The United States Since The Civil War by Charles Ramsdell Lingley

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A great contribution to the understanding of Hayes's administration was
made by the publication of C.R. Williams, _Life of Rutherford B. Hayes_
(2 vols., 1914). It is complete and contains copious extracts from
Hayes's diary, but is written with less of the critical spirit than is
desirable; J.F. Rhodes has a valuable chapter in his _Historical Essays_
(1909); J.W. Burgess, _Administration of R.B. Hayes_ (1916), is a
eulogy; V.L. Shores, _Hayes-Conkling Controversy_ (1919), describes the
civil service quarrel; J.R. Commons and others, _History of Labor in the
United States_ (2 vols., 1918), describes the strike of 1877; so also
does J.F. Rhodes, _History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley_
(1919), with full references. On the Chinese affair, consult Mrs. M.E.
B.S. Coolidge, _Chinese Immigration_ (1909). Most of the general
histories already mentioned dwell at length on the Hayes administration.

For the official messages of this and succeeding administrations, the
most convenient source is J.D. Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the
Presidents_ (10 vols., 1903).

* * * * *

[1] For a time public interest was absorbed by the determination of
President and Mrs. Hayes to serve no wines of any kind in the White
House. Finally a delicious frozen punch was served at about the middle
of the state dinners, known to the thirsty as "the Life-saving Station."
It was popularly understood to be liberally strengthened with old Santa
Croix rum, but the President later asserted that he had caused the punch
to be sharpened with the flavor of Jamaica rum and that no drop of
spirits was inserted. What the _chef_ really did, perhaps nobody knows.
At any rate, both sides were satisfied. Williams, _R.B. Hayes_, II; 312
note.

[2] Because March 4 fell on Sunday, the oath of office was privately
administered to Hayes on Saturday evening, March 3. Williams, _Hayes_,
II, 5.

[3] George W. McCrary was Secretary of War; Richard W. Thompson,
Secretary of the Navy; Charles Devens, Attorney-General.

[4] Chamberlain, the Republican claimant in South Carolina, wrote in
1901 that he was "quite ready now to say that he feels sure that there
was no possibility of securing permanent good government in South
Carolina through Republican influences." _Atlantic Monthly_, LXXXVII,
482.

[5] Many of the dispatches were in a complicated cipher which resisted
all attempts at solution. The _Tribune_ published samples from time
to time, keeping interest alive in the hope that somebody might solve
the riddle. Finally two members of the _Tribune_ staff were successful
in discovering the key to the cipher in a way that recalls the
paper-covered detective story. The newspaper aroused and excited public
interest by publishing specimens and eventually achieved a sensation by
putting the most damaging material into print on October 16, 1878. One
of the telegrams, with its translation, ran as follows:

"Absolutely Petersburg can procured by Copenhagen may Thomas
prompt Edinburgh must if river take be you less London Thames
will."

Translation: If Returning Board can be procured absolutely, will
you deposit 30,000 dollars? May take less. Must be prompt. Thomas.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF THE EARLY EIGHTIES

The Hayes administration was scarcely half over when the politicians
began to look forward to the election of 1880. At the outset of his
term, Hayes had advocated a single term for the executive and there was
no widespread movement among the politicians to influence him to change
his attitude. His enemies, indeed, had already turned to General Grant.
There had been a third-term boom for the General during his second
administration and he had indicated that he was not formidably opposed
to further continuance in office. Suddenly, however, the anti-third-term
feeling had risen to impressive proportions, whereupon the House of
Representatives had adopted a resolution which characterized any
departure from the two-term precedent as "unwise, unpatriotic, and
fraught with peril to our free institutions." As the resolution passed
by an overwhelming vote--233-18--nothing further was heard of a
third-term boom.

The Hayes administration put a different complexion on the matter. The
wheel-horses of the party were not enthusiastic over the President or
his policies, and in their extremity they looked to Grant. The New York
State Republican Convention, under control of Roscoe Conkling and his
forces, instructed delegates to support the General as a candidate for
the nomination and endeavored to forestall opposition to a third term.
It declared that the objection to a third presidential term applied only
to a third consecutive term and hence was inapplicable to the
re-election of Grant. Grant, meanwhile, presented a spectacle that was
at once humorous and pathetic. He had not expected, on leaving the
presidency, to return to power again, had dropped consideration of the
political future and had given himself up to the enjoyment of foreign
travel. The royal reception accorded him wherever he went suggested to
his political supporters that they utilize his popularity. It was
foreseen that when he returned to America he would receive a tremendous
ovation, on the wave of which he might be carried into office. He was
flooded with advice and entreaties that he act in accordance with this
plan. His family was eager to return to the position of social eminence
which they had occupied, and pressure from them was incessant. At first
he did nothing either to aid or to hinder the boom, then gave way to the
pressure and at last became extremely anxious to obtain the coveted
prize.

If the politicians did, in truth, desire a relaxation from the patronage
standards of the Hayes regime, they did not make that the ostensible
purpose of their campaign. They argued that the times demanded a strong
man; that foreign travel had greatly broadened the General and given him
a knowledge of other forms of government; that he had been great as a
commander of armies, greater as a President, and that as a citizen of
the Republic he "shone with a luster that challenged the admiration of
the world." Behind him were Conkling and Platt, with the New York state
organization under their control, Don Cameron who held Pennsylvania in
his hand, General Logan, strong in Illinois, and lesser leaders who
wielded much power in smaller states. Many business men were ready to
lend their aid; the powerful Methodist Church, to which he belonged, was
favorable to him; and, of course, his popularity as a military leader
was unbounded. His return to the United States while the enthusiasm was
at its height was the signal for an unprecedented ovation. The opponents
of a third term painted in high colors the danger of a revival of the
scandals of Grant's days in the presidential chair, formed "No Third
Term" leagues, called an "Anti-Third-Term" convention and decried the
danger of continuing a military man in civil office. _The Nation_
scoffed at the educational effect of foreign travel on a man who was
fifty-seven years of age and could understand the language in only one
of the countries in which he travelled. A large fraction of the
Republican press, in fact, was in opposition. "Anything to beat Grant"
and "No third term" were their war-cries. Nor was there any lack of
Republican candidates to oppose the Grant movement and to give promise
of a lively nominating convention. Blaine's popularity was as widespread
as ever. Those who feared the nomination of either Grant or Blaine
favored Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont or Secretary Sherman. Both
of these men were of statesmanlike proportions, but Edmunds was never
widely popular and Sherman was lacking in the arts of the
politician--"the human icicle," T.C. Platt called him.

The Republican nominating convention of 1880 met in Chicago in a
building described as "one of the most splendid barns" ever built. This
convention is unusually worthy of study because it involved most of the
elements which entered into American politics in the early eighties. It
was long memorable as making a record for that form of enthusiasm which
bursts into demonstrations. "Great applause," "loud laughter," "cheers"
and "hisses long and furious" dot the newspaper accounts of its
deliberations. The members "acted like so many Bedlamites," one of the
delegates said. On one day the opening prayer was so unexpectedly short
that there was applause and laughter. The keen contest for the
nomination resulted in galleries packed with supporters of the several
candidates, who cheered furiously as their favorite delegates appeared.
As the galleries came down nearly to the level of the floor, the
spectators were almost as much members of the convention as the
delegates themselves. It was under such conditions, then, that the
convention proceeded to the serious business of adopting principles and
choosing a leader.

Three hundred and six of the 757 delegates were sworn supporters of
Grant--pledged to die, if they died at all, "with their boots on," one
of their leaders said. In each of the big delegations--those from New
York, Pennsylvania and Illinois--a minority was unfavorable to Grant.
This minority could be counted in the General's column if the convention
could be forced to adopt the so-called "unit-rule," under which the
delegation from a state casts all its votes for the candidate favored by
the majority. In this particular case, the minorities in New York,
Pennsylvania and Illinois numbered more than sixty delegates, so that
the adoption of the rule was a stake worth playing for. The plan
formulated by the Grant leaders was worthy of the time.

Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania was chairman of the National Republican
Committee. Following the usual custom, Cameron was to call the
convention to order and present the temporary chairman who had been
chosen by the Committee. As the Grant supporters were in a minority even
on the Committee, provision was made to meet the emergency in case the
majority insisted on the appointment of an anti-Grant chairman. Cameron
was to announce the name, a Grant delegate was to move to substitute a
Grant man instead, and Cameron would enforce the unit-rule in the
resulting ballot. This would ensure control of the organization of the
convention and, doubtless, of the nomination of the candidate.

Unhappily for this well-laid plan, rumor of it leaked out, and the
majority of the National Committee--opposed to Grant--conveyed
information to Cameron that he must agree to give up such a scheme or be
ousted from his position. Cameron, convinced that his enemies were
determined, gave up his project, and Senator George F. Hoar, who favored
neither Grant nor Blaine, was made temporary and later permanent
chairman.

Although defeated in the first skirmish, the Grant forces pressed
forward for renewed conflict. Conkling presented a resolution that every
member of the convention be bound in honor to support the eventual
candidate, whoever he might be. The resolution passed 716 to three; and
he then moved that the three who had voted in the negative had thereby
forfeited their votes in the convention. James A. Garfield of Ohio led
the opposition to such rough-shod action and Conkling angrily withdrew
his resolution amid hisses. When Garfield reported from the Committee on
Rules in regard to the regulations under which the convention should
deliberate, he moved that the unit rule be not adopted and the
convention upheld him. It was manifest that the delegates were not in a
mood to surrender to a junto of powerful machine politicians.

The way having been now cleared for action, the convention adopted a
platform. This was composed largely of a summary of the achievements of
the party and denunciation of the opposition. Most of the planks were
abstract or perfunctory, or expressed in such a way as not to commit the
party seriously. _Harper's Weekly_, a Republican periodical, regretted
the character of the platform and remarked that such documents are
expected to say

An undisputed thing
In such a solemn way.

Judged by this criterion, the platform was ideal. The obligations of the
country to the veterans were emphasized and the restriction of Chinese
immigration called for. On the tariff, the only utterance was an avowal
that duties levied for the purposes of revenue should discriminate in
favor of labor. After this declaration of faith had been unanimously
adopted, a Massachusetts delegate presented an additional plank
advocating civil service reform.

The convention was now badly put to it. To reject a plank which had been
accepted both in 1872 and in 1876 would discredit the party,
particularly as the platform just adopted had accused the opposition of
sacrificing patriotism "to a supreme and insatiable lust for office."
Nevertheless the opposition to its adoption was formidable, and it had
already been twice rejected in the Committee on Resolutions, which drew
up the platform. There seemed no way of avoiding the issue, however, and
the plank was thereupon adopted, though not before Webster Flanagan of
Texas had blurted out, "After we have won the race ... we will give
those who are entitled to positions office. What are we up here for?"

With the speeches presenting candidates to the convention, the real
business of the week began. Senator Conkling aroused a tempest of
enthusiasm for General Grant in a famous speech which began with the
lines,

When asked what state he hails from,
Our sole reply shall be,
He comes from Appomattox
And its famous apple tree.

Garfield presented Sherman's name. At the outset General Grant led,
Blame was a close second and Sherman third. This order continued for
thirty-five ballots. By that time Blaine and Grant had fought each other
to a standstill. The General's three hundred and six held together
without a break, and Blaine's forces were equally determined.[1]

There was little chance of compromise, as Grant and Blaine were not on
speaking terms, and Conkling and Blaine looked upon each other with
unconcealed hatred. Since Sherman was handicapped by lack of united
support in his own state, the natural solution of the problem seemed to
be the choice of some other leader who might harmonize the contending
factions. On the thirty-fourth ballot, seventeen votes were given to
Garfield; on the next, fifty; then a stampede began, in spite of a
protest by Garfield, and on the thirty-sixth ballot a union of the
Blaine and Sherman forces made him the choice of the convention. The
nominee for the vice-presidency was Chester A. Arthur, who was one of
the leading supporters of Grant and a member of the Conkling group.

The choice of Garfield was well received by the country, perhaps the
more so as a relief from the danger of a third term. The nominee was a
man of great industry, possessed of a store of information, tactful,
modest, popular, an effective orator, and a veteran of the war. His
rise from canal boy to candidate for the presidency exemplified the
possibilities before industrious youth and gave rise to many a homily
on democratic America. Yet his friends had to defend his relation to a
paving scandal in the District of Columbia and an unwise connection with
the Credit Mobilier of 1873. In neither of these cases does Garfield
seem to have been corrupt, but in neither does he appear in a highly
favorable light.[2]

As the Republicans were dispersing, the Greenback convention was
assembling. Their strength in the campaign was almost negligible but
their platform presaged the future. Money to be issued only by the
government, the volume of money increased, ameliorative labor
legislation, restriction of Chinese immigration, regulation of
interstate commerce, an income tax, government for the people rather
than for classes, wider suffrage,--all these were advocated in concise
and unmistakable terms. James B. Weaver was the presidential candidate.

Among the Democrats, the all important question was whether Tilden would
be a candidate again. He naturally wished for a renomination and an
opportunity to prove by an election that he had been "fraudulently"
deprived of the presidency in 1876. The party, likewise, seemed to need
his services, as no other leader of equal prominence had appeared. On
the other hand, his health had rapidly failed since 1876 and it was
apparent that he was unequal to the exacting labors of the presidency.
Not until just before the meeting of the convention, however, did he
make known his wishes and then he declared that he desired nothing so
much as an honorable discharge from public service and that he
"renounced" the renomination. The party took him at his word and turned
to the adoption of a platform and the choice of another leader.

The platform reflected the bitterness of the party over the "great
fraud" of 1876-1877 and advocated tariff for revenue only, civil service
reform and the restriction of Chinese immigration. In other words,
except for the usual self-congratulation and the denunciation of the
opposition, the Democratic platform closely resembled that of the
Republicans. The convention then nominated for the presidency General
Winfield S. Hancock, a modest, brave Union soldier, of whom Grant once
said, "his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a
blunder for which he was responsible." He was not an experienced
politician, but was popular even in the South.

On the whole the Democratic convention was much less interesting than
its Republican predecessor. There were no fierce factional quarrels to
arouse the emotions to concert pitch. The applause spurted out here and
there like the "jets from a splitting hose" in the "Ki yi yi yi" which
characterized the cheers of the lower wards of New York, in contrast to
the rolling billows of applause which formed so memorable an element in
the opposition gathering. The New York Tribune, although hostile to
everything Democratic, perhaps stated the fact when it commented on the
lack of enthusiasm. The convention, the Tribune noted, was well-behaved,
but a mob without leaders; there were no Conklings or Garfields or
Logans, only John Kelleys and Wade Hamptons.

The campaign of 1880 reflected the lack of definite utterances in the
party platforms. Since each side was loath to press forward to the
solution of any real problem facing the nation, the campaign was
confined, for the most part, to petty or even corrupt partisanship. The
career of General Garfield was carefully overhauled for evidences of
scandal. Arthur's failings as a public officer were duly paraded.
General Hancock was ridiculed as "a good man weighing two hundred and
forty pounds." Some attempt was made by the Republicans to make an issue
of the tariff, and a remark of Hancock to the effect that the tariff was
a "local issue" was jeered at as proving an ignorance of public
questions. There was little response to the "bloody shirt" and little
interest in "the great fraud." A modicum of enthusiasm was injected into
the canvass by the participation of Conkling and General Grant. The
former was not happily disposed toward the Republican candidate and
Grant had always refused to make campaign speeches, but as the autumn
came on and defeat seemed imminent, these two leaders were prevailed
upon to lend their assistance. Near the end of the campaign a letter was
circulated in the Pacific states, purporting to have been written by
Garfield to a Mr. Morey, and expressing opposition to the restriction of
Chinese immigration. The signature was a forgery, but complete exposure
in the short time before election day was impossible and the letter
perhaps injured Garfield on the coast. Nevertheless Garfield and Arthur
won, although their popular plurality was only 9,500 in a total of about
nine millions. The electoral vote was 214 to 155 and showed that the
division among the states was sectional, for in the North Hancock
carried only New Jersey, together with Nevada and five electoral votes
in California, the result probably of the Morey letter.

Two aspects of the campaign had especial significance. The attempt by
Conkling and his associates to choose the Republican nominee through the
shrewd manipulation of political machinery, and against the wishes of
the rank and file of the party, was a move on the part of the greater
state bosses to get control of the national organization, so that they
might manage it as they managed their local committees and conventions.
The second notable circumstance concerned the collection and expenditure
of the campaign funds.

Even before the convention met, the Republican Congressional Committee,
pursuing the common practice of the time, addressed a letter to all
federal employees, except heads of departments, in which the suggestion
was made that the office holders would doubtless consider it a
"privilege and a pleasure" to contribute to the campaign funds an amount
equal to two per cent. of their salaries. The Republican National
Committee also made its demands on office holders--usually five per
cent. of a year's salary. The Democrats, having no hold on the federal
offices, had to content themselves with the cultivation of the
possibilities in states which they controlled. In New York, Senator
Platt was chairman of the executive committee and he sent a similar
communication to federal employees in the state. Even the office boy in
a rural post office was not overlooked, and when contributions were not
forthcoming, the names of delinquents were sent to their superiors.
Other developments appeared after the election was over. In February,
1881, a dinner was given in honor of Senator S.W. Dorsey, secretary of
the Republican National Committee, to whom credit was given for carrying
the state of Indiana. General Grant presided and grace was asked by
Reverend Henry Ward Beecher. Dorsey was an Arkansas carpet-bagger, who
had been connected with a railroad swindle and was soon, as it turned
out, to be indicted for complication in other frauds. The substance of
the speeches was that the prospect of success in the campaign seemed
waning, that Indiana was essential to success and that Dorsey was the
agent who accomplished the task. Arthur, who was one of the speakers,
explained the _modus operandi_: "Indiana was really, I suppose, a
Democratic State. It had been put down on the books always as a State
that might be carried by close and perfect organization and a great deal
of--(laughter). I see the reporters are present, therefore I will simply
say that everybody showed a great deal of interest in the occasion and
distributed tracts and political documents all through the State."

With the victory accomplished, the politicians turned from the contest
with the common enemy to the question of the division of the spoils;
from the ostensible issue of platforms, to the real issue that Flanagan
had personified. Although the Republicans had presented a united front
to their opponents, there were factional troubles within the party that
all but dwarfed the larger contest. The "Stalwarts" were composed of the
thorough "organization men" like Conkling, Platt and Arthur; the
"Half-breeds" were anti-organization men and more sympathetic with the
administration. The commander of the Stalwarts and one of the most
influential leaders in the country was Roscoe Conkling, Senator from New
York. In person Conkling was a tall, handsome, imperious man, with
something of the theatrical in his appearance and manner. As a
politician he was aggressive, fearless, scornful, shrewd and adroit when
he chose to be, and masterful, always. As an orator he knew how to play
on the feelings of the crowd; his vocabulary, when he turned upon one
whom he disliked, was memorable for its wealth of invective and
ridicule, and especially he uncorked the vials of his wrath on any who
were not strictly organization men. Although an able man and a
successful lawyer, Conkling seems to have had less interest in the
public welfare than in conventions, elections and patronage.

The announcement of Garfield's choice of a Cabinet was the signal for a
fierce patronage fight. James G. Blaine, the choice for Secretary of
State, was distasteful in the extreme to Conkling. Many years before,
during a debate in the House, Blaine had compared Conkling to Henry
Winter Davis as

Hyperion to a satyr, Thersites to Hercules, mud to marble,
dunghill to diamond, a singed cat to a Bengal tiger, a whining
puppy to a roaring lion.

He had contemptuously referred to Conkling's "haughty disdain, his
grandiloquent swell, his majestic, supereminent, overpowering,
turkey-gobbler strut." Accordingly when Garfield disregarded Conkling's
wishes in regard to the representation which New York should have in the
cabinet, Conkling laid the blame upon his old enemy.[3]

As soon as the administration was in office, the Senate met in executive
session to act on appointments, and it appeared that the parties were
evenly divided, the balance of power lying in the hands of two
Independents. President Garfield sent in his list of nominees for office
without consulting Conkling in regard to New York appointments. Among
them was William H. Robertson for the coveted position of collector for
the port of New York. As Robertson had been opposed to Grant and to the
unit rule in the Republican convention, Conkling's rage reached a fever
pitch. In an attempt to discredit the President before the country, he
made public a letter from Garfield giving countenance to the practice of
levying campaign assessments on federal employees. Conkling's point of
view is not difficult to understand. Consultation with the senators from
a state with regard to nominations to offices within its boundaries was
the common custom; Conkling had sunk his dislike of Garfield during the
campaign in order to assist in a party victory; moreover, he and Platt,
the other New York senator, understood that Garfield had agreed to
dispense New York patronage in conformity to the wishes of the
Stalwarts, in case Conkling took the stump. He had carried out his part
of the bargain and now desired his _quid pro quo_.