Stories From Thucydides by H. L. Havell

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On their return to Pylos the truce expired, and the Spartans demanded
back their ships, but the Athenians refused to restore them, on the
ground of some alleged violation of the conditions laid down.
Thereupon hostilities were resumed with vigour on both sides. The
Spartans made repeated attacks on the fort, and watched for an
opportunity of bringing off their men from the island: and the
Athenians kept a vigilant guard to prevent their escape. During the
day two triremes sailed continually round Sphacteria in opposite
directions, and at night their whole fleet, now raised to the number
of seventy by the arrival of twenty fresh ships, was moored about the
island, except on the exposed side in windy weather.

Before long the Athenians began to feel the difficulties of their
position. They were but scantily supplied with food, and had much
trouble in obtaining water. The only spring to which they had access,
and even that by no means abundant, was in the citadel of Pylos, and
most of them were reduced to scraping the shingle, and thus obtaining
a meagre supply of brackish water. On land their quarters were
straitened and uncomfortable, and they had no proper anchorage for
their ships, so that the crews had to go ashore in turns to get their
meals. They were greatly disappointed to find their task thus
prolonged, for they had supposed that a few days' siege would suffice
to starve the imprisoned Spartans into a surrender, as the island was
barren and ill-furnished with water. But day followed day, and still
they waited in vain for any sign of yielding. For the Spartan
magistrates had offered large rewards to anyone who succeeded in
conveying wine, meal, or other portable provisions, to the island, and
many were tempted to run the risk, especially among the Helots, who
were offered their liberty in return for this service. They put out
from various points of the mainland, and landed under cover of night
on the seaward side of the island, choosing their time when the wind
was blowing strong from the sea, which made it impossible for the
Athenian triremes to keep their exposed anchorage. The Spartan
hoplites stood ready on the rocks to help them; and so long as they
could get ashore with their freight, they cared nothing what happened
to their boats, for if they were wrecked, the Spartans had pledged
themselves for the full value. Others, still bolder, swam, across the
harbour, dragging after them leather bags filled with a mixture of
poppy-seed or linseed and honey, [Footnote: Poppy-seed was valued in
ancient medicine as an antidote against hunger, and linseed against
thirst.] and attached to a cord. These were soon detected; but the
other source of supply remained open, and it seemed likely that the
siege would be protracted till winter, when it would have to be given
up.

The Athenians at home were much concerned when they were informed of
this state of affairs, and they began to regret that they had not
accepted the terms offered by Sparta. They were suspicious and uneasy,
and Cleon, on whose advice they had acted, saw himself in danger of
falling a victim to their resentment. But his boundless self-
confidence served him well in this crisis. At first he affected to
disbelieve the report sent from Pylos, and proposed to send
commissioners to inquire into the true state of the case. His motion
was carried, and he himself was nominated as one of the commissioners.
Cleon was now placed in an awkward position: either he would have to
confirm the statement of the messengers from Pylos, and thus make
himself ridiculous, or, if he contradicted them, he would be convicted
of falsehood. So he turned round again, and advised the Athenians, if
they believed the report, to waste no more time, but to order an
immediate attack on the island. "If I were general," [Footnote: The
chief civil and military magistrate at Athens, corresponding to the
Roman consul.] he said, with a meaning glance at Nicias, who was then
holding that office, "it would not be long before these Spartans were
brought in chains to Athens. The Athenians want a _man_ to lead
them."

This Nicias, on whom the demagogue had so scornfully reflected, was a
great noble, and the chief political opponent of Cleon. When he heard
the boastful words of his rival, it struck Nicias that there was a
fine opportunity of bringing him to ruin, by thrusting upon him a
command for which he was totally unqualified. Encouraged by the shouts
of the multitude, who were crying to Cleon, "Why don't you go and do
it?" he rose from his place, and proposed that the tanner should be
sent in charge of an expedition to take the men at Sphacteria. At
first Cleon agreed to go, thinking that Nicias was jesting; but when
he saw that the proposal was made seriously, he began to draw back.
"It is your business, not mine," he said to Nicias. "I am not general
--you are; why should I do your work for you?" "Never mind the title,"
answered Nicias; "I resign my office on this occasion to you." The
dispute grew hotter and hotter, much to the amusement of the
Athenians, who fell readily into the humour of the situation, and
loudly applauded the proposal of Nicias. The more Cleon objected, the
more they shouted that he should go. Finding that he must make good
his words, Cleon at last plucked up a spirit, and accepted the honour
thus contemptuously forced upon him. "I am not afraid of the
Spartans," he declared valiantly. "Give me the contingent of soldiers
from Lemnos and Imbros, the Thracian peltasts, [Footnote: Light-armed
soldiers.] and four hundred archers, and without taking a single
Athenian from the city, within three weeks I will either bring those
Spartans as prisoners to Athens, or kill them where they are."

There was some laughter among the Athenians at Cleon's vain-glorious
promise; but the more sober-minded were not displeased at his
appointment, expecting that, if he failed, they would be rid of a
nuisance; while, if he succeeded, they would gain an immense advantage
over their enemies. Such, at least, is the comment of the historian;
but he makes no remark on the incredible levity of the Athenians, to
whom the gravest interests of state were matter for mirth and pastime;
and he has not a word of censure for Nicias and his "sober-minded"
partisans, who, in their eagerness to ruin a political opponent,
showed a criminal disregard for the welfare of Athens.

II

When Cleon arrived at Pylos with his forces, he found Demosthenes
engaged in active preparations for an attack on the island. For his
troops were growing impatient, and clamouring to be led into action,
and a happy accident had recently occurred, which greatly increased
the prospect of success. Till quite lately Sphacteria had been covered
with a dense growth of underwood, and Demosthenes knew by his
experience in Aetolia that an attacking force would be at a great
disadvantage in marching against an enemy who fought under cover, and
knew every inch of the ground. But a party of Athenian soldiers, who
had landed on the island to cook their breakfast, accidentally set
fire to the brushwood, and a wind springing up, the flames were
carried over the greater part of the island, leaving it a blackened
waste. Demosthenes now discovered that the besieged Spartans were more
numerous than he had supposed, having hitherto believed that their
number had been purposely exaggerated, to give an excuse for sending
more food; and the main obstacle being now removed, he issued the
welcome order to make ready for an immediate assault.

When he received his commission, Cleon had prudently stipulated that
Demosthenes should be associated with him in the command. The two ill-
assorted colleagues--the turbulent demagogue, and the veteran general
--now took counsel together, and after a last fruitless attempt at
negotiation, they set sail at night with a force of eight hundred
hoplites, and disembarking just before dawn on both sides of the
island at once, led their men at a run against the first guard-station
of the Spartans. They found the enemy posted in three divisions: the
first, consisting of thirty hoplites, formed an advanced guard; some
distance behind these, where the ground forms a shallow basin,
containing the only spring in the island, was stationed the main body,
commanded by Epitadas; and at the extreme north, opposite Pylos, there
was a small reserve force, left to guard a sort of natural citadel,
which would serve as a last retreat, if Epitadas and his men were
overpowered.

The thirty Spartans in the outpost were taken by surprise, and cut
down to a man; for though they had seen the Athenian ships putting
out, they had no suspicion of what was intended, supposing that they
were merely proceeding to their anchorage for the night. At daybreak
the rest of the fleet put in at the island, bringing the whole of the
forces which Demosthenes had at his disposal, except a few, who were
left to garrison the fort at Pylos. They were a motley host, armed for
the most part with slings, javelins, and bows, but admirably suited
for the work which was to be done. Swarming over the island by
hundreds and by thousands they took up their stations on every piece
of rising ground, threatening the enemy in front, in the rear, on the
right flank, and on the left. The Spartans, in their heavy armour,
were helpless against these agile foes, who eluded every attempt to
come to close quarters, and kept up a continual shower of arrows,
javelins, and stones. Such had been the orders of Demosthenes, which
were now carried into effect.

When the Spartans under Epitadas saw their advanced guard cut up, and
the Athenians marching against them, they drew up in order, and tried
to come within spear-thrust of the enemy; but they were unable to
effect their purpose, for the Athenian hoplites kept their ground, and
at the same moment they themselves were assailed on both flanks and in
the rear by a cloud of light infantry. It was a kind of warfare to
which the Spartans were totally unaccustomed: if they attempted to
advance, their nimble assailants drew back, and pursuit was impossible
on the rocky and broken ground. For a time the light-armed troops
approached them with caution, being somewhat cowed in spirit when
brought face to face with the renowned warriors of Sparta, hitherto
supposed to be invincible. But seeing how the Spartans were
embarrassed, they took courage, and came on in a roaring multitude,
surrounding them on all sides, and leaving them not a moment to take
breath. The air was darkened by a tempest of missiles; and a fine
dust, caused by the ashes of the late fire, rose in choking clouds
from the trampling of many feet. Exhausted by their violent exertions,
stunned by the uproar, and blinded by the dust, the Spartans began to
give ground, and closing their ranks fell back on the stronghold where
their reserve was stationed. They were hotly pursued, and some few
were cut off in the retreat, but the greater part succeeded in
reaching the fort, where they turned at bay, and prepared to defend
themselves to the last. Until a late hour in the day the Athenians
made vain attempts to dislodge them from their position, which was
only assailable in front. At last, when both sides were sorely
distressed by the long conflict under a burning sun, an officer who
was in command of the Messenian troops came to the generals, and
offered, if they would place a few light-armed soldiers at his
disposal, to lead them up the precipitous cliffs at the northern end
of Sphacteria, and take the Spartans in the rear. Permission being
readily granted, he chose his men, and taking care that his movements
were not perceived by the enemy, made his way with them along the
perilous and slippery face of the cliffs to the rear of the
beleaguered garrison, scaled the steep ascent, and suddenly appearing
on the heights, struck terror into the Spartans, and gave fresh
courage to their assailants.

The situation of the Spartans was now similar to that of their
ancestors when they made their last stand at Thermopylae. They were
attacked in front and rear, and hemmed in on both sides by the natural
difficulties of the place. In their weak and exhausted condition it
would have been an easy task to make an end of them. But the great
object of Cleon and Demosthenes was to take them alive. They therefore
suspended the attack, and sent a herald, and summoned them to lay down
their arms. When they heard the proclamation, most of them lowered
their shields, and waved their hands in the air, to show that they had
dropped their weapons. The Athenian generals then entered into a
parley with Styphon the third in command of the Spartans; for
Epitadas, the chief officer, was slain, and Hippagretus, the second,
had been left for dead on the field. Styphon requested permission to
communicate with the Spartan authorities on the mainland, and ask what
he and his comrades were to do; and the Athenian commanders sent one
of their own men to carry the message. Having heard his report, the
Spartan magistrates sent a herald to see how matters stood; and after
more than one messenger had passed to and fro between their camp and
the island, they sent their final instructions, conveyed in these
words "The Spartans bid you to decide for yourselves, but to do
nothing dishonourable."

Fifty years before, these wounded and weary men would have needed no
instructions to tell them their duty. According to the ancient
tradition of Sparta they had but one course open to them--to die at
their posts. But the lapse of time had softened the stern fibre of the
Spartan character; and the broken remnant now brought to bay in
Sphacteria interpreted the ambiguous mandate in their own favour, and
surrendered themselves and their arms.

The number of the prisoners was two hundred and ninety-two, of whom
about a hundred and twenty were Spartans of pure descent, several of
them belonging to the highest families in Sparta. They were
distributed among the captains of the fleet for transportation to
Athens. Dating from the first sea-fight, the siege had lasted
altogether seventy-two days; and during seven weeks of this period
they had subsisted on the casual supplies smuggled over by the
blockade-runners from the mainland. Great was the joy at Athens when
that costly freight was brought safely into the harbour of Peiraeus;
and Cleon, whose bustling energy had really helped to precipitate a
crisis, was the hero of the hour. He had promised to settle the
business, one way or the other, within twenty days, and this promise,
which had been laughed at as a piece of crazy vanity, was fulfilled to
the letter. The whole merit of the performance, however, belonged to
Demosthenes, who had planned the attack on Sphacteria with admirable
sagacity, and led the operations from first to last.

The surrender of a picked troop of Spartan warriors caused a
revolution of feeling throughout Greece. Hitherto it had been assumed
as a matter of course that no Spartan soldier, in any circumstances,
would yield to an enemy; but now more than a hundred Spartans had
preferred life to honour. It was generally believed that the survivors
were inferior in valour to those who had fallen; and some time
afterwards one of the captives was asked this insulting question by
one of the Athenian allies: "Your _brave_ comrades were buried on
the field, I suppose?" The Spartan's answer was couched in a riddle:
"It would be a mighty clever spindle, [Footnote: Arrow.] which singled
out the brave." His meaning was that the stones and arrows had dealt
out death among his comrades without distinction.

CAMPAIGNS OF BRASIDAS IN THRACE

I

One advantage which accrued to the Athenians from the possession of
the Spartan captives was the immunity from invasion. For if the
Spartans prepared to make any movement against Attica, they could
bring out their prisoners, and threaten to put them to death. And in
other directions the future looked brighter than it had done for many
years. They held Pylos, which was garrisoned by Messenian troops, and
served as an open door, through which they could carry havoc over the
whole western district of Laconia; and the occupation of Cythera,
which was effected in the following year, gave them increased facility
for harassing the commerce of Sparta, and making descents on her
eastern coast.

Elated by these successes, the Athenians determined on a bolder
flight, and forgetting the lessons of Pericles, thought of recovering
the possessions which they had held on the mainland thirty years
before. With this intention they planned an attack, which was to be
carried out from three different points at once, on Boeotia. But the
whole scheme proved a failure, and led to a severe defeat at Delium;
and about the same time news arrived from Thrace which showed that the
tide was turning, and should have warned them, if they were wise, to
set bounds to their restless ambition.

Brasidas had long since recovered from the wounds received at Pylos.
The deep humiliation of Sparta, now reduced to become a suppliant for
peace, filled him with shame and sorrow, and in the eighth year of the
war he formed the bold design of organizing a campaign against the
coast-towns of Thrace, which were among the most important of the
Athenian tributaries. Having obtained the necessary commission from
Sparta, he collected a force of seventeen hundred heavy-armed
infantry, and in the summer following the disaster at Sphacteria,
turned his steps northward, and arrived without mishap at the borders
of Thessaly. The Thessalians generally were then on friendly terms
with Athens, and, apart from this, the passage of so large a force
through their territory caused suspicion and alarm among the
inhabitants. But Brasidas was a man of rare gifts: endowed with more
than a full share of the typical Spartan virtues, he combined with
these a graciousness of manner, and a winning eloquence, which made
him an equal of the most accomplished Athenian. He had, moreover,
friends among the powerful nobles of Thessaly, who undertook to guide
him in safety to the Macedonian frontier. On reaching the river
Enipeus, he found his passage barred by a Thessalian force, who seemed
resolved to dispute his progress. His courteous demeanour, and fair
words, disarmed their hostility, and he was allowed to pass. Fearing,
however, a general rising of the natives against him, and urged to
despatch by his guides, he pushed on by forced marches, and entering
the passes of Olympus, descended into the southern plain of Macedonia,
whose king Perdiccas, a shifty and treacherous barbarian, though
nominally in alliance with Athens, favoured the enterprise of
Brasidas.

Perdiccas had undertaken to provide pay for half the Spartan force, in
return for help to be rendered against a rebel chieftain with whom he
was at war. But Brasidas, whose main object was to raise a revolt
among the Athenian allies, insisted on entering into negotiations with
the rebel, and having patched up a truce, conducted his troops to the
neighbourhood of Acanthus, a town on the eastern side of the
Chalcidian peninsula, where there was a party discontented with the
Athenian rule. In all the cities subject to Athens the general mass of
the people were found loyal towards her, or, at the worst, disinclined
for any change; and Acanthus was no exception. When Brasidas with his
little army appeared before the walls the people at first refused him
admission. But it was just before the vintage, and their grapes were
hanging in ripe clusters, exposed to the hand of the spoiler; and so,
to save their vineyards from ravage, they were at last induced to give
him a hearing.

It was very important for Brasidas to secure the voluntary adherence
of the Acanthians, whose action would have a powerful effect in
determining the attitude of the other Chalcidians towards them.
Accordingly he exerted all his skill as an orator, which was
considerable, to allay their suspicions, and rouse their enthusiasm
for the cause which he represented. That cause, he said, was the
liberation of Greece from the tyranny of Athens. Let none of them
suppose that he had come in the interests of a faction, to enslave the
many to the few, or the few to the many. He had bound the authorities
of Sparta by the most solemn oaths to respect the constitution of any
state which enlisted under their banner. Freedom for Greeks!--that was
the watchword which should find a response in every patriotic heart.
After this fine burst of sentiment, Brasidas descended to a much lower
level, and plainly intimated that if the Acanthians would not join him
from these high motives, he would employ coercion, and proceed to
ravage their estates, This last argument was decisive, and in order to
save their valuable harvest from destruction, they agreed to admit
Brasidas and his army into the town. Shortly afterwards their example
was followed by Stagirus, one day to become famous as the birthplace
of Aristotle.

It is melancholy to find a man of really pure and generous character
like Brasidas lending himself to be the mouthpiece of Spartan
hypocrisy. To him the sounding phrases and lofty professions which he
uttered may have meant something: but in their essence they were mere
hollow cant, intended to divert attention from the true issue, and
drag a peaceful and prosperous community into the private quarrels of
Sparta. So degraded was now the tone of politics in Greece, even among
her best and ablest men.

II

On the banks of the Strymon, just where the river sweeps round in a
sharp curve, west and east, the Athenians had founded, six years
before the outbreak of the war, the colony of Amphipolis. It was a
site which had long been coveted by the leaders of Greek colonial
enterprise, being the key to the richest district in Thrace, with
unrivalled facilities for commerce, and close to the gold-mines of
Mount Pangeus. A previous attempt which was made by the Athenians to
occupy the position had ended in ruinous disaster; but nearly thirty
years later a second body of emigrants, led by Hagnon from Athens, met
with much better success; Amphipolis now grew and prospered, and at
the time which we have reached was the most important city in the
Athenian empire.

The Amphipolitans had a bitter and jealous enemy in the neighbouring
town of Argilus, situated a few miles to the west, on the road to
Amphipolis; and ever since the appearance of Brasidas in Thrace the
Argilians had been plotting against the tranquillity of their hated
rival. Accordingly, when Brasidas, who had planned a surprise on
Amphipolis, appeared before their gates, they welcomed him eagerly,
and conducted him and his army to the bridge over the Strymon, which
crossed the river just outside the southern end of the city wall. The
defenders of the bridge, few in number, and taken unawares, were
instantly cut to pieces; for Brasidas came upon them before daybreak,
and the weather, which was wintry and inclement, favoured his design.

The farms and country-houses of the Amphipolitans, which occupied an
extensive district on the eastern side of the city, now lay at the
mercy of Brasidas, and after choosing a position for his camp, he
began to overrun the country. For those who were responsible for the
safety of Amphipolis had taken no precautions, though they knew that
this daring and active enemy had been carrying on a campaign for many
weeks in the adjacent parts of Thrace. Consequently, a good number of
the citizens, who were attending to the business of their estates,
fell into his hands, and it is not improbable that, if he had made a
sudden assault on the city, he would have captured it on the same day.

There was a disaffected party in Amphipolis, who had planned the
betrayal of the place, acting in concert with Argilus, through the
agency of certain Argilian citizens residing in the town. The traitors
now proposed that Brasidas and his army should be admitted, but they
were overruled by the general voice of the people, and it was agreed
that the Athenian Eucles, governor of Amphipolis, should send a
message for help to another Athenian officer, who was commissioned to
watch the interests of Athens in Thrace. That officer was Thucydides,
the historian, from whose work the materials for the present narrative
are taken. Thucydides was descended on his mother's side from the
royal family of Thrace, [Footnote: Such, at least, is the highly
probable conjecture of Classen.] and through this connexion he was the
owner of valuable working rights in the gold-mines of Mount Pangaeus,
and a man of great power and, influence in these districts. When the
message arrived from Amphipolis, he was engaged in some business at
Thasos, and postponing all other concerns he collected a small
squadron of seven ships and hastened to the rescue with all speed.
But Brasidas, who had received intelligence of his movements, was too
quick for him. He had valuable hostages in the persons of those
Amphipolitans who had been taken outside the walls. The population of
Amphipolis consisted almost entirely of men of mixed or foreign
descent, who were anxious about their properties, and in fear for
their friends, while the few Athenian residents were alarmed for their
own safety, having little hope of prompt succour. Taking advantage of
this state of public feeling, the politic Spartan issued a
proclamation, pledging him to respect the rights and property of all
who chose to remain; while those who preferred to withdraw were
allowed five days to take away their goods. This tempting offer
produced the desired effect. It was in vain that the Athenian governor
interposed his authority, and strove to uphold the imperial claims of
Athens. The people threatened to rise in mutiny against him, and when
the partisans of Brasidas, now grown bold, openly moved a resolution
to accept his conditions, the proposal was carried, and the Spartan
general marched unopposed into the town.

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