The United States Since The Civil War by Charles Ramsdell Lingley

C >> Charles Ramsdell Lingley >> The United States Since The Civil War

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42

The growing enthusiasm for silver which was sweeping over the South and
West and rapidly developing into something resembling frenzy was
difficult for the more stolid East to comprehend. Not merely the
politician, but the man on the street and in the store, the
school-teacher, the farmer and the laborer, in those portions of the
country, fell to discussing the virtues of silver as currency and the
effect of a greater volume of circulating medium upon prices and
prosperity. The two metals became personified in the minds of the
people. Gold was the symbol of cruel, snobbish plutocracy; silver of
upright democracy. Gold deserted the country in its hour of need;
silver remained at home to minister to the wants of the people. Such
arguments as those presented in _Coin's Financial School_, published in
1894, brought financial policy within the circle of the emotions of its
readers even if they did not satisfy the more critical student of
monetary problems. This influential little volume, written by W.H.
Harvey, acted as a hand-book of free coinage, cleverly setting forth
the major arguments for the increased use of silver and bringing
forward objections which were triumphantly demolished. Simple
illustrations enforced the lessons taught by its pages: a wood-cut of a
cripple with one leg indicated how handicapped the country was without
the free coinage of two metals; in another, Senator Sherman and
President Cleveland were depicted digging out the silver portion of the
foundations of a house which had been erected on a stable basis of both
gold and silver; in a third, western farmers were seen industriously
stuffing fodder into a cow which capitalists were milking for the
benefit of New York and New England.[1] With the enthusiasm and the
sincerity of the early crusaders, the people assembled in ten thousand
schoolhouses to debate the absorbing subject of the currency. Indeed
the South and West had become convinced that the miseries inflicted
upon mankind by war, pestilence and famine had been less "cruel,
unpitying, and unrelenting than the persistent and remorseless
exaction" which the contraction of the volume of the currency had made
upon society. Low prices, the stagnation of industry, empty and idle
stores, workshops and factories, the increase of crime and
bankruptcy--all were laid at the door of the gold standard.

The East looked upon the rising in the West at first with amusement,
and was quite ready to accept the diagnosis of a western newspaper man,
quoted by Peck in his _Twenty Years of the Republic_:

What's the matter with Kansas?

We all know; yet here we are at it again. We have an old
moss-back Jacksonian who snorts and howls because there is a
bath-tub in the State House. We are running that old jay for
Governor.... We have raked the ash-heap of failure in the State
and found an old human hoop-skirt who has failed as a business
man, who has failed as an editor, who has failed as a preacher,
and we are going to run him for Congressman-at-large.... Then we
have discovered a kid without a law practice and have decided to
run him for Attorney-General.

Later the East looked upon tendencies in the West with more concern:
Roosevelt, although admitting the honesty of the Populists, characterized
their ignorance as "abysmal"; others were more inclined to doubt their
sincerity; their conventions were supposed to be made up of cranks and
unsexed women; and their principles were looked upon as "wild and crazy
notions."

In fact it was no simple task to distinguish between the legitimate
grievances and ambitions of the westerners, and their eccentricities
and errors. Nor was this difficulty lessened by the reputation with
which some of the proponents of silver were justly or unjustly
credited. "Sockless Jerry" Simpson and Mrs. Lease were among them--the
Mrs. Lease to whom was ascribed the remark "Kansas had better stop
raising corn and begin raising hell!"[2] Benjamin R. Tillman was
another--a rough, forceful character, leader of the poor whites and
small farmers of South Carolina, organizer of the "wool hats" against
the "silk hats" and the "kid gloves"--Governor of the state and later
member of the federal Senate. Although a Democrat, he was thoroughly at
odds with Cleveland, and publicly declared it was his ambition to stick
his pitchfork into the President's sides.[3] Richard P. Bland, of
Missouri, had the disadvantage of having been one of the earliest of
the silver supporters, since he had initiated the bill which resulted
in the Bland-Allison act, and was looked upon in the East as a
thorough-going, free-silver radical. Governor Altgeld, of Illinois,
leader of the Democrats of that state from 1892 to 1896, was a
successful lawyer who was looked upon by his friends as a
liberal-minded humanitarian, the friend of

The mocked and the scorned and the wounded,
the lame and the poor,

whose sympathies with the laboring classes had given him the support of
the reformers and the wage earners. But his pardon of the Haymarket
anarchists and his attitude during the Pullman strike had led the East
to regard him as a dangerous revolutionist and an enemy to society.[4]

The free-silver movement nevertheless continued to gather momentum. For
some years influential silver advocates had been associated in the
Bimetallic League, an organization which supported the free coinage
of both gold and silver. Among its members were prominent Democrats,
Republicans and Populists, especially from the western states, and some
of the foremost labor leaders. At one of its meetings in 1893 it was
determined to invite every labor and industrial organization in the
country to send delegates. A few experts, even in the East, gave some
scientific support to the argument for the greater use of silver.
Eastern Republicans like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed free coinage
of both metals by an international agreement, which, they thought,
might be brought about through threats of tariff discrimination against
nations refusing to adhere to the arrangement. A silver convention in
Nebraska in 1894 was attended by a thousand delegates. From the point of
view of party harmony the subject was a nuisance. Democratic state
conventions were badly divided. Thirty of them adopted resolutions
distinctly favorable to free coinage and fourteen opposed. Ten of the
latter committed themselves definitely to the gold standard. The
fourteen included all the northeastern states, together with Michigan,
Wisconsin and Minnesota. Such gold Democrats as President Cleveland
sought to stem the tide, but Cleveland's control over his followers was
rapidly dwindling, and it seemed likely that the silver element of the
party might reach out to seize the organization and displace the former
leaders.

The Republican professional politicians were as ignorant of technical
monetary problems as the Democrats, and moreover did not wish to risk
popular disapproval in any section by utterances which might be
offensive to that part of the country. The first Republican state
convention during 1896 was that in Ohio. Its financial plank was
awaited with interest, because of the early date of the meeting and
because its proceedings were in the hands of friends of the most
prominent candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. The
convention dodged the issue by demanding that all our currency be
"sound as the Government and as untarnished as its honor," and that
both metals be used as currency and kept at parity by legislative
restrictions. The New York _Tribune_ thought that this could mean
nothing but a gold standard; the _Times_ was fearful that it would lead
to silver; the _Springfield Republican_ condemned it as "chock full of
double-dealing." Its ambiguity, however, was in line with the purposes
and ambitions of two men who were actively preparing for the campaign
of 1896--Marcus A. Hanna and Major William McKinley.

Marcus A. Hanna, or "Mark" Hanna as he was universally known, was an
Ohioan, born in 1837.[5] As a young man he entered upon a business
career in Cleveland, first in a wholesale grocery company, later in a
coal and iron firm and finally in a variety of industrial and
commercial enterprises which his energy and ability opened to him. The
expansion of industrial America after the Civil War was coincident with
the greater part of Hanna's career and he was a typical product of that
period in his political, economic and social philosophy. After he had
attained a degree of business success he became actively interested in
politics and took a prominent part in placing Joseph B. Foraker in the
governor's chair in Ohio in 1885. Strained relations between the two
turned Hanna's attention to the fortunes of John Sherman. When it
became apparent in 1888 that the presidential campaign would turn upon
President Cleveland's tariff principles, Hanna, who looked upon the
protective tariff as synonymous with industrial expansion and even of
industrial safety, threw his weight upon the side of Sherman, who was
again seeking the Republican nomination. The failure of Sherman was a
blow to Hanna, but it called to his attention the pleasing personality
of a more prominent protectionist, William McKinley. He was an
important agent in McKinley's successful campaign for the governorship
of Ohio in 1891. Two years later the Governor met serious financial
reverses, and again Hanna proved to be a firm friend. Aided by other
men of means he rescued McKinley from bankruptcy. Between the two there
sprang up a mutual admiration of unusual strength, and finally, in
1894-1895, Hanna withdrew from his business enterprises in order to
devote his entire time to the political fortunes of his friend.

Mark Hanna had extraordinary capacity for leadership. Sociable,
open-handed, full of energy, direct, aggressive, shrewd, daring, a hard
fighter, a loyal friend, an organizer and a man of his word, he was
essentially a man of action. In politics he was practical and
straight-forward. He wanted results, not reforms, and results meant
accepting the prevailing methods and using them. When he wished a
street-railway franchise in Cleveland, he bought enough influence with
the city government to get what he wanted, as others of his day did. He
was a strict party man; good government and safety to industry, he
believed, were dependent upon Republican control. Patriotism therefore
demanded his utmost energy in getting Republicans elected. In political
campaigns his counsel, his energy and his money were always available.
A protective customs tariff, a "sound" currency system and a free hand
in the conduct of business were the things which he most desired from
the government.

William McKinley would have been a formidable competitor for the
presidential nomination in 1896 even without the assistance of his
rugged friend. His personality was attractive, in a pleasing, soothing,
tactful, ingratiating way. His military career had been honorable even
if not famous. For most of the time from 1877 to 1891 he had been a
member of the House of Representatives, becoming identified
particularly with the high protective tariff and acting as sponsor for
the McKinley act of 1890. After being defeated for re-election, just
subsequent to the passage of the tariff law, he had become Governor of
Ohio for two terms. The panic of 1893 and the ill-fated Wilson-Gorman
tariff act during the time when he was Governor caused the tide of
popular favor to swing away from the Democrats; McKinley, as the
apostle of protection, appeared in a more favorable light; and his
partisans began to press him forward as the logical nominee for 1896
and as "the advance agent of Prosperity." The fact that his home was in
a populous state in the Middle West was also in his favor, because the
Republicans had frequently chosen their candidate from this debatable
ground rather than from the Northeast, where success was to be had
without a struggle.

Hanna's first care upon determining to devote himself to the interests
of McKinley was to keep the candidate before the people as the one man
who could rescue the nation from industrial depression. To that end he
widely circulated the Cleveland _Leader_, a strong McKinley organ, for
eighteen months at his own expense; he rented a house in Georgia,
entertained Governor McKinley there and brought numbers of southern
politicians to meet the candidate; and experienced political workers
were sent all over the country and especially to the South to prepare
the way for the election of delegates to the nominating convention.
Hanna himself went to the East to discover on what terms the support of
some of the states in that section could be obtained. On his return he
reported that aid would be assured by a guarantee that the patronage of
the administration would go to certain powerful politicians; Hanna
thought the bargain a desirable one, but the candidate objected and
Hanna acquiesced. The campaign of publicity and of personal canvass for
delegates and influence continued. First and last, it is estimated,
Hanna contributed over $100,000 for this purpose, urging his assistants
always to use funds only for legitimate ends, although promising
McKinley partisans who aided in the work that they would be "consulted"
in the disposition of patronage.

Two difficulties stood in the way of completely ensuring the choice of
McKinley as the candidate by the convention. Several states had
"favorite sons" whom they would be sure to present, and if so many of
these should appear as to prevent McKinley's nomination on the first
ballot or at least on an early one, there might be a stampede to an
unknown man--a "dark horse"--and then Hanna's ambitions would be
frustrated. Thomas B. Reed of Maine was an especial source of anxiety
as he possessed considerable strength throughout New England. To guard
against such a danger, Hanna sedulously cultivated the popular demand
for Governor McKinley and also fought in the state conventions for
delegates even against favorite sons. A crucial state was Illinois,
where Senator Cullom was powerful. The Senator says that a
representative of McKinley offered him "all sorts of inducements" to
withdraw, but McKinley's biographer mentions no such attempt at a
bargain. Eventually Cullom made the fight and was defeated, and from
then on, the nomination of McKinley seemed sure unless he should be
tripped by the currency issue.

The silver question was the second obstacle in the way of success. Not
only was the party divided, but McKinley's record on the subject was
far from consistent. He had voted for the Bland free-silver bill in
1877, for the Bland-Allison act in 1878 and for the passage of that act
over President Hayes's veto. In 1890 he had urged the passage of the
Sherman silver purchase law, intimating that he would support a free
coinage measure if it were possible to pass it. Hardly more than a year
later he was campaigning for the governorship of Ohio, and there he
denounced the free coinage of silver and advocated international
bimetallism. In 1896 McKinley feared that a definite public utterance
on the one side or the other of the question would widen the division
in the party, prevent his nomination and lose the election. Hence the
ambiguous currency plank in the Ohio state convention and hence, also,
the refusal of the candidate to commit himself openly. Nevertheless he
commissioned a friend to go to the East and explain his attitude
privately to certain leaders and prominent business men, urging them
not to force a declaration for gold before the convention met. In this
way, he thought, the currency issue might be subordinated, the tariff
emphasized and the party held together. In this state of uncertainty
the currency situation was allowed to rest until the convention met at
St. Louis on June 16.

The platform adopted was, for the most part, of the usual sort. It
urged popular attention to the matchless achievements of thirty years
of Republican rule and contrasted that period of "unequalled success
and prosperity" with the "unparalleled incapacity, dishonor, and
disaster" of Democratic government; it promised the "most ample
protection" to the products of mine, field and factory; generous
pensions, American control of Hawaii, a Nicaragua canal, the Monroe
doctrine, restricted immigration and the arbitration of labor disputes
affecting interstate commerce received the support of the party.

It was the currency plank, however, that differentiated the platform of
1896 from that of other campaigns. Many Republican leaders and business
men, particularly in the East, were disposed to call for a definite
party statement in favor of a gold standard and had reached the point
where they could not be put off by the usual meaningless straddle.
Thomas C. Platt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Joseph B. Foraker, Charles W.
Fairbanks and other party chiefs were among them. Hanna was ready to
declare for gold after he had been assured of the nomination of his
candidate. McKinley was willing to stand for gold, although he
preferred not to mention that word in the plank and hoped to make the
contest on the tariff. Moreover so many silver delegates had already
been elected to the Democratic convention, which was soon to be held,
that a definite utterance from that party seemed a certainty. The
Prohibitionists had already divided into halves over the dominant
issue. It was almost imperative, therefore, for the Republican
convention to be more explicit than it had hitherto ventured to be. As
leader after leader arrived who was insistent upon a gold standard, it
became increasingly evident to Hanna that he must proceed with caution.
If McKinley committed himself to gold, the silver advocates would balk
at his candidacy, and perhaps unite on somebody else; if he committed
himself to silver, he would lose the eastern leaders. The astute Hanna
therefore allowed sentiment in favor of the gold plank to gather force,
although holding the discussion as far as possible under cover, and
kept McKinley from making a definite statement. Then at the last
minute, when the McKinley delegates were numerous enough to ensure the
nomination of the Major and when it was too late for the silver forces
to agree upon an opposition candidate, Hanna gave way to the pressure
for gold and agreed to the plank which he had always favored.[6]

Despite the canny management of Hanna a defection took place over the
decision on the currency issue. As soon as the platform was read,
Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, moved to replace the gold plank
by one advocating the free coinage of silver. The earnestness with
which Teller urged the adoption of the substitute was an indication of
the sincerity of the western wing of the party. He had been a strict
Republican since the formation of the party in the mid-fifties, yet he
now found himself forced to accept a policy which he believed to be
pernicious or break the political bonds which had held him for forty
years. The majority of the convention, however, was determined to adopt
the gold plank and overwhelmingly defeated the Teller amendment,
whereupon the Senator and thirty-three other silver supporters solemnly
withdrew from the hall.

The way was now clear for the nomination of a candidate. Thomas B.
Reed, Senator Quay and other favorite sons received but scant support,
and McKinley was nominated by an overwhelming majority on the first
ballot. Garrett A. Hobart, a lawyer and business man whose reputation
was confined to New Jersey, his home state, was nominated for the
vice-presidency. The platform and the candidate were generally hailed
with favor in the East. To be sure, critical newspapers were inclined
to look askance upon McKinley's past. The New York _Evening Post_, for
example, favored a gold standard but decried the candidate's "absence
of settled convictions about leading questions of the day, and his want
of clear knowledge on any subject." Yet on the whole, the platform and
the candidate were popular, and, in view of the serious factional
disputes among the Democrats, the Republicans seemed likely to make
good their boast that victory would be so easy that they could nominate
and elect a "rag baby" if they chose. The redoubtable Hanna was
appointed chairman of the National Republican Committee, from which
office he was to direct the campaign. McKinley still believed that the
contest would be of the old-fashioned sort and that it would turn on
the tariff, despite the platform utterance of the party. And so it
might have proved had it not been for an important change of purpose
and leadership in the opposition.

The friends of free silver coinage went to the Democratic convention at
Chicago on July 7 with the same determination to get a definite
statement on the currency question that had characterized the eastern
leaders at the Republican convention. Without the loss of a moment they
wrested the control of the organization from the former leaders by
defeating Senator Hill of New York, a gold Democrat, for the temporary
chairmanship and electing Senator Daniel of Virginia, a recognized
proponent of free silver. Hill's support came mainly from the
Northeast; Daniel's, from the West and South. Senator White of
California, a representative of the silver wing, was then chosen
permanent chairman and the convention was ready for the contest over
the platform. While it awaited that document, however, it listened to
several favorite leaders, of whom Senator Tillman and Governor Altgeld
of Illinois were the best known. From the sentiments expressed by these
men it was clear that the radical Democrats believed that they were
speaking for the masses of the people and that they were bent upon
making far-reaching changes both in the organization and the creed of
the party.

A disquieting feature was a degree of turbulence beyond that which
usually characterizes our nominating conventions. The official
proceedings record the following, for example, while Senator Tillman
was addressing the delegates:

I hope that when this vast assembly shall have dispersed to its home
the many thousands of my fellow-citizens who are here will carry
hence a different opinion of the pitchfork man from South Carolina
to that which they now hold. I come to you from the South--from the
home of secession--from that State where the leaders of--(the
balance of the sentence of the speaker was drowned by hisses). Mr.
Tillman (resuming): There are only three things in the world that
can hiss--a goose, a serpent, and a man....

In the last three or four or five years the Western people have come
to realize that the condition of the South and the condition of the
West are identical. Hence we find to-day that the Democratic party
of the West is here almost in solid phalanx appealing to the South,
and the South has responded--to come to their help.... Some of my
friends from the South and elsewhere have said that this is not a
sectional issue. I say it is a sectional issue. (Long prolonged
hissing.)

At length, the platform was presented. It was a summary of the
complaints against the East which had been forming in the West and
South ever since the days of the Greenbackers and the "Ohio idea." It
recognized first that the money question was paramount to all others;
laid hard times at the door of the gold standard, which it denounced as
a British policy; and demanded the free coinage of both metals at the
existing legal ratio, under which sixteen parts of silver by weight
were declared equivalent to one part of gold in minting coins. Nor
would the party wait for the consent of any other nation. It opposed
the issuance of interest-bearing bonds in time of peace, condemned the
bond transactions of the Cleveland administration and denounced the
national bank-note system. The McKinley tariff was declared a prolific
breeder of trusts which enriched the few at the expense of the many.
The plank concerning the income tax, which had so recently been
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, excited much
condemnation among Republicans and conservative Democrats, who
denounced it as an attack on the Court. It noted that the Court had
uniformly sustained income taxes for nearly a hundred years and
declared it to be the duty of Congress

to use all the constitutional power which remains after that
decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as
it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation
may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may
bear its due proportion of the expenses of the government.

The reaction of the party on the labor disputes of recent years and
especially the Pullman strike was clearly in evidence. Arbitration of
such controversies was called for; "interference" by federal
authorities in local affairs was condemned; government by injunction
was objected to; and the passage of such laws was demanded as would
protect all the interests of the laboring classes.