Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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This plausible story found ready credence with the Syracusan generals,
and they named a day on which they promised to appear in full force
before the walls of Catana. When the time appointed drew near, they
marched out with the whole Syracusan army, leaving the city to be
garrisoned by their allies, and took up a position within easy reach
of Catana. Thereupon Nicias, who was fully informed of their
movements, embarked his troops by night, sailed down the coast past
Syracuse, and entering the Great Harbour, came to land near the
outlying suburb of Polichne, where stood the great temple of the
Olympian Zeus. Here he planted a breastwork of palisades to defend his
ships, and drew up his army on ground which offered many obstacles to
the advance of the Syracusan cavalry. Then, having broken down the
bridge over the Anapus, he waited for the enemy to appear.

Meanwhile the Syracusan generals had marched upon Catana, and finding
that they had been duped, returned with all speed to the defence of
their own city. After a long and fatiguing march, they came in view of
the Athenian position, and drew up their forces for battle. But Nicias
declined the challenge, and the day being now far advanced, they fell
back and encamped for the night in the open field.

Next morning Nicias, acting with unusual vigour, drew up his army in
two equal divisions, and leaving one half to defend the camp, and act
as a reserve, with the other he advanced rapidly upon the enemy. The
Syracusans, who had perhaps reckoned too much on the known indolence
of Nicias, were taken by surprise. Their discipline was lax, and many
of them had left their posts, and gone off into the town.
Nevertheless, they met the attack with firmness: those who were on the
spot hastened to assume their weapons, which they had laid aside,
while the stragglers came running back, and took their stand wherever
they saw a gap in the ranks. After some preliminary skirmishing
between the light-armed troops, the heavy masses of the hoplites came
to close quarters, and a fierce hand to hand struggle ensued. While
the issue was still uncertain, a violent thunderstorm broke over the
contending armies, and struck terror into the Syracusans, who regarded
it as an omen of defeat. But the seasoned soldiers of Nicias saw
nothing unusual in an autumn tempest, and perceiving the enemy to
waver, they pressed their attack, and broke through the opposing
lines. The whole Syracusan army now fell back upon Syracuse, but they
retired without haste or disorder, and their retreat was covered by a
numerous and efficient body of cavalry, so that their total loss
amounted only to two hundred and sixty.

The victory thus remained with the Athenians; but the moral advantage
was entirely on the side of the Syracusans. With an army composed of
raw recruits, they had met the flower of the Athenian forces, trained
by years of warfare, and led by experienced generals, in fair fight,
and though attacked at a disadvantage, they had fought with spirit,
and retreated with coolness and deliberation. They had good reason to
be satisfied with the result of their first encounter with the
invader, and they might well share the high and confident hopes
expressed by their most eminent citizen, Hermocrates. Speaking at a
general assembly, immediately after the battle, the great patriot
congratulated his countrymen on the courage which they had displayed,
and at the same time pointed out the necessity of improving their
discipline and military organization. One important reform should be
made at once; the number of the generals, which had hitherto been
fifteen, should be greatly reduced, and those appointed to the supreme
command should be given absolute power, so that they might act with
secrecy and despatch. Further, let the whole adult male population be
placed under arms, and kept in constant drill all through the winter.
If these measures were vigorously carried out, they might successfully
defy the Athenians to do their worst.

Acting on this advice, the Syracusans deposed the existing generals,
and chose Hermocrates, with three others, to fill their place. The
reform of the army was at once taken in hand, and ambassadors were
sent to Corinth and Sparta to ask for aid. Corinth, as the mother-city
of Syracuse, might well respond to the call, and it was hoped that the
Spartans would be induced to declare open war on Athens, so as to
compel the Athenians to withdraw their forces from Sicily, or at least
prevent them from sending reinforcements.

Various defensive works were undertaken by the Syracusans during the
winter. The most important of these was a new wall, extending from the
northern sea to the Great Harbour, and taking in a wide space of
ground, outside the old line of wall, to the west of the city. By thus
increasing the area of Syracuse, they made it much more difficult for
Nicias to draw his line of blockade, when the siege began in the
following spring. They also constructed a fort, with a permanent
garrison, to guard the temple of Zeus in the suburb of Polichne, and
drove piles into the sea at all the landing-places of the Great
Harbour.

Soon after the battle Nicias shifted his winter quarters to Naxos, and
learning this the Syracusans marched in full force to Catana, laid
waste the territory, and burnt the deserted huts of the Athenians. The
insult was tamely endured, and shortly afterwards the ever-active
Hermocrates had an opportunity of thwarting the Athenian intrigues
among the Greek cities of Sicily. The scene of this diplomatic
encounter was Camarina, a Dorian city which had hitherto wavered
between its hatred of Syracuse and its fear of Athens. Early in the
winter Athenian envoys appeared at Camarina with overtures of
alliance, and Hermocrates was sent to represent the interests of
Syracuse. Speaking first in the debate, Hermocrates set himself to
unmask the designs of the Athenians, who, under the thin pretence of
helping the Ionic cities of Sicily, had come (he said) to make a
conquest of the whole island. The Ionians of Greece had long groaned
under their yoke, and the same fate was in store for the Ionians of
Sicily, if they allowed themselves to be beguiled by specious lies.
The plea of friendship and goodwill might pass with the degenerate
Greeks of Asia and the Aegaean, born to be cajoled and enslaved; but
the Camariaeans were of the stout Dorian race, the hereditary foes of
tyranny, too wise and too brave to lend themselves as tools to a bare-
faced scheme of aggression. If not, let them beware: Syracuse was
fighting in a righteous cause, and must prevail in the end; help was
coming from Peloponnesus, and if the Camariaeans stood aloof, the day
would come when they would regret their disloyalty.

There can be no doubt that Hermocrates was right in his view of the
motive which brought the Athenians to Sicily, and the arguments of
Euphemus, the advocate for Athens, who strove to confute him, will not
bear examination. But the people of Camarina were in a difficult
position; their city had suffered many things in the past at the hands
of Syracuse, and they had reason to fear that her oppressions might be
renewed, if she emerged triumphant from the present struggle. On the
other hand, if the Athenians were victorious, they might forfeit their
independence altogether. In this dilemma they determined to play a
waiting game, and when the time came for action, to throw their weight
on the winning side. For the present they answered that they chose to
remain neutral.

The debate at Camarina, though interesting and instructive from the
light which it throws on the passions and motives of the combatants,
had little influence on the final issue of the war. But about the same
time a scene was being enacted in another part of the Greek world,
which led to most momentous consequences. Early in the winter the
Syracusan envoys arrived at Corinth, and made an earnest appeal for
help. The Corinthians were warmly attached to their famous colony,
which had never wavered in its allegiance to the mother-city, and
moreover they were the implacable enemies of Athens. They therefore
took up the cause of Syracuse with enthusiasm, and they sent the
envoys on to Sparta, accompanied by delegates of their own, to urge
the immediate resumption of hostilities against Athens, and the
sending of prompt aid to Sicily.

At Sparta they found an able and unscrupulous ally, the very last whom
they had expected to meet there. This was the outlaw Alcibiades, who,
after eluding the vigilance of the Athenian officers at Thurii, had
crossed over in a merchant ship to Cyllene, the port of Elis. While
staying there, he received an invitation from the Lacedaemonians to
proceed to Sparta, and made his way thither, having first stipulated
for a safe-conduct; for he dreaded the vengeance of the Spartans, to
whom he had done much mischief by raising the coalition which led to
the battle of Mantinea. So there he was, the guest of his old enemies,
burning with all an exile's hatred, and ready to strike some deadly
blow against the city which had cast him out.

At first the Spartans gave but a cool and qualified response to the
application of the envoys from Corinth. They were prepared to lend
moral support to the Syracusans, by sending an embassy to encourage
them in their resistance, but of more substantial aid they said little
or nothing. Now was the time for Alcibiades to play his part. He knew,
far better than any of his hearers, all the vulnerable points of
Athens, and had no scruple in using his knowledge for her ruin. Having
obtained permission from the magistrates, he rose to address the
Spartan assembly; and his speech is given at full length by the
historian, who was himself an exile at the time, and may possibly have
been present [Footnote: The suggestion is made by Grote.] on this
important occasion.

The Spartans might smile when they heard this accomplished traitor
professing friendship towards themselves, and zeal for their service;
they might be disgusted at the flippant sophistries by which he strove
to defend his unexampled villainy. But far different feelings must
have been awakened, when he went on to unfold the gigantic scheme of
conquest, to which, as he pretended, the invasion of Sicily was no
more than a prelude. According to this statement, the Athenians
intended, after subjugating the Greeks of Sicily, to turn their arms
against the Italian Greeks, and finally to attack Carthage. If all
these designs were successful, they would build a great number of new
ships, taking their materials from the forests of Italy, raise a vast
military force, both of Greeks and barbarians, and then return, backed
by the whole power of the West, and draw a ring of war round
Peloponnesus. With such resources they would be irresistible, and all
Greece must inevitably fall under their sway.

"Such," continued Alcibiades, "is the secret history of the Sicilian
expedition, which you have heard from the mouth of him who knows it
best. Remember, then, that the issue before you concerns not Syracuse
only, but Sparta also: for if Syracuse falls--and fall she must, if
left without support--all Sicily will be under the heel of Athens;
then will come the turn of Italy, and after that you will soon have
the enemy at your own doors. Now learn what you must do, if you would
avert all the evils which I have foretold. You must send a fleet to
Sicily at once, with hoplites who can row the ships themselves, and
serve in the army as soon as they land, and with them a Spartan
commander, to organize the fighting men of Sicily, and compel those
who are hanging back to do their duty. Such a man will be a host in
himself, and will infuse new life and energy into the defence.
Further, you must establish a fortified camp at Decelea, a position
which commands the whole territory of Attica; for by so doing you will
reduce Athens to a state of siege, and compel the whole male
population to serve on garrison duty; you will deprive the Athenians
of their revenues from the silver-mines at Laurium, and you will put
new heart into the cities subject to Athens, and encourage them to
withhold their tribute. Let these measures be carried out with
promptitude and vigour, and you will soon reap your reward, in the
humiliation of Athens, and the honour and gratitude of all Greece."

At these words of Alcibiades the sluggish Spartans took fire, and
recognizing the importance of his advice they determined to follow the
course which he had indicated. Gylippus, a Spartan of high rank,
received orders to proceed at once to Syracuse, and assume the control
of the war, and the Corinthians were directed to provide ships for the
conveyance of troops. But after this brief display of energy the
Spartans relapsed into their wonted torpor. Many months elapsed before
Gylippus was able to embark for Sicily, and meanwhile important events
had been occurring at the seat of war. We return, therefore, to the
head-quarters of Nicias, which had once more been removed from Naxos
to Catana.

VI

For the next year and a half [Footnote: Spring 414--autumn 413 B.C.]
the scene of our narrative lies almost entirely in the immediate
neighbourhood of Syracuse, so that it now becomes necessary to
describe in some detail the site of that city, and the character of
the adjacent country. Mention has already been made of the island of
Ortygia, the site of the original colony, connected with the mainland
of Sicily by a bridge or causeway. At the southern extremity of
Ortygia there is a narrow strip of land, pointing like a finger
towards the rocky peninsula of Plemmyrium; and between these two
points lies the entrance to a spacious bay, already alluded to under
the name of the Great Harbour. At the western end of the bay there is
a long stretch of low, marshy ground, intersected by the little rivers
Cyana and Anapus, and infested with fever during the heats of summer.
On a rising ground, south of the Anapus, stood the suburb of Polichne,
with its great temple, sacred to the Olympian Zeus. A little to the
north of Ortygia the coast rises abruptly in a bold line of cliffs,
facing eastwards, and forming the base of a triangular plateau, which
slopes upwards from the sea, and gradually grows narrower until it
ends in a point, called the hill of Euryelus. This plateau, which bore
the name of Epipolae, is guarded on all its three sides by rocky
precipices, only to be ascended at two or three places. Its eastern
end, called Acheadina, from the wild pear-trees which once flourished
there, was occupied by a new city, now included with Ortygia in the
same wall of defence. Here were situated the famous stone-quarries,
which afterwards acquired so tragic an interest from the sufferings of
the captive Athenians; and southwards from this district the ground
shelves gently to the shores of the Little Harbour, a sheltered inlet
at the northern end of Ortygia.

At the opening of spring the operations against Syracuse began in good
earnest. The first object of Nicias was to obtain possession of the
heights of Epipolae, for since the construction of the new Syracusan
wall it had become impossible for him to draw his line of blockade
from the side of the Great Harbour. His preparations were already far
advanced, when the Syracusan generals resolved to anticipate him, by
occupying all the approaches to Epipolae. With this intention they
issued an order for a full muster of troops in a meadow by the Anapus,
and after a general review and inspection of arms they appointed a
picked body of six hundred hoplites to guard the heights of Epipolae,
and hold themselves ready for any other pressing service. But the
precaution was taken too late. On the night before the review Nicias
set sail with his whole army from Catana, and landed at a place called
Leon, not more than six or seven furlongs from the northern side of
Epipolae. The fleet then took up its station in the sheltered water
behind the peninsula of Thapsus, while the land forces, advancing at a
run, crossed the level ground, and then, breasting the ascent, gained
the summit of Euryelus.

News of their approach presently reached the Syracusans, who were
still mustered by the Anapus, and breaking off the review, they
marched in haste towards Epipolae, hoping still to dislodge the
Athenians from their position. But in their rapid advance over a
distance of nearly three miles their ranks became disordered, and
their attack was so straggling and ineffectual that they were easily
repulsed, and driven back with considerable loss into the town. On the
following day Nicias led his troops down the slope, and offered battle
before the walls of Syracuse; but the challenge was declined, and the
Syracusans remained within their defences, leaving the Athenians in.
undisputed possession of Epipolae.

After this important success the Athenian generals prepared at once to
form the siege of Syracuse. They first constructed a fort at a place
called Labdalum, on the northern verge of Epipolae, and near its
western extremity, to serve as a safe depositary for their baggage and
money. Then, taking up a position near the centre of Epipolae, they
built a circular wall, covering a considerable space of ground, and
defended on the side towards the city by an outer breastwork, a
thousand feet long. This enclosure, which was called the Circle, was
intended as a shelter for the men employed on construction of the
blockading wall, which started from either side of the Circle, and was
to be carried north and south until it reached the sea. The work made
rapid progress, and greatly alarmed the Syracusans, who saw themselves
in danger of being cut off from all hope of succour on the land side.
Dismayed by this prospect, they resolved to make one more effort to
drive the Athenians from their position, and marching out in full
force, offered battle. Advancing in haste and disorder, they would
certainly have suffered a crushing defeat, but for the prudent caution
of their generals, who were so much impressed by the superior
discipline of the Athenians, that they gave the order to retire, and
led their troops back into the city, leaving only a detachment of
horse to skirmish with the besiegers. But the Athenians had now an
efficient force of cavalry, which had been raised by successive
reinforcements to the number of six hundred and fifty men; and these,
backed by a small force of infantry, soon drove the horsemen of
Syracuse from the field.

The Athenians then completed the building of their Circle, and began
to lay the materials for the northern line of wall. By the advice of
Hermocrates the Syracusans made no further attempt to attack them in
full force, but began to build a counterwall, running out from the
city in a direction south of the Athenian Circle, so as to cross the
line to be followed by the wall of blockade, and prevent it from
reaching the Great Harbour. The work proceeded without interruption,
for the Athenians were engaged in their building operations north of
the Circle, and did not choose to divide their forces. When it was
completed, this counterwork consisted of a solid stone wall, crowned
with wooden towers, and defended in front by a palisade. The blockade
of Syracuse was thus rendered impossible, as long as the defenders
could keep possession of their counterwall. But unfortunately the
guards left in charge of the new wail soon began to neglect their
duty, and erected tents in the shade, where they passed the hot hours
of the afternoon, while some even left their posts, and went off to
refresh themselves in the city. The Athenian generals did not fail to
take advantage of this negligence. Watching their opportunity, when
most of the Syracusan guards were reposing under the shelter of the
tents, they sent a chosen troop of some three hundred men to make a
sudden assault on the counterwall. Then, having divided the main body
of the Athenian army between them, they disposed their forces so as to
prevent any rescue from the town. One division was drawn up before the
principal gate in the new Syracusan wall, while the other proceeded to
a postern-gate, at the point where the counterwall started from the
city. The combined movement was completely successful; the three
hundred carried the stockade and cross-wall by storm, and compelled
the defenders to take refuge within the ramparts of Syracuse. The
whole Athenian army then marched up to the counterwall and stockade,
which they speedily demolished, carrying off the materials for their
own use.

Wishing to prevent any second attempt on the part of the Syracusans to
cut them off from the southern slope of Epipolae, the Athenian
generals now fortified that part of the cliff which looks towards the
Great Harbour. By occupying this point they obtained a new centre,
commanding the space between the Circle and the southern edge of the
cliff, and placing them in communication with the level valley of the
Anapus, across which they had to carry their line of blockade. For the
present building operations were suspended on the northern side of the
Circle, as they wished first of all to complete the investment of
Syracuse towards the south.

Perceiving their intention, the Syracusans began a second counterwork,
consisting of a stockade and ditch, which started at the point of
junction between the old city-wall and the new, and ran across the low
swampy ground as far as the Anapus. Thus the Athenians were confronted
by a new obstacle, which had to be removed, before they could make any
further progress. Acting with energy and decision, they sent orders to
the fleet, which was still lying at Thapsus, to sail round into the
Great Harbour; and without waiting for its arrival, before daybreak
Lamachus led his troops down the cliff, and advanced against the
stockade. His men carried hurdles and planks, to secure their footing
in the most treacherous parts of the swamp, and, proceeding thus, in
the first light of dawn they came up to the stockade. They found the
Syracusans assembled in force to resist them, and an engagement
ensued, which speedily ended in favour of the Athenians. The right
wing of the Syracusan army fled back into the city, while the left
wing retreated towards the suburb of Polichne, hotly pursued by the
picked troop [Footnote: P. 203.] of Athenian hoplites, who wished to
cut them off before they reached the river. By this rash movement the
Athenians came near to forfeiting the advantage which they had gained,
and brought upon themselves an irreparable loss. For the Syracusan
cavalry turned on their pursuers, and drove them back in disorder upon
the Athenian right. The sudden reverse created something like a panic
in that part of the line, and Lamachus, who was in command of the left
wing, hastened to their relief, and threw himself, with a handful of
men, between the Syracusan cavalry and the fugitives. This gallant
action turned the tide of battle once more, and gave the Athenians on
the right wing time to rally; but Lamachus and his followers, pushing
forward too hotly, were attacked by the enemy in a place where their
retreat was cut off by a ditch, and slain to a man.

Meanwhile the Syracusans who had fled into the city, observing the
temporary defeat of the Athenians, had taken courage again, and they
returned to the field, having first sent a detachment to attack the
Athenian Circle, where Nicias, who was disabled by sickness, had been
left in charge with a small garrison. Thinking to make an easy
capture, the party sent on this service ran up the slope of Epipolae,
and reached the breastwork of the Circle, which they took and
demolished. With the scanty force at his disposal, Nicias had little
hope of repelling the attack, so he had recourse to a desperate
expedient. He ordered the camp-servants to set fire to a great pile of
timber, which was lying, together with a number of siege engines, in
front of the wall. They did as he directed, and a great flame arose,
which drove back the assailants, and gave warning of his danger to the
Athenians in the plain below, where the whole Syracusan army was now
in full retreat. Almost at the same moment the Athenian fleet was seen
sailing into the Great Harbour, and a strong contingent from the
victorious army came swarming up the hill to the rescue. Thereupon the
storming party from Syracuse turned and fled back to the city, where
they found the streets thronged by their beaten and dispirited
comrades.

The result of this battle was to leave the Athenian in undisputed
possession of the whole country round Syracuse. Lamachus, indeed, had
fallen, and the loss of that daring and active spirit soon made itself
severely felt. But for the present the fortunes of Athens were in the
ascendant, and everything seemed to promise a speedy triumph. The
Syracusans were thoroughly cowed by their defeat, and looked passively
on, while a double wall of blockade crept steadily forwards from the
southern edge of Epipolae towards the Great Harbour, where the
Athenian fleet had now taken up its permanent station. The native
Sicels, who had hitherto held back through fear of Syracuse, now
joined the Athenians in great numbers. Even the distant Etruscans, the
ancient enemies of Syracuse, sent three war-galleys to take part in
the sack of the great Dorian city.

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