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The Price of Things by Elinor Glyn

E >> Elinor Glyn >> The Price of Things

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"And you say it is a dance Macabre? Tell me just what you mean."

They had reached a comfortable sofa by now in a salon devoted to bridge,
which was almost empty, the players, so eager to take part in the
dancing, that they had deserted even this, their favourite game.

"When a nation loses all sense of balance and belies the traditions of
its whole history, and when masses of civilised individuals experience
this craze for dancing and miming, and sex display, it presages some
great upheaval--some calamity. It was thus before the revolution of 1793,
and since it is affecting England and America and all of Europe it seems,
the cataclysm will be great."

Amaryllis shivered. "You frighten me," she whispered. "Do you mean some
war--or some earthquake--or some pestilence, or what?"

"Events will show. But let us talk of something else. A cousin of your
husband's, who is a very good friend of mine, was here yesterday. He went
to England to-day, you have not met him yet, I believe--Denzil Ardayre?"

"No--but I know all about him--he plays polo and is in the Zingari."

"He does other things--he will even do more--I shall be curious to hear
what you think of him. For me he is the type of your best in England.
We were at Oxford together; we dreamed dreams there--and perhaps time
will realise some of them. Denzil is a beautiful Englishman, but he is
not a fool."

A sudden illumination seemed to come into Amaryllis' brain; she felt how
limited had been all her thoughts and standpoints in life. She had been
willing to drift on without speculation as to the goal to be reached.
Indeed, even now, had she any definite goal? She looked at the Russian's
strong, rugged face, his inscrutable eyes narrowed and gazing ahead--of
what was he thinking? Not stupid, ordinary things--that was certain.

"It is the second evening, amidst the most unlikely surroundings, that
you have made me speculate about subjects which never troubled me before.
Then you leave me unsatisfied--I want to know--definitely to know!"

"Searcher after wisdom!" and he smiled. "No one can teach another very
much. Enlightenment must come from within; we have reached a better stage
when we realise that we are units in some vast scheme and responsible for
its working, and not only atoms floating hither and thither by chance.
Most people have the brains of grasshoppers; they spring from subject to
subject, their thoughts are never under control. Their thoughts rule
them--it is not they who rule their thoughts."

They were seated comfortably on their sofa, and Verisschenzko leaning
forward from his corner, looked straight into her eyes.

"You control your thoughts?" she asked. "Can you really only let them
wander where you choose?"

"They very seldom escape me, but I consciously allow them indulgences."

"Such as?"

"Visions--day dreams--which I know ought not to materialise."

Something disturbed her in his regard; it was not easy to meet, so full
of magnetic emanation. Amaryllis was conscious that she no longer felt
very calm--she longed to know What his dreams could be.

"Yes--but if I told you, you would send me away."

It seemed that he could read her desire. "I shall order myself to be
gone presently, because the interest which you cause me to feel would
interfere with work which I have to do."

"And your dreams? Tell them first?" she knew that she was playing
with fire.

He looked down now, and she saw that he was not going to gratify her
curiosity.

"My noblest dream is for the regeneration of a nation--on that I have
ordered my thoughts to dwell. For the others, the time is not yet for me
to tell you of them--it may never come. Now answer me, have you yet seen
your new home, Ardayre?"

"No, but why should you be interested in that? It seems strange that you,
a Russian, should even know that there is such a place as Ardayre!"

"Continue--I know that it is a wonderful place, and that your husband
loves it more than his life."

Amaryllis pouted slightly.

"He does indeed! Perhaps I shall grow to do so also when I know it; it is
the family creed. Sir James--my late father-in-law--was the only
exception to this rule."

"You must uphold the idea then, and live to do fine things."

"I will try--if only--" then she paused, she could not say "if only John
would be human and unfreeze to me, and love me, and let us go on the road
together hand in hand!"

"It is quite useless for a family merely to continue from generation to
generation piling up possessions, and narrowing its interests. It must do
this for a time to become solid, and then it should take a vaster view,
and begin to help the world. Nearly everything is spoiled in all
civilisation because of this inability to see beyond the nose, this poor
and paltry outlook."

"People rave vaguely," Amaryllis argued, "about one's duty and vast
outlooks and those things, but it is difficult to get any one to give
concrete advice--what would you advise me to do, for instance?"

"I would advise you first to begin asking yourself the reason of
everything, each day, since Pandora's box has been opened for you in any
case. 'What caused this? What caused that?' Search for causes--then
eradicate the roots, if they are not good, do not waste time on trying to
ameliorate the results! Determine as to why you are put into such and
such a place, and accomplish what you discover to be the duty of the
situation. But how serious we have become! I am not a priest to give you
guidance--I am a man fighting a tremendously strong desire to take you in
my arms--so come, we will return to the ball room, and I will deliver you
to your husband."

Amaryllis rose and stood facing him, her heart was beating fast. "If I
try to do well--to climb the straight road of the soul's advancement,
will you give me counsel should I need it by the way?"

"Yes, this I will do when I have complete control, but for the moment you
are causing me emotions, and I wish to keep you a thing apart--of the
spirit. Hermits and saints subdue the flesh by abstinence and fasting;
they then become useless to the world. A man can only lead men while he
remains a man, with a man's passions, so that he should not fight in this
beyond his strength--only he should _never sully the wrong thing_. Come!
Return to the husband--and I shall go for a while to hell."

And presently Amaryllis, standing safely with John, saw Verisschenzko
dancing the maddest one-step with Madame Boleski, their undulations
outdoing all others in the room!




CHAPTER IV


The day after the wonderful rejoicing which the homecoming of Amaryllis
had been the occasion of at Ardayre, she was sitting waiting for her
husband in that exquisite cedar parlour which led from her room.

They would breakfast cosily there, she had arranged, and nothing was
wanting in the setting of a love scene. The bride wore the most alluring
cap and daintiest Paris neglige, and her fair and pure skin gleamed
through the diaphanous stuff.

How she longed for John to notice it all, and make love to her! She had
apprehended a number of delightful possibilities in Paris, none of which
had materialised, alas! in her case.

John was the same as ever--quiet, dignified, polite and unmoved. She had
taken to turning out the light before he came to her at night, to hide
the disappointment and chagrin which she felt might show in her eyes. It
would be so humiliating if he should see this. There would soon be
nothing left for her to do but pretend that she was as cold as he was, if
this last effort of _froufrous_ left him as stolid as usual.

She smoothed out the pale chiffon draperies with a tender hand. She got
up and looked at herself in the mirror. It was fortunate that the
reflection of snowy nose and throat and chin, and the pink velvet cheeks,
required no art to perfect them; it was all natural and quite nice, she
felt. What a bore it must be to have to touch up like Madame Boleski!

But what was the meaning of all the imputations she had read of in those
interesting French novels in Paris?--the languors and lassitudes and
tremors of breakfasting love! There was just such a scene as this in one
she had devoured on the boat. A _dejeuner_ of _amants--_certainly they
had not been married, there was that want of resemblance, but surely this
could not matter? For a fortnight, three weeks, a month, surely even a
husband could be as a lover--especially to a mistress who took such pains
to please his eye!

Would Elsie Goldmore spend such dull breakfasts when she espoused Harry
Kahn? Elsie Goldmore was a Jewess, perhaps that made the difference,
perhaps Jews were more expansive--But the people in the novels were not
Jews. Of course, though, they were French, that must be it! Could it be
that all Englishmen, to their wives, were like John? This she must
presently find out.

Meanwhile she would try--oh, try so hard to entice him to be lovely to
her! He was her own husband; there was absolutely no harm in doing this.
And how glorious it would be to turn him into a lover! Here in this
perfectly divine old house! John was so good-looking, too, and had the
most attractive deep voice, but heavens! the matter-of-factness of
everything about him!

How long would it all go on?

John came in presently with _The Times_ under his arm. He was
immaculately dressed in a blue serge suit. Amaryllis had hoped to see
him in that subduedly gorgeous dressing gown she had persuaded him to
order at Charvets during their first days. It would have been so
suitable and intimate and lover-like. But no! there was the blue serge
suit--and _The Times_.

A shadow fell upon her mood. Her own pink chiffons almost seemed
out of place!

John glanced at them, and at the glowing, living, delicious bit of young
womanhood which they adorned. He saw the rebellious ripe cherry of a
mouth, and the warm, soft tenderness in the grey eyes, and then he
quickly looked out of the window--his own blue ones expressionless, but
the hand which held the newspaper clenched rather hard.

"Amn't I a pet!" cooed Amaryllis, deliberately subduing the chill of her
first disappointment. "Dearest, see I have kept this last and loveliest
set of garments for the morning of our home-coming--and for you!" and she
crept close to him and laid her cheek against his cheek.

He encircled her with his arm and kissed her calmly.

"You look most beautiful, darling," he said. "But then, you always do,
and your frills are perfection. Now I think we ought to have breakfast;
it is most awfully late."

She sat down in her place and she felt stupid tears rise in her eyes.

She poured out the tea and buttered herself some toast, while John was
apparently busy at a side table where dwelt the hot dishes.

He selected the daintiest piece of sole for her, and handed her
the plate.

"I am not hungry," she protested, "keep it for yourself."

He did not press the matter, but took his place and began to talk quietly
upon the news of the day--in a composed fashion between glances at _The
Times_ and mouthfuls of sole.

Amaryllis controlled herself. She was too proud and too just to make a
foolish scene. If this was John's way and her little effort at enticement
was a failure, she must put up with it. Marriage was a lottery she had
always heard, and it might be her luck to have drawn a blank. So she
choked down the rising emotion and answered brightly, showing interest in
her husband's remarks--and she even managed to eat some omelette, and
when the business of breakfast was quite over she went to the window and
John followed her there.

The view which met their eyes was exquisite.

Beyond the perfect stately garden, with its quaint clipped yews and
masses of spring flowers and velvet lawns, there stretched the vast park
with its splendid oaks and browsing deer. It was a possession which any
man could feel proud to own.

John slipped his arm round her waist and drew her to him.

"Amaryllis," he said, and his voice vibrated, "to-day I am going to show
you everything I love here at Ardayre--because I want you to love it
all, too. You are of the family, so it must mean something to you, dear."

Amaryllis kindled with re-awakening hope.

"Indeed, it will mean everything to me, John."

He kissed her forehead and murmured something about her dressing quickly,
and that he would wait for her there in the cedar room. And when she
returned in about a quarter of an hour in the neatest country clothes, he
placed her hand on his arm and led her down the great stairs and on
through the hall into the picture gallery.

It was a wonderful place of green silk and chestnut wainscoting, and all
the walls of its hundred feet of length were hung with canvases of
value--portraits principally of those Ardayres who had gone on. Face
after face looked down on Amaryllis of the same type as John's and her
own--the brown hair and eyes of grey or blue. Some were a little fairer,
some a little darker, but all unmistakably stamped "Ardayre."

John pointed out each individual to her, while she hung fondly on his
arm, from some doubtful crude fourteenth century wooden panels of Johns
and Denzils, on to Benedict in a furred Henry VII. gown. Then came Henrys
and Denzils in Elizabethan armour and puffed white satin, and through
Stuart and Commonwealth to Stuart again, and so to William and Mary
numbers of Benedicts, and lastly to powdered Georgian James' and Regency
Denzils and Johns. And the name Amaryllis recurred more than once in
stately dame or damsel, called after that fair Amaryllis of Elizabeth's
days who had been maid of honour to the virgin Queen, and had sonnets
written to her nut brown locks by the gallants of her time.

"How little the women they married seem to have altered the type!" the
young living Amaryllis exclaimed, when they came nearly to the end. "It
goes on Ardayre, Ardayre, Ardayre, ever since the very first one. Oh!
John, if we ever have a son he ought to be even more so--you and I being
of the same blood--" and then she hesitated and blushed crimson. This was
the first time she had ever spoken of such a thing.

John held her arm very tightly to his side for a second, and his voice
was uncertain as he answered:

"Amaryllis, that is the profound desire of my heart, that we should
have a son."

A strange feeling of exaltation came over Amaryllis, half-innocent,
wholly ignorant as she was.

She had been stupid--French novels were all nonsense. Marriages in real
life were always like this--of course they must be--since John said
plainly and with such deep feeling that his profoundest desire was that
they should have a son! That meant that she would surely have one. This
was perfectly glorious, and it must simply be those silly books and Elsie
Goldmore's too uxorious imagination which had given her some ridiculously
romantic exaggerated ideas of what love hours would be. She would now be
contented and never worry again. She nestled closer to her husband and
looked up at him with eyes sweet and fond, the brown, curly lashes wet
with tender dew.

"Oh!--darling, when, when do you think we shall have a son?"

Then, for the first time in their lives, John Ardayre clasped her in his
arms passionately and held her to his heart.

"Ah, God," he whispered hoarsely, as he kissed her fresh young lips.
"Pray for that, Amaryllis--pray for that, my own."

Then he restrained himself and drew her on to the four last pictures at
the end of the room. They were of his grandfather and grandmother, and
his father and mother. And then there was a blank space, and the brighter
colour of the damask showed that a canvas had been removed.

"Who hung there, John?"

"The accursed snake charmer woman whom my father disgraced the family
with by bringing home. She was his wife by the law, and a Frenchman
painted her. It was a fine picture with the bastard Ferdinand in her
arms--the proof of our shame. I had it taken down and burnt the day the
place was mine."

Amaryllis was receiving surprises to-day--John's face was full of
emotion, his eyes were sparkling with hate as he spoke. How he must love
everything connected with his home, and its honour, and its name--he
could not be so very cold after all!

She thought of the Russian's words about a family--the uselessness of its
going on for generations, piling up possessions and narrowing its
interests. What had the aims been of all these handsome men? She knew the
earlier history a little, for even though she was of a distant branch
they had been proud of the connection, and treasured the traditions
belonging to it. But these were just dry facts of history which she knew,
so now she asked:

"John, what did any of them do? Did they accomplish great deeds?"

He took her back to the beginning again and began to tell her of the
achievements of each one. There would be three perhaps, one after
another, who had filled high posts in the State, and indeed had been
worthy of the name. Then would come one or two quiet plodding ones, who
seemed to have done little but sit still and hold on.

Then Denzil Ardayre, knight of Elizabeth's time, pleased Amaryllis most
of all--though there had been greater soldiers, and more able politicians
than he later on, culminating in Sir John Ardayre of George IV. days,
who had hammered against pocket boroughs and corruption until he died an
old man, the hour the Reform Bill swept aside abuses and the road to
freedom was won.

"How strange it seems that different ages produce more accentuated stamps
of breeding than others," Amaryllis said, "even in the same families
where the blood is all blue. Look, John! that Denzil and the rest of the
Elizabethans are the most refined, aristocratic creatures you could
imagine, in their little ruffs. Absolutely intellectual and cultivated
faces and of old race--and then comes a James period, less intelligent,
more round featured. And a Cavalier one, gay and gallant, aristocratic
and chiselled also, but not nearly so clever looking as the Elizabethan.
Then we get cadaverous William and Mary ones, they might be lawyers or
business men, not that look of great gentlemen, and the Anne's and the
first George's are really bucolic! And then that wonderfully refined,
cultivated, intellectual finish seems to crop up in the later eighteenth
century again. Have you noticed this, John? You can see it in every
collection of miniatures and portraits even in the museums."

John responded interestedly:

"The Elizabethans were supremely cultivated gentlemen--no wonder that
they look as they do--and their lives were always in their hands which
gives them that air of insouciance."

When the history of the family achievements had been told her down to
John's father, she paused, still clinging to his arm, and said:

"I am so glad that they did splendid things, aren't you? And we shall not
drift either. You must teach me to be the most perfect mistress of
Ardayre, and the most perfect wife for the greatest of them all--because
your achievement is the finest, John, to have won it all back and
redeemed it by the work of your own brain."

He pressed the hand on his arm.

"It was hard work--and the home times were ugly in those days, Amaryllis,
though the goal was worth it, and now we must carry on...." And then his
reserve seemed to fall upon him again, and he took her through the other
rooms, and kept to solid facts, and historic descriptions, and his bride
had continuously the impression that he was mastering some emotion in
himself, and that this stolidity was a mask.

When lunch time came the usual relations of obvious and commonplace
goodfellowship had been fully restored between them, and that atmosphere
of aloofness which seemed impossible to banish enveloped John once more.

Amaryllis sighed--but it was too soon to despair she thought, after the
hope of John's words, and with her serene temperament she decided to
leave things as they were for the present and trust to time.

But as her maid brushed out the soft brown hair that night, an unrest and
longing for something came over her again--what she knew not, nor could
have put into words. She let herself re-live that one moment when John
had pressed herewith passion to his heart. Perhaps, perhaps that was the
beginning of a change in him--perhaps--presently--

But the clock in the long gallery had chimed two, and there was yet no
sound of John in the dressing-room beyond.

Amaryllis lay in the great splendid gilt bed in the warm darkness, and at
last tears trickled down her cheeks.

What could keep him so long away from her? Why did he not come?

The large Queen Anne windows were wide open, and soft noises of the night
floated in with the zephyrs. The whole air seemed filled with waiting
expectancy for something tender and passionate to be.

What was that? Steps upon the terrace--measured steps--and then silence,
and then a deep sigh. It must be John--out there alone!--when she would
have loved to have stayed with him, to have woven sweet fancies in the
luminous darkness, to have taken and given long kisses, to have buried
her face in the honeysuckle which grew there, steeped in dew. But he had
said to her after their stately dinner in the great dining-hall:

"Play to me a little, Amaryllis, and then go to bed, child--you must be
tired out."

And after that he had not spoken more, but pushed her gently towards the
door with a solemn kiss on the forehead, and just a murmur of
"Good-night." And she had deceived herself and thought that it meant that
he would come quickly, and so she had run up the stairs.

But now it was after two in the morning, and would soon be growing
towards dawn--and John was out there sighing alone!

She crept to the window and leaned upon the sill. She thought that she
could distinguish his tall figure there by the carved stone bench.

"John!" she called softly, "I am, so lonely--John, dearest--won't
you come?"

Then she felt that her ears must be deceiving her, for there was the
sound of a faint suppressed sob, and then, a second afterwards, her
husband's voice answering cheerily, with its usual casual note:

"You naughty little night bird! Go back to bed--and to sleep--yes--I am
coming immediately now!"

But when he did steal in silently from the dressing-room an hour later in
a grey dawn, Amaryllis, worn out with speculation and disappointment, had
fallen asleep.

He looked down upon her charming face--the long, curly brown lashes
sweeping the flushed cheek, and at the rounded, beautiful girlish
form--all his very own to clasp and to kiss and to hold in his arms--and
two scalding tears gathered in his blue eyes, and he took his place
beside her without making a sound.




CHAPTER V


"Here are the papers, Hans, but I think the whole thing stupid nonsense.
What does it matter to any one what Poland wants? What a nuisance all
these old boring political things are! They always spoiled our happiness
since the beginning--and now if it wasn't for them we could have a
glorious time here together. I would love managing to come out to meet
you under Stanislass' nose. None of the others I have ever had are as
good in the way of a lover as you."

The man swore in German under his breath.

"Of a lightness always, Harietta! No _devouement_, no patriotism....
Should I have agreed to the divorce, loving your body as I do, had it not
been a serious matter? The pig-dog who now owns you must be sucked dry of
information--and then I shall take you back again."

A cunning look came into Madame Boleski's hazel eyes. She had not the
slightest intention of permitting this--to go back to Hans! To the
difficulty of making both ends meet! Even though he did cause every inch
of her well-preserved body to tingle! They had suggested her getting the
divorce for their own stupid political ends, to be able to place her in
the arms of Stanislass Boleski, and there she meant to stay! It was
infinitely more agreeable to be a grande dame in Paris, and presently in
London, than to be the spouse of Hans in Berlin, where, whatever his
secret power might be with the authorities, he could give her no great
social position; and social position was the goal of all Harietta
Boleski's desires!

She could attract lovers in any class of life--that had never been her
difficulty. Her trouble had been that she could never force herself into
good American society, even after she had married Hans, and they had
dwelt there for a year or more. Her own compatriots would have none of
her, and so she wanted triumph in other lands. She hated to remember her
youth of humiliation, trying to play a social game on the earnings of any
work that she could pick up, between discreet outings with--friends who
failed to suggest matrimony. Hans, on some secret mission to San
Francisco, where she had gone as companion to a friend, had seemed a
veritable Godsend and Prince Charming, when, in her thirtieth year, he
actually offered legal marriage, completely overcome by her great
physical charm. But although she loved Hans with whatever of that emotion
such a nature could be capable of, five years of him and more or less
genteel poverty had been enough, and now she was free of that, and could
still enjoy surreptitiously the pleasure of his passion, and reign as a
_persona grata_ wife of one of the richest men in Poland at the same
time. That those in authority who had arranged the divorce required of
her certain tiresome obligations in return for their services, was one of
those annoying parts of life! She took not the slightest interest in the
affairs of any country. Nothing really mattered to her, but herself. Her
whole force was concentrated upon the betterment of the position and
physical pleasure of Harietta Boleski.

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Under the Sun: The Letters of Bruce Chatwin

We all want to be happy, we want our children to be happy, and there are countless books advising us how to achieve happiness. But is this really what we should be aiming for?

"A fly bothers me, I kill it: you kill what bothers you. If I had not killed the fly, it would have been out of pure liberalism: I am liberal in order not to be a killer."

Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes

'He was not to be described as a happy person," Diana Trilling wrote in a memoir about her husband, the critic Lionel Trilling. "Indeed, he thought poorly of happiness and of people who claimed to be happy or desired happiness above other gratifications in life . . . seriousness was the desirable condition of man." It is easy to make all sorts of assumptions about why an unhappy person would not value happiness; and indeed why seriousness might be seen as an alternative to happiness; or just to say that it was seriousness that made Trilling happy. One of the ways in which happiness is made to seem like an inclusive ideal – the ways it charms us – is by our asserting that by definition the things that matter most to us must make us happy, that that is how we know they are good. It's as though one word could do the work of the moral imagination.

Or can we just say that if happiness is one's aspiration, then learning about the history of the slave trade, say, or watching the news, or indeed ageing are all to be avoided. And yet learning about the terrible things people can do to each other, and the history of the terrible things people have done to each other, is important – we can't imagine a life without it – and gives some people a great deal of pleasure; pleasure, as psychoanalysts might say, of various kinds. Anyone who has or knows children, or remembers being a child, will know how happy it can make them tormenting their siblings. And so if we value happiness we can't help but wonder what morality it entails, what kind of morality it might involve us in.

It is not surprising, in other words, that happiness has always had rather a mixed reception. No one in their right minds we might think, especially now, would be promoting unhappiness; and yet the promotion, the preferring of happiness – the assumption of a right to happiness – brings with it a lot of things we might not like. And the desire for happiness may reveal things about ourselves that we like even less. "A people who conceive life to be the pursuit of happiness must be chronically unhappy," the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins wrote.

What are we going to have to do, what are we going to have to become, what are we going to have to renounce or ignore if we want to be happy? Or if we are to propose happiness, or its pursuit, as some kind of right? We tend to make rights of things we assume to be in short supply, things perpetually under threat. Wherever there is scarcity now human rights are asserted; and the assertion of rights is reactive to a sense of scarcity deemed to be needless. Or, to put it slightly differently, calling something a right can be a way of rhetorically enforcing an important wish, a way of making a wish sound important.

I want to begin with three fairly obvious propositions that are also misgivings about the right to happiness or its pursuit. And I'd like to suggest that the right to frustration may be more useful and interesting – more enlivening – than the right to happiness. That's to say I want to waylay the common, all-too-plausible idea that the solution to frustration is satisfaction, or that happiness is the answer to unhappiness, or that if we get rid of the bad things, the good things will start happening. Happiness and the right to pursue it are sometimes wildly unrealistic as ideals; and, because wildly unrealistic, unconsciously self-destructive.

Because happiness is not always the kind of thing that can be pursued, we should view it, more often than not, as a lucky side effect but not a calculable or calculated end. Making it such an end all too easily brings out the worst in us. If this is a version, to rewrite John Lennon's famous line, of "happiness is what happens to you when you are doing something else", it also suggests that scarcity is integral to a sense of reality; that we should be thinking of what Philip Larkin in "Born Yesterday" called "a skilled, / Vigilant, flexible, / Unemphasised, enthralled / Catching of happiness" rather than the engineering of it.

Our relation to happiness often betrays an unconscious desire for disillusionment. The wanting of it and the having of it can seem like two quite different things. And this is what makes wishing so interesting; because wishing is always too knowing. When we wish we are too convinced of our pleasures, too certain that we know what we want. The belief that we can arrange our happiness – as though happiness were akin to justice, which we can work towards – may be to misrecognise the very thing that concerns us.

My three fairly obvious propositions are: first, in Freud's formulation from Civilisation and its Discontents, "happiness is something essentially subjective" (subjective I take it, in the sense of being not only personal but idiosyncratic). We can be surprised by what makes us happy, and it will not necessarily be something that makes other people happy. This has significant consequences not least in the area of our lives that is sometimes conducive to happiness, sexuality. And this makes happiness as a social or communal pursuit complicated. We have only to imagine what it would be for someone to propose that we had a right to sexual satisfaction to imagine both how we might contrive this and what terrible things might be done in its name.

Second, bad things can make us happy – and by bad things I mean things consensually agreed to be unacceptable. It clearly makes some people happy to live in a world without Jews, or homosexuals, or immigrants, and so on. There are also what we might call genuinely bad things, like seriously harming people and other animals, that gives some people the pleasure they most crave. I remember a very unhappy boy of 10 telling me in a psychotherapy session that he was only happy when he was cutting the feet off rats that he had caught. He said it made him feel "really awake", that it was like "turning on the light in your favourite room in the world". Cruelty and humiliation make some people happy, perhaps lots of people happy some of the time; and this issue is not dealt with merely by saying that they are not really happy or that they are in some way perverse or sick. We tend to pathologise the forms of happiness we cannot bear. If we are to have a right to happiness or to its pursuit – two different things – we must then acknowledge the full range of things that make people happy. This means taking them at their word. Cruelty can make people happy. And we might then want to think about what problem, or rather problems, happiness is deemed to be the solution to. It is not, for example, incidental to our predicament that so many of our pleasures are, or are felt to be, forbidden (this is what Freud's account of the Oedipus complex is a way of thinking about). So put briefly – as every child and therefore every adult knows – being bad can make you happy. Happiness is subjective, it takes many forms, and one of its forms is immorality.

Last but not least – though the least exciting – is the third point: some people like being unhappy. Indeed for some people their lives can be construed as the pursuit of unhappiness. It is astounding the lengths to which some people will go to be unhappy, to contrive their own misery, as though happiness itself were a phobic object and held terrors. And we don't talk of the right to be unhappy, when we should. Unhappiness can, after all, among many other things, be the registration of injustice or loss. At its best, a culture committed to the pursuit of happiness might be committed, say, to the diminishing of injustice; but at its worst, the culture of happiness may proscribe a whole range of feelings and perceptions.

It is sometimes said that psychoanalysis is one of the last places in the culture where people are allowed to be unhappy. And clearly psychoanalysis protects, if it does not actually foster, a person's right to be unhappy. The subjectivity of happiness, what it is that the individual really loves and gets pleasure from, the immorality of pleasures and the lure of transgression, happiness as a perversion, the fear of pleasure and the masochistic solution – all this is the material of psychoanalysis, and not only of psychoanalysis.

Yet, historically, psychoanalysis is the inheritor of a set of political propositions it would seem to be at odds with; or at least at a very odd angle to. If Freud and happiness doesn't sound like a very promising subject, Freud and rights seems even less so (there's only one reference to the rights of man in Freud's work). Rights, like class, have never really been the thing for psychoanalysis; omissions, one would think, of some significance. Don't have much confidence in the so-called rights of man, Freud seems to say in his New Introductory Lectures; they are no match for the ferocity of inner morality – the super-ego, or "conscience". The whole business of rights only turns up when the individual, the melancholic individual, is briefly released from his internal regime ("For after a certain number of months the whole moral fuss is over, the criticism of the superego is silent, the ego is rehabilitated and again enjoys all the rights of man till the next attack.") Morality, at least in these patients, is periodic, as are the rights of man, the gift, as it were of a higher power.

"Our normal sense of guilt," Freud writes, "is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego". This translates as: our happiness depends on the distance between who we are and who we should be according to the dictates of our internalised morality. We are mostly unhappy because we are rarely as we should be. When the internal authorities are so implacable and sadistic — over-severe, abusive, humiliating, as Freud writes — what are the possibilities for happiness?

The right to happiness, or to its pursuit, would mean the right to a generous super-ego, the right to a super-ego that was on the side of one's pleasure: one that promoted the view that feeling alive was more important than being right or good. It is one of Freud's more horrifying ironies that the pursuit of pleasure incites, calls up, the super-ego. And, of course, when and if pleasure is forbidden its pursuit requires punishment. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Virtue has to be its own reward. To pursue pleasure is to be pursued by punishment. There is no one more moralistic, more coercive, than a hedonist.

As the right to happiness or its pursuit is my subject, and I am by training a child psychotherapist, all this is by way of a lengthy preamble to putting together the famous sentence from Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence with something from the paediatrician and psychoanalyst DW Winnicott's story about child development. I want to ask what, if anything, the right to happiness or its pursuit has to do with the child's development; whether Jefferson's founding declaration has anything to do with the declaration of independence that is the child's personal development.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness". Some of us might not believe in the Creator part now, and some of us might find more and more difficult the idea that people are born equal when the conditions in which they are born are manifestly so unequal; and most of us would want to assume that by "men" Jefferson meant "people". And yet, as many people have noted, the pursuit of happiness – something not mentioned in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, nor in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – seems peculiarly salient; it is the only one of the things listed that is a pursuit.

What exactly might it mean to have an "unalienable right" to "the pursuit of happiness", given that it is fairly obvious that the pursuit of happiness is so morally equivocal – could be, among other things, a threat to the society that promoted it? At first sight it seems to be a pretty good idea; if we are convinced of anything now we are convinced that we are pleasure-seeking creatures, who want to minimise the pain and frustration of our lives. Or at least a "we" could be consolidated around these beliefs. We are the creatures who, possibly unlike any other animal, pursue happiness. But the pursuit of happiness, like the pursuit of liberty – the utopian political projects of the 20th century – has legitimated some of the worst crimes of contemporary history across the political spectrum.

In Jefferson's Declaration, the art critic Dave Hickey has noted, "Happiness is not assured, but its pursuit is protected . . . the government will act to ensure our safety, and it will stand back as we act on our own behalf in the 'pursuit of happiness'. When that pursuit putatively threatens our safety the government invariably steps in. Safety trumps happiness, the government always wins." It is not too much of a stretch here to see, in this account, the government as the parents, and the citizens as adolescent children; the governmental parents protect the pursuit of happiness, but prioritise safety. The developing child pursues his own happiness under the rules and conditions provided by the adults. Children cannot bring themselves up, and children cannot bring up children (in Lord of the Flies the question recurs: "are there any adults?").

If it is said, or written, that we have a right to be happy or to pursue happiness, it is assumed that happiness is something we are capable of, something that is available, if certain obstacles are removed. If liberty is there when tyranny is taken away, happiness is there when whatever makes us unhappy is removed. From a pragmatic point of view the art of a good life involves removing the obstacles to happiness; the picture, if we visualise it, is of something looked for, something looked forward to, and of there being something in the way. And this something in the way could be called an unavailable mother, a prohibitive father, competing sibling, not having enough brains or beauty, or charm, or money, or education, or luck. We would get closer to our happiness were these things acquired; and a reality sense would be something to do with acknowledging which of these things cannot be acquired. It is all about, in short, our relation to obstacles; our distinguishing the intractable from the changeable, what we have to acknowledge from what we can influence; whether our desire is forbidden or not – whether we want a cream cake or another man's wife. It is, in pragmatic terms, about knowing what is possible. And everybody, it seems, is shadowed by an imaginary other person, a lucky counterpart, who gets all the happiness going; Lacan writes of "the jealousy born in a subject in his relation to an other, insofar as this other is held to enjoy a certain form of jouissance or superabundant vitality". This other person presumably enjoys his happiness, his super-abundant vitality with no conflict, with no thought of safety, with no consideration of the rules and conditions required by the good of the rest.

A right to the pursuit of happiness must be a right to remove the obstacles to happiness. This, at least, is the logic of the case. The man called the happiness tsar, Lord Layard, says we now know what makes children happy (the book he co-authored last year is called A Good Childhood). What, then, are the obstacles to the child's happiness, and why can't we set about trying to remove them? And some of them we can remove. But what if the so-called obstacles to happiness are, or sometimes are, among the things that matter most to us? If, say, we love both luxury and justice? What if two mutually exclusive things make us happy, and one has to be abrogated? And what if some obstacles are immovable, untransformable into anything other than obstacles?

There is something about the sexual drive, Freud suggested, that makes it intrinsically unsatisfiable. There are not infinite resources of food, of energy, of medicine. It is, for example, true, as every mother knows, that the mother cannot give the child everything that he wants, and that if she could it wouldn't be what he wanted. That everyone feels left out of something. It is misleading to think that one's parents have been the obstacle to one's happiness, even if they have radically thwarted it. Indeed we might end up thinking that a right to irresolvable conflict might be the most realistic right we could come up with. That the attempt to resolve at least some conflicts was a distraction from finding better ways of living them; that the right to pursue happiness has seduced us into pursuing happiness when we could have been doing something better.

If the alternative to happiness is not, in the binary way, unhappiness; and if happiness has become so insidious, so hypnotic a single end for a good life, why have we wanted this strange narrowing of our intent? What have we lost, or forgotten, or ignored, or paid insufficient attention to, or protected ourselves from by wanting happiness? Happiness, it would seem, is the most plausible of our aims in life. But what psychoanalysis can chip in with here is that we are at our most defensive when we are at our most plausible.

One of the other things we most want is to be able to feel frustrated; to register what we feel deprived of. Frustration issues in many things only one of which is happiness; and happiness can be, at its worst, a pre-emptive strike against frustration, a refuge from it rather than any kind of productive, unpredictable transformation of it. If we want to talk of a right to pursue happiness there needs to be a prior right, as it were, to feel frustration; to be able to bear and to bear with a sense of what is lacking in one's life. And not simply because frustration makes satisfaction possible in the way that hunger can make a meal delicious. But because frustration and satisfaction do not only or always have a logical, a causal, a pragmatic relationship with one another. Or to put it rather more obviously, what we are lacking when we are unhappy is not always happiness, any more than what an alcoholic is lacking is a drink. And proposing a right to the pursuit of happiness may seduce us, by a kind of word-magic, into thinking that happiness is just the thing.

It is of interest that when Winnicott writes about deprivation in children he too talks about rights. "Let us consider the meaning of the anti-social act," he writes in a paper called "The Deprived Child": "for instance, stealing. When a child steals what is sought . . . is not the object stolen; what is sought is the person, the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother. In fact every infant at the start can truly claim the right to steal from the mother because the infant invented the mother, thought her up, created her out of an innate capacity to love."

For Winnicott, the child makes the mother he needs and gradually, through disillusionment and hatred, disentangles her, to some extent, from the mother she happens to be. But it is "the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother" that I want to consider. Because the thing stolen is not quite or even nearly the thing wanted – which is not a thing, but a mother – it can never satisfy. What we have is a picture of the right to pursue happiness getting stuck, something I think it is prone to do; as though there is something about the pursuit of happiness that sponsors and endorses addiction. In this sense, consumer capitalism is a system tailor-made for deprived children.

The theft requires communicable translation; it requires, as it were, someone to be able to say, or otherwise communicate what it is that is really being pursued. In Winnicott's declaration the child has a right to the pursuit of a mother to get what he needs for his development. He is entitled to a mother; she belongs to him in the sense that his own development belongs to him. A good-enough mother or parents might give you the wherewithal for your pursuit of happiness; they might have backed your desire, helped you to believe in and not only be fearful of your pleasures. But it is more complicated than this. Lives are not the kind of things that can be guaranteed by mothers. And this is where the idea of a right to pursue one's own happiness becomes more interesting.

Do children want to be happy? And if they don't want to be happy what else might they want to be? This would seem to be of some importance because they are growing up in a world in which their parents mostly want them to be happy, or at least don't like them being unhappy, admittedly for a variety of different reasons. And by a world I mean the particular cultures for whom happiness has become the preferred object, or the preferred fetish. Children are supposed to be anti-depressants for their parents.

Happiness is something parents often demand of their children; we, as we say, want our children to be happy; we were once children who's parents wanted us to be happy. And that means the whole spectrum, from not being a worry to them, not making their lives more difficult, being curative of their woes, to the pleasure our parents could take in our pleasure and our wellbeing. We are more dependent on our children than they are on us; and we are dependent, in brief, on their happiness. What makes the child happy is not going to be unlinked to what makes the parents happy. Clearly if a parent lives as if their child has a right to happiness, or a right to its pursuit, and that they are the guardians of this right, they are going to have a difficult, an even more difficult, task on their hands. Lovers often feel that they should be making each other happy when they are in fact making themselves a problem to each other.

So by way of conclusion I want to suggest that a right to the pursuit of happiness is asserted when a capacity for absorption has been sabotaged, when there is a loss of confidence in people's passions. Happiness becomes important when the possibility for absorption is under threat. That the child does not want to be happy – or perhaps, more exactly, the child doesn't want only to be happy – the child wants first to be safe, and then to be absorbed. There are, for example, only two reasons for children to go to school – apart, that is, from acquiring the werewithal to earn a living: to make friends, and to see if they can find something of absorbing interest to themselves.

There is an interesting moment in Lord of the Flies when Henry, one of the "littluns", wanders away from the main group of children. "He went down to the beach and busied himself at the water's edge." William Golding writes: "There were creatures that lived in this last fling of the sea, tiny transparencies that came questing in with the water over the hot, dry sand. With impalpable organs of sense they examined this new field. Perhaps food had appeared where the last incursion there had been none . . . This was fascinating to Henry. He poked about with a bit of stick, that itself was wave-worn and whitened and a vagrant, and tried to control the motions of the scavengers . . . He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things."

The adult narrator can see Henry as in some way identified with these rudimentary scavengers; and the narrator intimates that without adults the children feel how much is out of control or under-controlled. And then there is the remarkable sentence: "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things." He feels himself exercising control, but he is not, and his absorption is beyond, in excess of, mere happiness. Something else is wanted more than happiness by Henry, and it seems to be the exercise of control over living things, one of which is himself. It would be easy, and partly true, to say that what Henry is absorbed by here, what is beyond mere happiness, is power, control over living things. But Golding is clear about two things; it is an illusion of power – Golding refers to Henry having "the illusion of mastery" – and it is also the absorption itself that is beyond mere happiness. "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness." It is an illusion that absorbs him beyond happiness; in other words, he is playing. Absorption is not in and of itself a moral good; in the novel the tyrannical, sadistic Jack absorbs the attention of a lot of the children who do his bidding. But in proposing, in the context of the novel, that there is a beyond to mere happiness, something else or further that is wanted; and that indeed happiness may be a poor substitute for something else, that happiness may be something that can get in the way of whatever is beyond it; by proposing this Golding is saying something about what can override the pursuit of happiness, and what may be lost in its pursuit. For better and for worse, being able to feel our frustration is the precondition for becoming absorbed. When this is impossible the pursuit of happiness tends to take over. The right to pursue happiness may be, at its worst, the right not to feel frustrated. And if frustration is not allowed to take its course, to take its time, there is no absorption, only refuges from unhappiness. The child is fobbed off with happiness when what she really wants is to get her appetite back. The right to the pursuit of happiness can be a cover story for the wish to hide.


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Author, author: Sue Townsend aka Adrian Mole

Gabriel Josipovici's essay is a welcome counterblast in conservative times, says Tom McCarthy

That modernism represents one of the great seismic shifts in the history of western literature wouldn't be disputed by any literary professors who know their onions. What they find it harder to agree on is when that shift begins and what exactly it consists of – in short, what modernism, properly speaking, is. Gabriel Josipovici, former Weidenfeld professor of comparative literature at Oxford and currently a star turn in the graduate school of humanities at Sussex, eschews both the definitions usually proffered by cultural historians of a Marxist bent (that it was a reaction to industrialisation or to a crisis among the bourgeoisie) and the humanist ones given by liberals (that it was an era of unbridled self-expression), not to mention the dismissive ones put out by conservatives (that it was all a bit of silliness we've thankfully got over now). In their stead he ventures, at the outset of this book-length essay, a more essential formula: that modernism should be understood as "a coming into awareness by art of its precarious status and responsibilities".

Herein lie both the strength and weakness of the argument that follows. The disadvantage of such a general characterisation is that these terms apply as much to Shakespeare as to Joyce: think of the self-reflectiveness of so much of the former's work, from Hamlet's disruptive (and disrupted) play-within-a-play to the sonnets' constant awareness of form and its limits. They apply even to Ovid: what do the "Pygmalion" or "Orpheus" sequences of Metamorphoses enact if not allegories of art's fragile status and responsibilities? The advantage is that Josipovici knows this, and uses the knowledge as a cue to drag the cursor way back, tracing the tendency that comes to a head in the "high" modernist period (the early 20th century) through the Romantics to the reformation and beyond.

Thus Cervantes's Don Quixote is, both lucidly and utterly correctly, identified as a far more "modern" work than many more recent offerings – modern in the fraught relationship it maintains with its own narrative modes, the way it orchestrates a sense of disenchantment or erosion of the sacred, and, most of all, the way its main "adventure" becomes one of reading and writing. Aeschylus's Oresteia is held up – again in spot-on fashion – as a template for an anti-humanist worldview: what matters is not the individual but the house, or oikos, from which he emerges and of which he forms no more than an iteration. It's an insight that helps us to understand (although Josipovici doesn't mention him) why that arch-modernist William Faulkner delves, in Attic style, through generations of the Compson family, trawling their dwindling estate for residues of buried history. From that other Greek unit of measure, the polis or city-state, Josipovici derives a modern aesthetic of interconnectedness, of man as a diminished agent operating within systems that exceed him.

Interconnectedness is a feature of this book, providing not only one of its central themes but also its discursive method. A typical paragraph will zap us from Dürer to Mann to Flaubert to Dostoevsky in order to make a point about Kierkegaard. It can disorient at times, but the associative or digressive approach is the right one for the task. What I'm not so sure about is the overall "pitch". Josipovici is a formidable scholar whose The World and the Book I remember being a landmark text when I was studying literature. But there he was writing in academic mode, with a certain critical framework and its attendant permissions taken for granted; here, he's shifted into a more populist mode, and it doesn't always play to his advantage. Adopting the vocabulary of the middlebrow in order to legitimise the vanguard merely robs it of what animates it most. Rather than celebrate the subversive energies of Luigi Nono's opera Prometeo, for example, he tries to sell it to the Glyndebourne crowd by claiming that it leaves us "with a sense of sorrow and of wonder and, at an even deeper level, a sense of having bathed in the waters of life". The sentiment is just that: sentimental. While the impetus behind it is profound, it ends up sounding trite.

Josipovici has never been a fellow traveller of any school or fashion. His points of contact here, as in his other work, are original, at times idiosyncratic. To use Kierkegaard rather than the more obvious Nietzsche to explain the vertiginous, abyss-gazing disposition of most modernist works is refreshing. To choose Wordsworth as a historical model for what a truly modernist-inspired contemporary literature might be seems odd, to say the least; wouldn't Laurence Sterne or Gerard Manley Hopkins make much better heroes? And to trot out the old canard that equates Flaubert with naturalist realism is just wrong. The Flaubert who wrote Bouvard and Pécuchet, in which two Quixotic figures re-enact gestures from book illustrations in vain bids for imagined authenticity, before the narrative gives over to a "dictionary of received ideas" whose authorship is never clear? The Flaubert who wrote The Temptation of Saint Anthony, in which phantasms shake and rivet a disintegrating consciousness that yearns "to become matter"? Come on.

What can't be faulted is the plaintive logic running through this book. In cultural terms, we live in deeply conservative times. Editors at several major publishing houses have to run novels' synopses past reader focus groups before being allowed to publish them; "literary" festivals feature newsreaders and other media personalities. We shouldn't imagine, though, that things were that different in the golden age of modernism. Ulysses was printed, in 1922, on a small, private press in Paris, in a run of 1,000; Kafka's Metamorphosis, on its small-press publication in 1915, sold 11 copies – of which 10 were bought by Kafka. Yet can anyone, now, name the successful middlebrow writers of 1922 or 1915? Of course not. That alone should give Josipovici comfort.

Tom McCarthy's C (Cape) is on the Booker longlist.


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David Grossman and the new publishing season

'I read Tony Blair A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males'

Wednesday 1st September

Dear Diary,

Woken early by an employee of Parcel Force. He was a Chinese bloke and asked if I was "Mr Occupier!" I said I was Mr Adrian Albert Mole. He was holding a squarish, heavy-looking parcel. I hoped it was the wooden Japanese neck-pillow I had ordered from Innovations many months ago.

After a chilly doorstep wrangle (the wind was blowing through the fly of my pyjamas, directly on to my prostate), I managed to persuade him to hand the package over and went inside. When I opened it at the kitchen table I was shocked to find Tony Blair's face staring up at me with the words, Tony Blair A Journey. Inside was a House of Commons acknowledgments slip from Pandora:

Aidy darling,

Had a brief disastrous affair with a bookshop manager – he left his wife and turned up at my apartment with his ghastly suitcases and a hyperactive boy-child called Plato. He has promised me free books for life. I know you are obsessed with TB so enjoy this advance copy.

After a struggle to control my jealous rage I started to read.

As I ploughed through the acknowledgments I could not help but reflect that, had I had 26 people to help me with my own books I might have had at least one published by now.

My own semi-autobiographical novel, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland has been with Hutchinson for two and a half years.

At 11am my mother came in from next door to "borrow" yet more teabags (she already owes me 17). On seeing Mr Blair's cover photograph she began to sniffle: "He was so full of promise," she said, "And look at him now, he's a broken bulrush in the River Nile of life."

I went to the lavatory and was in there for some time. When I returned my mother was engrossed in the book and my father had let himself into the house and was rummaging through my fridge (God! I should never have installed those wheelchair ramps which allow him easy access to my house).

I went into my bedroom to get dressed and came back to find my father eating the cold custard from last night's dinner. My mother looked up from A Journey and said: "He writes that he came very near to having a drinking problem."

My father said: "A pisshead yeah? What was he on?"

My mother said: "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine over dinner."

My father sneered. "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine? He's a bleedin' amateur." He put the empty custard jug back in the fridge and lit a cigarette.

He said: "Now, if he was crawling in the gutter in Downing Street, screaming at the moon and trying to fight a policeman on the door of Number 10, then yes, I'd agree he did have a drink problem."

He tapped cigarette ash into the ashtray that had been welded on to the arm of his wheelchair.

Thursday 2nd September

Dear Diary,

I read A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males: Alastair Campbell, Gordon Brown, John Prescott, Margaret Beckett, Philip Gould, Jonathan Powell and Peter Mandelson, yet he was not an Alpha Male himself. He was a receptacle and a conduit of their wishes and opinions. Mr Blair had as much self-belief as a chameleon.

I remembered that when he returned to London after a long period in the United States he had an American accent, much like that of his fellow Christian and friend, Sir Cliff Richard.

I am not a trained psychologist but I am wise beyond my 40 years and think that I have discovered why Mr Blair was so keen to become a war leader and to swagger alongside George Bush. He thought it would give him another pair of testicles and would promote him to Alpha Maleness.

At 1.30pm I took A Journey round to my parents' house and said: "I've finished it."

"What?" said my mother, "You've read all 718 pages? It's impossible."

I reminded her that I was a speed reader and had read War and Peace in two days.

"What's your method?" she said suspiciously.

"I skip over the adverbs and adjectives," I said.

I left them fighting over who was to read A Journey first and went to my desk to write a stern letter to Hutchinson, demanding that my own book, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland, be published tout suite:

Dear Hutchinson,

My friend and confidante Dr Pandora Braithwaite BA, MA, D phil, advanced me a copy of Tony Blair A Journey (incidentally I notice with sorrow that Dr Braithwaite's name does not appear in the index, though she has spoken to me at length many times about the long and intimate conversations she had with Mr Blair into the early hours). I congratulate you on your sales of the above book, which brings me to the subject of Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland. Apart from an acknowledgment slip some time in 2007 which said: 'Your manuscript arrived at our office today. However, it may be sometime before we can get back to you', I have heard nothing from you and warn you that unless you promise me a publication date, I will take the manuscript back and offer it to Penguin.

Yours,

Adrian A Mole

PS Mr Blair uses too many emotive adjectives and he could do with taking a red pen to his adverbs also.


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