Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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The way was thus left clear for the gallant two hundred. Those who led
the party had secured possession of the passages through the towers,
and stood ready to bar the way against all assailants. Others who
followed brought ladders, and planting them at the foot of the towers,
mounted to the top, and kept off the Peloponnesians, when they
attempted to force an entrance, with a shower of javelins. Over the
intervening space now swarmed the main body of the Plataeans; and each
man, as he got over, halted at the edge of the outer ditch, and kept
up a hot fire of javelins and arrows, to cover the retreat of his
comrades, and repel any attack from below. When all the rest had
crossed the wall, those who held the towers began to descend; and this
was the most perilous part of the adventure, especially for those who
came last. All, however, succeeded in joining their comrades by the
ditch, and just at this moment the picked troop of three hundred, who
carried torches, came upon them. But fortune still favoured the
Plataeans; crouching in the deep shadow thrown by the high banks of
the ditch, they plied the enemy, who with their blazing torches
afforded an easy mark, with darts and arrows. And thus, fighting and
retreating at the same time, they made their way gradually across the
ditch, but not without a severe struggle, for the water was swollen by
the snow which had fallen in the night, and covered with rotten ice.
Their best friend was the tempest, which raged with extraordinary
violence throughout the night.

When their last man had crossed, the Plataeans went off at a run in
the direction of Thebes, being assured that no one would expect them
to take the road which led to their worst enemy. And the prudence of
this course soon appeared, for looking back they saw the
Peloponnesians hurrying with lighted torches along the road to Athens.
Then after marching towards Thebes for about a mile, they doubled
back, and taking to the mountains soon reached the friendly territory
of Attica. They received a kind welcome at Athens, where it was found
that out of the original two hundred and twenty, only eight were
missing. Seven of these had lost heart at the last moment, and
returned to Plataea, where they announced that all the rest of the
party had been slain. One only, an archer, was taken prisoner at the
outer ditch.

On hearing the report of those who had turned back, the Plataeans
applied for a truce to bury their dead; and when their herald came
back from his useless errand, they learned to their delight that this
gallant enterprise, so ably planned, and so boldly executed, had been
crowned with complete success.

II

Well would it have been for the Plataeans who remained in the town if
they had stood by their first purpose, and shared the fortunes of
their brave comrades. Better far to have died, sword in hand, than to
meet the ignoble fate which was now reserved for them. It was in the
following summer, two years after the beginning of the siege, that the
crisis arrived. The Plataeans had come to the end of their provisions,
and were suffering severely from want of food. In this state of
weakness they were suddenly attacked by the besiegers, who might
easily have carried the town by storm. But the Spartan general wished,
if possible, to avoid this, as all places taken by assault would have
to be given back to their original owners on the conclusion of peace,
whereas those which had voluntarily surrendered might be retained.
Accordingly he sent a herald, and summoned the Plataeans to surrender,
promising that they should have a fair trial by Spartan judges; and
they, being actually on the point of starvation, accepted the terms
offered, and laid down their arms. They were kept in custody and
supplied with food until the judges, five in number, arrived from
Sparta. On the arrival of the judges no express charge was made
against them, but they were called up one by one, and asked this
simple question: "Have you done any service to the Spartans or their
allies in the course of the present war?"

The Plataeans saw the snare which was set for them, and seeking to
evade it they asked permission to plead their cause at length. Leave
being given, the Plataean advocate rose to address the court, and made
a most moving and eloquent appeal, which well deserves to be
reproduced in its main outlines.

"Men of Sparta," began the orator, "we surrendered our city on the
faith of your promise that the innocent should be spared, and only the
guilty condemned. But we fear that our confidence has been misplaced.
That our doom is already pronounced we have but too plain evidence, in
your sinister question, in your cold, condemning looks, in the gloomy
faces of our enemies, who have poisoned your ears against us. We have
but little hope of turning you from your purpose by anything that we
can say. Nevertheless we have resolved to speak, lest in the hour of
death we should be tormented by the thought that a word might have
saved us, and that word remained unspoken.

"In the history of the last fifty years no city in Greece has a fairer
record than ours. Though not trained to the sea, we served in the
fleet at Artemisium; we fought under Pausanias in the great battle
which decided the fate of Greece, and took part beyond our strength in
all the trials and perils of our common country. On the gratitude of
Sparta we have a special claim, for in the day of her direst
extremity, after the earthquake, when the Helots were in arms against
her, we sent a third part of our citizens to her aid. Since then we
have been found in the ranks of your enemies; but this was your fault,
not ours. Who drove us into the arms of Athens, when we were hard
pressed by the tyranny of Thebes? We joined the Athenian alliance at
your bidding; they defended us against our enemies, and admitted us to
the rights of Athenian citizenship. We were bound, therefore, by every
tie of honour and duty to stand by them, whether their cause was just
or unjust.

"What, then, is the meaning of your question, whether we have done you
or your allies any service during this war? If you ask as foes, how
can you claim any service? And if you ask as friends, you have done us
bitter wrong, by attacking us unprovoked.

"The Thebans seized our city in time of peace, and at a holy season,
and we were justified by the laws of nature and of nations in wreaking
vengeance upon them. It may seem to your interest to pay court to them
now; but think how different was our conduct from theirs when the
Persian was at our doors, threatening slavery to us all. We were among
the few who obeyed the call of honour, while Thebes and all the other
towns of Boeotia took sides with the Barbarian.

"Hitherto Sparta has been called the glass of honour in Greece. What,
then, will men say, if Spartan judges are guilty of blotting Plataea
out of the map of Greece, and of the judicial murder of her citizens?
Strange, indeed, and terrible has been the fate of our city, both now
and in the past. Our fathers were brought to the brink of ruin by
their valour and devotion; we, their sons, have just passed through
all the horrors of a siege, and now we are forced to plead for our
lives. Outcasts from our fatherland, spurned and rejected of all, we
are thrown upon your mercy; and much we fear that your hearts are
hardened against us.

"We adjure you, then, by the memory of those times, and of the part
which we took in the salvation of Greece, not to betray us to our
worst enemies, the Thebans. Do not win their gratitude by murder, but
ours by mercy. Forget the cold calculations of policy; think of the
everlasting infamy of such a deed. Your fathers are buried in our
land, and we have been constant in paying all honour and service to
their tombs. Will ye give up the land in which they rest to the men
[Footnote: The Thebans, who fought on the side of the Persians at
Plataea.] who are guilty of their blood? Will ye enslave those fields
which saw the triumph of Greek liberty, and dishonour the gods by
whose favour the victory was won? By your own renown, by the
conscience of Greece, by the memory of your sires, we adjure you, men
of Lacedaemon, not to do this deed.

"But it is time to make an end. If we have spoken in vain, and you are
resolved on our death, we have still one request. Send us back into
our city, and keep us there immured until we have perished of hunger.
Any fate is better than falling into the hands of the Thebans, the
enemies of Plataea, and of all Greece."

The orator had indeed spoken in vain, or if his words had made any
impression on the minds of the judges, it was speedily obliterated by
a fierce and bitter tirade which was delivered by a Theban speaker in
reply. As soon as he had finished his harangue, the prisoners were
called up again in turn, and questioned as before. When each of them
had answered, in the only manner possible, he was led away and put to
death; and not one of them was spared. The number of those slain was
two hundred and twenty-five, and of these twenty-five were Athenians.
The city was then levelled to the ground, and the territory left at
the disposal of the Thebans. Thus was this brave little community
sacrificed to the rancour of Thebes, and the selfish policy of Sparta.

CAPTURE OF A HUNDRED AND TWENTY SPARTANS AT SPHACTERIA

I

The result of six years of desultory fighting had fully justified the
forebodings of Archidamus, and the sanguine anticipations of Pericles.
In spite of the terrible ravages of the plague, Athens had easily held
her own against the whole power of the Peloponnesian league. As yet,
however, no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. But in
the seventh year of the war an event occurred which would have enabled
the Athenians, but for their own folly, to conclude an honourable
peace.

The ablest of the Athenian generals at this time was Demosthenes,
[Footnote: To be carefully distinguished from the great orator, born
about forty years after the date reached in this chapter (425 B.C.).]
who in the previous year had greatly distinguished himself by a
brilliant campaign in Aetolia. In the following summer he obtained
permission to take passage on board a fleet which was bound on a
voyage to Corcyra and Sicily. He sailed in a private capacity, but he
was authorized to use the ships against the coasts of Peloponnesus, if
he saw any opening which might be utilized in the interests of Athens.

On a rocky promontory, at the northern end of the spacious bay of
Navarino, lies the little town of Pylos, generally believed to have
been the home of the Homeric Nestor. Since the conquest of Messenia by
the Spartans, the town had remained in ruins, and the country for some
distance round was a desert. The natural advantages of the adjacent
coast had already caught the keen eye of Demosthenes, and he had
formed the plan of raising a fortified outpost on the spot, to be held
by a picked troop of the banished Messenians, and thus planting a
thorn in the side of Sparta.

Fortune favoured his design. For on rounding the western headland of
Peloponnesus, the fleet encountered a storm, and was compelled to seek
shelter at Pylos. Demosthenes now urged the admirals to employ their
enforced leisure in fortifying the place. But they repulsed him
rudely, and treated his suggestion with contempt. He next tried to
interest the inferior officers in his project, but meeting with no
better success, he began to fear that this grand opportunity would be
thrown away. The discussion, however, had reached the ears of the
soldiers, and having nothing else to do, they agreed among themselves
to pass the time by building a fort. Choosing a place of great natural
strength, where the rocky coast descends abruptly to the open sea,
they went to work with a will. As they had no tools for stone-cutting,
they picked out the stones, and fitted them together according to
their shape; and for want of hods they carried the mortar, wherever it
was required, on their backs, stooping forward and clasping their
hands together behind them, to prevent it from slipping off. They
carried out their self-imposed task with great energy, and after six
days of vigorous labour the fort was completed, for the natural
defences of the site were so strong that in most places there was no
need of a wall. As the weather was now favourable, the fleet proceeded
on its voyage, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison the
fort.

The news of the occupation of Pylos soon reached the Spartans, but at
first they paid little heed, thinking that they could expel the
audacious intruders whenever they chose to exert themselves. Moreover,
they were just then engaged in keeping one of those religious
festivals of which the Spartan calendar was so full, and a good part
of their army was absent in Attica. Agis, however, the Spartan king,
and those under him who were commanding in Attica, took a wiser view
of the situation, and cutting short their operations they led their
forces with all speed back to Sparta. They were the more inclined to
do this as the season was yet early, the weather inclement, and, the
corn being still green, they wanted means to nourish their troops.
Thus the inventive genius of Demosthenes had already proved of signal
service to his country; for this was the shortest of all the
Peloponnesian invasions, lasting only fifteen days.

On the return of their troops from Attica the Spartans sent a small
force to commence the attack on Pylos, and ordered the main body of
their army to follow. There was some discontent among those who had
already been serving abroad at this second levy, and the full muster
of the troops was consequently delayed. In the meantime a message was
despatched to a Peloponnesian fleet then sailing to Corcyra, which at
this time was in a state of revolution, with orders to return at once,
and assist in the campaign against Pylos. Demosthenes was now in
imminent danger, being threatened with an immediate assault by sea and
land, which he had no adequate means of repelling. Having sent off two
of his ships to recall the Athenian squadron from its voyage to
Corcyra, he prepared to defend himself, until the arrival of succour,
as best he could.

The Peloponnesian fleet was the first to arrive, and the Spartans, who
were now present in full force with their allies, determined to make
the most of their time. They hoped, by a simultaneous onslaught of
their army and fleet, to carry the fort before the Athenian ships had
time to return. But in case they should fail in this, they intended to
cripple the movements of the relieving squadron, by blocking the
entrances to the bay. For the long, narrow island of Sphacteria forms
a natural break water, converting the harbour of Navarino into a land-
locked basin, with two narrow passages at the northern and southern
end. [Footnote: The description of Thucydides does not correspond to
the picture of the harbour given in our modern maps. But in the course
of twenty centuries great changes may well have occurred.] These
inlets the Spartans proposed to close, by anchoring triremes close
together, with their prows turned seawards, which they could easily
have done, for at the southern entrance there was only room for eight
or nine vessels to sail abreast, and at the northern entrance only
room for two. This precaution, however, was never carried out; and the
Spartans, as if blinded by fate, adopted another measure, which led to
fatal consequences for themselves. Wishing to keep command of every
spot of land in the neighbourhood of Pylos, they landed a body of
their own men, numbering four hundred and twenty, with the usual
proportion of Helots, on the island, and the same time posted troops
at every assailable point on the opposite coast.

Thinking now that the little garrison at Pylos, surrounded on all
sides by enemies, would fall an easy prey, they sent orders to the
fleet to get under way, and prepared to attack the fort on the land
side. Meanwhile Demosthenes had not been idle: having drawn his three
remaining ships under the shelter of the fort, and protected them in
front by a stockade, he armed the crews with such weapons as he had,
including a number of wicker-shields, taken from a thirty-oared
Messenian galley which had recently come to his assistance with a
force of forty hoplites. Then, having posted the greater part of his
troops for the defence of his position against the Peloponnesian army,
he himself descended with a picked body of sixty hoplites, and took up
his station on the rocky shore. For on this side the defences were
weakest, as the Athenians, in building the fort, had never anticipated
an attack from the sea.

Demosthenes had just time to address a few words of caution and
encouragement to his men, assuring them of victory, if they would only
stand fast, when the Peloponnesian fleet was seen bearing down upon
them; and at the same moment a loud shout from the fort announced that
the garrison was already engaged behind them. The assault was fiercest
at the point where Demosthenes and his men were stationed, and the
Peloponnesians made desperate efforts to effect a landing. But they
were embarrassed by the difficult and rocky coast, which only allowed
a few ships to approach at a time. As fast as one division was beaten
back, another came on, with the white foam spouting round the prows,
and the waters roaring and eddying to the strokes of the gigantic
oars, while the cliffs resounded with the shouts of their comrades in
the ships behind, cheering them on to the attack.

Conspicuous among those who fought on the ships was seen the gallant
figure of Brasidas, who exerted himself, by voice and by example, to
infuse his own heroic spirit into the rest of the crews and their
officers. His ringing tones were heard above the tumult, urging on the
captains and steersmen, when they hung back in fear lest their ships
should be shattered on the rocks. "Spare not these timbers," he cried,
"but let every hull among them go to wreck, rather than suffer the
enemy to violate the soil of Lacedaemon. Where is your loyalty to
Sparta? Have you forgotten the debt which you owe to her? Have at
them, I say, and hurl this fort with its defenders into the sea."
Saying this he ordered the master of his own trireme to beach the
vessel, and stood ready on the gangway, that he might be the first to
leap on shore. But as he attempted to land he was hurled back by the
Athenians, and fell fainting, covered with wounds, on the deck. His
shield slipped off his arm, and dropped into the sea, and having been
washed ashore, was picked up by the Athenians, who used it to adorn
the trophy which they afterwards erected.

After the fall of Brasidas the Peloponnesians still continued their
efforts to effect a landing, but they were baffled by the obstinate
defence of the Athenians, and the rugged and inhospitable coast. It
was a strange reversal of affairs which had been brought about by the
fortune of war. On one side were the Spartans, trained to military
service on land, but now compelled to serve on board a fleet, in order
to obtain a footing on their own territory, and on the other side the
Athenians, whose natural element was the sea, drawn up on land to
repel a naval attack.

Next day the assault was repeated, but again without success. The
Spartans sent for a supply of timber, to construct siege engines,
intending to try and batter down the Athenian wall where it overlooked
the harbour, as at this point there was a better landing-place for the
ships. In this task, however, they were interrupted by the sudden
appearance of the Athenian fleet, now numbering fifty vessels, having
been reinforced by four Chian ships, and six from Naupactus. Finding
the harbour occupied by the Peloponnesians, and the whole coast lined
with troops, they retired for the night to the little island of Prote.
Next day they weighed anchor early, and dividing their fleet, sailed
into the harbour of Navarino by both entrances at once. Though taken
by surprise, the Peloponnesians manned their ships, and as fast as
they were ready put out to meet them; but before their array was
complete they were attacked by the Athenians, who disabled many of
their vessels, captured five, and drove the rest ashore. So complete
was the rout that the Athenians pursued the flying ships into the very
interior of the harbour, and rammed some of them after they had been
brought to land. Others they charged while the crews were still
getting on board, and began to tow off the disabled hulls. But in the
heat of victory the Athenians had pushed their advantage somewhat too
far, and they paid for their audacity by the loss of a considerable
number of their men. For the Lacedaemonians, in wild dismay at the
defeat of their ships, by which their comrades on the island would be
cut off from all help, made desperate exertions to save their fleet,
wading into the water in their heavy armour, and hauling back the
vessels as they were being towed off. In the confined space
manoeuvring was impossible, and the sea-fight had now become a furious
hand to hand encounter, as between two armies on land. After a
prolonged struggle, in which both sides suffered severely, the
Spartans succeeded in saving their ships, except those which had been
taken at first, and the Athenians then retired to their station.

The result of this battle was to give the Athenians complete command
of the sea, for the Peloponnesian fleet was in no condition to renew
the engagement. From their camp on the mainland the Spartans could see
the Athenian triremes rowing round and round the island, and keeping
vigilant watch, to prevent those who were confined there from
escaping. News of the disaster was sent without delay to Sparta, and
the magistrates, recognising the gravity of the crisis, proceeded at
once to Pylos, wishing to inform themselves on the spot, and then
decide what was best to be done. Finding on their arrival that there
was no prospect of rescuing their men on the island, they applied to
the Athenian commanders for a truce, to enable them to send envoys to
Athens, and arrange some terms for the recovery of the imprisoned
Spartans. The Athenians consented, and a truce was made on the
following conditions: The Spartans were to surrender all their fleet,
including any ships of war on the coast of Laconia, to the Athenians,
and to refrain from any attack on the fort, until the return of the
envoys. The Athenians, on their part, agreed to allow provisions to be
sent to the Spartans on the island, all such provision being conveyed
thither under their own inspection, and none by stealth. They further
agreed to carry the envoys to Athens in one of their own triremes, and
to suspend all hostilities until the expiration of the truce. When the
envoys returned, the Peloponnesian ships were to be given back.

It was a proud moment for Athens when the Spartan envoys appeared
before the assembly, bearing the humble petition from her great enemy.
The terms offered by the spokesman of the embassy in the name of
Sparta were simple and concise, peace and friendship with Sparta, in
return for the men shut up on the island. The rest of his speech was
made up of grave moral reflections, such as are generally paraded by
those on the losing side. Let the Athenians beware of abusing their
advantage; though they had the upper hand to-day, they might be
brought to their knees to-morrow. War was a game of hazard, in which
the luck was always changing. Now they had an opportunity of
concluding an honourable peace, and establishing a lasting claim to
the gratitude of Sparta. And if the two leading states of Greece were
once united, they could dictate what terms they pleased to the rest.

The notorious selfishness of Spartan policy is glaringly manifested in
this speech. In their anxiety to recover their own citizens, the
Spartans completely ignored the interests of their allies, and held
out the right hand of fellowship to the people whom they had lately
branded as the oppressors and spoilers of Greece. The Athenians might
well distrust the professions of these perfidious statesmen, who
repudiated their sworn obligations with such cynical levity. The
Spartans in Sphacteria were already, they thought, prisoners of
Athens, to be dealt with as they pleased; and were they to resign this
costly prize, in return for a vague promise of friendship from Sparta?
Their answer was framed on the advice of Cleon: they could not, they
said, enter into any discussion, until the men on the island had
surrendered themselves, and been brought to Athens. Then, if the
Spartans agreed to restore to the Athenians Nisaea and Pegae,
[Footnote: The harbour-towns of Megara.] and some other places which
they had held before the Thirty Years' Truce, peace might be made, and
the prisoners restored. The Spartan envoys were somewhat startled by
these demands, which involved a gross breach of faith to their own
allies; so they affected to ignore the proposal, and suggested a
private conference between themselves and select Athenian
commissioners. It is not impossible that the terms offered, infamous
as they were to Sparta, might have been accepted; but the whole
negotiation was frustrated by the violence of Cleon, who, on hearing
the suggestion of the envoys, overwhelmed them with abuse, accusing
them of double-dealing and bad faith. The envoys were confounded by
this specimen of Athenian manners, and seeing that they were wasting
their time to no purpose, they turned their backs on the city of free
speech.

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