Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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IV

The Argives thought themselves bound to abide by the conditions of the
truce, though made without their consent; but shortly after the
retreat of Agis, an Athenian force of a thousand hoplites and three
hundred cavalry arrived at Argos, and Alcibiades, who was present in
the character of ambassador, strongly urged the renewal of the
campaign. His proposal was warmly supported by the Mantineans and
Eleans, and they and the Athenians marched forthwith against
Orchomenus in Arcadia, which was in alliance with Sparta; and the
Argives, who had wavered at first, soon afterwards joined them.
Orchomenus was gained over with little trouble, and then the Eleans
were eager to proceed against Lepreum, a town in their alliance which
had gone over to Sparta. But the Argives, Athenians, and Mantineans,
insisted on attacking Tegea, where there was a party opposed to
Sparta, by whose means they hoped to bring this powerful city, the
ancient rival of Mantinea, to their side. Thereupon the Eleans
abandoned the expedition, and went home in a rage, but the rest of the
allies took up their quarters at Mantinea, and prepared to make an
attack on Tegea.

The Spartans were in high anger against Agis for his unsoldier-like
conduct in the recent campaign, and when they heard of the
capitulation of Orchomenus their resentment rose to such a pitch that
it was proposed to inflict on him a heavy fine, and raze his house to
the ground. At his earnest entreaty they consented to reserve the
sentence, and give him an opportunity of wiping out the stain on his
honour; but as a mark of diminished confidence they appointed ten
commissioners, without whose consent he was not allowed to lead an
army out of the city.

They had just come to this decision when an urgent message arrived
from Tegea, bidding them to bring help with all speed, or the town
would be lost. The imminent peril startled the Spartans from their
wonted apathy, and they set out at once in full force to the relief of
Tegea. On reaching the borders of Arcadia they sent back the elder and
younger men, amounting to a sixth part of the army, to serve as a
garrison in Sparta; and at the same time couriers were despatched to
summon their allies in Arcadia and central Greece. The Arcadians
arrived in time to take part in the battle, but the Boeotians,
Corinthians, and others, though they hastened to obey the order, were
delayed by a long and difficult march, through the hostile territory
of Argos.

Passing by Tegea, Agis entered the district of Mantinea, and having
pitched his camp began to lay waste the country. Informed of his
approach, the Argives and their allies marched out to meet him, and
choosing a position on the slope of a hill, defended in front by
rugged and broken ground, they drew up in order of battle. The
Spartans, incited, doubtless, by the example of their king, who was
eager to redeem his reputation, rushed impetuously to the assault; and
they were already within a stone's-throw of the enemy when a Spartan
veteran cried out to Agis: "Heal not ill with ill!" His meaning was
that in Argos Agis had been too cold, and now he was too hot. Agis
heard the warning voice, and his own good sense must have shown him
how rashly he was acting; accordingly, at the very moment of
encounter, he gave the word to retreat, and fell back to the
neighbourhood of Tegea. At this place there was a copious head of
water, which, when properly regulated, served to irrigate the fields
of Tegea and Mantinea. The disposal of the water-supply was a constant
source of dispute between the two rival cities; and Agis now prepared
to turn the whole volume of the fountain towards Mantinea, expecting
that the Mantineans, when they saw their fields threatened with
inundation, would come down into the plain to hinder the mischief.

The Argives and their allies were dumb-foundered by the sudden
disappearance of the Spartans; and when they had recovered from their
astonishment, they waited impatiently for the order to pursue the
runaways. As no such order was given, cries of "Treason!" arose in the
ranks, and the generals were openly accused of having sold themselves
to the enemy. The Spartans, it was asserted, had been allowed to
escape, when they were fairly caught under the walls of Argos; and now
the confederates had been betrayed a second time by their officers.
Amid the general clamour the Argive commanders stood for a moment
confounded and amazed; then recovering themselves they gave the word
to advance, and led their forces down into the plain. Here they passed
the night in the open field, and early next morning they stood to
their arms, and prepared for an immediate attack.

Agis was not aware that the Argive generals had taken up a new
position, and thinking that the confederates were still stationed on
the hill, he gave up his scheme of diverting the water, and directed
his march towards the place where he had first encamped. As they
proceeded thus in marching order, and quite unprepared for any hostile
movement, the Spartans suddenly found themselves face to face with the
whole Argive army, drawn up in order of battle. For one instant it
seemed as if a panic were about to spread through the Spartan ranks;
then their wonderful discipline prevailed, and with all promptitude,
but without flurry or confusion, the necessary orders were passed from
the King to the commanders of divisions, from these again to the
colonels, from the colonels to the captains, and from the captains
down to the sergeants, [Footnote: I have thought it best to give the
English titles, which of course have only a general correspondence
with the Greek Polemarch, Lochagus, etc.] who in their turn had to see
that the required movement was executed by the men under their
command: for such was the regular gradation of authority and
responsibility in the Spartan army. Thanks to this perfect
organization, in a very few minutes every man was in his place and
ready for battle.

On the left wing of the Spartan army were posted the Sciritae, hardy
mountaineers from southern Arcadia; next to them stood the
enfranchised Helots, who had served under Brasidas in Thrace, and
others of the same race who had received the Spartan citizenship in
reward for public service; then came the main body of the Spartans
themselves, and after them the rest of the Arcadian allies; while the
right wing was assigned by immemorial privilege to the Tegeans, with
whom were a few picked Spartans. The cavalry, never a very strong part
of the Spartan army, were posted on either flank.

On the other side the Mantineans held the place of honour on the right
wing, because the engagement was fought in their territory; next in
order were the Arcadian allies of Argos, and after them, more towards
the centre, stood a picked troop of a thousand Argives, trained and
equipped at the public expense; then followed the main body of the
Argive troops, with the rest of their allies, the Athenians occupying
the extreme left. As to the numbers engaged, nothing certain is known.

Some time was lost by the Argive army in delivering the customary
harangues addressed by the generals of the several contingents to
their men, and this enabled the Spartans to steady their ranks before
the fighting began. They, on their side, men of war from their youth,
had no need of set speeches to remind them of their duty; but pithy
words of exhortation passed from man to man, and high and clear rose
their national war-songs, thrilling them with the memories of their
heroic past. Then the signal was given on both sides to charge, and
the Argives and their allies rushed impetuously to the onset, while
the Spartans advanced to meet them with even and deliberate pace,
timed to the music of numerous pipers, who were stationed at regular
intervals in their ranks.

The regular equipment of the Greek infantry soldier consisted, besides
his helmet and body-armour, of shield and lance, and in advancing to
battle he had always a tendency to diverge towards the right, from a
natural wish to keep his shielded side towards the enemy. This
divergence from the forward direction was begun by the man posted on
the extreme right; his comrade on the left followed his example, and
the deflection was continued along the whole line. The consequence was
that when two armies came into action, the left wing on either side
was greatly outflanked by the opponents' right; and the battle of
Mantinea affords no exception to this rule, for not even Spartan
discipline was able to counteract the overpowering instinct of self-
preservation. Seeing that his left wing was on the point of being
outflanked by the Mantineans, Agis signalled to the Sciritae and
Brasideans to draw off in a lateral direction towards the left, in
order to present an equal line to the right wing of the enemy. The
order was executed, and to fill up the gap thus produced on the left
of his own centre, Agis ordered the Spartan officers commanding on his
right wing to bring up their men and occupy the vacant space. They,
however, flatly refused to obey the order, and consequently the
Sciritae and Brasideans were assailed in front and on both flanks by
overwhelming numbers, and driven back with great loss to their camp.

So completely were the Spartans out-manoeuvred and worsted in tactics,
through the blunders of their general, and the cowardice of his
subordinates. But in this terrible crisis they showed what native
valour, aided by life-long discipline, can do. Leaving a victorious
enemy in their rear, they advanced without flinching against the
opposing centre, where the main body of the Argives were posted, with
the troops of Orneae and Cleonaea supporting them on the left. Then it
was seen that neither the courage of the Spartans, nor the terror of
their name, had diminished with the lapse of time; for when the
confederate troops found themselves face to face with the renowned
warrior of the Eurotas, they turned and fled, almost without striking
a blow, and trampling their comrades under foot, in their haste to
avoid the thrust of the Spartan lances. The Athenians on the left wing
were now in great danger; for the charge of the troops of Agis had cut
them off from the centre, and they were attacked on the other flank by
the Tegeans and Spartans. They were saved from immediate destruction
by the exertions of their own cavalry, and presently found themselves
at liberty to retire from the field; for Agis, having completed the
rout of the main body, called off his men, and went to the relief of
his own left. The Mantineans and the Argive Thousand made no effort to
retrieve the fortunes of the day, but gave way before the first onset
of the Spartans, and joined the flight of their comrades. The
Mantineans suffered severely in their retreat, but of the Argives only
a few were slain.

Such was the battle of Mantinea, which completely restored the
military fame of the Spartans, and blotted out the reproach of
cowardice and sloth which for some years past had rested on their
name.

VI

One incident remains to be recorded, before we proceed to the crowning
catastrophe of our great historical drama. The Athenians, it should be
observed, were still nominally at peace with Sparta, and if they had
been wise they would have taken the opportunity of this respite from
hostilities to recover Amphipolis, and consolidate their empire in
Thrace. Instead of this, they looked around for fresh conquests, and
fixed their eyes on the little island of Melos, belonging to the
Cyclad group, which had been colonized in very early times from
Sparta.

The Melians had not joined the Confederacy of Delos, and they might
therefore be reproached for sharing the protection of Athens without
making any return. Beyond this the Athenians had no ground of
complaint against them, for they had taken no part in the
Peloponnesian War, but had remained quietly at home, occupied with
their own affairs. But Athens claimed the haughty title of mistress of
the sea, and pretended to regard the neutrality of one insignificant
island as an open defiance of her power. Ten years before an Athenian
fleet had been sent under Nicias to reduce the refractory Melians to
subjection; but the attempt was unsuccessful, and Nicias withdrew,
after having ravaged the outlying districts. Being now more at
leisure, the Athenians resolved, in the mere wantonness of power, that
Melos should only be suffered to exist as a dependency of Athens, and
thirty triremes sailed from the harbour of Peiraeus to carry out the
arbitrary decree.

On their arrival at Melos the Athenian admirals sent envoys into the
town, to summon the inhabitants to surrender. The envoys were invited
to a private conference with the chief men of the island; and between
the representatives of Athens and the Melian nobles there ensued an
extraordinary dialogue, which is given at great length by the
historian, and is commonly known as the Melian Debate. We cannot
suppose that the arguments here placed by Thucydides in the mouth of
the Athenian speaker were really uttered as set down by that writer.
Such a paradox of iniquity, such a shameless insult to the general
conscience of humanity, might have been employed by Plato, in exposing
the vicious teaching of the Sophists, or by Aristophanes in the full
riot of his satire: but the total abnegation of principle here implied
could never have been openly avowed by a responsible agent, speaking
for the most polished community in Greece. Even the worst criminals
seek to give some specious colour to their villainy; and the condemned
felon, who will face death without a tremor, shudders at the cry of
execration which greets his appearance at the scaffold. So hard it is,
even for the most depraved, to stifle the last embers of the moral
sense. We cannot suppose, then, that an educated Athenian of the fifth
century would publicly have claimed for his state the right of rapine
and murder. For this is the line of argument pursued by the
representative of Athens in the Melian Debate. The substance of what
he says may briefly be stated as follows "You are weak--we are strong;
Melos is a paltry island, Athens is queen of the Aegaean, and the
existence of an independent city in these waters is an insult to her
empire. Let us waste no time in discussions about abstract law and
right. For the mighty there is but one law--to get what they can, and
to keep it; and the weak have no rights, except by the sufferance of
the strong. This rule of conduct we know to be universal among men,
and we believe that the gods themselves are governed by it. [1]
To sum up the whole case in one word: you must yield or perish."

[1]
Desire of power, on earth a vicious weed,
Yet sprung from high, is of celestial seed;
In God 'tis glory; and when men aspire,
'Tis but a spark too much of heavenly fire.--DRYDEN.

It was in vain that the unhappy Melians tried to argue the question
from a higher standpoint; in vain they warned the Athenians that they
themselves might one day stand before the bar of justice, and plead
for their existence. They were brought back relentlessly to the grim
alternative-submission, or extermination. At length this strange
controversy came to an end, and after one final hint, of fearful
significance, the Athenian envoys withdrew, leaving the Melians to
consider their answer. The brave islanders were not long in coming
to their decision: they would not, they said, consent to enslave a city
which had maintained its liberty for seven hundred years; they put
their trust in divine justice, and in their kinsmen the Spartans, and
were resolved to resist to the last.

On receiving this answer the Athenian commanders at once laid siege to
Melos, and the doomed city was soon closely blockaded by sea and land.
The Melians made a gallant defence, and twice succeeded in breaking
through the lines of the besiegers, and conveying supplies into the
town. But presently reinforcements arrived from Athens, and the
Melians were confined within their walls. All hope of succour from
Sparta had vanished, food began to fail, and treason was at work among
the garrison. Thus driven to extremity, the Melians surrendered at
discretion. Then the Athenians showed that their threats had not been
idly uttered. All the men of military age in Melos were put to death,
the women and children were sold into slavery, and the land was
distributed among Athenian settlers.

In the fifth year of the war, after the capitulation of Mytilene, a
thousand of the inhabitants had been butchered in cold blood; and this
sentence, which seems so cruel to us, was regarded by the Athenians as
an act of mercy. Six years later, the decree which had originally been
passed against Mytilene, was actually executed on Scione, which had
revolted at the instigation of Brasidas. In this act of savage
retribution, Athens still remained within the limits of Greek
international law, which placed the inhabitants of a revolted city at
the mercy of their conquerors. But the case of Melos was different,
for that island had never been included in the Athenian alliance, and
the Melians had done nothing to provoke an attack. Thus the three
names, Mytilene, Scione, and Melos, mark an ascending scale of
barbarity, culminating in a massacre which, even in the eyes of
Greeks, was an atrocious crime. Athens had now offended beyond
forgiveness, giving colour to the accusations of her worst enemies,
and heaping up vengeance for the days to come.

THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY

I

The Peloponnesian War may be conveniently divided into four chief
periods. The first of these periods lasted for ten years, down to the
peace of Nicias. The second extends from the peace of Nicias to the
massacre of Melos. In the third, the scene of war was shifted from
Greece to Sicily, and it was there that the Athenian power really
received its death-blow. The fourth and final period begins after the
overthrow of the Athenians at Syracuse, and ends, nine years
afterwards, with their final defeat at Aegospotami, and the downfall
of the Athenian empire.

It is the third of these periods which will occupy our attention for
the remainder of the present volume, and as the momentous events which
we have to relate occurred entirely in Sicily, it is necessary to say
something of the previous history of that great island. The connexion
of the Greeks with Sicily begins in the latter half of the eighth
century before Christ, when settlers from Chalcis in Euboea founded
the city of Naxos on the north-eastern coast, under the shadow of
Aetna. Naxos in its turn sent out colonists, who built the cities of
Leontini and Catana, the former on an inland site, commanding the
great plain which extends southwards from Aetna, the latter on the
coast, in a line with the centre of the same plain. These were Ionic
colonies, and we may close the list with the name of Messene
[Footnote: Originally called Zancle.] founded twenty years later on
the Sicilian side of the strait which bears its name.

We have now to enumerate the principal Dorian cities. First among
these in time, and by far the first in importance, was Syracuse,
founded from Corinth a year after the settlement of Naxos. Between
Syracuse and the mother-city there was a close and intimate tie of
friendship, which remained unbroken throughout the course of Greek
history. The original city was built on the island of Ortygia, but a
new town afterwards arose on the low-lying coast of the mainland, and
spread northwards till it covered the eastern part of the neighbouring
heights. Ortygia was then converted into a peninsula by the
construction of a causeway, connecting the new city with the old.
Under the despotism of Gelo, who made himself master of the city in
the early part of the fifth century, [Footnote: 485 B.C.] Syracuse
rose to great power and splendour, and her territory extended over a
great part of eastern Sicily. Gelo gained immortal renown by defeating
a mighty host of Carthaginians, who invaded Sicily at the time when
the confederate cities of old Greece were fighting for their existence
against Xerxes and his great armada. After his death the power passed
to his brother Hiero, whose victories in the Olympian and Pythian
Games are commemorated in the Odes of Pindar. Hiero reigned for twelve
years, and was succeeded by his brother Thrasybulus; but a year later
the despotism was overthrown, and the government returned to a
democracy.

A bare mention must suffice for Gela, founded from Rhodes and Crete
nearly half a century after Syracuse, and the more famous Agrigentum,
a colony from Gela, and next to Syracuse the greatest city in Sicily.
These played no part in the struggle with Athens; but Selinus and
Camarina, the two remaining Dorian cities of southern Sicily, will
occupy an important place in the following narrative.

Thus the whole coast districts on southern and eastern Sicily were
held by opulent and flourishing Greek cities. On the north was Himera,
an Ionic colony, and the scene of Gelo's great victory over Carthage;
while the western and north-western district was divided between the
Phoenicians and the Elymi, a people of unknown origin, whose chief
seats were at Eryx and Egesta. The inland parts were held, in the
west, by the Sicans, who are believed to have come from Spain, and in
the east by the Sicels, a people of Latin race, who gave their name to
the island.

II

Since the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens had been
meddling in the affairs of Sicily, under pretence of aiding the Ionian
cities, who dreaded the encroaching ambition of Syracuse. That these
fears were not unfounded was proved when, a few years afterwards, the
Syracusans expelled the commons of Leontini, and took possession of
their territory. The Leontine exiles sought refuge at Athens, but
their appeal for help remained for a time unanswered, as the Athenians
were then fully occupied in Greece. But six years after the conclusion
of the Peace of Nicias, an appeal came to Athens from a remote corner
of Sicily, which stimulated the Leontine exiles to fresh efforts, and
led to most important results.

Between the Greeks of Selinus and the Elymians of Egesta there was a
long-standing quarrel, and in a war which had recently broken out the
Egestaeans were reduced to severe straits by the combined forces of
Selinus and Syracuse. In their distress they turned to Athens for
help, and envoys were sent to plead their cause before the Athenian
assembly. In aiding Egesta, argued the envoys, Athens would be serving
her own interests; for if the Syracusans were not speedily checked in
their aggressions, they would soon make themselves masters of the
whole of Sicily, and in that case they could bring such an accession
of strength to the enemies of Athens in Greece as to make them
irresistible. They had good reason, therefore, to take sides against
the enemies of Egesta, and the more so as the Egestaeans promised to
defray all the expenses of the war.

The Athenians generally were inclined to take up the quarrel of
Egesta, but as a measure of precaution it was decided to send agents
of their own to make an inspection on the spot, and see whether the
Egestaeans were as wealthy as they pretended. On their return to
Athens these men reported that Egesta was possessed of fabulous
riches. At every house where they had been entertained, the tables and
the sideboards had been one blaze of gold and silver plate. The fact
was that the Egestaeans had collected all the gold and silver vessels
in the town, and others borrowed from the neighbouring cities, and by
passing them on from house to house, wherever these important guests
were invited, had contrived to make a great display. As an earnest of
all this wealth, the Athenian commissioners brought back with them
sixty talents of silver.

The smallness of this sum ought to have been sufficient to arouse the
suspicions of the Athenians; but they were willing to be deceived, and
they gave ready credence to reports of their commissioners. Voting in
full assembly, they passed a decree that sixty ships should be sent to
Sicily, under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. The
fleet was first to be employed in helping Egesta, and when that
contest had been brought to a successful issue the Leontines were to
be restored to their homes; finally, the generals were empowered to
act as might seem best in the interests of Athens. The real purpose of
the enterprise is indicated in the last clause. Vague plans of
conquest were floating before the minds of the Athenians, and at a
time when their whole energies should have been employed to repair the
breaches in their empire, they dreamed of founding a new dominion in
the west.

Five days later the assembly met again to vote supplies and discuss
any further details which remained to be settled. But Nicias
determined to take the opportunity of reopening the whole question,
wishing, if possible, to divert his countrymen from their purpose, and
put an end to the expedition altogether. It was folly, he argued, to
take up the cause of needy foreigners, and drain the resources of
Athens for a distant and hazardous enterprise, when their subjects in
Thrace were still in open revolt, and their enemies in Greece were on
the watch to take them at a disadvantage. If they trusted in the
treaty with Sparta, they would soon find how infirm was the ground of
their confidence. That treaty had been forced upon the Spartans by
their misfortunes, and they would be only too glad to repudiate it,
which they could easily do, as many of the conditions were still under
dispute. Moreover, the most powerful cities of the Peloponnesian
League had refused to sign the treaty, and were ready, at the first
hint from Sparta, to renew the war. Athens was beset with perils,
which were enough to tax her strength to the utmost: and yet they
talked of sailing to Sicily, and raising up a new host of enemies
against her! Even if the expedition succeeded, they could never keep
their hold on that vast and populous island, while, if it failed, they
would be utterly ruined. As to the supposed danger from the ambition
of Syracuse, that was mere idle talk. The schemes of conquest, with
which the Egestaeans had tried to alarm the Athenians, would keep the
Syracusans busy at home, and prevent them from meddling in the affairs
of Greece. "Leave the Greeks of Sicily alone," said Nicias with true
prophetic insight; "and they will not trouble you. Do not disturb the
prestige which belongs to a distant and unfamiliar power. If they once
learn to know you, they may learn to despise you."

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