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Birth Control by Halliday G. Sutherland

H >> Halliday G. Sutherland >> Birth Control

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BIRTH CONTROL

A Statement of Christian Doctrine against the Neo-Malthusians

BY

HALLIDAY G. SUTHERLAND, M.D. (Edin.)







CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE ESSENTIAL FALLACIES OF MALTHUSIAN TEACHING

Section 1. MALTHUS AND THE NEO-MALTHUSIANS.
(a) Malthus
(b) The Neo-Malthusians

Section 2. TEACHING BASED ON FALSE PREMISES.
(a) That Population progresses geometrically
(b) That Food Supply progresses arithmetically
(c) That Overpopulation is the cause of Poverty and Disease

Section 3. THE ROOT FALLACY

Section 4. WHAT OVERPOPULATION MEANS

Section 5. NO EVIDENCE OF OVERPOPULATION
(a) In the Suez Canal Zone
(b) In "Closed Countries" like Japan

Section 6. A NATURAL LAW CHECKING FERTILITY

Section 7. OVERPOPULATION IN THE FUTURE

Section 8. HOW NATIONS HAVE PERISHED

Section 9. PHYSICAL CATASTROPHES
(a) Disease
(b) War

Section 10. MORAL CATASTROPHES


CHAPTER II

THE FALSE DEDUCTIONS CONCERNING POVERTY

Section 1. BIRTH-RATE AND POVERTY
(a) Famines
(b) Abundance
(c) Wages

Section 2. POVERTY IN GREAT BRITAIN DUE TO OTHER CAUSES
(a) Under-development
(b) Severance of the Inhabitants from the Soil

Section 3. CAUSES OF POVERTY IN INDIA

Section 4. POVERTY IN FACT CAUSES A HIGH BIRTHRATE
(a) Malthusianism is an attack on the Poor
(b) A Hindrance to Reform
(c) A Quack Remedy for Poverty

Section 5. POVERTY AND CIVILISATION


CHAPTER III

HIGH BIRTH-RATES NOT THE CAUSE OF HIGH DEATH-RATES

Section 1. POVERTY AS NOW EXISTING

Section 2. HIGH BIRTH-RATE NOT THE CAUSE OF HIGH DEATH-RATE:
PROVED FROM STATISTICS
(a) Canada
(b) Connaught

Section 3. A LOW BIRTH-RATE NO GUARANTEE OF A LOW DEATH-RATE

Section 4. VITAL STATISTICS OF FRANCE

Section 5. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION


CHAPTER IV

HOW RELIGION AFFECTS THE BIRTHRATE

Section 1. FRENCH STATISTICS MISINTERPRETED BY MALTHUSIANS

Section 2. EVIDENCE FROM HOLLAND

Section 3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Section 4. THE SAME RESULTS IN ENGLAND


CHAPTER V

IS THERE A NATURAL LAW REGULATING THE PROPORTION OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS?

Section 1. THE THEORY OF THOMAS DOUBLEDAY REVIVED

Section 2. MR. PELL'S GENERALISATIONS CRITICISED

Section 3. THE LAW OF DECLINE

Section 4. ILLUSTRATED FROM GREEK HISTORY
(a) Moral Catastrophe in Ancient Greece
(b) The Physical Catastrophe induced by Selfishness


CHAPTER VI

THE FALLING BIRTH-RATE IN ENGLAND: ITS CAUSES

Section 1. NOT, AS MALTHUSIANS ASSERT, DUE MAINLY TO CONTRACEPTIVES

Section 2. DECLINE IN FERTILITY DUE TO SOME NATURAL LAW

Section 3. AND TO CHARACTER OF OCCUPATION.

Section 4. AGGRAVATED DOUBTLESS BY MALTHUSIANISM


CHAPTER VII

THE EVILS OF ARTIFICIAL BIRTH CONTROL

Section 1. NOT A PHYSICAL BENEFIT
(a) A Cause of Sterility
(b) Neuroses
(c) Fibroid Tumours

Section 2. A SCANDALOUS SUGGESTION

Section 3. A CAUSE OF UNHAPPINESS IN MARRIAGE

Section 4. AN INSULT TO TRUE WOMANHOOD

Section 5. A DEGRADATION OF THE FEMALE SEX

Section 6. SPECIALLY HURTFUL TO THE POOR
(a) Affecting the Young
(b) Exposing the Poor to Experiment
(c) Tending towards the Servile State

Section 7. A MENACE TO THE NATION
(a) There is a Limit to lowering the Death-rate
(b) Birth Control tends to extinguish the Birth-rate
(c) A Danger to the Empire
(d) The Dangers of Small Families

Section 8. THE PLOT AGAINST CHRISTENDOM


CHAPTER VIII

THE RELIGIOUS ARGUMENT AGAINST BIRTH CONTROL

Section 1. AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE LAW OF NATURE

Section 2. REFLECTED IN THE NORMAL CONSCIENCE

Section 3. EXPRESSED IN THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

Section 4. BIRTH CONTROL CONDEMNED BY PROTESTANT CHURCHES

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII

A NEO-MALTHUSIAN ATTACK ON THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND


CHAPTER IX

THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON BIRTH CONTROL

Section 1. A FALSE VIEW OF HER DOCTRINE

Section 2. THE ESSENCE AND PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE

Section 3. ARTIFICIAL STERILITY WHOLLY CONDEMNED

Section 4. THE ONLY LAWFUL METHOD OF BIRTH CONTROL

Section 5. CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY




BIRTH CONTROL




CHAPTER I


THE ESSENTIAL FALLACIES OF MALTHUSIAN TEACHING

Section 1. MALTHUS AND THE NEO-MALTHUSIANS

Birth control, in the sense of the prevention of pregnancy by chemical,
mechanical, or other artificial means, is being widely advocated as a sure
method of lessening poverty and of increasing the physical and mental
health of the nation. It is, therefore, advisable to examine these claims
and the grounds on which they are based. The following investigation will
prove that the propaganda throughout Western Europe and America in favour
of artificial birth control is based on a mere assumption, bolstered up by
economic and statistical fallacies; that Malthusian teaching is contrary to
reason and to fact; that Neo-Malthusian practices are disastrous alike to
nations and to individuals; and that those practices are in themselves an
offence against the Law of Nature, whereby the Divine Will is expressed in
creation.

(a) _Malthus_

The Rev. Thomas Malthus, M.A., in 1798 published his _Essay on the
Principle of Population_. His pamphlet was an answer to Condorcet
and Godwin, who held that vice and poverty were the result of human
institutions and could be remedied by an even distribution of property.
Malthus, on the other hand, believed that population increased more rapidly
than the means of subsistence, and consequently that vice and poverty were
always due to overpopulation and not to any particular form of society or
of government. He stated that owing to the relatively slow rate at
which the food supply of countries was increased, a high birth-rate [1]
inevitably led to all the evils of poverty, war, and high death-rates.
In an infamous passage he wrote that there was no vacant place for the
superfluous child at Nature's mighty feast; that Nature told the child to
be gone; and that she quickly executed her own order. This passage was
modified in the second, and deleted from the third edition of the Essay. In
later editions he maintained that vice and misery had checked population,
that the progress of society might have diminished rather than increased
the "evils resulting from the principle of population," and that by "moral
restraint" overpopulation could be prevented. As Cannan has pointed out,
[2] this last suggestion destroyed the force of the argument against
Godwin, who could have replied that in order to make "moral restraint"
universal a socialist State was necessary. In order to avoid the evils of
overpopulation, Malthus advised people not to marry, or, if they did,
to marry late in life and to limit the number of their children by the
exercise of self-restraint. He reprobated all artificial and unnatural
methods of birth control as immoral, and as removing the necessary stimulus
to industry; but he failed to grasp the whole truth that an increase of
population is necessary as a stimulus not only to industry, but also as
essential to man's moral and intellectual progress.

(b) _The Neo-Malthusians_

The Malthusian League accept the theory of their revered teacher, but,
curiously enough, they reject his advice "as being impracticable and
productive of the greatest possible evils to health and morality." [3]
On the contrary, they advise universal early marriage, combined with
artificial birth control. Although their policy is thus in flat
contradiction to the policy of Malthus, there are two things common to
both. Each is based on the same fallacy, and the aim of both is wide of the
mark. Indeed, the Neo-Malthusian, like Malthus, has "a mist of speculation
over his facts, and a vapour of fact over his ideas." [4] Moreover, as will
be shown here, the path of the Malthusian League, although at first glance
an easy way out of many human difficulties, is in reality the broad road
along which a man or a nation travels to destruction; and as guides the
Neo-Malthusians are utterly unsafe, since they argue from (a) false
premises to (b) false deductions. We shall deal with the former in this
chapter.


Section 2. TEACHING BASED ON FALSE PREMISES

The theory of Malthus is based on three errors, namely (a) that the
population increases in geometrical progression, a progression of 1, 2,
4, 8, 16, and so on upwards; (b) that the food supply increases in
arithmetical progression, a progression of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and so on
upwards; and (c) that overpopulation is the cause of poverty and disease.
If we show that _de facto_ there _is_ no overpopulation it obviously cannot
be a cause of anything, nor be itself caused by the joint operation of the
first two causes. However, each of the errors can be severally refuted.

(a) In the first place, it is true that a population _might_ increase in
geometrical progression, and that a woman _might_ bear thirty children
in her lifetime; but it is wrong to assume that because a thing _might_
happen, it therefore does happen. The population, as a matter of fact, does
not increase in geometrical progression, because Nature [5] places her own
checks on the birth-rate, and no woman bears all the children she might
theoretically bear, apart altogether from artificial birth control.

(b) Secondly, the food supply does not of necessity increase in
arithmetical progression, because food is produced by human hands, and is
therefore increased in proportion to the increase of workers, unless the
food supply of a country or of the world has reached its limit. The food
supply of the world _might_ reach a limit beyond which it could not
be increased; but as yet this event has not happened, and there is no
indication whatsoever that it is likely to happen.

Human life is immediately sustained by food, clothing, shelter, and fuel.
Food and clothing are principally derived from fish, fowl, sheep,
cattle, and grain, all of which _tend_, more so than man, to increase in
_geometrical_ ratio, although actually their increase in this progression
is checked by man or by Nature. As regards shelter there can be no increase
at all, either arithmetical or geometrical, apart from the work of human
hands. Again, the stock of fuel in or on the earth cannot increase of
itself, and is gradually becoming exhausted. On the other hand, within
living memory, new sources of fuel, such as petroleum, have been made
available, and old varieties of fuel have been used to better advantage,
as witness the internal-combustion engine driven by smoke from sawdust.
Moreover, in the ocean tides is a vast energy that one day may take the
place of fuel.

(c) Thirdly, before anyone can reasonably maintain that overpopulation
is the cause of poverty and disease, it is necessary to prove that
overpopulation actually exists or is likely to occur in the future. By
overpopulation we mean the condition of a country in which there are so
many inhabitants that the production of necessaries of livelihood is
insufficient for the support of all, with the result that many people are
overworked or ill-fed. Under these circumstances the population can be said
to _press on the soil_: and unless their methods of production could be
improved, or resources secured from outside, the only possible remedy
against the principle of diminishing returns would be a reduction of
population; otherwise, the death-rate from want and starvation would
gradually rise until it equalled the birth-rate in order to maintain an
unhappy equilibrium.


Section 3. THE ROOT FALLACY

According to Malthusian doctrine overpopulation is the cause of poverty,
disease, and war: and consequently, unless the growth of population is
artificially restrained, all attempts to remedy social evils are futile.
Malthusians claim that "if only the devastating torrent of children could
be arrested for a few years, it would bring untold relief." They hold that
overpopulation is the root of all social evil, and the truth or falsehood
of that proposition is therefore the basis of all their teaching. Now, when
Malthusians are asked to prove that this their basic proposition is true,
they adopt one of two methods, not of proof, but of evasion. Their first
method of evading the question is by asserting that the truth of their
proposition is self-evident and needs no proof. To that we reply that the
falsity of the proposition can and will be proved. Their second device is
to put up a barrage of facts which merely show that all countries, and
indeed the earth itself, would have been overpopulated long ago if the
increase of population had not been limited by certain factors, ranging
from celibacy and late marriages to famines, diseases, wars, and
infanticide. The truth of these facts is indisputable, but it is
nevertheless a manifest breach of logic to argue from the fact of poverty,
disease, and war having checked an increase of population, that therefore
poverty, disease, and war are due to an increase of population. It would be
as reasonable to argue that, because an unlimited increase of insects
is prevented by birds and by climatic changes, therefore an increase of
insects accounts for the existence of birds, and for variations of climate.
Nor is it of any use for Malthusians to say that overpopulation _might_ be
the cause of poverty. They cannot prove that it _is_ the cause of poverty,
and, as will be shown in the following chapter, more obvious and probable
causes are staring them in the face. For our present purpose it will
suffice if we are able to prove that overpopulation has not occurred in the
past and is unlikely to occur in the future.


Section 4. WHAT OVERPOPULATION MEANS

In the first place, the meaning of the word "overpopulation" should
be clearly understood. The word does not mean a very large number of
inhabitants in a country. If that were its meaning the Malthusian fallacy
could be disproved by merely pointing out that poverty exists both in
thinly populated and in thickly populated countries. Now, in reality,
overpopulation would occur whenever the production of the necessities of
life in a country was insufficient for the support of all the inhabitants.
For example, a barren rock in the ocean would be overpopulated, even if it
contained only one inhabitant. It follows that the term "overpopulation"
should be applied only to an economic situation in which the population
presses on the soil. The point may be illustrated by a simple example.

Let us assume that a fertile island of 100 acres is divided into 10 farms,
each of 10 acres, and each capable of supporting a family of ten. Under
these conditions the island could support a population of 1,000 people
without being overpopulated. If, however, the numbers in each family
increased to 20 the population would _press on the soil_, and the island,
with 2,000 inhabitants, would be an example of overpopulation, and of
poverty due to overpopulation.

On the other hand, let us assume that there are only 1,000 people on
the island, but that one family of ten individuals has managed to gain
possession of eight farms, in addition to their own, and that the other
nine families are forced to live on one farm. Obviously, 900 people would
be attempting to live under conditions of dire poverty, and the island,
with its population of 1,000, would now offer an excellent example, not of
overpopulation, but of human selfishness.

My contentions are that poverty is neither solely nor indeed generally
related to economic pressure on the soil; that there are many causes
of poverty apart altogether from overpopulation; and that in reality
overpopulation does not exist in those countries where Malthusians claim to
find proofs of social misery due to a high birthrate.

If overpopulation in the economic sense occurred in a closed country, whose
inhabitants were either unable or unwilling to send out colonies, it is
obvious that general poverty and misery would result. This _might_ happen
in small islands, but it is of greater interest to know what does happen.


Section 5. NO EVIDENCE OF OVERPOPULATION

In a closed country, producing all its own necessities of life and
incapable of expansion, a high birth-rate would eventually increase the
struggle for existence and would lead to overpopulation, always provided
that, firstly, the high birth-rate is accompanied by a low death-rate, and
secondly, that the high birth-rate is maintained. For example, although
a birth-rate was high, a population would not increase in numbers if the
death-rate was equally high. Therefore, a high birth-rate does not of
necessity imply that population will be increased or that overpopulation
will occur. Again, if the birth-rate fell as the population increased,
the danger of overpopulation would be avoided without the aid of a high
death-rate. For a moment, however, let us assume that the Malthusian
premise is correct, that a high birth-rate has led to overpopulation, and
that the struggle for existence has therefore increased. Then obviously
the death-rate would rise; the effect of the high birth-rate would be
neutralised; and beyond a certain point neither the population nor the
struggle for existence could be further increased. On these grounds
Neo-Malthusians argue that birth-control is necessary precisely to obviate
that cruel device whereby Nature strives to restore the balance upset by a
reckless increase of births; and that the only alternative to frequent and
premature deaths is regulation of the source of life. As a corollary to
this proposition they claim that, if the death-rate be reduced, a country
is bound to become overpopulated unless the births are artificially
controlled. Fortunately it is possible to test the truth of this corollary,
because certain definite observations on this very point have been
recorded. These observations do not support the argument of birth
controllers.

(a) _In the Suez Canal Zone_

In the Suez Canal Zone there was a high death-rate chiefly owing to fever.
According to Malthus it would have been a great mistake to lower this
death-rate, because, if social conditions were improved, the population
would rapidly increase and exceed the resources of the country. Now, in
fact, the social conditions were improved, the death-rate was lowered, and
the subsequent events, utterly refuting the above contention, are thus
noted by Dr. Halford Ross, who was medical officer in that region:

"During the years 1901 to 1910, health measures in this zone produced a
very considerable fall in the death-rate, from 30.2 per thousand to
19.6 per thousand; the infant mortality was also reduced very greatly,
and it was expected that, after a lapse of time, the reduction of the
death-rate would result in a rise of the birth-rate, and a
corresponding increase of the population. _But such was not the case_.
When the death-rate fell, the birthrate fell too, and the number of the
population remained the same as before, even after nearly a decade had
passed, and notwithstanding the fact that the whole district had become
much healthier, and one town, Port Said, was converted from an
unhealthy, fever-stricken place into a seaside health resort." [6]

Moreover, Dr. Halford Ross has told me that artificial birth control
was not practised in this region, and played no part in maintaining a
stationary population. The majority of the people were strict Mohammedans,
amongst whom the practice of birth control is forbidden by the Koran.

(b) _In "Closed Countries" like Japan_

But a much more striking example of the population in a closed country
remaining stationary without the practice of birth control, thus refuting
the contention of our birth controllers, is to be found in their own
periodical, _The Malthusian_. [7] It would appear that in Japan from 1723
to 1846 the population remained almost stationary, only increasing from
26,065,422 to 26,907,625. In 1867 the Shogunate was abolished, the Emperor
was restored, and Japan began to be a civilised power. Now from 1872 the
population increased by 10,649,990 in twenty-seven years, and "during the
period between 1897 and 1907 the population received an increment of 11.6
per cent., whereas the food-producing area increased by only 4.4 per
cent.... According to Professor Morimoro, the cost of living is now so high
in Japan that 98 per cent, of the people do not get enough to eat." From
these facts certain obvious deductions may be made. So long as Japan was
a closed country her population remained stationary. When she became a
civilised industrial power the mass of her people became poorer, the
birth-rate rose, and the population increased, this last result being the
real problem to-day in the Far East. In face of these facts it is sheer
comedy to learn that our Malthusians are sending a woman to preach birth
control amongst the Japanese! Do they really believe that for over a
hundred years Japan, unlike most semi-barbaric countries, practised birth
control, and that when she became civilised she refused, unlike most
civilised countries, to continue this practice? There is surely a limit to
human credulity.

The truth appears to be that in closed countries the population remains
more or less stationary, that Nature herself checks the birth-rate without
the aid of artificial birth control, and that birthrates and death-rates
are independently related to the means of subsistence.


Section 6. A NATURAL LAW CHECKING FERTILITY

During the past century the population of Europe increased by about
160,000,000, but it is utterly unreasonable to assume that this rate of
increase will be maintained during the present century. It would be as
sensible to argue that because a child is four feet high at the age of
ten he will be eight feet high at the age of twenty. Moreover, there is
evidence that, apart altogether from vice, the fertility of a nation is
reduced at every step in civilisation. The cause of this reduction in
fertility is unknown. It is probably a reaction to many complex influences,
and possibly associated with the vast growth of great cities. This decline
in the fertility of a community is a natural protection against the
possibility of overpopulation; but, on the other hand, there is a point
beyond which any further decline in fertility will bring a community within
sight of depopulation and of extinction.


Section 7. OVERPOPULATION IN THE FUTURE

It is a fallacy to say that overpopulation is the cause of poverty and
disease, and that for the simple reason that overpopulation has not yet
occurred. For the growth of a nation we assume that the birth-rate should
exceed the death-rate by from 10 to 20 per thousand, and it is obvious
that in a _closed_ country the evil of overpopulation might appear in
a comparatively short time. The natural remedies in the past have been
emigration and colonisation. According to the birth controllers these
remedies are only temporary, because sooner or later all colonies and
eventually the earth itself will be overpopulated. At the British
Association Meeting in 1890 the population of the earth was said to be
1,500 millions, and it was calculated that only 6,000 millions could live
on the earth. This means that if the birth-rate throughout the world
exceeded the death-rate by only 8 per thousand, the earth would be
overpopulated within 200 years. It is probable that in these calculations
the capacity of the earth to sustain human life has been underestimated;
that the earth could support not four times but sixteen times its present
population; and that the latter figure could be still further increased
by the progress of inventions. But, apart altogether from the accuracy of
these figures, the danger of overpopulation is nothing more or less than a
myth. Indeed, the end of the world, a philosophic and scientific certitude,
is a more imminent event than its overpopulation.


Section 8. HOW NATIONS HAVE PERISHED

Before speculating on what might happen in the future, it is well to
recollect what has happened in the past. The earth has been inhabited for
thousands of years, and modern research has revealed the remains of many
ancient civilisations that have perished. For example, there were the great
nations of Cambodia and of Guatemala. In Crete, about 2000 B.C., there
existed a civilisation where women were dressed as are this evening the
women of London and Paris. That civilisation perished, and even its
language cannot now be deciphered. Why did these civilisations perish?
Surely this momentous question should take precedence over barren
discussions as to whether there will be sufficient food on the land or in
the sea for the inhabitants of the world in 200 years' time. How came it
about that these ancient nations did not double their numbers every fifty
years and fill up the earth long ago?

The answer is that they were overcome and annihilated by the incidence of
one or other of two dangers that threaten every civilisation, including our
own. These dangers are certain physical and moral catastrophes, against
which there is only one form of natural insurance, namely, a birth-rate
that adequately exceeds the death-rate. They help to illustrate further the
fallacy of the overpopulation scare.

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Extract: The Whales by Evie Wyld

Christos Tsiolkas and David Mitchell, both much-tipped when they appeared on the award longlist, have been overlooked in the six finalists

It headed the most controversial Man Booker prize longlist in years, but Christos Tsiolkas's The Slap has failed to make the final cut for the literary award, as has David Mitchell's much-tipped fifth novel, The Thousand Autumns of Jacob de Zoet.

Judges overlooked Australian novelist Tsiolkas's tale of the consequences when a child is slapped at a suburban barbecue – which is either "unbelievably misogynistic" or "riveting from beginning to end", depending on who's asked – and Mitchell, twice shortlisted for the prize in the past, to select a shortlist which ranges from two-time former winner Peter Carey's Parrot and Olivier in America to Emma Donoghue. The Irish writer has also stirred up debate with her Josel Fritzl-inspired Room, the story of a boy and his mother imprisoned in a tiny room for years.

Orange prize winner Andrea Levy's The Long Song, about the last years of slavery in Jamaica; Howard Jacobson's The Finkler Question, a cerebral comedy about grief and Anglo-Jewishness; experimental novelist Tom McCarthy's C, which tells the story of Serge Carrefax, a first world war radio operator who escapes from a German prison camp; and South African writer Damon Galgut's tale of a young man travelling through Greece, India and Africa, In a Strange Room, complete the six-strong shortlist for the £50,000 prize, announced this morning.

"It's been a great privilege and an exciting challenge for us to reduce our longlist of 13 to this shortlist of six outstandingly good novels," said chair of judges Andrew Motion, the former poet laureate. "In doing so, we feel sure we've chosen books which demonstrate a rich variety of styles and themes – while in every case providing deep individual pleasures."

The panel of judges had previously read 138 books to select the 13 titles for their longlist, with Martin Amis's new novel The Pregnant Widow and Ian McEwan's venture into comic fiction Solar both overlooked and Carey the only previous Booker winner on the longlist.

His inclusion on the shortlist today for Parrot and Olivier in America, a reimagining of Democracy in America author Alexis de Tocqueville's visit to the New World, gives him the chance of becoming the first ever writer to win the Booker three times, having previously taken it in 1988 for Oscar and Lucinda and 2001 for True History of the Kelly Gang.

"The omission of both David Mitchell and Christos Tsiolkas from the shortlist is a real shock. While both writers might rightly feel aggrieved at being overlooked, I imagine it took some wrangling amongst the judges to reduce one of the best longlists in years to six," said Jonathan Ruppin at independent book chain Foyles, who, while praising all six books for their "lightness of touch which means the reader doesn't get bogged down in something worthy or dull", predicted that Room was the most likely title to go on to win the award.

Waterstone's tipped C to take the prize, with fiction buying manager Simon Burke calling it "a challenging yet dazzling novel". "The news that David Mitchell has not made the shortlist will cause great wailing and gnashing of teeth across the bookworld, but perhaps is a useful reminder of the independence and unpredictability of the Booker," he said. "But this is still a hugely varied and exciting list, worthy of the Booker brand. Carey and Levy have to be strong contenders, but our money is on Tom McCarthy. The more people that read [C] the better."

The bookies agreed, with William Hill immediately installing McCarthy as 2/1 favourite to win the prize. "There has been a considerable media buzz around all of the books on the shortlist, and literary punters have staked more money in total on Tom McCarthy to win than any of the other authors, so he is a worthy favourite," said spokesman Graham Sharpe. Donoghue and Galgut came in second at the bookmaker, both at 3/1, with one customer so sure that In A Strange Room would win that they placed £400 on Galgut at 7/1, the largest single bet on the prize "for a few years", said Sharpe.

Carey came in fourth, at 5/1, with Levy at 7/1 and Jacobson the 8/1 outside to take the prize.

The opinion-splitting novels picked for this year's longlist have helped make it the most popular since 2001, with Tsiolkas's novel selling the most copies, followed by Donoghue's. The winner, who will join a roster of former winners including Margaret Atwood, Roddy Doyle and JM Coetzee, will be announced on 12 October. Last year's winner Wolf Hall by Hilary Mantel is the fastest-selling Booker winner ever, with sales of around half-a-million copies to date.

The Man Booker shortlist in full:

Peter Carey's Parrot and Olivier in America

Emma Donoghue's Room

Damon Galgut's In a Strange Room

Howard Jacobson's The Finkler Question

Andrea Levy's The Long Song

Tom McCarthy's C


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The books that send me back to school

For Ralph Miliband governments could never tame capitalism. New Labour thought otherwise – and then came the financial crisis. But what will David or Ed do if they gain the leadership? By John Gray

Viewed from one angle Ralph Miliband was a theorist of revolution who failed to notice the radical transformations going on around him. A lifelong Marxist, he never doubted that the future would be shaped by the struggle against capitalism. In fact it was capitalism that proved to be the revolutionary force in the late 20th century, consigning socialism to the memory hole. By the time Miliband died in May 1994, the Soviet system had been replaced by a type of resource-based authoritarian capitalism, while China's Communist party was overseeing the development of an unbridled market of a kind that Milton Friedman could only dream about.

In Britain in the 1980s Miliband managed to convince himself that Labour, which he had always bitterly attacked, might, under the influence of Tony Benn, turn into a genuinely socialist party. In fact Labour split, which more than any other single factor enabled the continuing dominance of Thatcher. Probably only the battles fought by Neil Kinnock prevented Labour disintegrating altogether. When John Smith became leader, the party began the "prawn cocktail offensive", a rapprochement with the financial sector pursued through private lunches with leading City figures, which formed the prelude to New Labour. Only weeks after Smith died (in the same month as Miliband) the party would start burying any trace of its socialist past.

When he gave the Bennite wing his intellectual support, Miliband was colluding in the politics of make-believe. Yet in one vital respect this intractably oppositional Jewish refugee from nazism had a firmer grip on reality than the social democrats who eventually prevailed in Labour's internecine conflicts, and when he ridiculed Anthony Crosland's vision of a domesticated and pacified capitalism, he left the party with a dilemma it has not been able to resolve. Like Marx, Miliband understood that states and governments are never autonomous actors; their options are shaped, and often foreclosed, by the distribution of power and resources. This was the central theme of Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society (1969), a penetrating assault on social-democratic thinking in which he developed and extended the argument against revisionism of his earlier Parliamentary Socialism: A Study of the Politics of Labour (1961).

In The Future of Socialism (1956), Crosland had argued that Labour must distinguish between means and ends (a theme pursued later by Blair). Capitalism had changed fundamentally, and rather than opposing it Labour should use the market to advance socialist values. Properly managed to ensure steady economic growth, free markets could be used to promote an egalitarian society in which everyone could live the good life. Against this rosy vision, Miliband urged – rightly, I've always thought – that the world had not changed as much as Crosland and his fellow-revisionists imagined. Capitalism remained an unruly beast, and the idea that governments had learnt how to tame it was just an illusion.

The oil shocks of the 70s were an early warning of the fragility of the postwar order. The shocks were not fatal, and capitalism survived the crisis (as it will survive the present crisis, in one form or another). But it was already becoming apparent that while governments could withstand upheavals in the global economy, the state was not the directing agency social democrats imagined it to be. As Miliband saw it, the state was a servant of these forces rather than their potential master. Of course he exaggerated. The interests of capitalists are often at odds, and in any case politics is driven by far more than class conflict. Even so, Miliband's view that the state is constrained, reactive and hemmed in by market forces has become increasingly plausible with the passage of time. But if this is so, what role can there be for a party that aims to make capitalism a force for the collective good? Can a future Labour government succeed where past governments have failed and harness capitalism to a vision of social improvement? Or should Labour accept that it is capitalism itself that must be changed?

These are precisely the questions that face Miliband's sons as they contend for the Labour leadership. The clash between the two has an undeniable drama, and it is not just a matter of sibling rivalry. It occurs at a time when the world economy is in a crisis the founders of New Labour believed to be impossible. Lacking the Marxian insight that capitalism is inherently volatile and constantly mutating, they never doubted that the deregulated finance-capitalism that developed in the US towards the end of the past century would last. The left had to overcome its suspicion of the free market, and accept that only by exploiting its productivity could government improve society: social democracy and neo-liberal economics were actually complementary.

Just like Crosland, though without his Keynesian grasp of the dangers of recurring boom and bust, New Labour believed capitalism had been tamed. But as Ralph Miliband suspected and events have confirmed, the anarchic energy of the free market is not so easily controlled. The fall of communism was celebrated as a triumph of capitalism, which now became practically world-wide; but the effect was to make capitalism more unstable, as disturbances in one part of the system were rapidly transmitted to all the rest. The fragmented world of the cold war was more resilient to shocks, and also more hospitable to social democracy, than the world that ensued. Governments found that few of the levers they used to control the economy worked as they had before. New Labour did not want to control the market. A feature of the understanding it reached with the City was that financial markets would continue to be deregulated. In part this was accepted as the price for power, but it also reflected New Labour's Fukuyama-like faith that market capitalism was the final stage of economic development; the future lay with the self-regulating market.

As could be foreseen, things turned out rather differently. With regulatory controls relaxed or scrapped the financial institutions whose support Labour had wooed became predatory, raking in vast profits from strategies whose risks they did not understand. Inevitably this hubris led to their downfall, and the financial system imploded. The market millennium lasted hardly more than a decade, leaving a legacy of unsustainable debt.

The happy conjunction of neo-liberal economics with social democracy on which New Labour was founded is now history. This is the truth evaded in Tony Blair's autohagiography. If New Labour is obsolete it is not because of the personal defects of Gordon Brown, Blair's delusional moral certainty and incessant war-mongering or even the dysfunctional relationship between the two leaders. It is because American finance-capitalism, the model for virtually everything that New Labour ever did, has blown itself up.

The problem with the debate between the Milibands is not that it risks turning into a public family feud. It is that neither of the two contenders has come to terms with the bankruptcy of the New Labour project in which each of them was involved. Neither has acknowledged, or perhaps fully understood, the implications of the financial crisis for a future Labour government. It can only mean an erosion of the very foundations of Britain's social democratic inheritance. Yet in different ways, each of the Miliband brothers still sees government as capable of controlling market forces – the illusion their father presciently exposed.

In his Keir Hardie lecture in July, David Miliband spoke eloquently of moving away from state paternalism and reviving Labour traditions of mutualism. The state can no longer be the centre of knowledge and initiative – its function is rather that of empowering society. Top-down Fabian control must be replaced by open democratic relationships. No doubt these are desirable goals, if very much in the spirit of the prevailing conventional wisdom and perhaps not so different from Cameron's fluffy "big society". The larger difficulty is that Miliband is harking back to Crosland (whom he recently cited as his political hero) at a time when Crosland's thinking is no longer applicable.

Crosland's vision was based above all on economic growth – steady, continuing and robust. Following Keynes, he believed that wise economic management could create a society of abundance. But the effect of the financial crisis has been to curtail growth, at least in developed economies. Even if the economy recovers, governments will not have the largesse he assumed would be available. Bailing out the banks has passed the burden of debt on to the state, and no British government can expect to avoid large-scale cut-backs in borrowing and spending. Instead of the market generating wealth that could be used by governments for collective purposes, the resources of government have been pre-empted for the repayment of debts incurred by the market's excesses. Against this background, the post-paternalist state is likely to mean higher unemployment and cash-starved public services.

Unlike his brother, Ed Miliband has chosen to define his candidacy explicitly in terms of New Labour's failings and argues forcefully for the need to remodel capitalism. "Britain's big question of the next decade," he has written, "is whether we head towards an increasingly US-style capitalism – more unequal, more brutish, more unjust – or whether we can build a different model, a capitalism that works for people and not the other way around". Once again these are noble aspirations but far removed from reality. Globalisation is an idea that has been greatly over-hyped, yet governments' freedom of action has without question been reduced as capital has become more mobile. Even the US may soon find it difficult to fund its ballooning federal debt. But if American capitalism is entering a crisis zone, Britain will not have the luxury of forging a new economic model; it will have trouble just staying afloat. Ralph Miliband's pessimistic assessment of the future of social democracy could well be vindicated.

If one of the Miliband brothers wins the Labour leadership and becomes prime minister he will confront in an acute form the constraints on the power of the state his father astutely identified. Rather than controlling or reshaping capitalism, a Miliband government would find itself struggling to preserve Britain's social democratic inheritance in the face of capitalism's renewed disorder. Ralph Miliband seems never to have lost the Marxist faith that history would eventually open the way to a truly socialist society. He would surely have appreciated the curious dialectic through which it has fallen to his sons to defend the social democracy he so fiercely attacked.


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Booktrust teenage prize shortlist spans time, space and genre

It's the start of another school year and I'm dreaming of new pencil cases, satchels and the books I read in class. But what are the books you remember from your own school days?

Fourteen years after I finished school, there's still something about September which feels like the start of the year, and I'm nostalgic this morning for new pencils and felt tips, satchels and packed lunches. As the hope of the nation barrels back into classrooms, I'm also thinking back to the books I read in school.

I was away last weekend and talking about how we all read William Golding's Lord of the Flies (and no, the weekend wasn't that bad, it's just that one of my friends is currently making her way through his complete works, to settle a bet). I was 14, and I think there couldn't have been a more perfect book to pick for kids of that age – if you're not going to be hooked by Ralph and Piggy and Simon and Jack, and "kill the pig, cut his throat, spill his blood", then you're not going to be hooked by anything. This was the edition we had – just looking at it casts me back to yellow highlighters and doodling and the horrors of reading aloud.

Anyway, the shocking gloriousness of Lord of the Flies made me hungry for more Golding. Our school library was pretty small, but it did, impressively, have a copy of Pincher Martin. I am quite sure I failed to get any allegorical, existential meaning from the book, but it successfully terrified me, burning an image of Martin clinging to his lonely rock into my brain. In typically disorganised fashion, I promptly lost the book for about a month and was subsequently banned from the school library for giving it back so late – obviously as a sop to all those Golding fans clamouring for more of his work.

Golding and my thieving tendencies aside, Jane Eyre bored me, King Lear enthralled me, and I described Romeo and Juliet in my mock GSCE as a novel – so something clearly went wrong there (thankfully I'd got the right end of the stick by the time the real thing came around). But the other book which really stands out in my memory from schooldays is Wuthering Heights. I was on to A-levels by then, but for some reason we were still going through the purgatory of reading (droning) aloud in class – possibly one of the best ways to make a group of teenagers lose interest in a novel. I was lazy, more interested in messing around than working, but I was so caught up in the melodramas of Cathy and Heathcliff ("Do not leave me in this abyss where I cannot find you! Oh God! It is unutterable! I cannot live without my life! I cannot live without my soul!") that I'd be pages ahead when it came to my turn to read and would get in trouble for not concentrating. And I distinctly remember spending a break time racing to the end.

The rest of it, though, the years of English classes and essays, revising and exams, has largely faded into oblivion, which is rather worrying. But how about you? Indulge my nostalgia and tell me what you remember of your own literary school days.


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