Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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Day by day the spirits of the Syracusans sank lower and lower. They
now began to feel the actual pressure of a siege. Months had passed
since their envoys had sailed for Greece, and there was still no sign
of help from Corinth or Sparta. They had lost all hope of saving
themselves by their own unaided efforts, and no course seemed left to
them but to make the best terms they could with Nicias. Negotiations
were accordingly opened with the Athenian general, but after much
discussion no definite result was attained. In this hour of weakness
and distress, the Syracusans became divided against themselves, and
every man suspected his neighbour of treason. Then they turned upon
their generals, who, after holding out such high promises, had brought
them to this pass, either by mismanagement, or by deliberate
treachery. Hermocrates and his colleagues were deposed from their
command, and three other generals succeeded to their place.

In the eyes of all those who were watching the struggle, the fate of
Syracuse was sealed; she was destined to fall a prey to the devouring
ambition of Athens. But at this very moment a little cloud was
approaching from the east, which was fraught with disaster and ruin to
the besieging army.

VII

Just at the time when the Syracusans were brought to the brink of
despair, Gylippus, after so many months' delay, was on his voyage to
Sicily. While lying at Leucas, a Corinthian settlement in the Ionian
sea, he received the alarming intelligence that Syracuse was already
completely blockaded, and the report was confirmed by every vessel
that came in from the west. Deceived by these false rumours, he gave
up all hope of saving Sicily, but hoping still to forestall the
Athenians in Italy, he put out from Leucas with four ships, and
steered a straight course for Tarentum. From this city, which was
friendly to Sparta and Syracuse, he started on his mission among the
Italian Greeks, and putting in at Locri he heard for the first time
that the Athenian wall was still unfinished on the northern side of
Epipolae, leaving a wide gap, through which a relieving force might
enter the town.

Two courses now lay open to Gylippus. He might sail southwards, and
make an attempt to run the blockade of Syracuse--or he might land on
the northern coast of Sicily, march across the island, and fight his
way into the city through the unwalled interval. In either case, the
enterprise seemed desperate enough. By a very moderate exertion on the
part of Nicias, employing only a fraction of the immense force at his
disposal, Gylippus might have been destroyed, before he had time to
become dangerous. But Nicias was lulled into a fatal confidence. He
had heard of the mission of Gylippus, but made no attempt to oppose
his voyage to Italy, regarding him as a mere free-booter, unworthy of
serious notice. At last, learning that Gylippus was at Locri, he was
induced to send out four triremes against him. They were instructed to
take station at Rhegium, and cut off the daring intruder as he passed
through the strait. But when they reached Rhegium, the wary Spartan
was already beyond their reach. He had decided to approach Syracuse by
land, and was now far advanced on his voyage to Himera, the only Greek
settlement on the north coast of Sicily. Himera, though an Ionic
colony, was attached to the Dorian interest, and her citizens gave a
hearty welcome to the Spartan deliverer. Before long, a little army of
about three thousand men was assembled at Himera, and ready to follow
the fortunes of Gylippus. Seven hundred of these were the sailors and
marines from his own vessels, armed as hoplites, and the Himeraeans
furnished a thousand infantry, light and heavy-armed, and a hundred
cavalry. Owing to the recent death of a powerful chieftain, who had
been a strong partisan of Athens, the northern Sicels had now changed
sides, and they sent a thousand men to serve under the Spartan leader.
Small contingents also arrived, in answer to the call of Gylippus,
from Gela and Selinus. With this little force, composed of such motley
elements, Gylippus started from Himera, and entered on his march for
the relief of Syracuse. The fate of Syracuse was already wavering in
the balance. As yet no news of approaching succour had reached the
beleaguered city, and the Syracusans had abandoned all hope. To save
themselves from a worse calamity, they resolved to surrender, and an
assembly was summoned to settle the terms of capitulation. But at this
very moment a message came to them by sea, which kindled their courage
afresh, and banished these counsels of despair. When Gylippus left
Leucas, a Corinthian fleet of some fifteen vessels was preparing to
sail from that port for Syracuse. One of the ships, commanded by a
certain Gongylus, was delayed in the harbour, and started after the
rest. But Gongylus, instead of steering the ordinary course, which
would have taken him first to Italy, made a bold dash, straight across
the sea, and just when the momentous decision was pending, his ship
came to anchor in the Little Harbour. Forthwith the joyful tidings
spread like wildfire through the city: Gylippus was coming, armed with
full authority from Sparta--Corinth had taken up their cause--Syracuse
was saved! All thought of surrender was instantly flung away, and news
arriving shortly afterwards that Gylippus was near at hand, the whole
Syracusan force marched out to meet him, and escorted him triumphantly
into the town.

Thus, without a blow being struck, an immense access of strength had
been brought to the besieged, and the grand condition of successful
resistance, on which Alcibiades had laid such weight, was fulfilled. A
Spartan officer of consummate ability was now in Syracuse, and he had
made his way into the city, not alone, not by stealth, but at the head
of an army, and before the very eyes of the enemy. Weeks must have
elapsed between the departure of Gylippus from Leucas, and his arrival
at Syracuse; and during all this time, with one trifling exception,
Nicias made no effort to oppose his progress. Prudent men might well
have regarded the enterprise of Gylippus as a wild and desperate
adventure; and such it must have proved, but for the astounding
blindness and apathy of Nicias.

At the time when Gylippus reached Syracuse the Athenian lines of
circumvallation were all but completed on the side of the Great
Harbour; but a wide interval was still left between the Circle and the
northern sea, and it was here that Gylippus had effected an entrance.
To keep this space open was a matter of supreme importance, and the
scene of action is now shifted again to the northern slope of
Epipolae. On the day after his arrival Gylippus succeeded in capturing
the Athenian fort at Labdalum, and the command of this position gave
increased facilities for the construction of a third counterwall,
which was forthwith taken in hand, and carried in the direction of
Labdalum, until it crossed the blockading line at its northern end.

If the Syracusans succeeded in completing and holding this
counterwork, the blockade of Syracuse would be rendered impossible.
Yet for some time Nicias made no attempt to interrupt its progress. As
if already convinced of his inferiority in the field, he took steps to
keep his communications open by sea, and with this object he employed
a part of his forces in fortifying the headland of Plemmyrium, which
commanded the entrance to the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts
which served as an arsenal for the Athenian stores; and henceforth
Plemmyrium became the chief station for his fleet. This removal had a
disastrous effect on the Athenian crews; for the place being almost a
desert, and the springs distant and scanty, they were compelled to go
far from their quarters in search of forage and water, and while thus
engaged they were cut off in great numbers by the Syracusan horse, who
had been posted at Polichne for this purpose. A rapid demoralization
of the crews was the consequence, and desertions became more frequent
every day.

Meanwhile the counterwall was advancing steadily up the hill, and
every day Gylippus drew up his army, to cover the operations of the
workmen. At last he determined to force on an engagement, and in the
first encounter the Syracusans, fighting in a confined space, which
prevented their cavalry from coming into action, suffered a defeat. In
no wise discouraged by this reverse, on the next day they took up a
position in the more open ground, and offered battle again. By this
time the Syracusan counterwork had almost passed the end of the
Athenian wall, and if it were carried a few yards further, the siege
of Syracuse would be brought to a standstill. Roused by the imminence
of the crisis, Nicias determined to make one more effort to regain his
mastery in the field, and led his troops to the attack. The main body
of the hoplites were soon hotly engaged on both sides, and in the
midst of the action Gylippus directed his cavalry and light-armed
infantry to make a sudden charge on the Athenian left. This movement
was executed with so much skill and resolution that the Athenians in
that part of the line gave way, and drew after them the rest of their
comrades, who broke their ranks, and fled for shelter behind the siege
works.

The Syracusans lost no time in turning their victory to account. On
the very same night their wall was extended some distance beyond the
blockading line, and until this new barrier was overthrown, the
investment of Syracuse had now become impossible.

Whichever way he looked, Nicias saw himself menaced with failure and
defeat. He had sent twenty ships to intercept the Corinthian squadron
on its voyage from Leucas; but the little fleet of rescue succeeded in
avoiding the snare, and made its way into the port of Syracuse, thus
adding twelve fresh vessels to the defending force. Gylippus himself
was marching unhindered up and down the island, passing from city to
city, and raising reinforcements of ships and men; and a second
embassy had been despatched by the Syracusans, to carry the news of
their victory to Corinth and Sparta, and ask for further help. Another
ominous sign of coming events was the bustle and activity now visible
in the dockyards of Syracuse and the waters of the Little Harbour; for
the Syracusans had turned their attention seriously to their fleet,
and thought of nothing less than attacking the Athenians on their own
element.

These symptoms of renewed confidence and energy were observed by
Nicias with growing disquiet. And if he turned his eyes to his own
camp, he saw little to relieve his anxiety. For the predictions of
Lamachus had been fulfilled to the letter. By his fatal policy of
procrastination Nicias had frittered away the resources of the most
splendid armament that ever set sail from Peiraeus. His soldiers were
infected by the despondency of their leader, and many of them were
stricken by the marsh-fever which haunts the unwholesome district of
the Anapus. Above all the condition of the fleet showed the lamentable
effect of long inaction and delay. All the supplies of the Athenians
came to them by sea, and in order to keep their communications open,
it was necessary to keep the whole of the fleet on constant duty. In
consequence of this, the hulls of the triremes had become sodden with
water, which made them leaky, and difficult to row. Moreover the
crews, which were largely composed of foreign seamen, had grown
restive and mutinous under the severe strain of hardships and
privation, so different from the easy and lucrative service in the
hope of which they had enlisted. Some took the first opportunity of
deserting to the enemy, while others ran away to remote parts of
Sicily; and there was no means of filling the places thus left vacant.

Such was the burden of care and apprehension which lay heavy on the
feeble shoulders of the Athenian general. He was naturally a weak man,
haunted by superstitious terrors, irresolute, easily cast down; and
this infirmity of character was aggravated by a painful and incurable
disease. There was no longer any question of laying siege to Syracuse:
he himself was now besieged, and it was all he could do to maintain
his position within his defences, and keep the sea open for the
conveyance of supplies. In this desperate situation he determined to
send a written despatch to Athens. We are led to suppose that this was
an unusual proceeding, and that news from the seat of war was
generally sent by word of mouth. The document is given at full length,
with all its grievous confessions of incompetence and failure. After
setting forth the facts of the case as stated above, Nicias insists
that one of two things must be done: either the army now lying before
Syracuse must be recalled to Athens, or the Athenians must send out a
second army, equal in strength to the first, and a general to relieve
him of his command.

At the conclusion of his despatch Nicias peevishly complains of the
exacting temper of the Athenians, and their readiness to blame anyone
but themselves if anything untoward occurred. Whatever may be the
truth of the general charge, it was most ill-timed and ungrateful in
his own case. Towards him, at least, the conduct of his fellow-
citizens was marked by an excess of generosity, amounting to actual
infatuation. Nothing is more remarkable than the unshaken confidence
of the Athenians in their feeble general, after hearing this terrible
indictment, drawn up by his own hand. They refused to accept his
resignation, and passed a decree that large reinforcements should be
sent to Sicily, with Demosthenes and Eurymedon as generals; and in the
meantime they appointed Menander and Euthydemus, two officers already
serving before Syracuse, to share with Nicias the burden of command.
Before the winter was ended Eurymedon started with ten ships for
Sicily, to announce that effectual help was coming; while Demosthenes
was charged with the duty of enlisting troops and organizing a fleet.

Meanwhile new perils were gathering round the Athenians at home, which
should have warned them to abandon their wild plans of conquest, and
concentrate all their strength for their own defence. The Spartans had
long been restrained by a scruple of conscience from an open
declaration of war, wishing to avoid the guilt which is associated
with the first act of aggression. Eighteen years before they had
refused all offers of arbitration, and deliberately provoked an
encounter with Athens, in direct violation of the Thirty Years' Truce,
which provided for an amicable settlement of differences; and by so
acting they had, as they believed, incurred the anger of heaven, and
brought on themselves a long train of disasters. But now the position
was reversed: for in the previous year the Athenians had made descents
on the coasts of Laconia, and other districts of Peloponnesus; and
they had repeatedly turned a deaf ear to the friendly overtures of the
Spartans, who proposed to submit all disputed matters to a peaceful
tribunal.

Thus relieved of their scruples, the Spartans prepared to renew the
war in good earnest, and early in the following spring [Footnote: B.C.
4I3.] they summoned their allies to the Isthmus, and marched under
Agis their king into Attica. After ravaging the plain, they encamped
at Decelea, fourteen miles north of Athens, and here they established
a fortified post, which was garrisoned by contingents of the
Peloponnesian army, serving in regular order. Once more Alcibiades had
cause to exult in the success of his malignant counsels, which had
sent Gylippus to Syracuse, and had now planted this root of bitter
mischief on the very soil of Attica.

While the allies were thus engaged at Decelea, a considerable body of
troops had embarked at Taenarum and at Corinth, and sailed to take
part in the defence of Syracuse. In Greece, all the old enemies of
Athens were arming against her, and beyond the sea her prospects grew
darker and darker every day. Yet nothing, it seemed, could break the
spell of fatal delusion which rested on the doomed city. While Attica
lay in the grip of the enemy, a fleet of sixty-five triremes, carrying
a great military force, weighed anchor from Peiraeus, and steered its
course, under the command of Demosthenes, for Sicily.

VIII

We must now return to Syracuse, where fortune was preparing a new blow
for the ill-fated Athenian army. Gylippus came back from his mission
at the beginning of spring, bringing with him the reinforcements which
he had gathered from various parts of Sicily. At once resuming the
offensive, he planned an attack on the forts recently erected by
Nicias at Plemmyrium, and in order to divide the attention of the
Athenians, he determined to make a simultaneous movement against them
by sea and land. He himself took command of the army, and setting out
at night, made his way round to the rear of the Athenian position at
Plemmyrium. Meanwhile the Syracusan fleet lay ready in two divisions,
one of which, consisting of thirty-five vessels, was moored in the
docks, within the Great Harbour, while the other, to the number of
forty-five, had its station in the Lesser Harbour. At the hour
appointed by Gylippus, just as day was breaking, both squadrons got
under weigh, and bore down upon Plemmyrium, from the opposite sides of
Ortygia. Though taken by surprise, the Athenians put out in haste with
sixty triremes, and a sea-fight ensued, in which the Syracusans for
some time had the advantage. By this time Gylippus was at hand with
his army, and by a sudden assault on the Athenian forts he made an
easy capture of all three; for the greater part of the garrison had
flocked down to the sea, to watch the progress of the action in the
Great Harbour. Fortunately for these men, who had so grossly neglected
their duty, the Athenian fleet had now gained a decisive victory, and
they were thus enabled to make their escape by water, and cross over
to the camp of Nicias, on the other side of the bay.

By the capture of Plemmyrium a great treasure fell into the hands of
the Syracusans. The loss to the Athenians, in money, stores, and men,
was serious enough; but further consequences ensued, which were
nothing less than disastrous. The enemy now commanded both sides of
the entrance to the Great Harbour, and not a ship-load of provisions
could reach the Athenian camp without an encounter with the Syracusan
triremes. Well might despondency and dismay take possession of the
beleaguered army, cramped in their narrow quarters on the swampy flats
of the Anapus.

All Sicily, with one or two exceptions, had now declared for Syracuse,
and reinforcements came pouring in from every side. Gylippus was
resolved, if possible, to destroy the armament of Nicias, before the
fresh succours from Athens had time to arrive; and, as before, the
attack was to be made simultaneously by sea and land. Since the loss
of Plemmyrium, the Athenian fleet had been penned up in the confined
space at the head of the Great Harbour. Outside of these narrow
limits, the whole coast was in the hands of the enemy, and any
Athenian trireme which ventured out into open water ran the risk of
being driven on a hostile shore. Unless they chose to incur this great
peril, the Athenians would have to fight in close order, with the
long, tapering prows of their vessels exposed to collision.

The Syracusans skilfully availed themselves of the advantage thus
offered. The impact of prow with prow, which had hitherto been
regarded as a disgraceful evidence of bad seamanship, had now become
the most effective method of attack; and in order to execute this
simple manoeuvre without damage to their own ships, the Syracusans
shortened the prows of their triremes, and strengthened them with
heavy beams of timber, thus converting them into a broad and solid
mass, which could be driven with crushing force against the slender
beaks of the Athenian galleys.

When all was ready, Gylippus led out his troops, and assailed the
Athenian wall which faced towards Syracuse, and at the same time the
garrison stationed at Polichne left their quarters, and made another
attack on the opposite side. The assault had already commenced, when
the Syracusan fleet, which numbered eighty triremes, was seen
advancing towards the inner shore of the bay, where the ships of
Nicias lay moored; and the Athenian seamen, who had not expected to be
called into action, hastened in some confusion to man their ships,
seventy-five of which were presently engaged with the enemy. After a
day passed in irregular and desultory fighting, the battle ended
slightly in favour of the Syracusans. During the next day the
Syracusans remained inactive, and Nicias employed the interval in
repairing the ships which had suffered damage, and providing for the
defence of his fleet. The Athenian naval station was protected by a
row of piles, rammed into the bottom of the sea, forming a semi-
circular breastwork, with an opening about two hundred feet wide,
where the ships passed in and out. On either side of this entrance
Nicias caused a merchant vessel to be moored, and each vessel was
provided with an engine called a dolphin, a heavy mass of lead,
suspended from the yard-arm, which could be dropped on the deck of any
hostile trireme attempting to pass.

Early on the following morning the Syracusans resumed hostilities both
by sea and land, and after several hours of desultory fighting, they
drew off their fleet, and sailed back to their station under the walls
of the city. The Athenians were well pleased by this sudden relief,
and concluding that their work was done for the day, they disembarked
at leisure, and began to prepare their midday meal. But before they
had time to snatch a mouthful, the whole Syracusan fleet was seen
advancing again from the opposite shore, and the hungry and weary
Athenian crews were summoned on board to repel a second attack. This
crafty manoeuvre was due to a suggestion of Ariston, the most skilful
of the Corinthian seamen, by whose advice provisions had been brought
down to the beach, so that the Syracusan crews were kept together, and
ready to renew the action, after a brief interval for repose and
refreshment.

For a little while the two fleets faced each other, without venturing
to attack; then the Athenians, who were feverish with hunger and
fatigue, could restrain themselves no longer, but with one consent
they dashed their oars into the water, and with shouts of mutual
encouragement charged down upon the enemy. The Syracusans kept a firm
front, and opposing their massive prows to the rash assault, inflicted
great damage on the Athenian triremes, many of which were completely
wrecked by the shock of the collision. On every side the Athenians
were hard beset; the light-armed troops posted on the decks of the
Syracusan vessels, plied them with a shower of javelins, while the
waters swarmed with a multitude of boats, manned by daring
adventurers, who rowed boldly up to the sides of the Athenian
triremes, broke the oars, and hurled darts through the port-holes at
the rowers. After fighting for some time at a great disadvantage, with
exhausted crews, and in a narrow space, where they had no room to
manoeuvre, the Athenians were compelled to fall back, and sought
refuge behind their palisade.

This important success raised the spirits of the Syracusans higher
than ever. They had gained a decisive victory over the greatest naval
power in Greece, sunk seven triremes, disabled many more, and slain or
taken prisoners a large number of men. Flushed with pride and hope,
they immediately began to prepare for a final attack, which was to end
in the complete destruction of their enemies both by sea and land. But
these high expectations received a sudden check; for on the day after
the battle, [Footnote: Or possibly two days.] the watchers on the
walls of Syracuse descried a great fleet on the northern horizon.
Presently the regular beat of ten thousand oars could be distinctly
heard; it grew louder and louder, and as the vanguard came into full
view, the alarmed Syracusans recognized the truth. There was no
mistaking the peculiar build and familiar ensigns of the renowned
Athenian galleys. This could be no other than the fleet of
Demosthenes, arrived just in time to save the shattered armament of
Nicias, and once more turn the tide of war against Syracuse. A great
multitude rushed to the battlements, and gazed with keen pangs of
anxiety as the long line of triremes, seventy-three in number, swept
past the walls of Ortygia, rounded the southern point, and crossing
the Great Harbour, dropped anchor at the naval station of Nicias. If
anyone not concerned in the struggle had been present, he might have
admired the grand exhibition of military pomp and power, the perfect
trim and condition of the triremes, the precision of the rowing, and
the glittering ranks of the hoplites, javelin-men, archers, and
slingers, who thronged the decks. But no such feeling could find room
in the minds of the Syracusans. After their long trials and
sufferings, on the very eve of their crowning triumph, a new host of
enemies had sprung up against them, and all their toils were beginning
anew.

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