Military Reminiscences of the Civil War V2 by Jacob Dolson Cox

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General Schofield had joined me at Gum Swamp about nine o'clock on
the morning of the 8th, and after our conference we had mounted to
ride to General Palmer's headquarters to see what prospect there
might be for securing a crossing near the railroad which would
permit preparation for rebuilding the railroad bridge. A note now
came from General Carter at Wise's Forks telling of information
received from a negro that a large body of the enemy had crossed
Southwest Creek at the Wilmington road early in the morning. As the
cavalry had a picket at the upper Trent bridge and were supposed to
be patrolling beyond the Wilmington road, the information did not
seem threatening, but I sent back directions to have the cavalry
ordered to do their work thoroughly by instantly testing the truth
of the information. Carter was also ordered to support the cavalry
with a regiment of infantry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlvii. pt. ii. p. 734.] The message from the front was followed
almost instantly by another, saying that a heavy force of the enemy
had penetrated between Upham's brigade and the rest of the division,
almost simultaneously with a report from the cavalry that their
picket had been driven from the bridge at the Trent road. As that
picket was two miles in front of Upham's left on the British road,
it was too evident that the duty of the horsemen had not been well
done. Ruger was ordered to march his division at speed to the front,
and we galloped to Wise's Forks. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. pp. 977,
994.]

The account I have before given of the enemy's dispositions for the
day's work [Footnote: _Ante_, pp. 429, 430.] makes it easy to
understand the situation as we found it. Hoke, with his own and
Clayton's divisions, had turned northward on the British road after
getting over Southwest Creek, and as he approached the Dover road,
had deployed and advanced upon Upham's flank. The latter, upon the
first intimation of an enemy's approach, had hurried the
Twenty-seventh Massachusetts to the British road and placed it in
line about a quarter of a mile south of the Dover road, which was,
of course, his connection with the rest of the division. He also
ordered to the same point the section of artillery, and directed the
left battalion of his other regiment (Fifteenth Connecticut) to
change front also to the south. These orders were judicious, but the
odds were too great to make them successful. Far outflanked on
either hand, the Massachusetts regiment was put to rout, all the
horses of one of the guns were killed, and though the men cut the
traces and tried to save the gun by hand, they had to abandon it,
while the other retreated on the run toward the main position.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 997-999.]
General Hill had crossed the creek at the improvised bridge on
hearing the sound of Hoke's engagement, but finding a swamp between
him and Upham's right, had to make a circuit of it, driving back our
pickets in the interval between Carter's and Palmer's divisions.
Turning toward the noise of Hoke's firing, he intercepted the right
battalion of Upham's Connecticut regiment, and took many of them
prisoners. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 1087.] Most of the rest of the
regiment finding Hoke's division partly surrounding them, and all
other retreat cut off by Hill, surrendered to Hoke. Colonel Upham
and most of the Massachusetts regiment succeeded in reaching our
main lines, though in confusion. All this was not done, however,
without fighting, which took time, and as the whole engagement was
in forest or swamp, the enemy was a good deal delayed in his
movements and in rectification of lines.

When we reached the field Carter had gone in person toward Upham's
position, having first sent a regiment forward on the Dover road to
try to reopen communication with him. Palmer was ordered to send his
reserve brigade rapidly to extend his left and assist Carter. But as
there was still an interval between them, the regiment of cavalry
which had come in on the left was transferred to the centre and
ordered to make a strong skirmishing fight till Ruger's division
could arrive on the ground. Palmer at the same time was ordered to
demonstrate strongly toward the creek. Riding forward on the Dover
road, I found Carter with the regiment from his division, still
energetically striving to reach Upham. As the sound of the battle
showed that the enemy was also in front of our centre, it was
evident that we must make a concentration of our forces till the
divisions were in touch with each other. I therefore directed Carter
to make his main line in front of Wise's Forks as solid as possible,
concentrating his artillery near the Dover road, and to limit the
activity of the advanced regiment to bold skirmishing, drawing it
back to the main line as the enemy advanced in force.

Hoke had evidently supposed that Upham's detachment on the British
road was the flank of our principal position, and was surprised at
finding strong demonstrations from the direction of Wise's Forks,
now partly in his own rear. This checked his progress and made him
turn upon Carter. The advanced regiment retired as ordered, and when
it was within the lines the enemy was saluted with such a fire of
artillery and musketry as instantly checked him. Although he
repeated his efforts to force the position at the Forks several
times, they all were futile, and Carter had at no time the least
difficulty in holding his main line firmly.

In Palmer's division, when Hill's advance across the creek drove
back the pickets and threatened to pass the left flank of Boughton's
brigade, this officer drew back his left to the British road and
threw up a hasty barricade there. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlvii. pt. i. p. 992.] Claassen's brigade was sent to prolong
Boughton's line to the left, and Ruger's division having come up,
the connection between Palmer and Carter was secured, the latter
advancing his brigades so as to make a better continuous line. The
attacks of Hoke and Hill extended across Ruger's front, but nothing
heavier than brisk skirmishing occurred on Boughton's line.
Claassen's brigade was sent forward toward Jackson's Mill,
accompanied by my aide, Captain Tracy, in order to locate the left
of the enemy's line, and determine the extent of his forces in front
of our left and centre. No strong opposition was met till the Dover
road came in sight, where the enemy were seen moving toward Hoke's
position in front of Carter. Claassen was followed back in his
orderly retirement to his position on Ruger's right, and was
attacked there, but easily repulsed his assailants. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 982, 990.]

Palmer had reported sharp skirmishing across his front all the way
to the Neuse road on his right, and had drawn his lines back a
little, so as to keep them in front of the British road, contracting
his right and extending his left, as the sound of the fighting
showed that the heaviest attacks were falling upon Carter. By the
middle of the afternoon a continuous line of breastworks had been
made along the whole of Palmer's division in front of the British
road. Ruger had extended it diagonally till it joined Carter's
right, the latter continuing it across the Dover road in front of
Wise's Forks to a difficult swamp on the extreme left. For our left,
the lower Trent road served for our communication along the front,
and for our right the British road was used in like manner.

Late in the day there were indications of an attempt to turn
Palmer's right on the Neuse road, and this, which added to the
complexity of the situation, seems to have grown out of an excentric
movement of the Confederate left under Hill. In crossing Southwest
Creek to make his attack, he tells us the plan had been that when
Hoke should strike our flank on the Dover road, he should cut off
any retreat on the British and Neuse roads. This would be best
accomplished by pushing straight from his bridges for the British
road. But having made a circuit about a swamp to the rear of Upham's
right, he received a note from Bragg's headquarters saying that Hoke
wished he would enter the British road from the Neuse road, which
implied a long circuit to their left. As Hoke had himself made the
bridge by which Hill had crossed, and knew the field better than the
rest by his skirmishes of the previous day, it is evident that there
was an error in interpreting his wish. But as Hill was on ground
unknown to him, and Bragg's dispatch directed Hoke's suggestion to
be carried out, Hill obeyed, and turned his troops down the right
bank of Southwest Creek, feeling the way to the Neuse road through
swamps and woods. Reaching the outlet of the British road at
half-past four without seeing signs of our retreat that way, and the
distant firing showing that Hoke was not advancing, Hill thought it
too late to venture further, and marched back by the way he had come
five miles to his bridge. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii.
pt. i. p. 1087.] His presence had been observed by our pickets and
skirmishers, and was naturally interpreted by Palmer as the advance
of a new column which had crossed the creek by the Neuse road. It,
of course, gave an exaggerated impression of the enemy's strength,
and as prisoners had been taken belonging to Lee's corps, who
reported part of Hood's old army present with Bragg in command of
the whole, we had to take into account the contingency of our having
on our hands the formidable force thus indicated. Hill was met at
his bridge by orders to cross to the left bank and join Hoke by
recrossing at Jackson's Mills and following the Dover road. He
effected the junction about midnight. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] Hoke had
been keeping up a skirmishing fight in the latter part of the day,
and at night intrenched himself across the Dover road just in front
of the British road. Hill, after joining him, continued the line
northward, parallel to ours, and therefore crossing the British road
again, recurving toward the creek. Our breastworks were made
stronger, and we kept our teams hard at work bringing up ammunition
and supplies. General Schofield went back to New Berne to get into
communication with the rest of his department, and try to hurry
forward the two old divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, who were
marching to join us. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt.
ii. pp. 743-751.] My own orders were to remain on the watchful
defensive whilst the construction of the railroad toward us went on
energetically. On Thursday, the 9th, we husbanded our resources, for
our ammunition was running short and the roads through the swamp
were nearly impassable. We extended our works on Carter's left,
recurving them so as to cross the lower Trent road, and, though we
had no troops at the moment except one regiment of Ruger's to put
into these intrenchments, they were ready for prompt occupation by
any we might send there if another effort were made to turn that
flank. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. pp. 978, 995.] With this in view,
General Ruger was directed to put one of his brigades in reserve,
extending the rest of his troops to fill the vacancy so made, and
covering the front with abatis and slashed timber. Pickets were
advanced and every effort made to obtain information and keep close
watch of the enemy's movements. About ten o'clock General Palmer
reported a force moving toward the Neuse road which, after
demonstrating there for some time, marched back again. [Footnote:
_Id_., pt. ii. pp. 747, 749-750.] This seems to have been an effort
to repeat the movement of Hill on the previous afternoon, but this
time by Hoke's division. Finding Palmer's line in good earthworks,
Hoke made no attack, and returned to his position, though Bragg's
order declared that "success must be achieved." [Footnote: _Id_., p.
1359.] While this was going on, Hill advanced his line and drove in
Carter's skirmishers; but these being reinforced, quickly retook
their rifle-pits, and Hill retired to his own works. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. p. 1087.] Bragg's delay in
testing conclusions with us was due, in part no doubt, to the fact
that Stewart's corps of the Army of Tennessee was _en route_ to him,
and the railway was being worked energetically to bring up these
reinforcements. They arrived during the day, and the final attack
upon us was arranged for Friday, the 10th. Stewart's men were under
the command of General Walthall, the senior division commander
present. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 1088.]

In the night of Thursday and the early morning of Friday, the active
skirmishing of the enemy was so continuous as to remind us of the
days in the Georgia campaign when the intrenched lines of the
opposing armies faced each other in the narrow valley near New Hope
Church. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii. p. 769.] Bragg ordered Hoke's
troops to be relieved by Walthall's, and to make a considerable
circuit to their right, seeking to reach the lower Trent road in our
rear, and, advancing upon it, attack Carter's division in reverse.
The sharp skirmishing had covered these changes of position. Upon
hearing the sounds of Hoke's attack, Walthall and Hill were to
assist him by strong demonstrations, but, as the latter says, in
deference to his report that the men were very unwilling to attack
earthworks, "their experience in the late campaign [in the west] not
being favorable to such an undertaking," no actual assault was
ordered, but doubled skirmish lines were to advance as far as
possible. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. p. 1088.]

On our side we were watchful and expectant, my orders to the
divisions being that whenever one part of the line should be
engaged, the rest should push forward strong skirmish lines to test
the extent of the enemy's deployment, and gain the information on
which I could act in reinforcing either wing from the other. General
Greene, who was on his way to rejoin Sherman, volunteered for duty
as a staff officer, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i.
p. 979.] as did General Stiles of my own division of the
Twenty-third Corps, who was likewise returning to his proper
command. [Footnote: General George S. Greene, division commander in
the Twentieth Corps, had commanded a division in the Twelfth Corps,
before its consolidation into the other. He was the same who was
distinguished at Antietam (_ante_, vol. i. pp. 321-331). He
graduated at West Point in 1823, and was a descendant of General
Greene of the Revolutionary War, a military stock well continued in
F. V. Greene of the Engineers, a general officer in the late Spanish
War.] The absence of most of my own staff made their help most
acceptable.

General Schofield was on his way up from New Berne, and horses were
awaiting him at the end of the railway when, about half-past eleven,
Hoke's attack came with much more energy and resolution than the
Confederates had shown before. Ruger's reserve brigade (McQuiston's)
was ordered over to the left at once, a brigade he had loaned to
Palmer (Thomas's) was ordered back, and Palmer was ordered to send
another brigade if the enemy was quiet in his front. Hoke's attack
lapped so far over the lower Trent road as to threaten the Dover
road also, and lest General Schofield should be in danger of
capture, I directed Palmer to signal down the railroad track for him
to await further news from us before leaving the train. [Footnote:
_Id._, pt. ii. p. 772.]

The artillery of both Carter's and Ruger's divisions were
concentrated upon Hoke, who was surprised to find our line so well
prepared to meet him. For nearly an hour, however, the fighting was
fierce; but it then began to flag a little, and I at once ordered
McQuiston's brigade to charge, throwing the left forward upon Hoke's
flank. This was decisive, and the enemy broke and fled. Walthall and
Hill were now advancing against Carter's right and against Ruger,
and as the line of the latter was very thin, I had to recall
McQuiston in the full tide of pursuit and send him back to the
centre double quick. He brought in nearly 300 prisoners, and our
left was relieved of all danger. For a while my headquarters group
was in a hot place. General Greene had his horse shot under him, one
orderly had an arm taken off by a shell, two others were wounded,
and several had horses killed.

The men of Stewart's and Lee's corps were to have co-operated with
Hoke, but the difficulty of movement over such blind and wooded
country caused delay which gave time for me to reinforce the centre.
The artillery was hurried to the same position, and the Confederates
were defeated easily, their unwillingness to assault breastworks
being increased by the sight of Hoke's men in disordered flight. At
half-past twelve I was able to send word to General Schofield that
the road was no longer threatened by the enemy, and he joined us
before the fighting at the centre was over. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. p. 978; pt. ii. p. 772.] Bragg withdrew
to the intrenchments he had occupied on the 9th. The certainty that
two corps of the Army of Tennessee were represented in the attack
besides the troops of Bragg's own department, added to the lack of
supplies and munitions, made us quite willing to remain on the
defensive and await the arrival of Couch, who was within a day's
march of us with the two veteran divisions of the Twenty-third
Corps. The construction of the railroad and the hurrying forward of
ammunition were ordered with strenuous urgency, and messages to
Couch made him force the marching to join us. [Footnote: The officer
who was sent by Schofield to hasten Couch's march found my old
division at the head of the column slowly filing over a rickety
foot-bridge in the darkness, grumbling at the continued plodding in
the mud. He shouted to them the news of our fighting and my possible
need of help. The cry went up from the men, "If General Cox wants
us, he can have us," and they dashed into the stream in solid
column, forcing the pace till they reached the field.] Bragg
retreated in the night of the 10th and was speeding back to
Goldsborough by rail, for Johnston was now hastening to join Hardee,
who was retreating before Sherman out of South Carolina.

The numbers which Hill and Walthall brought to Bragg were smaller
than we inferred from our knowledge of the organizations present. We
took prisoners belonging to four divisions of Hood's old army.
Hoke's division and the brigades of Whitford, Hagood, and Baker had
all been stronger in numbers than similar organizations of our own.
We were necessarily wholly ignorant of the causes which had reduced
the divisions coming from the West, and indeed learned of their
presence in North Carolina only through the prisoners we took in the
engagement and the deserters who came into our lines. As we have
seen, [Footnote: _Ante_, p. 424.] the number of Hood's men in the
State at the beginning of the month was over 9000, with other
detachments on the way. Bragg's other forces were an equal number.
After all the casualties of the campaign, the Army of Tennessee
reported 11,442 present on April 7th, of which 8953 were
"effectives." When they were paroled at Greenesborough on April
26th, 17,934 appeared and signed the papers. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 1059, 1066. In the table of the
paroled, Cheatham's two divisions (his own and Brown's) are listed
in Hardee's corps, and with those of Stewart's and Lee's corps, less
Anderson's (late Talliaferro's) division, make the total given.] It
is impossible to tell exactly what part of these were at Kinston.
Hill's claim that he had but little over 1300 effectives in five
brigades of Lee's corps is not credible. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 1088.
For my criticism of his amusingly erroneous statements in regard to
Antietam, see "The Nation," No. 1538, p. 462, and No. 1543, p. 71.]
It is certain that Bragg knew I had three divisions and that he
believed his force was the stronger. Our losses had been 1337, of
which 900 were the "missing" in Upton's brigade and the cavalry.
Bragg made no formal report of the campaign or of his losses in this
part of it.

CHAPTER XLVIII

JUNCTION WITH SHERMAN AT GOLDSBOROUGH--THE MARCH ON
RALEIGH--CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

Occupation of Kinston--Opening of Neuse River--Rebel ram
destroyed--Listening to the distant battle at Bentonville--Entering
Goldsborough--Meeting Sherman--Grant's congratulations--His own
plans--Sketch of Sherman's march--Lee and Johnston's
correspondence--Their gloomy outlook--Am made commandant of
Twenty-third Corps--Terry assigned to Tenth--Schofield promoted in
the Regular Army--Stanton's proviso--Ill effects of living on the
country--Stopping it in North Carolina--Camp jubilee over the fall
of Richmond--Changes in Sherman's plans--Our march on
Smithfield--House-burning--News of Lee's surrender--Overtures from
Governor Vance--Entering Raleigh--A mocking-bird's greeting--Further
negotiations as to North Carolina--Johnston proposes an
armistice--Broader scope of negotiations--The Southern people desire
peace--Terrors of non-combatants assuaged--News of Lincoln's
assassination--Precautions to preserve order--The dawn of peace.

Reconnoitring parties sent toward Kinston on the 11th showed that
only a rear-guard occupied that town and that we could occupy it
when we pleased. General Couch joined us on the 12th, and Hoke
having sent in a flag of truce offering to exchange prisoners, of
whom we had nearly 400, I sent Major Dow of my staff with General
Schofield's answer declining to do so. The major found no enemy on
our side of the Neuse. The railroad bridge was burned and the middle
part of the wagon bridge destroyed. The roads were so nearly
impassable that we could hardly feed the troops where we were, and
whilst the railroad building went on, we hastened also the opening
of a supply line by water. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii.
pt. i. pp. 933, 934; pt. ii. pp. 801, 802, 814.] Commander Rhind of
the navy efficiently co-operated in this, and we marched to Kinston
bridge on the 14th, laid pontoon bridges on the next day, and
occupied the town. The Confederate ram had been burnt and her wreck
lay a little below the bridge. The transports and their convoying
war vessel did not get up till the 18th, but as they then brought a
hundred thousand rations, we were able to begin accumulating stores
at Kinston as an advanced depot. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlvii. pt. ii. pp. 836-839, 880, 883.] Small additions to our
wagon-trains also arrived, and orders were issued to march toward
Goldsborough on the 20th. Meanwhile 2000 men had been set at work
getting out railroad ties and timber for bridges. [Footnote: _Id._,
pp. 836, 851.]

During the halt at Kinston we partly reorganized the troops in view
of the approaching union with Sherman. The officers and men who
belonged to the divisions in Sherman's army were separately
organized into a division under General Greene, so that they could
easily be transferred to their proper commands. The rest of Palmer's
and Carter's divisions were united in one under Carter, and Palmer
was assigned to the District of Beaufort, from which I was relieved.
Ruger's division remained in my provisional corps with the other
two. General Stiles was assigned to a brigade in Ruger's division.
[Footnote: _Id._, pp. 839, 895.]

On Monday, the 20th, we were in march for Goldsborough, leaving a
brigade to garrison the post at Kinston and protect the growing
depot there. On Sunday we had heard all day the very distant
artillery firing, which we knew indicated a battle between Sherman
and Johnston. It was a scarcely distinguishable sound, like a dull
thumping, becoming somewhat more distinct when one applied his ear
to the ground. We judged that this final battle in the Carolinas was
near Smithfield, and we were not far out of the way, for Bentonville
was only a little south, and either place about fifty miles from us.
Two days' march took us into Goldsborough with no opposition but
skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. We found the railroad
uninjured, except that the bridges were burned; but they were small
and would not delay Colonel Wright long when the large one at
Kinston should be completed. Captain Twining, General Schofield's
engineer and aide, had carried dispatches to Sherman on the 20th,
and the latter was now in full possession of the story of our
movements since the fall of Fort Fisher. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 942.] On the 22d Sherman was able to
announce in field orders the retreat of Johnston toward Raleigh and
our occupation of Goldsborough, whilst Terry had laid his pontoons
across the Neuse completing the connection with Wilmington also. His
declaration for the whole army that the "campaign has resulted in a
glorious success" was more than justified. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. i.
p. 44.]

On Thursday, the 23d, Sherman joined us in person, and we paraded
the Twenty-third Corps to honor the march-past of Slocum's Army of
Georgia, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, as they came in from
Bentonville. Sherman took his place with us by the roadside, and the
formal reunion with the comrades who had fought with us in the
Atlanta campaign was an event to stir deep emotions in our hearts.
The general did not hesitate to speak out his readiness, now that
his army was reunited, to meet the forces of Lee and Johnston
combined, if they also should effect a junction and try to open a
way southward. The men who had traversed the Carolinas were ragged
and dirty, their faces were begrimed by the soot of their camp-fires
of pine-knots in the forests, but their arms were in order, and they
stepped out with the sturdy swing that marked all our Western
troops. Our men were in new uniforms we had lately drawn from the
quartermaster, and the tatterdemalions who had made the march to the
sea were disposed to chaff us as if we were new recruits or pampered
garrison troops. "Well, sonnies!" a regimental wag cried out, "do
they issue butter to you regularly now?" "Oh, yes! to be sure!" was
the instant retort; "but _we_ trade it off for soap!" The ironical
emphasis on the "we" was well understood and greeted with roars of
laughter, and learning that our men were really those who had been
with them in Georgia and had fought at Franklin and Nashville before
making the tour of the North to come by sea and rejoin them in North
Carolina, they made the welkin ring again with their greeting
cheers.