The Afghan Wars 1839 42 and 1878 80 by Archibald Forbes

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The remnant of the army consisted now of about seventy files of the 44th,
about 100 troopers, and a detachment of horse-artillery with a single
gun. The General sent to Akbar Khan to remonstrate with him on the attack
he had allowed to be made after having guaranteed that the force should
meet with no further molestation. Akbar protested his regret, and pleaded
his inability to control the wild Ghilzai hillmen, over whom, in their
lust for blood and plunder, their own chiefs had lost all control; but he
was willing to guarantee the safe conduct to Jellalabad of the European
officers and men if they would lay down their arms and commit themselves
wholly into his hands. This sinister proposal the General refused, and
the march was continued, led in disorder by the remnant of the camp
followers. In the steep descent from the Huft Kotul into the Tezeen
ravine, the soldiers following the rabble at some distance, came suddenly
on a fresh butchery. The Afghans had suddenly fallen on the confused
throng, and the descent was covered with dead and dying.

During the march from Kubbar-i-Jubbar to the Tezeen valley Shelton's
dogged valour had mainly saved the force from destruction. With a few
staunch soldiers of his own regiment, the one-armed veteran, restored now
to his proper _métier_ of stubborn fighting man, had covered the rear and
repelled the Ghilzai assaults with persevering energy and dauntless
fortitude. And he it was who now suggested, since Akbar Khan still held
to his stipulation that the force should lay down its arms, that a
resolute effort should be made to press on to Jugdulluk by a rapid night
march of four-and-twenty miles, in the hope of clearing the passes in
that vicinity before the enemy should have time to occupy them.

That the attempt would prove successful was doubtful, since the force was
already exhausted; but it was the last chance, and Shelton's suggestion
was adopted. In the early moonlight the march silently began, an ill omen
marking the start in the shape of the forced abandonment of the last gun.
Fatal delay occurred between Seh Baba and Kutti Sung because of a panic
among the camp followers, who, scared by a few shots, drifted backwards
and forwards in a mass, retarding the progress of the column and for the
time entirely arresting the advance of Shelton's and his rear-guard. The
force could not close up until the morning, ten miles short of Jugdulluk,
and already the Afghans were swarming on every adjacent height. All the
way down the broken slope to Jugdulluk the little column trudged through
the gauntlet of jezail fire which lined the road with dead and wounded.
Shelton and his rear-guard handful performed wonders, again and again
fending off with close fire and levelled bayonets the fierce rushes of
Ghilzais charging sword in hand. The harassed advance reached Jugdulluk
in the afternoon of the 11th, and took post behind some ruins on a height
by the roadside, the surviving officers forming line in support of the
gallant rear-guard struggling forward through its environment of
assailants. As Shelton and his brave fellows burst through the cordon
they were greeted by cheers from the knoll. But there was no rest for the
exhausted people, for the Afghans promptly occupied commanding positions
whence they maintained a fire from which the ruins afforded but scant
protection. To men parched with thirst the stream at the foot of their
knoll was but a tantalising aggravation, for to attempt to reach it was
certain death. The snow they devoured only increased their sufferings,
and but little stay was afforded by the raw flesh of a few gun bullocks.
Throughout the day volley after volley was poured down upon the weary
band by the inexorable enemy. Frequent sallies were made, and the heights
were cleared, but the positions were soon reoccupied and the ruthless
fire was renewed.

Captain Skinner, summoned by Akbar, brought back a message that General
Elphinstone should visit him to take part in a conference, and that
Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson should be given over as hostages
for the evacuation of Jellalabad. Compliance was held to be imperative,
and the temporary command was entrusted to Brigadier Anquetil. Akbar was
extremely hospitable to his compulsory guests; but he insisted on
including the General among his hostages, and was not moved by
Elphinstone's representations that he would prefer death to the disgrace
of being separated from his command in its time of peril. The Ghilzai
chiefs came into conference burning with hatred against the British, and
revelling in the anticipated delights of slaughtering them. Akbar seemed
sincere in his effort to conciliate them, but was long unsuccessful.
Their hatred seemed indeed stronger than their greed; but at length
toward nightfall Akbar announced that pacific arrangements had been
accepted by the tribes, and that what remained of the force should be
allowed to march unmolested to Jellalabad.

How futile was the compact, if indeed there was any compact, was soon
revealed. The day among the ruins on the knoll had passed in dark and
cruel suspense--in hunger, thirst, and exhaustion, in the presence of
frequent death; and as the evening fell, in anguish and all but utter
despair. As darkness set in the conviction enforced itself that to remain
longer in the accursed place was madness; and the little band, leaving
behind perforce the sick and wounded, marched out, resolute to push
through or die fighting. In the valley the only molestation at first was
a desultory fire from the camping Ghilzais, who were rather taken by
surprise, but soon became wide awake to their opportunities. Some hurried
forward to occupy the pass rising from the valley to the Jugdulluk crest;
others, hanging on the rear and flanks of the column encumbered with its
fatal incubus of camp followers, mixed among the unarmed throng with
their deadly knives, and killed and plundered with the dexterity of long
practice. Throughout the tedious march up the steeply rising defile a
spattering fire came from the rocks and ridges flanking the track, all
but blocked by the surging concourse of miserable followers. The advance
had to employ cruel measures to force its way through the chaos toward
the crest. As it is approached from the Jugdulluk direction the flanking
elevations recede and merge in the transverse ridge, which is crowned by
a low-cut abrupt rocky upheaval, worn down somewhat where the road passes
over the crest by the friction of traffic. Just here the tribesmen had
constructed a formidable abattis of prickly brushwood, which stretched
athwart the road, and dammed back the fugitives in the shallow oval basin
between the termination of the ravine and the summit of the ridge. In
this trap were caught our hapless people and the swarm of their native
followers, and now the end was very near. From behind the barrier, and
around the lip of the great trap, the hillmen fired their hardest into
the seething mass of soldiers and followers writhing in the awful Gehenna
on which the calm moon shone down. On the edges of this whirlpool of
death the fell Ghilzais were stabbing and hacking with the ferocious
industry inspired by thirst for blood and lust for plunder. It is among
the characteristics of our diverse-natured race to die game, and even to
thrill with a strange fierce joy when hope of escape from death has all
but passed away and there remains only to sell life at the highest
possible premium of exchange. Among our people, face to face with death
on the rocky Jugdulluk, officers and soldiers alike fought with cool
deadly rancour. The brigadier and the private engaged in the same fierce
_mêlée_, fought side by side, and fell side by side. Stalwart Captain
Dodgin of the 44th slew five Afghans before he fell. Captain Nicholl of
the horse-artillery, gunless now, rallied to him the few staunch gunners
who were all that remained to him of his noble and historic troop, and
led them on to share with him a heroic death.

All did not perish on the rugged summit of the Jugdulluk. The barrier was
finally broken through, and a scant remnant of the force wrought out its
escape from the slaughter-pit. Small detachments, harassed by sudden
onslaughts, and delayed by reluctance to desert wounded comrades, were
trudging in the darkness down the long slope to the Soorkhab. The morning
of the 13th dawned near Gundamuk on the straggling group of some twenty
officers and forty-five European soldiers. Its march arrested by sharp
attacks, the little band moved aside to occupy a defensive position on an
adjacent hillock. A local sirdar invited the senior officer to consult
with him as to a pacific arrangement, and while Major Griffiths was
absent on this errand there was a temporary suspension of hostilities.
The Afghans meanwhile swarmed around the detachment with a pretence of
friendship, but presently attempts were made to snatch from the soldiers
their arms. This conduct was sternly resented, and the Afghans were
forced back. They ascended an adjacent elevation and set themselves to
the work of deliberately picking off officer after officer, man after
man. The few rounds remaining in the pouches of the soldiers were soon
exhausted, but the detachment stood fast, and calmly awaited the
inevitable end. Rush after rush was driven back from its steadfast front,
but at last, nearly all being killed or wounded, a final onset of the
enemy, sword in hand, terminated the struggle, and completed the dismal
tragedy. Captain Souter of the 44th, with three or four privates all of
whom as well as himself were wounded, was spared and carried into
captivity; he saved the colours of his regiment, which he had tied round
his waist before leaving Jugdulluk. A group of mounted officers had
pushed forward as soon as they had cleared the barrier on the crest. Six
only reached Futtehabad in safety. There they were treacherously offered
food, and while they halted a few moments to eat two were cut down. Of
the four who rode away three were overtaken and killed within four miles
of Jellalabad; one officer alone survived to reach that haven of refuge.

The ladies, the married officers, and the original hostages, followed
Akbar Khan down the passes toward Jugdulluk, pursuing the line of retreat
strewn with its ghastly tokens of slaughter, and recognising almost at
every step the bodies of friends and comrades. At Jugdulluk they found
General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson, and learned
the fate which had overtaken the marching force. On the following day
Akbar quitted Jugdulluk with his hostages and the ladies, all of whom
were virtually prisoners, and rode away through the mountains in a
northerly direction. On the fourth day the fort of Budiabad in the
Lughman valley was reached, where Akbar left the prisoners while he went
to attempt the reduction of Jellalabad.

CHAPTER VIII: THE SIEGE AND DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD

Sale's brigade, retreating from Gundamuk, reached Jellalabad on the 12th
November 1841. An investigation into the state of the fortifications of
that place showed them, in their existing condition, to be incapable of
resisting a vigorous assault. But it was resolved to occupy the place,
and to Captain George Broadfoot, as garrison engineer, was committed the
duty of making it defensible. This assuredly was no light task. The
enciente was far too extensive for the slender garrison, and its tracing
was radically bad. The ramparts were so dilapidated that in places they
were scarcely discernible, and the ruins strewn over what should have
been the glacis afforded near cover to assailants, whose attitude was
already so threatening as to hinder the beginning of repairing
operations. Their fire swept the defences, and their braves capered
derisively to the strains of a bagpipe on the adjacent rocky elevation,
which thenceforth went by the name of 'Piper's Hill.' A sortie on the
15th cleared the environs of the troublesome Afghans, supplies began to
come in, and Broad-foot was free to set his sappers to the task of
repairing the fortifications, in which work the entrenching tools he had
wrenched from the Cabul stores proved invaluable. How greatly Sale had
erred in shutting up his force in Jellalabad was promptly demonstrated.
The connecting posts of Gundamuk and Peshbolak had to be evacuated; and
thus, from Jumrood at the foot of the Khyber up to Cabul, there remained
no intermediate post in British possession with the solitary exception of
Jellalabad, and communications were entirely interrupted except through
the medium of furtive messengers.

The Jellalabad garrison was left unmolested for nearly a fortnight, and
the repairs were well advanced when on the 29th the Afghans came down,
invested the place, and pushed their skirmishers close up to the walls.
On December 1st Colonel Dennie headed a sortie, which worsted the
besiegers with considerable slaughter and drove them from the vicinity.
Bad news came at intervals from Cabul, and at the new year arrived a
melancholy letter from Pottinger, confirming the rumours already rife of
the murder of the Envoy, and of the virtual capitulation to which the
Cabul force had submitted. A week later an official communication was
received from Cabul, signed by General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger,
formally announcing the convention which the Cabul force had entered into
with the chiefs, and ordering the garrison of Jellalabad forthwith to
evacuate that post and retire to Peshawur, leaving behind with 'the new
Governor,' an Afghan chief who was the bearer of the humiliating missive,
the fortress guns and such stores and baggage as there lacked transport
to remove. The council of war summoned by Sale was unanimous in favour of
non-compliance with this mandate. Broadfoot urged with vigour that an
order by a superior who was no longer a free agent and who issued it
under duress, could impose no obligation of obedience. Sale pronounced
himself untrammelled by a convention forced from people 'with knives at
their throats,' and was resolute in the expression of his determination
to hold Jellalabad unless ordered by the Government to withdraw.

More and more ominous tidings poured in from Cabul. A letter received on
January both reported the Cabul force to be still in the cantonments,
living utterly at the mercy of the Afghans; another arriving on the 12th
told of the abandonment of the cantonments and the beginning of the
march, but that the forlorn wayfarers were lingering in detention at
Bootkhak, halted in their misery by the orders of Akbar Khan. Those
communications in a measure prepared the people in Jellalabad for
disaster, but not for the awful catastrophe of which Dr Brydon had to
tell, when in the afternoon of the 13th the lone man, whose approach to
the fortress Lady Butler's painting so pathetically depicts, rode through
the Cabul gate of Jellalabad. Dr Brydon was covered with cuts and
contusions, and was utterly exhausted. His first few hasty sentences
extinguished all hope in the hearts of the listeners regarding their
Cabul comrades and friends.

There was naturally great excitement in Jellalabad, but no panic. The
working parties were called in, the assembly was sounded, the gates were
closed, the walls were lined, and the batteries were manned; for it was
believed for the moment that the enemy were in full pursuit of fugitives
following in Brydon's track. The situation impressed Broadfoot with the
conviction that a crisis had come in the fortunes of the Jellalabad
garrison. He thought it his duty to lay before the General the conditions
of the critical moment which he believed to have arrived, pointing out to
him that the imperative alternatives were that he should either firmly
resolve on the defence of Jellalabad to the last extremity, or that he
should make up his mind to a retreat that very night, while as yet
retreat was practicable. Sale decided on holding on to the place, and
immediately announced to the Commander-in-Chief his resolve to persevere
in a determined defence, relying on the promise of the earliest possible
relief.

Because of the defection of his Sikh auxiliaries and the
faint-heartedness of his sepoys, Wild's efforts to cross the threshold of
the Khyber had failed, and with the tidings of his failure there came to
Sale the information that the effort for his relief must be indefinitely
postponed. It may be assumed that this intimation weakened in some degree
the General's expressed resolution to hold Jellalabad with determination,
and it is not to be denied that this resolution was in a measure
conditional on the not unwarranted expectation of early relief. Neither
he nor his adviser Macgregor appears to have realised how incumbent on
the garrison of Jellalabad it was to hold out to the last extremity,
irrespective of consequences to itself, unless it should receive a
peremptory recall from higher authority; or to have recognised the
glorious opportunity presented of inspiriting by its staunch constancy
and high-souled self-abnegation a weak government staggering under a
burden of calamity. Than Sale no braver soldier ever wore sword, but a
man may delight to head a forlorn hope and yet lack nerve to carry with
high heart a load of responsibility; nor was Macgregor so constituted as
to animate his chief to noble emprise. Fast on the heels of the gloomy
tidings from the Khyber mouth there came to them from Shah Soojah, who
was still the nominal sovereign at Cabul, a curt peremptory letter
obviously written under compulsion, of which the following were the
terms: 'Your people have concluded a treaty with us; you are still in
Jellalabad; what are your intentions? Tell us quickly.'

Sale summoned a council of war, which assembled at his quarters on
January 27th. Its proceedings were recorded, and the documents laid
before it were preserved by Captain Henry Havelock in his capacity as
Sale's staff-officer. Record and papers were reclaimed from Havelock's
custody by General Sale before the evacuation of Afghanistan, and had
been long lost to sight. They have recently been deposited among the
records of the India Office, but not before their latest non-official
possessor had published some extracts from them. It is to be hoped that
the more important documents may be given to the public in full, since
passages from documents, whether intentionally or not, may be so
extracted as to be misleading. Broadfoot, who had been a member of the
council of war, and who was apparently aware of the suppression of the
official records, wrote in 1843 a detailed narrative of its proceedings
while his recollection of them was still fresh, and this narrative he
sent to Havelock, desiring him to note 'any points erroneously stated,
distinguishing between what you may merely not remember and what you know
I am mistaken in.' Havelock, who was a loyal and ardent admirer of
General Sale, having sparsely annotated Broadfoot's narrative, returned
it with the statement that he had compared it with memoranda still in his
possession, and that he considered that it 'contributes a fair and
correct statement of that which occurred.' The officers comprising the
council to whom Sale and Macgregor addressed themselves were Colonel
Dennie of the 13th, Colonel Monteath of the 35th N.I., Captains Backhouse
and Abbott of the artillery, Captain Oldfield commanding the cavalry, and
Captain Broadfoot the garrison engineer. The following is a summary of
the proceedings, as recorded by Broadfoot and authenticated by Havelock.

After a few formal words from General Sale, he called on Macgregor to
submit a matter on which that political officer and himself were agreed.
Macgregor then described the situation from the point of view of Sale and
himself, and expressed their united conviction that nothing was to be
hoped for from the Government. Reserving his own liberty of action, he
sought the opinion of the officers on offers received from Akbar Khan to
treat for the evacuation of Afghanistan, and he laid before them a draft
answer to Shah Soojah's curt letter, professing the readiness of the
garrison to evacuate Jellalabad on his requisition, since it was held
only for him, but naming certain conditions: the exchange of hostages,
the restoration of British prisoners and hostages in exchange for the
Afghan hostages on arrival of the force at Peshawur, escort thither 'in
safety and honour,' with arms, colours, and guns, and adequate assistance
of supplies and transport. Both Sale and Macgregor frankly owned that
they were resolved to yield, and negotiate for safe retreat.

Great excitement from the first had pervaded the assemblage, and when
Macgregor had finished his statement Broadfoot arose in his wrath. He
declined to believe that the Government had abandoned the Jellalabad
garrison to its fate, and there was a general outburst of indignation
when Sale produced a letter carrying that significance. Broadfoot waxed
so warm in his remonstrances against the proposed action that an
adjournment was agreed to. Next day Sale and Macgregor urged that it was
impossible to hold out much longer, that later retreat would be
impracticable, and that the scheme they proposed was safe and honourable.
Broadfoot denounced it as disgraceful, contended that they could hold
Jellalabad indefinitely--'could colonise if they liked'--and retreat at
discretion. He denied that the place was held for Shah Soojah, and
challenged their right to surrender the post unless by Government order.
Hostages he proclaimed worthless while the Afghans held heavier pledges
of ours in the shape of prisoners and hostages. He denounced as
disgraceful the giving of hostages on our part. Monteath's remark that
nobody would go as a hostage roused Oldfield to express himself tersely
but pointedly on the subject. 'I for one,' he exclaimed in great
agitation, 'will fight here to the last drop of my blood, but I plainly
declare that I will never be a hostage, and I am surprised that anyone
should propose such a thing, or regard an Afghan's word as worth
anything.' The resolution to treat for the abandonment of Jellalabad was
carried, Oldfield only voting with Broadfoot against it, but the
stipulations: regarding hostages were omitted. Broadfoot continued to
press modifications of the conditions set out in the proposed reply,
pleading, but in vain, that the restoration of the prisoners in Afghan
hands before departure of the garrison should be insisted on; and that
since evacuation was resolved on, it should at least be conducted as a
military operation, and not degradingly under escort. Then, and little
wonder, he objected to expressions in the draft letter as too abject, and
he was successful in procuring the alteration of them. The letter was
written out, signed by Macgregor, and despatched to Cabul. It was agreed
that those members of the council who chose to do should record in
writing the reasons for their votes, and this was done by Dennie,
Monteath, Abbott, and Broadfoot.

Broadfoot, pending an answer from Cabul, set the garrison to work in
digging a ditch round the fortifications. The reply from the Shah, to the
effect 'If you are sincere in offers, let all the chief gentlemen affix
their seals,' was laid before the reassembled council on February 12th.
The implied imputation on the good faith of British officers might well
have stung to indignation the meekest; but the council's opinion was
taken as to the expediency of complying with the derogatory request made
by the Shah, as well as of a stipulation--a modification of what
Broadfoot had originally urged in vain--for the surrender of all
prisoners, hostages, sick, and wounded under detention in Afghanistan, on
the arrival at Peshawur of the Jellalabad brigade. The members of
council, who in the long interval since the previous meeting had been
gradually regaining their self-respect and mental equipoise, unanimously
declined to accept the proposals tendered them by their commanding
officer and his political ally; and a letter written by Monteath was
accepted, which 'was not a continuation of the negotiation.'

Thus ended the deliberations of the memorable council of war, whose
eleventh hour resolve to 'hold the fort' mainly averted the ruin of
British prestige in India and throughout the regions bordering on our
Eastern Empire; and the credit of its final decision to repudiate the
humiliating proposals of Sale and Macgregor belongs to George Broadfoot,
who was firmly though silently backed by Havelock. The day after that
decision was formulated a letter came from Peshawur informing the
garrison that every effort would be made for its relief; and thenceforth
there was no more talk of surrender, nor was the courage of the little
brigade impaired even when the earthquake of February 19th shook the
newly repaired fortifications into wreck. Broadfoot's vehement energy
infected the troops, and by the end of the month the parapets were
entirely restored, the bastions repaired, and every battery
re-established.

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