, ninety-eight
miles; from Ghuznee to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, one hundred and thirty-four
miles; and from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Candahar, eighty-eight miles, Ghuznee
was reached on the seventh day, the daily average being fourteen
miles--excellent work for troops unseasoned to long continuous travel,
tramping steadily in a temperature of from 84° to 92° in the shade. When
possible the force moved on a broad front, the brigades and regiments
leading by rotation, and halts were made at specified intervals. The
'rouse' sounded at 2.45 A.M. and the march began at four; the troops were
generally in camp by two P.M. and the baggage was usually reported all in
by five; but the rearguard had both hard work and long hours. There was
no sign of opposition anywhere, not a single load of baggage was left
behind, comparatively few men fell out foot-sore, and the troops were
steadily increasing in endurance and capacity of rapid and continuous
marching.

At Ghuznee there was no rest day, and the steadfast dogged march was
resumed on the morning of the 16th. The strain of this day's long tramp
of twenty miles to Yergati was severe, but the men rallied gamely, and
the General by dint of care and expedient was able to keep up the high
pressure. 'The method,' writes General Chapman, 'of such marching as was
now put in practice is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of
freedom in movement with carefully regulated halts, and the closest
control in every portion of the column; it employed the individual
intelligence of each man composing the masses in motion, and called on
all for exertion in overcoming the difficulties of the march, in bearing
its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishment of the object in
view.' On the 20th a distance of twenty-one miles was covered--the
longest day's march made; the effort was distressing owing to the heat
and the lack of shade, but it was enforced by the absence of water. There
was no relaxation in the rate of marching, and Khelat-i-Ghilzai was
reached on the eighth day from Ghuznee, showing a daily average of nearly
seventeen miles.

The 24th was a halt day at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, where Sir Frederick Roberts
received a letter from General Primrose in Candahar, describing the
sortie made on the village of Deh Khoja and giving details of his
situation. It was resolved to evacuate Khelat-i-Ghilzai and take on its
garrison with the column, which on the 25th resumed its march to
Candahar. On his arrival at Tir Andaz on the following day the General
found a letter from Candahar, informing him that at the news of the
approach of the Cabul force Ayoub Khan had withdrawn from his investment
of Candahar, and had shifted his camp to the village of Mazra in the
Urgundab valley, nearly due north of Candahar. On the morning of the 27th
General Hugh Gough was sent forward with two cavalry regiments a distance
of thirty-four miles to Robat, the main column moving on to Khel Akhund,
half way to the former place. Gough was accompanied by Captain Straton
the principal signalling officer of the force, who was successful in
communicating with Candahar, and in the afternoon Colonel St John, Major
Leach, and Major Adam rode out to Robat, bringing the information that
Ayoub Khan was engaged in strengthening his position in the Urgundab
valley, and apparently had the intention to risk the issue of a battle.
On the 28th the whole force was concentrated at Robat; and as it was
desirable that the troops should reach Candahar fresh and ready for
prompt action, the General decided to make the 20th a rest day and divide
the nineteen miles from Robat to Candahar into two short marches.

The long forced march from Cabul may be regarded as having ended at
Robat. The distance between those two places, 303 miles, had been covered
in twenty days. It is customary in a long march to allow two rest days in
each week, but Roberts had granted his force but a single rest day in the
twenty days of its strenuous march. Including this rest day, the average
daily march was a fraction over fifteen miles. As a feat of marching by a
regular force of 10,000 men encumbered with baggage and followers, this
achievement is unique, and it could have been accomplished only by
thorough organisation and steady vigorous energy. Sir Frederick Roberts
was so fortunate as to encounter no opposition. For this immunity he was
indebted mainly to the stern lessons given to the tribesmen by Sir Donald
Stewart at Ahmed Khel and Urzoo while that resolute soldier was marching
from Candahar to Cabul, and in a measure also to the good offices of the
new Ameer. But it must be remembered that Roberts had no assurance of
exemption from hostile efforts to block his path, and that he marched
ever ready to fight. It will long be remembered how when Roberts had
started on the long swift march, the suspense as to its issue grew and
swelled until the strain became intense. The safety of the garrison of
Candahar was in grave hazard; the British prestige, impaired by the
disaster of Maiwand, was trembling in the balance. The days passed, and
there came no news of Roberts and of the 10,000 men with whom the wise,
daring little chief had cut loose from any base and struck for his goal
through a region of ill repute for fanaticism and bitter hostility. The
pessimists among us held him to be rushing on his ruin. But Roberts
marched light; he lived on what the country supplied; he gave the
tribesmen no time to concentrate against him; and two days in advance of
the time he had set himself he reached Candahar at the head of a force in
full freshness of vigour and burning with zeal for immediate battle.

While halted at Robat on the 29th Sir Frederick heard from General Phayre
that his division had been retarded in its march by lack of transport,
but that he hoped to have it assembled at Killa Abdoolla on the 28th, and
would be able to move toward Candahar on the 30th. But as Killa Abdoolla
is distant some eight marches from Candahar, it was obvious that General
Phayre could not arrive in time to share in the impending battle. On the
morning of the 31st the Cabul force reached Candahar. Sir Frederick
Roberts, who had been suffering from fever for some days, was able to
leave his dhooly and mount his horse in time to meet General Primrose and
his officers to the east of Deh Khoja. The troops halted and breakfasted
outside the Shikapore gate, while General Roberts entered the city and
paid a visit to the Wali Shere Ali Khan. On his arrival he assumed
command of the troops in Southern Afghanistan; and he remained resting in
the city while the Cabul force marched to its selected camping ground
near the destroyed cantonments on the north-west of Candahar. A few shots
were fired, but the ground was occupied without opposition. Baker's
brigade was on the right, camped in rear of Picquet hill, in the centre
was Macpherson's brigade sheltered in its front by Karez hill, and on the
left among orchards and enclosures was Macgregor's brigade, in rear of
which was the cavalry.

CHAPTER IX: THE BATTLE OF CANDAHAR

Although Yakoub Khan had ceased to beleaguer Candahar, he had withdrawn
from that fortress but a very short distance, and the position he had
taken up was of considerable strength. The Urgundab valley is separated
on the north-west from the Candahar plain by a long precipitous spur
trending south-west from the mountainous mass forming the eastern
boundary of the valley further north. Where the spur quits the main
range, due north of the city, the Murcha Pass affords communication
between the Candahar plain and the Urgundab valley. The spur, its summit
serrated by alternate heights and depressions, is again crossed lower
down by an easy pass known as the Babawali Kotul. It is continued beyond
this saddle for about a mile, still maintaining its south-westerly trend,
never losing its precipitous character, and steeply scarped on its
eastern face; and it finally ends in the plain in a steep descent of
several hundred feet. The section of it from the Babawali Kotul to its
south-western termination is known as the Pir Paimal hill, from a village
of that name in the valley near its extremity. Ayoub Khan had made his
camp near the village of Mazra, behind the curtain formed by the spur
described, and about a mile higher up in the valley than the point at
which the spur is crossed by the road over the Babawali Kotul. He was
thus, with that point artificially strengthened and defended by
artillery, well protected against a direct attack from the direction of
Candahar, and was exposed only to the risk of a turning movement round
the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill. Such a movement might be made the
reverse of easy. A force advancing to attempt it must do so exposed to
fire from the commanding summit of the Pir Paimal; around the base of
that elevation there were several plain villages, and an expanse of
enclosed orchards and gardens which strongly held were capable of
stubborn defence. In the valley behind the Pir Paimal hill there was the
lofty detached Kharoti hill, the fire from which would meet in the teeth
a force essaying the turning movement; and the interval between the two
hills, through which was the access to the Mazra camps, was obstructed by
deep irrigation channels whose banks afforded cover for defensive fire,
and could be swept by a cross fire from the hills on either flank.

[Illustration: Kandahar.]

Sir Frederick Roberts at a glance had perceived that a direct attack by
the Babawali Kotul must involve very heavy loss, and he resolved on the
alternative of turning the Afghan position. A reconnaissance was made on
the afternoon of the 31st by General Gough, accompanied by Colonel
Chapman. He penetrated to within a short distance of the village of Pir
Paimal, where it was ascertained that the enemy were strongly entrenched,
and where several guns were unmasked. A great deal of valuable
information was obtained before the enemy began to interfere with the
leisurely withdrawal. The cavalry suffered little, but the Sikh infantry
covering the retirement of the reconnaissance were hard pressed by great
masses of Afghan regulars and irregulars. So boldly did the enemy come on
that the third and part of the first brigade came into action, and the
firing did not cease until the evening. The enemy were clearly in the
belief that the reconnaissance was an advance in force which they had
been able to check and indeed drive in, and they were opportunely
audacious in the misapprehension that they had gained a success. The
information brought in decided the General to attack on the following
morning; and having matured his dispositions, he explained them
personally to the commanding officers in the early morning of September
1st. The plan of attack was perfectly simple. The Babawali Kotul was to
be plied with a brisk cannonade and threatened by demonstrations both of
cavalry and infantry; while the first and second brigades, with the third
in reserve, were to turn the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill, force the
enemy's right in the interval between that hill and the Kharoti eminence,
take in reverse the Babawali Kotul, and pressing on up the Urgundab
valley, carry Ayoub Khan's principal camp at Mazra. The Bombay cavalry
brigade was to watch the roads over the Murcha and Babawali Kotuls,
supported by infantry and artillery belonging to General Primrose's
command, part of which was also detailed for the protection of the city;
and to hold the ground from which the Cabul brigades were to advance.
General Gough was to take the cavalry of the Cabul column across the
Urgundab, so as to reach by a wide circuit the anticipated line of the
Afghan retreat.

Soon after nine A.M. the forty-pounders on the right of Picquet hill
began a vigorous cannonade of the Babawali Kotul, which was sturdily
replied to by the three field-guns the enemy had in battery on that
elevation. It had been early apparent that the Ayoub's army was in great
heart, and apparently meditating an offensive movement had moved out so
far into the plain as to occupy the villages of Mulla Sahibdad opposite
the British right, and Gundigan on the left front of the British left.
Both villages were right in the fair way of Roberts' intended line of
advance; they, the adjacent enclosures, and the interval between the
villages were strongly held, and manifestly the first thing to be done
was to force the enemy back from those advanced positions. Two batteries
opened a heavy shell fire on the Sahibdad village, under cover of which
Macpherson advanced his brigade against it, the 2d Goorkhas and 92d
Highlanders in his first line. Simultaneously Baker moved out to the
assault of Gundigan, clearing the gardens and orchards between him and
that village, and keeping touch as he advanced with the first brigade.

The shell fire compelled the Afghan occupants of Sahibdad to lie close,
and it was not until they were near the village that Macpherson's two
leading regiments encountered much opposition. It was carried at the
bayonet point after a very stubborn resistance; the place was full of
ghazees who threw their lives away recklessly, and continued to fire on
the British soldiers from houses and cellars after the streets had been
cleared. The 92d lost several men, but the Afghans were severely
punished; it was reported that 200 were killed in this village alone.
While a detachment remained to clear out the village, the brigade under a
heavy fire from the slopes and crest of the Fir Paimal hill moved on in
the direction of that hill's south-western extremity, the progress of the
troops impeded by obstacles in the shape of dry water-cuts, orchards, and
walled enclosures, every yard of which was infested by enemies and had to
be made good by steady fighting.

While Macpherson was advancing on Sahibdad, Baker's brigade had been
pushing on through complicated lanes and walled enclosures toward the
village of Gundigan. The opposition experienced was very resolute. The
Afghans held their ground behind loopholed walls which had to be carried
by storm, and they did not hesitate to take the offensive by making
vigorous counter-rushes. Baker's two leading regiments were the 72d and
the 2d Sikhs. The left wing of the former supported by the 5th Goorkhas,
the old and tried comrades of the 72d, assailed and took the village. Its
right wing fought its way through the orchards between it and Sahibdad,
in the course of which work it came under a severe enfilading fire from a
loopholed wall which the Sikhs on the right were attempting to turn.
Captain Frome and several men had been struck down and the hot fire had
staggered the Highlanders, when their chief, Colonel Brownlow, came up on
foot. That gallant soldier gave the word for a rush, but immediately fell
mortally wounded. After much hard fighting Baker's brigade got forward
into opener country, but was then exposed to the fire of an Afghan
battery near the extremity of the Pir Paimal spur, and to the attacks of
great bodies of ghazees, which were withstood stoutly by the Sikhs and
driven off by a bayonet attack delivered by the Highlanders.

The two brigades had accomplished the first part of their task. They were
now in alignment with each other; and the work before them was to
accomplish the turning movement round the steep extremity of the Pir
Paimal ridge. Macpherson's brigade, hugging the face of the elevation,
brought up the left shoulder and having accomplished the turning
movement, swept up the valley and carried the village of Pir Paimal by a
series of rushes. Here, however, Major White commanding the advance of
the 92d, found himself confronted by great masses of the enemy, who
appeared determined to make a resolute stand about their guns which were
in position south-west of the Babawali Kotul. Reinforcements were
observed hurrying up from Ayoub's standing camp at Mazra, and the Afghan
guns on the Kotul had been reversed so that their fire should enfilade
the British advance. Discerning that in such circumstances prompt action
was imperative, Macpherson determined to storm the position without
waiting for reinforcements. The 92d under Major White led the way,
covered by the fire of a field battery and supported by the 5th Goorkhas
and the 23d Pioneers. Springing out of a watercourse at the challenge of
their leader, the Highlanders rushed across the open ground. The Afghans,
sheltered by high banks, fired steadily and well; their riflemen from the
Pir Paimal slopes poured in a sharp cross fire; their guns were well
served. But the Scottish soldiers were not to be denied. Their losses
were severe, but they took the guns at the point of the bayonet, and
valiantly supported by the Goorkhas and pioneers, shattered and dispersed
the mass of Afghans, which was reckoned to have numbered some 8000 men.
No chance was given the enemy to rally. They were headed off from the Pir
Paimal slopes by Macpherson. Baker hustled them out of cover in the
watercourses in the basin on the left, and while one stream of fugitives
poured away across the river, another rolled backward into and through
Ayoub's camp at Mazra.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21