Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

H >> H. L. Havell >> Stories From Thucydides

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15

Turning now to the mainland of Greece we find, in most of the leading
states, a sentiment of mingled fear and hatred against Athens, which
had been steadily increasing in volume in the course of the last
thirty years. The haughty Thebans had not forgotten their defeat at
Oenophyta, and their nine years of servitude to Athens. Aegina was
groaning under her yoke, and threatened with total political
extinction. Megara complained that her commerce was ruined by a decree
which excluded her merchants from the ports in the Athenian Empire. In
the heart of Peloponnesus the Spartans were hatching mischief against
their hated rival, who had robbed them of half their dignity as the
acknowledged leaders of the Greeks. Corinth, whose commerce was
chiefly in the western sea, outside the sphere of Athenian influence,
was disposed to be friendly, and had done the Athenians good service
during the revolt of Samos.[Footnote: See below, p. 31.] But five
years later [Footnote: B.C. 435.] an event occurred which changed this
feeling into bitter hatred against Athens, and drove the Corinthians
into the ranks of her most inveterate foes. And it is at this point
that we take up the main thread of our story.

STORIES FROM THUCYDIDES

CORINTH AND CORCYRA

I

It was in a remote corner of the Greek world that the trouble began
which was destined to breed such mischief and havoc for the whole of
Greece. At the beginning of the seventh century before our era the
island of Corcyra had been colonised by the Corinthians. The colony
grew and flourished, and in its turn founded other settlements on the
opposite coasts of Epirus and Illyria. Among these was Epidamnus,
called by the Romans Dyrrachium, and in Roman times the ordinary
landing-place for travellers from Italy to Greece. After many years of
prosperity the resources of Epidamnus were much crippled by internal
faction, and by wars with the neighbouring barbarians. Four years
before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the nobles of Epidamnus,
who had been expelled in the last revolution, made an alliance with
the native tribes of Illyria, and by constant plundering raids reduced
the Epidamnians to such straits that they were compelled to apply to
Corcyra for help. But the Corcyraeans, whose sympathies were on the
side of the banished nobles, refused to interfere.

Epidamnus, as we have seen, was a colony founded by a colony, and
according to Greek custom the original settlers had been led by a
citizen of Corinth, the mother-city of Corcyra. Seeing, therefore,
that they had nothing to hope from the Corcyraeans, the distressed
people of Epidamnus began to turn their thoughts towards their ancient
metropolis, and considered whether they should appeal to her to save
them from ruin. But as this was a step of doubtful propriety, they
first consulted the oracle of Delphi, the great authority on questions
of international law. Receiving a favourable answer, they sent envoys
to Corinth, and offered to surrender their city to the Corinthians, in
return for their countenance and protection.

The Corcyraeans had long been in evil odour at Corinth, for they had
grown insolent in prosperity, and neglected all the observances which
were due from a colony to the mother-city. They were, in fact,
superior to the Corinthians in wealth and power, and their fleet,
numbering a hundred and twenty triremes, was second only to that of
Athens. Corcyra was famous in legend as the seat of the Phaeacians, a
heroic sailor race, whose deeds are sung by Homer in the
_Odyssey_; and the Corcyraeans regarded themselves as the lawful
inheritors of their fame. For all these reasons they despised the
Corinthians, and made no secret of their contempt. Remembering the
many occasions on which they had been publicly insulted by Corcyra,
the Corinthians lent a favourable ear to the petition of Epidamnus,
and determined to appropriate the colony to themselves. Accordingly
they invited all who chose to go and settle at Epidamnus, and sent the
new colonists under a military escort, with instructions to proceed by
land to Apollonia, for fear lest they should be obstructed by the
Corcyraean fleet, if they went by sea.

Great was the indignation at Corcyra when the news arrived that her
colony had been surrendered to Corinth, and a force of forty ships was
sent off in haste, bearing a peremptory demand to the Epidamnians that
they should receive back their exiles and send away the new colonists.
As the citizens refused to obey their mandate, they prepared to lay
siege to the town, which is situated on an isthmus.

When the Corinthians heard of the danger of Epidamnus, they began to
make preparations on a much larger scale, collecting a host of new
colonists, and a fleet of seventy-five ships to convoy them on their
passage to Epidamnus. Apprised of these proceedings, the Corcyraeans
sent envoys to Corinth, with a civil remonstrance against the
arbitrary interference with their own colony. They were willing, they
said, to submit the matter to arbitration, and in the meantime to
suspend all hostilities against the revolted city. But the Corinthians
paid no attention to their overtures, and all being now ready, the
great multitude, drawn from all parts of Greece, set sail for
Epidamnus. When they reached Actium, at the mouth of the Ambracian
Gulf, they were met by a herald, sent out from Corcyra in a skiff, to
forbid their approach. This was a mere manoeuvre, to throw the guilt
of commencing hostilities on the Corinthians; and meanwhile the
Corcyraeans manned their ships, to the number of eighty, and put out
to meet the enemy's fleet. In the sea-fight which followed the
Corcyraeans gained a complete victory, and on the same day Epidamnus
was compelled to capitulate to the besieging force.

By this victory the Corcyraeans gained complete command of the western
or Ionian sea, and for the rest of the summer they sailed from place
to place, plundering the allies of Corinth. The Corinthians, however,
were not at all disposed to acquiesce in their defeat, and during the
whole of the following year they were busy organising a fresh
expedition on a vast scale, being resolved at all costs to put down
the insolence of Corcyra. These preparations caused no small anxiety
to the Corcyraeans. Hitherto they had stood apart, and refused to take
any share in the complicated game of Greek politics. The course of
affairs during the last forty years had tended more and more to divide
the Greek world into two opposite camps, arrayed under the banners of
Athens and Sparta. As Dorians, the Corcyraeans would naturally have
enrolled themselves among the allies of Sparta,--as islanders and
seamen, they might have leaned to the side of Athens: but confident in
their remote situation, and in the power of their fleet, they had
chosen to remain neutral. But finding themselves threatened with
destruction, they now resolved to abandon their policy of selfish
isolation, and sue for admission into the Athenian alliance.
Ambassadors were sent to Athens to urge their plea; and the
Corinthians, hearing of their intention, sent representatives of their
own to oppose the application.

The Athenians were fully alive to the gravity of the question which
they were called upon to decide, and after listening to the arguments
of the Corcyraean and Corinthian orators, they adjourned the debate
until the next day. To Corinth they were bound by old ties of
obligation; for on three distinct occasions the Corinthians had done
them signal service. More than seventy years before the date which we
have reached, the Spartans summoned their allies to consider whether
it was expedient to compel the Athenians to receive back the banished
tyrant Hippias; and it was chiefly by the eloquence of the Corinthian
speaker Sosicles, who drew a vivid picture of the miseries of
despotical government, that they were shamed out of their purpose. A
few years later, when the Athenians were at war with Aegina, they were
aided by twenty Corinthian ships. And quite recently, in the great
peril which menaced Athens at the revolt of Samos, Corinth had once
more shown herself a friend. At a congress of the Peloponnesian
allies, summoned to consider an appeal from the Samians for help, the
Corinthians had spoken strongly against interference with the revolted
allies of another city. Corinth was a place of old renown, the queen
of the Isthmus, a centre of civilisation; whereas Corcyra was a remote
island, and her people, though Greeks by descent, were in manners and
character more than half barbarians.

But there were two arguments put forward by the Corcyraean orator,
which outweighed all other considerations of policy or friendship. The
first was addressed to the fears of the Athenians, the second to their
ambition. War, he argued, was inevitable, and it was of the utmost
importance for Athens to secure the alliance of the Corcyraean fleet,
and prevent it from being added to the naval forces of her enemies.
And his concluding words struck a note which found a response among
the more daring spirits among his hearers, whose thoughts, as it would
seem, were already turning to the western colonies of Greece, as a new
field of enterprise and conquest. "It will not do," he said, "to be
too nice. While you are hesitating, and weighing nice points of
international right, you will be outdistanced in the race for power,
if you tamely give up a great naval station which holds the key to
Italy and Sicily."

Such reasoning, hollow and false as it was, turned the scale in favour
of Corcyra, and a defensive alliance was concluded, pledging the
Athenians and Corcyraeans to aid each other against any attack on the
territory or allies of either state. For the Athenians wished to avoid
breaking the Thirty Years' Truce, and therefore refrained from
entering into any agreement which might oblige them to acts of open
aggression against Corinth.

There can be little doubt that Pericles, who was mainly responsible
for this decision, committed a fatal error in advising the Athenians
to take up the cause of Corcyra. By this act Athens incurred the
implacable hostility of Corinth, and revived the old grudge which that
city had conceived against her when Megara joined the Athenian
alliance. In the constantly shifting currents of Greek politics,
Athens might well, under wise guidance, have steered her way safely
through the perils which surrounded her. The Corinthians had half
forgotten their grievance, as is proved by their conduct at the revolt
of Samos; and the tone of their representative at the Corcyraean
debate is decidedly friendly. The Spartans were sluggish and
procrastinating by nature, and required some powerful impulse to
induce them to act with vigour; and this impulse was now supplied by
Corinth. By accepting, therefore, the alliance of Corcyra, Athens
barred the way to all compromise, and gathered into one head all the
scattered causes of jealousy and hatred which had been accumulating
against her in the last fifty years.

Early in the following year the Corinthian fleet, numbering a hundred
and fifty sail, put to sea from Corinth, to renew the war with
Corcyra, and a battle was fought off the coast of Epirus. The
engagement was long and fierce, and the event was finally decided by a
small squadron of Athenian ships, which had been sent with
instructions to hinder any attempt of the enemy to land on the island
Seeing that the Corcyraeans were being forced back upon their own
coast, the Athenian captains, who had hitherto looked on, and taken no
part in the battle, now assumed the offensive, and lent such effectual
aid that the Corinthians were held in check until the sudden
appearance of twenty additional ships from Athens, which had been sent
off immediately after the others, put an end to the action. This
timely interference saved Corcyra from ruin; for next day the
Corinthians, after a formal remonstrance, set sail for home, taking
with them two hundred and fifty prisoners, belonging to the noblest
families in Corcyra, whom they kept in safe custody, but treated with
great consideration, hoping by means of them at some future time to
recover their influence in the island.

II

It was not long before the effects of this impolitic breach with
Corinth were sensibly felt by Athens. In the course of the following
summer, Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, situated on the borders of
Macedon, and included in the Athenian alliance, openly raised the
standard of revolt, encouraged by promises from Sparta, and by the
presence of a strong body of hoplites, sent for its support from
Corinth. Potidaea was presently closely invested by an Athenian army
and fleet, and the Corinthians pretended to make this a fresh ground
of complaint, though they had themselves incited the city to throw off
its allegiance to Athens.

Feeling that matters were now approaching a crisis, the Spartans
summoned a congress of their allies, and invited all who had any
grievance against Athens to state their case. Then some spoke of the
wrongs of Aegina, formerly not the least among Greek cities, but now
so crushed under the yoke of Athens that she had not dared to raise
her voice openly against the tyrant-city. The Megarians complained of
the restrictions on their commerce, which threatened them with an
empty exchequer and a starving population; and others followed in the
same strain. When all the rest had spoken, the Corinthian orator, who
had reserved his eloquence till the end, came forward and delivered a
vehement harangue, containing hardly any specific charge against
Athens, but well calculated to inflame the passions and provoke the
pride of the Spartans. Though the acknowledged leader of Greece, and
champion of her liberties, Sparta, he said, had always been the last
to see the dangers which menaced the common country, and the last to
take measures for her defence. Spartan apathy and indolence had
brought the Greeks to the brink of ruin in the Persian War; and when
that danger was passed, the same fatal indifference had enabled Athens
to advance step by step on the path of aggrandisement; until now she
had grown so strong that the united force of the whole Peloponnesian
league would be required to put her down. Why had not the Spartans
listened to the warnings which they had heard, when the Athenians were
rebuilding their walls? Then they might have stopped the evil at its
source, and saved a multitude of cities from slavery and oppression.
"Consider," cried the orator, warming to his subject, "what manner of
men these Athenians are, and how vast is the difference between them
and you. While you are shut up in this inland valley, treading the
dull round of mechanical routine, they are continually pushing forward
the boundaries of their empire, toiling night and day to make their
city great, never satisfied with what they have, always thirsting for
more. Cautious, timid, and conservative as you are, hardly to be
roused from your sloth by the most imminent perils, how can you hope
to curb the flight of Athenian ambition, which knows no limit, and is
checked by no reverse?

"Men of Sparta, I speak as a friend, and you will not take my candour
amiss. New times require new manners, and if you would maintain your
great position you must move with the march of events, and abandon
your old-fashioned ways. Do not mistake stagnation for stability, but
learn a lesson even from these hated Athenians, who have risen to
their present pitch of greatness by adapting themselves to every new
need as it arose.

"You know what you have to do, if you would wipe out the reproach
which rests upon you, and keep the respect of your faithful allies.
Send an army into Attica, and compel the Athenians to withdraw their
forces from Potidaea. And let it be done speedily, for while we are
talking our kinsmen are perishing."

It happened that an Athenian embassy was present in Sparta, having
been sent there on some other business, and not for the purpose of
representing Athens at the debate. But when they heard of the outcry
which had been raised against their city, the envoys asked permission
for one of their number to address the Spartan assembly, wishing to
explain the true character and origin of the Athenian Empire, and to
warn the Spartans against plunging the whole country into the horrors
of civil war. Leave being granted, the Athenian orator entered on his
subject by sketching the course of events for the last sixty years.
Athens, he said, had twice saved Greece, first at Marathon, and
afterwards at Salamis. On the first of these occasions she had stood
almost alone against an overwhelming force of Persians; and ten years
later, though betrayed by her allies, she had borne the brunt against
the navy of Xerxes. Who, then, was worthier than she to hold empire
over Greeks? That empire had been forced upon her by the inertness of
Sparta, and by the cowardice and sloth of her own allies in the Delian
league. The power thus gained had been used with moderation, in marked
contrast to the previous tyranny of Persia exercised over the same
cities, and the arrogance of Spartan officers when engaged on foreign
service. But a light yoke, it would seem, was harder to bear than a
heavy one; if Athens had openly oppressed her subjects, she would
never have heard a murmur.

Having thus tried to combat the prejudice against Athens, the orator
addressed himself directly to the Spartans, and said: "Consider the
awful responsibility which you will incur, if you suffer yourselves to
be carried away by the invectives of your allies, and drive us against
our will to tempt with you the dark uncertainties and perilous issues
of war. There is still time for an amicable settlement of our
differences: Athens is prepared to make all reasonable concessions,
and to submit to arbitration, as the terms of the treaty direct. And
if you decline to accept this offer, the guilt of the aggressor will
lie with you."

It is remarkable that the speaker, in tracing the later course of
Athenian policy, lays no claim to those high motives of patriotism
which had inspired his people with sublime self-devotion two
generations back. He boldly asserts the principle that it is lawful
for the stronger to rule the weaker, and claims merit for Athens in
abstaining from excessive abuse of her power. The Athenians, we may
believe, had been tainted by the baseness of their confederates. In
the early days of the Delian league they had not attempted to educate
the Greeks whom they led up to the standard of their own splendid
zeal,--or, if the attempt had been made, it was unsuccessful. They had
taken upon themselves the whole burden of a great public duty, and
standing alone, without moral support from their countrymen, they had
gradually fallen away from the pure and lofty virtues of their
ancestors. This decay of public morality proceeds with rapid strides
in the years which follow, and we shall presently hear the doctrine
that might is right proclaimed with cynical frankness by the lips of
an Athenian.

Having heard the complaints of their allies against Athens, and the
reply of the Athenian orator, the Spartans ordered all but those of
their own race to withdraw, and continued the debate with closed
doors. A great majority of the speakers were in favour of declaring
immediate war on Athens. But there was one important exception: the
aged Archidamus, who for the last fourteen years had been reigning as
sole king at Sparta, spoke strongly against the imprudence of assuming
the aggressive, before they had made adequate preparations to cope
with the offending city. It was an opinion generally held by the war-
party that the Athenians would be ready to make any concessions, in
order to save the land of Attica from ravage. This, said Archidamus,
was a great error; and the event proved that he was right. The
Athenians, with their great colonial empire, and complete command of
the sea, were quite independent of the products of their own estates
in Attica. And many years must elapse before the states of
Peloponnesus could train a fleet, and attack them on the sea, where
alone they were assailable. It was folly to suppose that such a
contest could be decided by a single summer campaign, as was commonly
believed by the enemies of Athens. "I fear rather," said the king,
with prophetic foresight, "that we shall leave this war as an
inheritance to our children; such is the power, and such the pride, of
the state with which we have to contend." On the other hand, the
Spartans, as champions of the liberties of Greece, must not allow the
common oppressors of their countrymen to continue their career of
tyranny unchecked. Let them first, however, try what could be effected
by negotiation, and in the meantime prepare for war, by building
ships, and above all by collecting money, without which all their
valour would be useless. Then, if Athens still refused to listen to
reason, they might declare war with better hope of success.

The speech of Archidamus shows a true insight into the nature of the
crisis which the Spartans were called upon to face, and his views were
amply justified by subsequent events. His wise words were no doubt
applauded by the older and more sober-minded among his hearers. But
there was another and a much more numerous party at that time in
Sparta, filled with bitter envy and hatred against Athens. Their
passions had been inflamed by the invectives of the Corinthian orator,
and without counting the cost they were resolved to try the issues of
immediate battle. Their blind rancour found expression in the curt and
pithy harangue of Sthenelaidas, one of the five Ephors, a college of
magistrates which in recent years had greatly encroached on the
authority of the kings. Sthenelaidas spoke with true laconic brevity.
"I don't understand," he said, "all the fine talk of these Athenians.
They have told us a great deal about their own merits, but have not
said a word in answer to the charges brought against them. Even if we
accept their own account of themselves, their good conduct in the past
only lends a darker colour to their present crimes. We have one plain
duty to perform, and that is to save our faithful allies from ill-
treatment. The time for words is past--leave them to the transgressor.
Our part is to act, at once, and with all our might, and put down the
overwhelming insolence of Athens."

Then, in his capacity as Ephor, Sthenelaidas, without staying for
further argument, forthwith put the question to the Spartan assembly.
According to their ordinary procedure, the Spartans gave their votes
by cries of "Ay" and "No." But on this occasion Sthenelaidas pretended
to be unable to distinguish whether the "Ays" or "Nos" had it, and
wishing to encourage the war-party by showing how much they were in
the majority, he ordered the house to divide on the question whether
the treaty was broken, and whether the Athenians were in the wrong or
not. The division was made, and a great majority were in favour of the
motion, recording their votes against Athens. The allies were then
called in, and informed to the result of the private debate, and a day
was named for a general synod of the whole Peloponnesian league, to
reconsider the situation and decide whether war was to be declared.

In the interval, before the final assembly of the allies, the Spartans
sent to ask the oracle at Delphi whether it was expedient for them to
make war; and the answer, according to common report, was that if they
fought with all their might they would conquer, and that the god
[Footnote: Apollo.] would be on their side. The Corinthians were at
the same time carrying on an active canvass against Athens, sending
their agents from city to city to blow up the flames of war.

In the autumn of the same year the allies met in full synod at Sparta,
and once more the Corinthian speaker led the cry against Athens, and
called for a unanimous war-vote, flattering his hearers with hopes of
a speedy victory. The Spartans, he said, had at last set a good
example to their allies, and shown themselves convinced that imperial
cities had imperial obligations, by pronouncing in favour of war.
Every member of the league must join heartily in the struggle, whether
he belonged to an inland or to a maritime city; for if the seaports
were closed by the Athenian fleets, the inland towns would be
prevented from exporting their products, and importing what they
wanted from abroad. War, then, was in the interest of the whole body
of allies. And on the moral side their position was equally sound, for
they were only acting on desperate provocation, and the common god of
Greece had promised success to their arms. But to deserve that
success, all must co-operate heartily, contributing freely from their
private purses to raise a fleet which would make them a match for
Athens on her own element. And they must watch the course of events
with a vigilant eye, and be ready to seize any opportunity which might
arise to aim a decisive blow at their common enemy. Let them be warned
by the experience of the Ionians, and put out all their strength to
save themselves from being swallowed up by the devouring ambition of
Athens. Justice, heaven's favour, the good-will of all Greece, were on
their side.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15