Worlds Best Histories France Vol 7 by M. Guizot and Madame Guizot De Witt

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Joseph Bonaparte had presumed too much on his forces and the remains of
his independence. Constantly hard and severe with regard to his brothers,
the emperor replied with scorn to King Joseph: "It is not ill-temper and
small passions that you need, but views cool and conformable to your
position. You talk to me of the constitution. Let me know if the
constitution forbids the King of Spain to be at the head of 300,000
Frenchmen? if the constitution prohibits the garrison from being French,
and the governor of Madrid a Frenchman? if the constitution says that in
Saragossa the houses are to be blown up one after another? You will not
succeed in Spain, except by vigor and energy. This parade of goodness and
clemency ends in nothing. You will be applauded so long as my armies are
victorious; you will be abandoned if they are vanquished. You ought to
have become acquainted with the Spanish nation in the time you have been
in Spain, and after the events that you have seen. Accustom yourself to
think your royal authority as a very small matter."

The emperor had correctly judged the precarious condition of the French
power in Spain; he had reckoned, and he still reckoned, on the success of
his arms. The military counsellor whom he had left near his brother
possessed neither his esteem nor his confidence. Marshal Jourdan was a
cold and prudent spirit, always imbued with the military habits of the
French Revolution, and had never courted the favor of Napoleon; King
Joseph was attached to him, and had brought him with him to Naples. The
lieutenants of the emperor showed him no deference; it was, however, by
his agency that the orders of the minister of war passed to the staff-
officers at Madrid. Already, and by the express instructions of the
emperor, Marshal Soult was on march for Portugal. His rapid triumphs did
not appear doubtful; and the operations of Marshal Victor in the south of
Spain were to be dependent on the succors that were to reach him when
Lisbon was conquered. The difficulties everywhere opposed to Marshal Soult
by the passionate insurrection of the Portuguese population, however,
retarded his march. He only arrived on the banks of the Minho on the 15th
of February; the peasants had taken away the boats. An attempted passage
near the mouth of the river having failed, the _corps d'armee_ was
compelled to reascend its course, after a series of partial combats
against the forces of the Marquis of Romana, who had given his support to
the Portuguese insurrection. When he had at length succeeded in crossing
the Minho at Orense, Soult seized successively the towns of Chaves and
Braga, which were scarcely defended. The chiefs of the insurgents had been
constrained by their soldiers to this useless show of resistance, General
Frere having been massacred by the militia whom he ordered to evacuate
Braga. At Oporto the disorder was extreme; the population fought under the
orders of the bishop. The attack had been cleverly arranged. At the moment
when the bewildered crowd was pressing tumultuously over the bridge of
boats across the Douro, the cables broke; men, women, and children were
engulfed in the waves. In spite of the efforts of the general, the city
was sacked. The long wars, the rude life of the camps, the daily habit of
subsisting by pillage, had little by little relaxed the bonds of
discipline. Marshal Soult established himself at Oporto, incapable of
advancing even to Lisbon with his forces reduced by garrisoning towns, in
presence of the English troops, who had not ceased to occupy the capital.
He could not, or he would not make known at Madrid the position in which
he found himself. Behind him the insurrection had closed every passage. He
found himself isolated in Portugal, and conceived the thought of
submitting the environs of Oporto to a regular and pacific government, re-
establishing order all round, and constantly attentive to gain the favor
of important persons. Perhaps the marshal raised his hopes even to the
foundation of an independent and personal power, more durable than
imperial conquests. It was with his consent that the draft of a popular
pronunciamento was circulated in the provinces of Minho and Oporto,
praying "his Excellency the Duke of Dalmatia to take the reins of
government, to represent the sovereign, and to invest himself with all the
attributes of supreme authority, until the emperor might designate a
prince of his house or of his choice to reign over Portugal."

The sentiments of the army were divided, and an opposition was preparing
to the schemes of the marshal, when the latter learned that an enemy more
redoubtable than the Portuguese insurrection was threatening him in this
province, where he had dreamed of founding a kingdom. Sir Arthur Wellesley
had arrived at Lisbon on the 22nd of April, with reinforcements which
swelled the English _corps d'armee_ to 25,000 men; fifteen or twenty
thousand Portuguese soldiers marched under his orders; a crowd of
insurgents impeded rather than aided his operations. He advanced
immediately against Marshal Soult, now for five weeks immovable at Oporto.
On the 2nd of May he was at Coimbra. Well informed of the plots which were
preparing at Oporto, to which a French officer named Argentan had been
engaged to lend a hand, he resolved upon attacking as speedily as possible
the positions of the marshal. When the latter was informed of the projects
of the English general, retreat was already cut off in the valley of the
Tamega by a strong assemblage of the insurgents, and in the valley of the
Douro by the English general Beresford. Only one route remained still open
to Marshal Soult--by Braga and the provinces of the north. Retreat was
resolved upon, the powder saturated, the field artillery horsed; the
departure was ordered for twelve at noon, and a part of the army was
already defiling on the road to Amarante.

In the night between the 11th and 12th two English battalions had crossed
the Douro at Avinto, three leagues above Oporto, collecting all the
vessels which were to be found on the river, and descending the course of
the stream under cover of the darkness. The army of Sir Arthur Wellesley
had meanwhile occupied the suburbs of the left bank, concealing his
movements behind the heights of La Sarca. Marshal Soult was ignorant of
that operation. At daybreak a small body of picked men, boldly crossing
the river within sight of our soldiers, took possession of an enclosure
called the Seminary. Entrenching themselves there, and constantly
receiving new reinforcements, the English made a desperate defence against
the attempts of General Delaborde. The main body of the enemy's army
beginning to fill all the streets of Oporto, the marshal at once sounded
retreat, and the wounded and sick were left to the care of the English.
When, on the evening of the 12th, the army reached the town of Baltar,
Soult learned that the roads by Braga had been intercepted, as well as by
the valley of the Douro. General Loison, unable to force the passage of
the Tamega, had evacuated Amarante. The roads from the north would bring
the army back to the suburbs of Oporto. The marshal, not wishing to risk a
fresh encounter with the enemy, at once made up his mind to sacrifice
without hesitation his baggage, ammunition, artillery, and even the
greater part of the treasure of the army, to enter the mountain passes,
and join at Guimaraens the divisions which had preceded him. When at last
the army reached Orense, after seven days' marching, varied by small
skirmishes, the soldiers were exhausted and depressed. Portugal was for
the second time lost to us. Marshal Soult immediately marched towards
Galicia, which had for two months been the theatre of Ney's operations,
and freed Lugo, while that marshal was making a brilliant expedition in
the Asturias along with General Kellermann. The two chiefs made an
arrangement as to the measures to be taken against the insurgents who had
assembled at St. Jago under the orders of the Marquis Romana; after which
Soult was to march upon Old Castile as far as Zamora, to be near the
English, who were said to be threatening the south of Portugal. Ney
proposed to attack Vigo, where General Noriena had fortified himself,
supported by the crews of several English vessels. From the very first,
since the junction of the two armies, both officers and soldiers had
exchanged keen and bitter recrimination. A better feeling, however, had
reappeared, and the mutual good-will of the chiefs for each other silenced
the ill-disposed. After their separation, Ney freed St. Jago; but after
advancing to the suburbs of Vigo, and seeing its strong position, he
waited for the result of Soult's movement against Romana.

Several days having elapsed, he learned that, after driving Romana back to
Orense without fighting, and staying several days at Montforte, the
marshal had taken the road to Zamora, without replying to the letters of
his companion-in-arms. From information received from Lugo, Ney was
persuaded that Soult's project had long been premeditated, and that he had
of deliberate purpose broken the bargain stipulated between them. His
anger burst forth with a violence proportioned to the frankness he had
shown when treating with Soult, and this anger was shared by the officers
and soldiers of his army. He at once determined to evacuate Galicia, which
was threatened both by the English and the Spanish insurgents. Leaving a
strong garrison at Ferrol, Ney slowly advanced towards Lugo, where he
collected the sick and wounded left by Soult, and then returned to
Astorga, in the beginning of July. He wrote to King Joseph: "If I had
wished to resolve to leave Galicia without artillery, I could have
remained there longer, at the risk of being hemmed in; but, avoiding such
a mode of departure, I have retreated, bringing with me my sick and
wounded, as well as those of Marshal Soult, left in my charge. I inform
your Majesty that I have decided not to serve again in company with
Marshal Soult."

King Joseph now had a most troublesome complication, and a position that
daily became more serious. At one time, in April, he was in hopes of
seeing his affairs right themselves again, in spite of the absence of all
news of Soult's operations in Portugal. Marshal Victor, urged by the King
of Spain and by his staff to obey the emperor's instructions and invade
Andalusia, had crossed the Tagus in three columns, and, reforming again on
the Guadiana, had, after passing that river, joined near Medellin Don
Gregorio de la Cuesta, who retreated for several days before him. A severe
battle having dispersed those large forces of the Spanish insurgents, on
the 28th March, the marshal took up his position on the banks of the
Guadiana, at the very time when General Sebastiani, at the head of two
divisions, was defeating the army of Estremadura at Ciudad Real, and
driving it back to the entrance of the Sierra Morena. There they awaited
the movement ordered in the instructions given to Soult, the pivot of the
whole campaign, projected by Napoleon before his departure for Paris. It
was in Germany, just after the battle of Essling, that the emperor learned
of the check caused to all his combinations by Soult's immobility at
Oporto. Obstinate in directing himself the operations of armies at a
distance, without the power of taking into account the state of public
opinion, and without any knowledge of all that had occurred between the
departure of the couriers and the arrival of peremptory orders no longer
suitable to the situation, the emperor conceived the idea of concentrating
three armies under one man. Making all personal considerations bend to the
order of seniority, he entrusted the command to Marshal Soult, thus
investing him with supreme authority over Marshals Mortier and Ney. The
order reached Madrid at the moment when the leaders of the armies were
most keenly antagonistic. "You will send a staff-officer to Spain,"
Napoleon had written to the minister of war, "with the orders that the
forces of the Duke of Elchingen, the Duke of Trevisa, and the Duke of
Dalmatia will form only one army, under the command of the Duke of
Dalmatia. These forces must only move together, to march against the
English, pursue them incessantly, defeat them, and throw them into the
sea. Putting all considerations aside, I give the command to the Duke of
Dalmatia, as being senior in rank. These forces ought to form from 50,000
to 60,000 men, and if the junction is promptly effected, the English will
be destroyed, and the affairs of Spain arranged finally. But they must
keep together, and not march in small parties. That principle applies to
every country, but especially to a country where there can be no
communication. I cannot appoint a place for the armies to meet, because I
do not know what events have taken place. Forward this order to the king,
to the Duke of Dalmatia, and to the two other marshals, by four different
roads."

Whilst thus writing, constantly and justly apprehensive of the danger
caused by the English army, Napoleon was still ignorant of the evacuation
of Portugal. "Let your instructions to them be, to attack the enemy
wherever they meet him," he said three days previously to General Clarke,
"to renew their communications with the Duke of Dalmatia, and support him
on the Minho. The English alone are to be feared; alone, if the army is
not directed differently, they will in a few months lead it to a
catastrophe."

The order sent by the emperor necessarily assisted in bringing about the
catastrophe of which he was afraid. Marshal Soult, being deceived as to
the plan of the English, and meditating an attack upon Portugal by Ciudad
Rodrigo, wished to concentrate large forces for this purpose. He sent for
Marshal Mortier, who was posted at Villacastin, where he covered Madrid,
and demanded reinforcements from Aragon and Catalonia. The latter troops
were refused him, and Generals Suchet and St. Cyr had great difficulty in
keeping those two provinces in respect. Marshal Jourdan had foreseen the
attack of the English on the Tagus, and was anxious about the position of
Marshal Victor, isolated in Andalusia. Like the other leaders, the marshal
acted independently, without attending to the orders from Madrid: he found
himself compelled to fall back upon Talavera.

He was not to hold that post long. In spite of the extreme difficulty
experienced by Sir Arthur Wellesley in maintaining a good understanding
with his Spanish allies, he had marched to attack Marshal Victor, to whom
King Joseph was sending reinforcements as quickly as he could. About
22,000 English soldiers were now on the field, reduced to such scarcity of
provisions and money as to cause pillage and disorder, in spite of their
commander's anger. Don Cuesta, with about 40,000 men under his orders, had
been appointed, much against his will, to occupy the mountain passes. A
Spanish army of 30,000 men, collected by General Venegas, was expected to
join the two principal armies. On leaving Madrid, with the forces at his
disposal, King Joseph had impressed upon Soult the necessity of attacking
the enemy's rear, so that the Anglo-Spanish army might be crushed between
superior forces. The marshal announced his departure.

Victor had had time to fall back upon Vargas, behind the Guadarama. Sir
Arthur Wellesley crossed the Alberche, a tributary of the Tagus, and as
soon as he found himself in presence of the enemy, wished to offer battle,
urging Cuesta to join him in attacking Victor before the arrival of the
enemy's reinforcements. The Spanish general declared that his honor was at
stake in holding his positions, and absolutely refused to fight. The
English alone, had not men enough at their disposal to contend with the
French troops. Scarcely had the latter commenced their retreat when the
Spanish, suddenly seized with the ardor of battle, rushed in pursuit,
complaining that the "rascals withdrew so fast," wrote Cuesta to
Wellesley, "that one cannot follow them in their flight." "If you run like
that, you will get beaten," replied the English general, scornfully,
annoyed at seeing himself perpetually thwarted in his able plans.

In fact when the Spaniards, a few days afterwards, at last engaged with
the French, Marshal Victor's advance-guard were sufficient to drive Cuesta
back as far as the English battalions, which had been prudently told off
to support him. The fighting was gallant on the part of our troops, and
helped to excite their ardor. King Joseph was urged to join battle: he
feared an attack on Madrid, which he had been compelled to leave
undefended, and reckoned upon the rapid movements of Soult, who had
received orders to advance with all haste from Salamanca to Placentia. He
had no experience of war, and neglected to take into account the chances
of delay and the loss of troops during the march. Marshal Victor was
daring, full of contempt for the Spanish troops, and ignorant of the
qualities of the English army, which had not for a long time been seen on
the continent. The French army advanced upon Talavera, which was strongly
held by Sir Arthur. Hampered by the obstinacy and want of discipline of
his Spanish allies, the English general had relinquished all attempts at
daring, entrenching himself on the defensive. Marshal Soult had not
arrived, being unable, he wrote, to effect his operation on the enemy's
rear before the beginning of August. On the 27th of July, however, on
occupying the ground before the English positions at Talavera, Victor gave
orders to attack a height which was badly defended, and was driven back
with heavy loss. Marshal Jourdan insisted on a delay of a few days, to
allow Soult time to arrive; but the anxiety of King Joseph, and Victor's
impatience, gained the day, and on the 28th, at daybreak, they attacked
the mamelon, already threatened on the 27th.

Our troops gained the top under the English fire, but Sir Arthur had
doubled the ranks of those in defence, and a terrible charge under General
Hill compelled the French again to abandon the position.

The check was serious, and the soldiers began to be discouraged. By common
consent, and without orders given by the leaders, the fight ceased. The
English and French crowded on the two banks of a small brook which
separated the two armies, and all quenched their thirst, without suspicion
of treason or perfidy, and without a single shot being fired on either
side. The French generals again discussed the question of resuming
hostilities. "If this mamelon is not taken," exclaimed Victor,
impetuously, "we should not take any part in a campaign." King Joseph,
deficient in authority both of position and character, gave way. Sir
Arthur Wellesley, seated on the grass at the top of a hill, surveyed the
enemy's lines, and the defences, which he had just strengthened by a
division, and a battery of artillery obtained with great difficulty from
Cuesta. Till then the English had borne the brunt of the fighting; on
General Donkin coming to tell Sir Arthur that the Spanish were betraying
him, the general-in-chief quietly said, "Go back to your division." The
attack was again begun, and this time directed against the whole line of
the English positions, while Village's brigade turned the mamelon to
assail them in flank.

At this moment a charge of the enemy's cavalry poured upon our columns. A
German regiment followed Seymour's dragoons, but were stopped by a
watercourse, and pulled up: the English horsemen alone, boldly crossing
the obstacle, made a furious attack on the French ranks, which opened to
let them pass. In their daring impetuosity the dragoons went as far as our
rear-guard, where they were stopped by new forces, and finally brought
back with great loss to the foot of the mamelon. They stopped the flank
movement however; and the centre of the English army, shaken for a moment,
formed again round Colonel Donellan after a brilliant charge, and our
soldiers were again driven back towards their position. The losses were
great on both sides. The English did not attempt to pursue their
advantages, and when the fight had ceased were satisfied with encamping on
the heights of Talavera. Next day the French army withdrew beyond the
Alberche without being disturbed by the enemy, and waited finally for
Marshal Soult's arrival.

He appeared on the 2nd of August at Placentia, too late for his glory as
well as for the success of the French arms, though in time to modify
Wellesley's plans. The latter had commenced to advance towards him,
thinking he should meet forces inferior to his own; but Mortier had
already followed Soult, Ney's troops were advancing by Salamanca, and King
Joseph was preparing to put under him all his regiments, except those
accompanying General Sebastiani in his march towards Madrid. Sir Arthur
Wellesley understood the dangers of his position: his troops were tired,
and badly fed; and not wishing to risk again the lot of arms, he hurriedly
re-crossed the Tagus, taking care to blow the bridges up, and fell back
upon Truxillo, by the rugged mountain passes. The want of a proper
understanding, and the mutual distrust which during the whole campaign had
reigned between the English and Spanish, had borne their fruits.
Wellesley's soldiers, deprived of the resources to which they had been
accustomed, and which they had a right to expect from their allies, died
in great numbers in their encampments on the bank of the Guadiana: their
wounded had been abandoned at Talavera, when Cuesta evacuated that
position. Sir Arthur gave vent to his bitter complaints in writing to
Frere, the English _charge d'affaires_ at the insurgents' head-quarters:
"I wish the members of the Junta, before blaming me for not doing more,
and charging me beforehand with the probable results of the faults and
imprudence of others, would be good enough to come here, or send somebody
to supply the wants of our army dying of hunger, and actually after
fighting two days, and defeating in the service of Spain an enemy of twice
their number, without bread to eat. It is a positive fact that for the
last seven days the English army has not received a third of its
provisions, that at this moment there are 4000 wounded soldiers dying for
want of the care and necessaries which any other country in the world
would have supplied, even to its enemies, and that I can derive assistance
of no kind from the country. I cannot even get leave to bury the dead
bodies in the neighborhood. We are told that the Spanish troops sometimes
behave well: I confess that I have never seen them behave otherwise than
badly."

The emperor's anger was extreme on learning the check our troops had
received at Talavera. He wrote to Marshal Jourdan, indignantly
recapitulating all the blunders made during the campaign, without at all
considering the difficulties everywhere caused by orders sent from a
distance, in ignorance of the actual facts of the situation. "When at last
they decided to give battle," Napoleon summed up, "it was done without
energy, since my arms were disgraced. Battle should not be given, unless
seventy chances in one's favor can be counted upon beforehand: even then,
one should not offer battle unless there are no more chances to be hoped
for, since the lot of battle is from its nature always doubtful: but once
the resolution is taken, one must conquer or perish, and the French eagles
must not withdraw till all have equally put forth every effort. There must
have been a combination of all these faults before an army like my army of
Spain could have been beaten by 30,000 English: but so long as they will
attack good troops, like the English ones, in good positions, without
reconnoitring these positions, without being certain of carrying them,
they will lead my men to death, and for nothing at all."

The Spanish armies were, after the battle scattered everywhere, according
to their custom, to appear again in a short time like swarms of wasps to
harass our soldiers. Sir Arthur Wellesley entrenched himself at Badajoz,
ready to fall back upon Portugal. No definitive result had crowned the
bloody campaign just completed, but it had an influence upon the
negotiations then being carried on in Spain. An attempt, long prepared by
the English, and to which they attached a great importance, now occupied
the Emperor Napoleon's mind still more than the affairs of Spain.

For several weeks it was believed that the great maritime expedition
organized on the coasts of England was for the purpose of carrying
overwhelming reinforcements to Spain. A first attempt, of less importance,
was directed against our fleets collected at the island of Aix, near
Rochefort. Admiral Willaumez, in charge of an expedition to the Antilles,
had to rally the squadrons of Lorient and Rochefort, and being unavoidably
delayed at the latter place, it was there that Admiral Gambier came to
attack our vessels. Vice-Admiral Allemand carefully fortified the isle of
Aix against an attack, the nature of which he had foreseen, though not the
extent. During the night of the 11th and 12th April, conducted by several
divisions, composed of frigates and brigs, thirty large fire-ships were
suddenly launched against our vessels, exploding in all directions,
breaking the wooden bars by the weight of their burning masses, adhering
to the sides of the ships and compelling even those which they did not set
on fire to go aside to avoid dangers which were more to be dreaded. Thanks
to the skill and bravery of our sailors, none of the vessels perished by
fire; but four of them ran aground at the mouth of the Charente, and were
attacked by the English. The _Calcutta_ surrendered after several hours'
fighting--her commander, Captain Lafon, having to pay with his life for
the weak resistance he is said to have made. The English blew up the
_Aquilon_ and _Varsovie_, and Captain Ronciere himself set fire to the
_Tonnerre_, after landing all his crew. Napoleon's continued efforts to
form a rival navy in France constituted a standing menace to England.
After the cruel expedition of the isle of Aix, the principal effort was to
be directed against Antwerp, always an object of English jealousy and
dissatisfaction, as a commercial port, or as a place of war. The works
which the emperor had been carrying on there increased their anxiety, and
on the 29th July forty vessels of the line and thirty frigates appeared in
sight of the island of Walcheren. From 700 to 800 transport-ships brought
an army to be landed, under the orders of Lord Chatham, Pitt's elder
brother, and containing about 40,000 men, with much artillery. The emperor
was at once informed, and M. Decres, minister of the marine, proposed to
station at Flushing the fleet of Admiral Missiessy. The latter refused,
saying that he would not let himself be taken, and did not wish to see his
crews decimated by the Walcheren fever. That was the auxiliary upon which
Napoleon reckoned against the English expedition; and rightly, too.