Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette by Lafayette
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Lafayette >> Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette
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A small quantity of buff and red cloth to be bought for the facings of
the Pennsylvanian and Jersey lines.
The four thousand good hats in the stores or in the army to be cut
round, or cocked in the form of caps, but to be in an uniform manner.
All the articles now in the possession of the clothier-general, to be
immediately ordered to North River, and, if necessary, wagons should be
pressed for their speedy transportation.
I will write a letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, wherein I will desire
him to send to the most convenient place the clothing which has been
put under his convoy.
We shall then have ten thousand new coats and waistcoats, and four
thousand old ones, the whole of an uniform ground, ten thousand new
hats and stocks, and four thousand old ones, five and twenty thousand
overalls, more than twenty thousand shirts, and thirty thousand pairs
of shoes.
Each soldier enlisted for the war, let them even be ten thousand, shall
have, if you choose, a new complete suit, one hat, one stock, two
shirts, two pairs of overalls, and two pairs of shoes.
Each draftsman, if he has not the same, will at least receive a decent
uniform coat, one stock, one hat, one pair of overalls, and two pairs
of shoes; he will not certainly come out but well provided with shirts.
By the above mentioned arrangement, there remain about a thousand coats
of every colour, a thousand hats, which are not absolutely bad, and two
thousand pairs of shoes; these I propose to give to such men as will
not appear under arms in the field, and, if necessary, some hunting-
shirts may be added to the said clothing.
The dragoons are generally better clothed than the infantry, and we
might very easily complete their coats or stable-jackets, as each
different regiment could adopt a different colour.
As soon as the French clothing comes, I wish the whole army to be
clothed at once, in observing to give the round hats to some particular
brigades, for the sake of uniformity, and to turn up the facings
according to the plan agreed.
There will be then no excuse for the officers who, out of neglect,
should suffer their men to lose a single article, and the most strict
orders may be given for that purpose.
The French arms that are coming might be put in the hands of soldiers
enlisted for the war.
I wish that there was a distinction of one woollen epaulette for the
corporal, and two for the serjeant.
As to the feathers, (become a distinction of ranks,) I wish such as
have been pointed out might be forbidden to other officers, and for the
light division I shall beg the leave of wearing a black and red
feather, which I have imported for the purpose.
These ideas, my dear general, are not given to you as a great stroke of
genius, but I heartily wish something of the kind may be thought
proper.
TO MM. LE COMTE DE ROCHAMBEAU, AND LE CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.~[1]
Camp, before Dobb's Ferry, Aug. 9, 1780.
Gentlemen,--I arrived two days ago at head quarters, and in consequence
of the mission I was charged with, my first care was to render an
account of our conversations; but the most minute details of them are
so important, and the fate of America, and the glory of France, depend
so completely upon the result of our combinations here, that, in order
to feel more certain of having perfectly understood your meaning, I
will submit to you a summary of our conversations, and entreat you to
write me word immediately whether I have rightly understood your
meaning. Before quitting Rhode Island, gentlemen, I should have taken
this precaution, if General Washington's march against New York had not
obliged me to join my division, at the very moment when, from our
further arrangements, you most required some information.
1st. I have described to you the actual situation of America, the
exhausted state in which I found her, and the momentary efforts she had
made, which could only have been produced by the hope of being
delivered, by one decisive blow, from the tyranny of the English.
I told you those efforts were so enormous, when we consider the state
of our finances, and the failure of all our resources, that I do not
expect to see them renewed during another campaign. I added that on the
1st of November we should no longer have any militia, that the 1st of
January one half of our continental army would be disbanded, and I took
the liberty of saying, in my own name, that I thought it necessary, as
a political measure, to enter into action this campaign; and this I had
ascertained also to be the case, by sounding, on my journey, the wishes
of the people.
2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you
respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have
with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at
fourteen thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four
thousand very bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat
exaggerated, and that it was necessary to begin by deducting the
sailors employed by Admiral Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said
that the American troops would take charge of New York, and that the
fort of Brooklyn (upon which you might operate in concert with a
division of our troops) is merely an earthen work of four bastions,
with a ditch and a shed, containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred
men, and having in front another smaller work, which cannot contain
more than a hundred men. I added that nothing could prevent a regular
approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is the key of New York.
3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that
the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where,
I again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the
passage of Hell's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long
Island, so as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst
awaiting your arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at
Morrisania, or, if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place
itself in a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall
have approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and
passing afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by
sea to Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General
Washington would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen
large cannon, to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with
these forces, and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might
soon be taken, and consequently the town of New York.
4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which,
even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses
some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the
militia of the island; and, in short, that with the assistance of our
Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the
Island of New York, we should assure the communication between Long
Island and the continent. From these various circumstances, my own
private opinion would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet
could be placed in security, before we possessed any superiority of
naval force.
5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as
soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay to
examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense
advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land
forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his
own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had
feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.
6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told
you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very
important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no
army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to
commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from
the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.
7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in
order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence
later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation, I
said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence in
you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and
would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.
This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is
what you did me the honour to reply to:--
1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather
than trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time
after you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it
would consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all
probability, of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be
sent by three ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger
number of vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could
prevent its arriving before the 1st of September, would be the
impossibility of a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and
that, in the latter case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of
autumn, and would then be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has
been apprised of our projects, and has received the order to facilitate
them; that, consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him
for the five promised vessels; and that, from all these circumstances,
you hoped to be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not
doubt, at least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior
forces for this winter, and for the next campaign.
2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you,
and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New
York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at
least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by
leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long
Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will
perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.
3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop
the enemy at the passage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give
you no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to
Westchester appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea
into a bay of Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau
looks upon it as a very long operation, and, from his own experience on
the subject, he believes that it would require nearly three weeks to
land an army, with all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You
desired to have every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in
order to be able to make calculations accordingly for the artillery and
engineer service. You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as
necessary, even at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true
that this idea may partly proceed from your doubts relating to the
communication concerning Morrisania.
5th. The Chevalier de Ternay conceives it would be difficult to take
possession of New York harbour, and hopes to accomplish the same object
by the situation in which he has placed his cruisers. He does not think
that his seventy-fours can enter, but from the difference of opinion
which I ventured to express, as to the importance at least of occupying
the harbour, he told me he would again attend to this project. As to
his manner of protecting the disembarkation, it would be to cruise in
the Sound, and his frigates, and one or two vessels, would enter into
the bay at the place where the troops should land.
6th. Rhode Island appears to you a very important point to preserve;
but if M. de Ternay should have the superiority, you think, as we do,
that it would be unnecessary to leave a garrison there during the
attack of New York. The Count de Rochambeau desired me to assure
General Washington that, in every case, upon receiving an order, he
would instantly repair to that spot which the commander-in-chief should
appoint. I told him, also, that the French generals wished that it were
possible to have an interview with him.
At the termination of our conversation, we decided upon the following
measures, of which I consequently gave an account to General
Washington.
1st. You have written to France to urge the speedy arrival and
augmentation of the promised succours. You have already asked for the
five vessels of M. de Guichen, and I have also taken charge of another
letter, which repeats the same request, and which will pass through the
hands of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.
2d. As soon as you receive news of the arrival either of the second
division or of the ships from the West Indies, you will immediately
despatch a messenger to General Washington; and, whilst our army is
marching towards Westchester, and your own making preparation for
embarkation, M. de Ternay will endeavour to effect his junction.
3d. If the French fleet should be equal to that of the enemy, it will
immediately enter into a contest for superiority; if it should be
superior, it will take the French troops instantly on board, and carry
them towards the bay intended for their landing.
4th. A spot shall be chosen from whence the ships may protect the
operation, and which will also afford to the troops first landed a
position well sheltered by the fire from the ships, and behind which
the remainder of the troops may join them; or by advancing with all the
landed troops, the right and left wings may be so placed as to cover
the last of the disembarkation. The spot selected shall be situated in
such a manner that the corps of the American army intended for this
particular expedition, may arrive and land at the very moment of the
landing of the Count de Rochambeau, and that their general may be able
to co-operate instantly with the French general.
5th. According to the number of French troops in a state to operate,
General Washington will either conduct himself, or send to Long Island,
a sufficient number of troops to obtain a force nearly equal to that of
the enemy, and he will also have a corps of troops of nearly the same
strength as the one opposed to him, either at Westchester or in the
Island of New York.
6th. The Chevalier de Ternay will examine, attentively, the possibility
of forcing the passage of Sandy Hook, and if it be deemed practicable,
will attain that important end.
7th. As soon as the arms, clothes, and ammunition, belonging to the
United States, shall arrive, the Chevalier de Ternay will have the
goodness, without giving them time to enter the harbour, to send them
with a convoy of frigates, or, if the batteries be not yet erected, by
a ship of the line, to that point in the Sound which General Washington
may judge proper to select.
8th. The French fleet will take charge of the boats we shall require,
which will be delivered up to them at Providence; they will also land
us all the powder that they can do without themselves; this does not
amount, at present, to more than thirty thousand pounds.
9th. I shall send to the French generals all the correct information I
may obtain respecting the passage of the Sound by Hell Gate; I shall
communicate to them, likewise, all the details relating to Brooklyn,
and they will send us the calculations which have been made in
consequence by the artillery and engineers,--from thence we shall
decide what must be sent with the American Long Island corps for these
two companies. Some doubts are entertained by the French generals
concerning the two points of this last article; I shall send them from
home some information respecting that subject, of which I had before
the honour of speaking to them.
10th. The invalids, magazines, &c., shall be sent to Providence, and
the batteries of that river are to be placed by us in proper order. It
is clearly specified that the instant the expected naval superiority of
force arrives, the French are not to lose a single day in commencing
their co-operative measures.
Such is, gentlemen, the abridgment of the account rendered to General
Washington; and it will serve as the basis for his preparations, as
well as a rule for the future elucidations you may receive. From the
confidence with which he has honoured me, I was obliged to settle
finally all that it was possible for me to arrange with you,--the fate
of America, in short, appears to be dependent upon your activity or
repose during the remainder of this summer. I attach the greatest
importance to all your ideas being clearly rendered, and I entreat you
to lose no time in writing a few words to say whether I have understood
your meaning.
A short time after my departure, gentlemen, you must have learnt that
General Clinton, fearing for New York; had been obliged, by a sudden
movement of our army, to enclose himself in that island. The army is at
present near Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right
side of the North River, and our advance guard is nearly three miles
before it.
If General Clinton, with a force and position equal to our own, should
judge proper to fight, we shall give him a favourable opportunity of
doing so, and he may take advantage of that kind of challenge to make
the most impartial trial of the English and Hessian against the
American troops.
I shall wait here, most impatiently, gentlemen, your answer to this
letter. I shall have the honour of communicating to you the various
advices General Washington may find it expedient to send you. The first
intelligence of the arrival of the ships is very necessary to our peace
of mind, and from an intimate knowledge of our situation, I assure you,
gentlemen, in my own private name and person, that it is important to
act during this campaign, that all the troops you may hope to obtain
from France next year, as well as all the projects of which you may
flatter yourselves, will never repair the fatal consequences of our
present inactivity. Without resources in America, all foreign succours
would prove of no avail; and although, in every case, you may rely
wholly upon us, I think it important to take advantage of the moment
when you may find here a co-operation, without which you will not be
able to achieve anything for the American cause.
I have the honour to be, &c.
P.S. Such, gentlemen, is the long official letter which I have the
honour of writing to you, but I cannot send it without thanking you for
the kindness you expressed for me at Rhode Island, and presenting you
the assurance. of my sincere and respectful attachment.
Footnote:
1. General Heath, who commanded the militia in the state of Rhode
Island, announced, on the 13th of July, the arrival of the French
squadron to Washington, who was then stationed with his staff at
Bergen. M. de Lafayette set out instantly, bearing instructions from
the general-in-chief dated the 15th, to meet the French Generals and to
concert with them. Washington had long formed a plan of offensive
operations, for the reduction of the town and garrison of New York
(letter to General Greene the 14th of July); this plan was to take
effect on condition, first, that the French and American troops should
form a junction; second, that the French should have a decided naval
superiority over the united forces of Admiral Graves and Admiral
Arbuthnot. In nine letters, written between the 20th of July and the
1st of August, which would not perhaps have offered much interest to
the reader, M. de Lafayette rendered an account of his mission, of
which a short analysis will give the principal details.
The first letters relate to the multiplied difficulties he encountered
in the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island, in collecting
provisions, clothing, arms, and, above all, powder, in sufficient
quantities for the projected expedition. These difficulties were much
increased by the insufficiency of every kind of munition brought by the
French squadron, which but half realized the promises of the French
cabinet. M. de Lafayette repaired to Newport the 25th, and found the
army, which had been disembarked, encamped in Rhode Island, and M. de
Rochambeau much occupied by the news of an important attack, and, in
fact, four of the enemy's ships appeared on the 19th, and nine or ten
more two days after, before Block Island. Sir Henry Clinton had on his
side left New York. By a combination of his land and sea forces, he
intended to surprise the French army. But he experienced some delay;
his soldiers could only embark in the transports the 27th; there was a
wrong understanding between him and Admiral Arbuthnot. He learnt that
the French had fortified themselves at Newport, and that the
neighbouring militia had joined them; and at length that General
Washington was making a rapid movement upon New York. He hastened to
pass over the Sound, and landed his troops on the 31st.
M. de Lafayette, who had always felt doubtful, himself, of Clinton's
making the attack, had then the opportunity of discussing with the
allies the project for an offensive operation. He was extremely anxious
to put it into execution, and General Washington was desirous also of
doing the same.
The thing was, however, difficult. Although the capture of New York had
always been one of the objects of the French ministry, the instructions
of M. de Rochambeau prescribed to him to attach great importance to the
station of Rhode Island, and to endeavour to make it the basis for his
other operations. He was therefore reluctant to quit it in order to
march upon New York. M. de Ternay, at the same time, considered it as
impossible to enter with his ships of war into the harbour of that
town, and contented himself with promising a blockade; he did not,
besides, possess that naval superiority which could only be obtained by
the arrival of the second division, which was so vainly expected from
France, or by the junction of the squadron of M. de Guichen, then in
the West Indies, to whom M. de Lafayette had written to promote that
object. M. de Rochambeau's own opinion was, however, in favour of
offensive measures, and he promised to conform, according to his
instructions, to the orders of the general-in-chief. Everything was
discussed and regulated in two or three conferences, which took place
from the end of July to the commencement of August, between MM. de
Rochambeau, de Ternay, and de Lafayette. The result of these
conferences is resumed in a letter, to which is annexed this
note--
In the suppressed letters it is also seen that the French troops
evinced the greatest ardour, and that the good intelligence that
reigned between the two allies completely justified the expectations of
M. de Lafayette, and the measures he had proposed. He wrote, in a
letter of the 31st, to General Washington:--
"The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you.
They swear at those that speak of waiting the second division: they are
enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to their dispositions
towards the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the
inhabitants and the militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You
would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our
drafts that came on from Connanicut, without provisions and tents, and
who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French
soldier and officer took an American with him, and divided his bed and
his supper in the most friendly manner. The patience and sobriety of
our militia are so much admired by the French officers, that, two days
ago, a French colonel called all his officers together, to take the
good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American
troops. So far are they gone in their admiration, that they find a
great deal to say in favour of General Varnum, and his escort of
militia dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other
band, the French discipline is such, that chickens and pigs walk
between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the
camp a corn-field, of which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories
dont know what to say to it."--(ORIGINAL.)--(_Letters of Washington
from the 14th of July to the 5th of August, 1780, and Appendix, Nos. 1
and 8_, VOL. vii.)
FROM THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU TO M. DE LAFAYETTE.
Newport, August 12th, 1780.
I received, my dear marquis, the letter you did me the honour of
writing the 9th of August; permit me to send you, in reply, the one I
had the honour of addressing to our general on the 10th of this month,
to express to him the opinion you asked for by his desire. I am only
now, therefore, waiting for his last orders, and I have earnestly
requested him to grant me the favour of an interview, that the admiral
and I may receive from his own lips the last plan he has decided upon;
we should do more in a quarter of an hour's conversation than we could
do by multiplied despatches. I am as thoroughly convinced as any person
can be of the truth of what your letters mentioned, that it was his
marching which had detained Clinton, who intended to come and attack
us; but I must observe to you also, at the same time, that there was
much reason to hope that he would have been well beaten here, and
during that time our general would have taken New York. As to your
observation, my dear marquis, that the position of the French at Rhode
Island is of no use to the Americans, I reply:--
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