Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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Then fixing his eyes on Alcibiades, who was sitting surrounded by his
own partisans, young profligates like himself, Nicias concluded thus:
"There is another danger against which I would warn you, men of
Athens--the danger of being led astray by the wild eloquence of
unscrupulous politicians, who seek to dazzle you with visions of new
empire, that they may rise to high command, and restore their own
shattered fortunes. Yes, Athens is to pour out her blood and treasure,
to provide young spendthrifts with the means of filling their racing-
stables! Against the mad counsels of these desperate men I invoke the
mature prudence of the elder members of this assembly, and call upon
them to show by a unanimous vote that neither flattery nor taunts can
induce them to sacrifice the true interests of Athens."

It must have been a severe ordeal for the young Alcibiades to sit and
listen to this keen and bitter invective, which set in a glaring light
the worst features in his character--his selfish ambition, his
shameless life, his total want of principle, his vulgar ostentation.
The last quality, so alien from the best traditions of Athenian
character, had been conspicuously displayed only a few weeks before at
the Olympic festival, where he had entered seven four-horsed cars for
the chariot-race, and won the first, second, and fourth prizes. Every
word of Nicias went home, galling him in his sorest point--his
outrageous vanity; and hardly had the elder statesman concluded his
speech, when he sprang to his feet, and burst without preface into a
wild harangue, which is a remarkable piece of self-revelation,
disclosing with perfect candour the inner motives of the man on whom,
more than on any other, the future of Athens depended. He began by
defending his barbaric extravagance, recently displayed at Olympia,
which, as he pretended to believe, had covered his native city with
glory, and spread the fame of Athenian wealth and power from one end
of Greece to another. The lavish outlay, and haughty demeanour, which
would be justly blamed in a common man, were right and proper in him,
one of the elect spirits of the time, inspired with great aims, and
treading the summits of public life. He had already shown what he
could do in the highest regions of diplomacy, by raising a great
coalition in Peloponnesus, which had faced the whole might of Sparta
in the field, and struck terror into the enemies of Athens.

After this impudent defence of his own pernicious policy, which had
led to the crushing defeat at Mantinea, and thus enabled the Spartans
to restore their damaged reputation, Alcibiades proceeded to deal with
the question of the day, and exerted all his sophistry to confirm the
Athenians in their design of invading Sicily. That island, he
asserted, was inhabited by a mixed population with no settled homes,
and no common patriotic sentiment; and among these motley elements
they would find plenty of adherents. The Siceliots [Footnote: Greeks
of Sicily.] were poorly armed, ill-furnished with heavy infantry, and
in constant danger from the hostile Sicels. The risk of attack from
the Peloponnesians would not be increased by sending part of the
Athenian fleet to Sicily: for Attica was in any case always exposed to
invasion, and a sufficient force of ships would be left at home to
keep command of the sea.

"We have no excuse, then," said Alcibiades in conclusion, "for
breaking our word to the Egestaeans, and drawing back from this
enterprise. Both honour and policy are pointing the way to Sicily. An
empire like ours is an ever-expanding circle, which lives by growing,
and cannot stand still. It is only by getting more, and always more,
that we can keep what we have. And let not Nicias succeed in his
attempt to set the old against the young, neither let us believe, like
him, that the stability of a state consists in stagnation. It is only
by a hearty co-operation of all ages and classes that any state can
prosper, and a community which finds no outlet for its energies abroad
is soon worn out by discord and faction at home. Above all is this
true of us Athenians, to whom ceaseless toil and endeavour is the very
element in which we live."

The advice of Alcibiades, thus tendered in the garb of political
wisdom, was of fatal and ruinous tendency, and in direct opposition to
the oft-repeated warnings of Pericles. But his speech was exactly
suited to the temper of his audience, and most of those who followed
him spoke to the same effect, and when the Egestaeans and Leontines
renewed their entreaties it became evident that the original motion
would be confirmed by a large majority. Nicias, however, resolved to
make one more effort, and he came forward to speak again, hoping by a
new device to check the torrent of popular enthusiasm. Affecting to
regard the matter as settled, he entered into an estimate of the force
required for the proposed expedition, prefaced by an alarming picture
of the wealth and power of the Sicilian Greeks. To act with effect
against such an enemy, they must send, not only an overwhelming naval
force, but a numerous body of troops, both cavalry and infantry, and a
fleet laden with supplies for many months. They must proceed, in fact,
as if they were founding a great city on a hostile soil. On no other
condition, added Nicias, would he undertake the command. Nicias had
intended, by exaggerating the difficulties of the undertaking, to damp
the ardour of the Athenians; but to his utter dismay, these timid
counsels were greeted with a great shout of applause. It was supposed
that he had changed his opinion, and even the elder men began to think
that so prudent a leader, backed by such an armament, could not fail
of success. A great wave of excitement swept over the assembly, and
the few who still doubted were cowed into silence. When the tumult had
subsided, a certain Demostratus, [Footnote: The name is given by
Plutarch.] who had spoken strongly in favour of the expedition,
addressing Nicias in the name of the assembly, asked him to state
plainly what force he required. Thus driven into a corner, Nicias
answered, with great reluctance, that the number of triremes must be
not less than one hundred, with five thousand heavy-armed infantry,
and slingers and bow-men in proportion. This enormous estimate was
carried without demur, and by the same vote full powers were conferred
on the generals to fix the scale of the armament as they might think
best for the interests of Athens.

Thus, by a strange freak of fortune, the Athenians, at the most
momentous crisis of their history, were urged along the road to ruin
by the most opposite qualities in their leaders, the cold caution of
Nicias, and the wild energy of Alcibiades.

III

During the whole of the following spring [Footnote: B.C. 415.]
preparations for the invasion of Sicily were actively pushed on, and
the whole city was in a bustle and stir of excitement. Athens had
recently recovered from the ravages of the plague, and six years of
peace had recruited her resources, both in men and money. Since the
first outbreak of the war a new generation had grown up, and these
young and untried spirits joined, with all the fire of youth, in an
enterprise which promised them a boundless field of adventure. Others
were attracted by the baser motive of gain, or by mere curiosity, and
the love of travel. No thought of danger or hardship, no hint of
possible failure, clouded the brilliant prospect; it was a gay holiday
excursion, and at the same time a grand scheme of conquest, offering
fame to the ambitious, wealth to the needy, and pleasant recreation to
all. Thousands flocked eagerly to enter their names for the service,
and the only trouble of the recruiting officers was in choosing the
stoutest and the best.

The great armament was on the eve of departure, and all hearts were
full of joyful anticipation, when an event occurred which suddenly
chilled this happy mood, and cast a shadow of evil augury on the whole
undertaking. The Athenians of that age, like their descendants nearly
five centuries later, [Footnote: See Acts xvii. 22.] were "more god-
fearing than other men." They worshipped a multitude of divinities,
and their city was thronged with the temples and statues of heroes and
gods. Conspicuous among the objects of popular adoration was the god
Hermes, who is exhibited by ancient poets and artists as a gracious
and lovely youth, the special patron of eloquence and wit, the
guardian spirit of travellers and merchants, and the giver of good
luck. A familiar feature in the streets and public places of Athens
was the bust of Hermes, surmounting a quadrangular stone pillar. Many
hundreds of these pillars, which were called Hermae, were scattered
about over the whole city, standing before the doors of houses and
temples, at cross-ways and places of public resort. Wherever he went,
whatever he did, the Athenian felt himself to be in the presence of
this genial and friendly power, who attended him, with more than human
sympathy, in all his ways.

If such were the feelings of the Athenians towards their favourite
deity, what must have been their horror when they awoke one morning to
find that all the busts of Hermes, with one or two exceptions, were
shattered and mutilated beyond all recognition. The whole population
was thunderstruck, and wild rumours ran from mouth to mouth concerning
the perpetrators and the motive of this shocking outrage. It was
evident that many hands must have been employed on the work of
destruction, and those who had so foully insulted the most hallowed
affections of their fellow-citizens were believed to be capable of any
enormity. It was loudly asserted that a black conspiracy was hatching
against the liberties of the people, and that the worst days of the
tyranny were about to be revived. For in those days religion and
politics were associated with a closeness of intimacy unknown in
modern Europe, and sacrilege might well be regarded as a prelude to
treason. Active measures were at once taken to bring the offenders to
justice, and great rewards were offered to anyone, whether citizen,
slave, or resident foreigner, who gave information concerning this or
any similar crime. At first nothing was disclosed as to the mutilation
of the Hermae, but other recent acts of profanation were brought to
light, and among these was mentioned a derisive parody of the great
Eleusinian Mysteries, alleged to have been performed in the house of
Alcibiades, and elsewhere. The enemies of Alcibiades, who were both
numerous and powerful, eagerly seized this handle against him; but
when the matter was debated in the public assembly, it became evident
that, if he were brought to trial at once, his present popularity, as
chief promoter of the Sicilian expedition, would ensure his acquittal.
Seeing, therefore, that their attack had been premature, those who had
led the outcry against him now drew back, reserving themselves for a
more favourable occasion. Being known as the bitter opponents of
Alcibiades, they could not, without exciting grave suspicions, propose
the adjournment of his trial; but other speakers, prompted by them,
urged on grounds of public expediency that the charges against him
should be held in suspense, so as not to delay the departure of the
fleet. Alcibiades saw plainly that this manoeuvre was contrived to get
him out of the way, to remove his adherents from Athens, and leave his
enemies free to pursue their machinations during his absence. But it
was in vain that he exposed the malicious motives of the last
speakers, and pleaded earnestly for an immediate trial. The Athenians
were still possessed by their daring scheme of conquest, and they
decreed that Alcibiades should keep his command, and sail at once to
Sicily.

IV

At last the great day arrived, and in the first light of a mid-summer
dawn, a vast multitude was seen pouring along the broad highway which
led, between the Long Walls, from Athens to Peiraeus. The Upper City
was almost deserted by its inhabitants, for there was hardly one
Athenian who had not some cherished comrade, or some near relation,
enrolled for service in Sicily, and the crowd was swelled by thousands
of strangers, who came as spectators of that memorable scene. Little
now appeared of that sanguine and joyous temper which had prevailed
among the Athenians when they first voted for the expedition. Their
feelings had lately been fearfully harrowed by the mutilation of the
Hermae, and now that the moment of parting was at hand, all the perils
and uncertainties of their grand enterprise rose up vividly before
them. They were restored, however, to some degree of cheerfulness,
when they reached the harbour of Peiraeus, and saw the magnificent
fleet riding at anchor. Nearly all the vessels lying in the bay were
Athenian; for the main body of the allies, and the commissariat ships,
had been ordered to muster at Corcyra. The triremes furnished by
Athens numbered a hundred, of which sixty were fully equipped as war-
galleys, while forty were employed as transports. These numbers had
been equalled more than once before during the war; but in efficiency,
in splendour of appearance, and in the quality of the crews, this was
by far the finest fleet that ever sailed from Peiraeus. Only the bare
hulls of the ships were provided by the state, and each vessel was
assigned to some wealthy citizen, who defrayed all the expense of
fitting her for active service. Sometimes the cost of equipping a ship
was divided between two or more citizens, and at ordinary times this
form of taxation must have been felt by the rich as a heavy burden.
But such was the popularity of the Sicilian expedition that the
wealthy Athenians who were charged with this duty went far beyond what
was required of them, each striving to surpass the others by the
superior beauty and speed of his own ship. The crews were all composed
of picked men, attracted by the double rate of pay which was furnished
from the state exchequer; and in addition to this, the trierarchs
[Footnote: Citizens charged with the duty of equipping a trireme.]
paid special premiums to the petty officers and to the highest class
of rowers. The same spirit of emulation extended to the whole body of
Athenians enrolled in the army and fleet; every man felt that whatever
he spent on his own personal equipment was spent for the honour and
glory of Athens. And the effect produced on the public mind in Greece
was, in fact, prodigious: after all the ravages of the plague, and ten
years of exhausting warfare, Athens, it seemed, was stronger than
ever, and in the mere exuberance of energy was making this imposing
display of wealth and power. As to the ostensible object of the
expedition--the conquest of Sicily--few doubted that it must follow as
a matter of course.

The last farewell had been spoken, the troops were all embarked, and
the rowers sat ready at their oars. The trumpet sounded, commanding
silence, and the voice of the herald was heard, repeating a solemn
prayer, which was taken up by the whole multitude on sea and on shore,
while the captains and soldiers poured libations of wine from goblets
of silver and gold. When this act of worship was ended, the crews
raised the paean, and at a given signal the whole fleet was set in
motion, and passed, in single file, out of the harbour. On reaching
the open water, they quitted this order, and engaged in a friendly
contest of speed as far as Aegina. Then the crews settled down to
their work, and the great armament swept on, high in heart and hope,
to join the allied contingents, and commissariat fleet, now assembled
at Corcyra.

As yet only general rumours of the intended invasion had reached
Syracuse, and few of the citizens were aware of the imminent peril in
which they stood. Among those who were better informed was
Hermocrates, a Syracusan of high rank, who for many years had been the
guiding spirit in Sicilian politics. Speaking at a public assembly,
about the time when the Athenian fleet sailed from Peiraeus, he urged
the necessity of taking prompt measures for placing the city in a
thorough state of defence. He had no fear, he said, of the ultimate
triumph of Syracuse in the approaching struggle: only let them be on
their guard, and not underrate the power of the enemy whom they would
have to face. The words of Hermocrates, who enjoyed a high reputation
for valour, patriotism, and sagacity, were not without their effect,
and it was resolved that the generals should at once set about
organizing the military resources of Syracuse, and providing all
things necessary for the public safety. Some steps in this direction
they had already taken; and tidings soon arrived at Syracuse which
caused them to redouble their exertions.

For in the meantime the Athenians had reached Corcyra, where they held
a final review of all their forces. The total number of the triremes
was a hundred and thirty-four, and with these sailed a vast fleet of
merchant ships, and smaller craft, laden with stores of all kinds, and
carrying a whole army of bakers, masons, and carpenters, with the
tools of their crafts, and all the engines required for a siege.
Besides these, there was a great number of other vessels, small and
great, fitted out by private speculators for purposes of trade. The
military force was on a corresponding scale, comprising five thousand,
one hundred hoplites, of whom fifteen hundred were full Athenian
citizens, four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred slingers from
Rhodes, and a hundred and twenty exiles from Megara, equipped as
light-armed troops. The force of cavalry was but small, being conveyed
in a single transport.

The whole armament now weighed anchor from Corcyra and sailed in three
divisions, each commanded by one of the generals, to the opposite
coast of Italy. On arriving at Rhegium, an Ionic city on the Italian
side of the strait, they received permission to beach their ships, and
form a camp outside the walls; and here they waited for the return of
three fast-sailing triremes, which had been sent forward from
Corcyrato carry the news of their approach to Egesta, and claim the
promised subsidy, and at the same time to sound the temper of the
Greek cities in Sicily. Before long the ships came back with their
report, and the Athenians now learned to their great chagrin that all
the fabled wealth of Egesta had dwindled to the paltry sum of thirty
talents.

The three generals now held a council of war, to decide on a plan of
campaign. It was evident that no help was to be obtained from Egesta,
and the attitude of the Rhegini, who declined to enter their alliance,
boded ill for the success of the expedition. As their prospects were
so discouraging, Nicias proposed to confine their operations within
the narrowest limits, to patch up a peace between Selinus and Egesta,
to aid the Leontines, if it could be done without risk or expense, and
after making a display of the Athenian power, to sail home to Athens.
Alcibiades protested strongly against such a course, as disgraceful to
Athens, and unworthy of the splendid armament entrusted to their
command. Let them try first what could be effected by negotiation with
the Greek cities and native tribes of Sicily, and after gaining as
many allies as possible in the island, let them proceed to the attack
of Selinus and Syracuse. Lamachus, on the other hand, a plain,
downright soldier, was for sailing straight to Syracuse, and striking
immediately at the heart of Sicily. The city, he argued, would be
found unprepared, and if they acted at once, in the first terror of
their presence, they were certain of victory; but if they waited,
their men would lose heart, the efficiency of the fleet would be
impaired, and the Syracusans would gather strength and courage from
the delay.

How true was the forecast of Lamachus was proved by the event; but his
bold plan was distasteful alike to the timid temper of Nicias, and to
the tortuous, intriguing spirit of Alcibiades. Finding, therefore,
that he had no hope of convincing his colleagues, he voted for the
middle course, and accordingly the plan of Alcibiades, unquestionably
the worst of the three, was adopted.

In pursuance of this fatal policy Alcibiades crossed over to Messene,
and tried to win over that city to the side of Athens. Meeting with no
success, he returned to Rhegium, and immediately afterwards he and one
of his colleagues sailed with a force of sixty triremes to Naxos. Here
the Athenians found a hearty welcome, but at Catana, which was then
under the influence of Syracuse, their overtures were rejected, so
they continued their voyage southwards, and made their camp for the
night at the mouth of the river Terias. Starting early next day, they
proceeded along the coast, and, crossing the bay of Thapsus, came in
sight, for the first time, of their great enemy, Syracuse. The main
body of the fleet remained in the offing, but ten triremes were sent
forward to reconnoitre the Great Harbour, and get a nearer view of the
fortifications. When the little squadron came within hearing of the
walls, a herald proclaimed in a loud voice that any of the Leontines
now present in Syracuse should leave the city without fear, and come
over to their faithful kinsmen and allies, the Athenians. After this
futile demonstration, better calculated; to excite laughter than
terror, the reconnoitring triremes withdrew, and the whole fleet
sailed back in the direction of Rhegium. On their return voyage the
Athenians succeeded, by a lucky accident, in gaining the adherence of
Catana, which henceforth became the head-quarters of the whole
armament. Soon after they had effected this important change of
station the Salaminian state trireme arrived with momentous news from
Athens. We have seen what a panic of superstitious fear had been
caused among the Athenians by the mutilation of the Hermae. Arrested
for the moment by the all-absorbing interest of the Sicilian
expedition, the excitement broke out with renewed violence after the
departure of the fleet. The enemies of Alcibiades saw that the time
was now ripe for bringing up against him the charge of violating the
mysteries, and pressing for a judgment. A formal indictment was laid
before the senate, and it was decided that he should come home and
stand his trial. But it was necessary to proceed with caution, for
Alcibiades was popular with the troops serving in Sicily; and it was
possible that, if any violence were attempted against his person, they
might break out into mutiny. Accordingly the captain of the Salaminian
trireme was instructed to treat him with all respect, and allow him to
return to Athens in his own vessel. On receiving the summons
Alcibiades affected to obey, and set sail from Catana, with the state
trireme in attendance. The two ships remained in company as far as
Thurii, a Greek town of southern Italy, but there the great criminal
disappeared, and after searching for him in vain the officers of the
Salaminia were obliged to return to Athens without him. When the news
of his flight was brought to Athens, he was arraigned in his absence,
and condemned to death. But if his enemies supposed that they had
heard the last of Alcibiades, they soon learnt how deeply they were
mistaken.

V

The conduct of the campaign in Sicily was thus left in the feeble
hands of Nicias; for though Lamachus nominally held an equal command,
his poverty and political insignificance prevented him from holding
the position to which his military talents entitled him. The few
remaining weeks of summer were frittered away in trivial operations on
the western coasts of the island, and then the Athenians withdrew into
winter quarters at Catana. The predictions of Lamachus now began to be
fulfilled: seeing that Nicias, with the vast force at his disposal,
attempted nothing against them, the Syracusans began to despise their
enemy, and thought of taking the offensive. Horsemen from Syracuse
rode repeatedly up to the Athenian outposts at Catana, and tauntingly
inquired if the Athenians had come to found a colony in Sicily. At
last even Nicias felt that some display of activity was necessary to
save himself from contempt. He had learnt from certain Syracusan
exiles that there was a convenient place for landing troops, on the
low-lying shore where the river Anapus flows into the Great Harbour.
Here he determined to make a sudden descent, and in order to avoid
disembarking in the face of an enemy, he contrived a stratagem to
remove the whole Syracusan force out of reach. A citizen of Catana,
who was attached to the Athenian interest, was sent with a message to
the Syracusan generals, which held out a tempting prospect of gaining
an easy and decisive advantage over the Athenian army. Professing to
come from the partisans of Syracuse still remaining in Catana, he
promised on their behalf that if the Syracusans made a sudden assault
on the Athenian camp, their friends in Catana would simultaneously
fall upon the Athenian troops, who were in the habit of deserting
their quarters and straggling about the town, and set fire to their
ships.

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