Worlds Best Histories France Vol 7 by M. Guizot and Madame Guizot De Witt

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Alliances would have been difficult and few in Napoleon's case, if he had
insisted on having genuine sympathy and hearty assistance; but he did not
ask so much from Prussia, nor even from the Emperor Francis, whose
daughter he had just married. Fear was enough for the accomplishment of
his wishes, and in that he reckoned rightly. King Frederick William asked
for Napoleon's alliance, because he dreaded seeing himself suddenly hemmed
in by the attack against Russia. After leaving him for a long time
unanswered, and at last bringing his preparations as far forward as he had
beforehand determined, the emperor accepted the offers of the King of
Prussia and his minister Hardenberg. In their anxiety to close the
bargain, the Prussian diplomatist had gone so far as to say that their
sovereign could place 100,000 men at the service of France. By skilful
system of rotation in their military service, the King of Prussia had been
able to exercise all his subjects who were of age to bear arms without
appearing to exceed the narrow limits allowed to his army by Napoleon.
Thus, under the weight of unjust restriction, were sown the seeds of that
military organization which afterwards proved several times so fatal to
us. In 1812, Napoleon let the King of Prussia know that he had observed
the state of his military resources. By the treaty of alliance, concluded
in February, 1812, the Prussian contingent in the war then preparing
amounted only to 20,000 soldiers. Large supplies of provisions were to be
received in part payment of the war contributions which Prussia still owed
France; and on this condition the emperor guaranteed the security of the
territory of his new ally--recently his mangled victim. Some hopes were
also allowed him of several ulterior advantages; but Napoleon refused to
restore Glogau, in spite of the entreaties of King Frederick William.

Austria would have wished to avoid the necessity of joining in the war and
allying herself to Napoleon; but the situation of the daughter of the
Emperor Francis upon the throne of France, and the eagerness which the
Austrian court had shown for the union, prevented any refusal. In his
negotiations Metternich insisted that the treaty should be kept secret:
"There are only two of us in Austria who wish for a French alliance," said
he; "the emperor is the first, and I am the second; but Russia must not
know of our feeling towards you." Some regiments were being secretly
prepared in Galicia.

In a famous conversation which Napoleon had, on 15th August, 1811, with
Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, he said, "Is it on
Austria that you reckon? You made war upon her in 1809, and deprived her
of a province during peace. Is it Sweden, from whom you took Finland? Is
it Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at Tilsit after being her ally?" The
same reproaches could with more justice have been applied to France--or
rather, to her ruler. He was soon to understand that truth, and weigh the
value of the alliances which he had imposed. On the eve of the Russian
campaign he was, and seemed, more formidable than the Czar; and fear made
the weak cling to his side, while they still concealed their secret hatred
and long-cherished rancor.

Russia, nevertheless, was also negotiating, relying upon her rival's
natural and declared enemies. The treaties were not new when they were
published, on the 20th July, 1812, between the Czar and the Spanish
insurgents, the 1st August with England, and on the 5th April with Sweden.

The powers hostile to France were astonished to hear of the advances made
by the new Prince Royal of Sweden. From recollection of the republican
enthusiasm of his youth, as well as personal antipathy, Bernadotte had
never liked General Bonaparte when they were comrades and rivals for
military fame. The fortune of Napoleon had dug a gulf between them. Raised
to the throne by a curious freak of destiny, Bernadotte had brought to his
new country no attachment for Napoleon, nor the enthusiastic recollections
of France with which he was generally credited. He had asked the emperor
to grant him Norway; but Napoleon did not wish to rob Denmark, and a
contemptuous silence was the reply to the court of Sweden. Bernadotte
pursued in another direction the same views of ambition and
aggrandizement; and in allying himself to Russia he asked for Norway,
urging the importance of the personal and national assistance which he
could contribute to the coalition. England was not a stranger to this
arrangement. Two months afterwards, disregarding his engagements with
Russia, and alarmed at the huge display of Napoleon's power, the Prince
Royal of Sweden proceeded to make fresh overtures to France. Norway was to
remain as the price of his alliance, together with a subsidy of
20,000,000. Napoleon was extremely angry. Bernadotte had never possessed
his good graces; and he, not unnaturally, felt indignant at the manoeuvres
of a Frenchman who had so soon forgot his country. "The wretch!" exclaimed
he; "he is true neither to his reputation, to Sweden, or his native land,
but is preparing bitter remorse for himself. When Russia wants the Sound,
her soldiers have only to cross the ice from Aland to Stockholm. The
present opportunity of humbling Russia is unique, and he will never have
such another. Never again will a man like me be seen marching against the
North with 600,000 men! He is not worth thinking about; let nobody mention
him again to me; I forbid sending any communication to him, formal or
informal." Thus repulsed, Bernadotte remained faithful to his engagements
with Russia, and was soon after to make others, which were still more
disastrous to his native country.

Soon after the official publication of the treaty uniting Sweden to the
enemies of France, the Emperor Alexander concluded a war which had long
occupied the greater part of his forces. The hostilities so long waged
between Russia and Turkey had not contributed to the glory of Alexander's
generals. "Your soldiers are very brave," said Napoleon once to the Czar's
ambassador, "but your generals are not worthy of them. It is impossible
not to see that they have managed their movements very badly, and acted
against all the rules." The fear inspired by the Emperor Napoleon had been
of still greater use to the Turks than the bad generalship of the
Russians, Alexander being eager to conclude the peace, in order to
concentrate his forces against an enemy more formidable than the Sultan.
Admiral Tchitchakoff, at the head of the army of the Danube, was empowered
to finish the war or negotiate peace. The Czar renounced part of his
former claims, contenting himself with Bessarabia, and proposing the Pruth
as the boundary for both empires, on condition that Turkey became an
active ally. The influence of the English diplomatists turned the balance,
and Mahmoud, yielding to the desire for peace, the Treaty of Bucharest was
signed on the 28th May, 1812.

Napoleon was afraid of this peace, and had tried to prevent it.
Perpetually trying to gain time, he succeeded in throwing off the scent
Nesselrode, who had been sent with instructions to put the question of
peace or war simply. Lauriston was directed to dwell constantly upon the
emperor's friendly feeling towards the Czar. Napoleon was at the trouble
of conversing for a long time with a Russian of position who was visiting
Paris. Czernicheff was sent to gather information as to the importance of
our armament, and had learned much, when the emperor sent for him to come
to the Elysee, to unfold his intentions with regard to Poland. He had
formerly said to Prince Kourakin, "I shall give you nothing in Poland--
nothing! nothing!" Now he declared his resolution never to restore to
Poland its national independence. "I had no wish to engage in the
convention which was proposed to me," said he, "because that engagement
was not compatible with my dignity; but I am well resolved on that point.
I have no other reason for arming except the notoriously unkind
disposition of the Russian court towards me. She is deceived as to my
intentions; she serves England, whose commerce extends to all parts of her
territory. I only ask her to come closer; by ourselves we two shall crush
all our enemies." Napoleon gave Czernicheff a letter for the Emperor
Alexander, which made him a sort of accredited agent at the Russian court.
"My brother, after the arrival of the courier sent by Count Lauriston on
the 6th instant, I laid down my views of the troublesome events of the
last fifteen months in a conversation with Colonel Czernicheff. It only
depends on your Majesty to finish it all."

At the same time a despatch of the Duke of Bassano (Maret), who had
succeeded the Duke of Cadore (Champagny) as minister of foreign affairs,
informed Lauriston of the importance of the mission. "The emperor is
anxious," said he, "that the troops should gradually advance upon the
Vistula, rest there, settle there, strengthen their position, fortify
their bridges; in short, make use of every advantage, and be certain of
taking the initiative in military movements. The emperor has shown great
kindness to Colonel Czernicheff, but I must tell you that officer has used
his time in Paris intriguing and disseminating corruption. The emperor
knew it without interfering. The preparations of his Majesty are really
enormous, and the more they are known it will only be the better for him.
The Emperor Alexander will, no doubt, show you the letter sent him by his
Majesty; it is very simple.... The emperor has no wish for an interview,
or even a negotiation which should take place out of Paris. He has no
confidence in a negotiation of any sort, unless the 450,000 men whom his
Majesty has put in movement, and their enormous mass of war apparatus,
should have caused the cabinet of St. Petersburg to reflect seriously,
and, by loyally restoring the system established at Tilsit, place Russia
again in the state of inferiority in which she then was. Your single aim
must be to gain time. The head of the army of Italy is already at Munich,
and the general movement is being everywhere declared. Maintain on all
occasions that, should war take place, it is Russia who wished for it."

It was no longer from Paris that the emperor dictated his diplomatic
orders and directed the movements of his armies. Since March he had lived
at St. Cloud, to avoid an opposition Which vexed him to the bottom of his
heart, and which he had in vain attempted to disarm. The Parisians, long
enthusiastic in favor of his glory, were showing discontent, aversion, and
complaint. After the long drought of the summer of 1811, bread was dear;
and the financial measures which had been tried to reduce the prices in
the capital were extremely onerous for the Treasury without acting
successfully upon trade. Corn was scarce, and the threat of an arbitrary
tariff kept back the supply of provisions. The strain upon all the
commercial relations caused by the continental blockade reacted
unfavorably on the necessary resources during a dearth. The Food Council
appointed by the emperor tried in vain to supply by artificial means the
beneficent action of commercial freedom and confidence.

Other causes contributed to the agitation and ill-temper of the Parisians;
and the discontent, as well as the suffering caused by the dearness of
corn, was not confined to the capital. Too clear-sighted, in spite of the
mad impulses of his ambition, not to feel what risks he was running, and
making France run, Napoleon wished to provide some protection. Though long
inexhaustible in men and devotion, the country was becoming tired, and
about to be deprived of its means of defence at the very moment when a new
European conflagration was bursting forth. The emperor had therefore
ordered the formation of a certain number of cohorts of the national
guard, under the name of "First Ban" (Body of Defence). Thus 120,000 men,
borrowed from the "sedentary contingents" of 1809 to 1812, had been formed
into regiments, on the assurance that they should not have to leave their
departments. Their families, however, were deprived of them, and the
present hardships combining with their fear of the future, there was great
dissatisfaction in the country. The number of deserters having increased,
the columns of militia recommenced their hateful work: and in the
conquered countries, Holland and the territory of the Hanse towns, the
conscription was violently resisted. Insurrections took place, followed by
executions. Several of the regiments raised in the ancient free towns had
mutinied, and kept themselves for several days in the isle of Heligoland.
These troops were incorporated with Marshal Davout's army, and put under
the most rigid guard. In Italy itself, and even in the army of Prince
Eugene, the discontent and fatigue were unmistakable. The hard service of
Napoleon had become a slavery. His severity towards the Pope also assisted
in alienating the Italians, and throughout the Roman States he was hated
by the population.

His pacific protestations, however, deceived nobody. The Czar had no wish
for war; he dreaded it, and his people had also long dreaded it; but now
he felt it to be inevitable, and the patriotic passion of defending their
soil took possession of the Russian nation. Lauriston was besieged with
attentions, but he lived alone, having no intercourse with the Russian
upper classes, who were now urging the emperor forward. "Everything will
be against us in this war," said Napoleon boldly to some of those about
him who knew Russia well, especially Caulaincourt and Segur. "On their
side, love of country and independence; all private and public interests,
even to the secret wishes of our allies! On our side, against so many
obstacles, glory alone, even without the hope of plunder, since the
frightful poverty of those regions renders it impossible."

The events proved, in a startling manner, the justice of what the military
diplomatists anticipated. From the history of the secret negotiations we
learn that advices and promises were largely bestowed by Austria and
Prussia upon the Emperor Alexander. The leaders of our armies, which had
for several months occupied Germany and Poland, could not pretend not to
see the increasing hatred which was silently brooding under the disguises
of popular submission and princely attentions. General Rapp, who commanded
at Dantzig, felt it his duty to inform Marshal Davout of the precarious
state in which our rule in Europe then stood. "If the French army has a
single check," wrote the general, "there will quickly be from the Rhine to
the Niemen only one single insurrection." Davout, in transmitting this
information to Napoleon, made only one remark: "I recollect, sire, true
enough, that in 1809, without the miracles wrought by you at Ratisbon our
situation in Germany would have been very difficult."

It was upon those miracles of his genius, and upon a destiny which he
justly considered superhuman, that the Emperor Napoleon always reckoned.
The information brought vexed him without persuading him, and made him
somewhat distrust those who ventured to give it him. The brilliant renown
of Marshal Davout, the justice and consistency of his administration in
Poland, and the admirable order which reigned in his army, had made
Napoleon somewhat displeased and gloomy. The rivals and enemies of Davout
skilfully utilized the occasion. "One would think that the Prince of
Eckmuehl commanded the army," they said constantly in the emperor's
presence. Some even accused him of aiming at the throne of Poland.
Napoleon had dispensed with Massena's services; and now he showed a
coolness towards Davout, as if he were jealous of his glory and power, and
at the moment of engaging in the supreme struggle wished to be surrounded
with servants only!

Marshal Davout, nevertheless, went on his way, executing the emperor's
instructions with consummate skill and prudence. There were now 450,000
men marching against Russia; an army of reserve of 150,000 men was about
to be formed in Germany from the recruits sent from all parts of France;
120,000 men of the national guard were to protect the French soil, in
combination with 150,000 soldiers, sick or new, who were still in the
military depots. According to the "cadres," which were often deceptive,
there were 300,000 men engaged in Spain. On leaving Italy to march to
Germany, Prince Eugene had left about 50,000 soldiers in the strongholds.
Thus for one man's quarrel, and in his name, there were under arms more
than 1,200,000 soldiers. The Russian army did not exceed 300,000 men: on
their side they had the weather, extent of country, and climate. "Don't
come into collision with the Emperor Napoleon," said Knesebek, the
Prussian envoy to the Czar; "draw the French into the interior of Russia.
Let fatigue and hunger do the rest." The Emperor Alexander had just learnt
that Davout had appeared at Elbing: having crossed the Vistula, he was on
his way to the Niemen. The feeling of the people as well as the ardor of
the court called the Czar to head-quarters, but he still hesitated, having
a repugnance to give the sign of general conflagration; and at last, on
the 21st, set out for Wilna after telling Lauriston that there was still
time for negotiations. The population of St. Petersburg were all present
at his departure, earnest and full of interest, and the churches were
crowded with people praying at the altars. "I go with you. God will be
against the aggressor." Such was the Czar's proclamation on reaching his
head-quarters.

Europe was no more deceived than Russia and France herself; in spite of
Napoleon's precautions, nobody was ignorant as to the real aggressor. The
emperor remained at St. Cloud till 9th May, 1812, waiting till an act of
the Czar's should give him the liberty of his movements. Before leaving
France, and as a last indication of his pacific intentions, he despatched
Narbonne to Wilna, with instructions to propose to the Czar an interview
and armed negotiation, on the Niemen. "My aide-de-camp, Count Narbonne,
who is the bearer of this letter to your Majesty, has at the same time
important communications for Count Romanzoff," wrote Napoleon on the 25th
April; "they will prove to your Majesty my desire to avoid war, and my
constancy to the sentiments of Tilsit and Erfurt. In any case your Majesty
will allow me to assure you, that if fate renders this war inevitable
between us, it will make no change in the sentiments with which your
Majesty has inspired me, and which are safe from all vicissitude or
alteration."

It was at Dresden, whither he had gone on leaving France, that Napoleon
received the refusal to negotiate, brought by Narbonne from the Czar.
England had replied by a similar refusal to the pacific manifesto which
the emperor, as usual, had addressed to her before recommencing new
hostilities in Europe. The orders for the positions of the troops were
already given. Davout was to concentrate between Marienwerder, Marienburg,
and Elbing; the Prussians had been appointed to the advance-guard, and
still remained on their right, advancing to the banks of the Niemen.
Marshal Oudinot occupied the suburbs of Dantzig, forming Davout's right;
while Ney's body, at Thorn, supported his left. Prince Eugene, with the
Bavarians, advanced to Plock, on the Vistula; the Poles, Saxons, and
Westphalians were united at Warsaw, under the orders of King Jerome; and
the guard, who held Posen, were commanded by Mortier and Lefebvre. General
St. Cyr was appointed to lead the Bavarians in the field, and General
Regnier was responsible for the Saxons. The Austrians were to invade
Volhynia. Already wherever the troops passed there was raised a chorus of
complaints from the pillaged and ill-treated populations, and from the
King of Prussia, who had seen Spandau and Pillau occupied by the French
troops, on pretext of depositing the war-material there. King Frederick
William had set out for Dresden, to present his claims personally to the
conqueror.

In the sight of the crowned crowd which at Dresden thronged around
Napoleon, there was something at once brilliant and sad. Amongst the
sovereigns who claimed the honor of presenting their homages, there were
very few who did not cherish against him some secret grievance or bitter
rancor. All dreaded some new misfortunes, and were endeavoring to charm
them away by servile flatteries. The Empress Marie Louise accompanied her
husband, showing her delight and want of tact in displaying her splendor
so near her native country, before the eyes of her father and mother-in-
law, who had just met her in Dresden. All purely military display had been
forbidden at the magnificent court around Napoleon. Murat and King Jerome
themselves had been ordered to their head-quarters, yet the couriers
followed each other night and day, frequently disturbing the brilliant
_fetes_ by the fear of the first cannon-shot ready to go off. At Paris,
Prince Kourakin, discontented and uneasy, had asked for his passports,
thus anticipating the official rupture. At St. Petersburg, Lauriston
received the order to join the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, and again lay
before him the proposals of peace. It was necessary to let the grass grow
--to let the sun dry the roads--to give Napoleon's emissaries the
opportunity of acting on the minds of the Poles, and stirring up amongst
them a national movement in favor of France, a mission to which Abbe
Pradt, afterwards Bishop of Malines, had been appointed. Talleyrand, of
whom the emperor at first thought, did not then enjoy his good graces.
"Set out, my lord," said Napoleon to the bishop, "set out at once; spare
no expense; rouse their enthusiasm; set Poland a-going without embroiling
me with Austria, and you will have well understood and fulfilled your
mission." The prelate's vanity was fired, surrounded as he was by the
apparatus of his new grandeur. He set out to stir up Poland in the name of
France!

The work was more difficult then than it had been in 1807, when Napoleon
had personally remarked the distrust of the great lords and the apathetic
indifference of the peasantry. The formation of the grand-duchy of Warsaw
did not please the Poles, who had already seen their hopes vanish. They
were poor, and a large number of their best soldiers were serving under
Napoleon. The continental blockade had ruined the trade of the Jews, who
had always been numerous and influential in Poland. The Abbe Pradt had to
use his efforts in the midst of an excited people, who wished for the
future something different from promises. His mission was to produce but
trifling results, because the penetration of the Poles guessed Napoleon's
thoughts, and his resolution to wage no decisive battle in their favor. He
set no great value on the political spirit of the race, their patriotic
passions meeting with scarcely any response in him. He wished to drag the
living force of Poland in his train, in order to support him in his
struggle; but it was in vain that he gave to the new aggression which he
was about to attempt the name of a second Polish war--the public voice was
no more deceived than history. The campaign of Russia was about to begin.

On leaving Dresden, Napoleon at last urged forward the advance of his
armies. In spite of the precautions he had taken, the transports moved
slowly and with difficulty, the staff officers dragging after them much
useless baggage, and on reaching Thorn he ordered some important
reductions. When pushing on towards Marienburg and Dantzig he was attended
by Davout and Murat. Cold in his manner to Davout, who was perpetually
quarrelling with Marshal Berthier, he was uncivil to Murat, who was tired
and ill. "Are you not satisfied with being king?" he asked, dryly. "I
scarcely am king, sire," retorted Murat. "I did not make you kings, you
and your brothers, to reign as you liked, but as I liked," returned the
emperor; "to follow my policy, and remain French on foreign thrones."
Napoleon had given orders for the last supply of provisions for the
strongholds, and completed the organization of inland navigation by
streams and rivers. On the 17th June he arrived at Intersburg, having
resolved to cross the Niemen at Kowno, in order to direct his march upon
the Dwina and Dnieper by the road leading to Moscow, passing first by
Wilna, the capital of Lithuania. It was, in fact, upon those two rivers,
the real frontiers of the Russian empire, that the Emperor Alexander had
concentrated his forces. The army of the Dwina was commanded by General
Barclay de Tolly; the army of the Dnieper marched under the orders of
Prince Bagration. The emperor went straight towards the enemy, hoping to
open the campaign by one of those brilliant strokes by which he had been
accustomed to terrify Europe. He reckoned upon passing the Niemen on the
22nd or 23rd, and on the 16th wrote from Koenigsberg, authorizing
Lauriston to ask his passports. The despatch was dated the 12th, from
Thorn, the ambassador having been told of the artifice. Napoleon soon
learned that Lauriston had not been allowed to leave Wilna. It mattered
little now; having reached the banks of the Niemen, his proclamation was
everywhere read to the troops:--