Josephus by Norman Bentwich

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When he arrived in Jerusalem, in the year 65 C.E., he found his country
seething with rebellion. The crisis soon came to a head. Gessius Florus,
who owed his governorship, as Josephus owed the success of his errand,
to the favor of the "God-fearing" Poppaea, roused the people to fury by
his pillage of the Temple, and the moderates could no longer hold the
masses in check. The Zealots seized the fortress of Antonia, which
overlooked the Temple, and, having become masters of the city, murdered
the high priest Ananias. Eleazar, whom Josephus, perhaps confusedly,
describes as his son, an intense nationalist among the priests, became
the leader in counsel, and sealed the rebellion by persuading the people
to discontinue the daily sacrifice offered in the name of the Roman
Emperor.

At the same time the extermination of the Jews in the Hellenistic
cities, Caesarea, Scythopolis, and Damascus, by the infuriated Syrians,
who organized a kind of Palestinian Vespers, convinced the people that
they were engaged in a war to the death. The Herodian party, as the
royal house and its supporters were called, endeavored to preserve
peace, by dwelling on the overpowering might of Rome and the inevitable
end of the insurrection, but in vain. In fear the priests withdrew to
their duties in the Temple, and did not venture out till the Zealots
were for a time dislodged. The Roman legate of Syria, Cestius Gallus,
after the defeat of the Romanizing party by the Zealots, himself marched
on Jerusalem in the autumn of 68 C.E. with two legions. But he failed
ignominiously to quell the revolt. The Roman garrison in the city was
put to the sword, and the legate, while beating a hasty retreat, was
routed in the defiles of Beth-Horon, where two centuries before the
Syrian hosts had been decimated by Judas the Maccabee. The two legions
were cut to pieces. The fierce valor of the untrained national levies
had broken the serried cohorts of the Roman veterans, and in the
unexpectedness of this deliverance the party of rebellion for a time was
triumphant among all sections of the Jewish people.

Even those who had been the most determined Romanizers, such as the
high-priestly circle, were induced, either by a belief in the chances of
success or from a desire to protect themselves by a seeming adherence to
the national cause, to throw in their lot with the war party. It might
have been better for their people, had they, like Agrippa, joined the
Romans. Half-hearted at best in their support of the struggle, yet by
their wealth and position able at first to obtain a commanding part in
the conduct of the war, they used it to temporize with the foe and to
dull the edge of the popular feeling. Josephus unfortunately does not
enlighten us as to the inner movements in Judea at this crisis. He
merely relates that the Sanhedrin became a council of war, and Palestine
was divided into seven military districts, over most of which commanders
of the Herodian faction were placed. Joseph the son of Gorion and
Ananias the high priest, both members of the moderate party, were chosen
as governors of Jerusalem, with a particular charge to repair the walls,
and the Zealot leader Eleazar the son of Simon was passed over.

Josephus himself, though he possessed no military experience, and had
apparently taken no part in the opening campaign, was made governor of
Lower and Upper Galilee, the most important military post of all; for
Galilee was the bulwark of Judea, and if the Romans could be
successfully resisted there, the rebellion might hope for victory. It
lay in a strategic position between the Roman outposts, Ptolemais (the
modern Acre) on the coast and Agrippa's kingdom in the east. It was a
country made for defense, a country of rugged mountains and natural
fastnesses, and inhabited by a hardy and warlike population, which, for
half a century, had been in constant insurrection. Thence had come the
founders of the Zealots and the still more violent band of the Sicarii,
and each town in the region had its popular leader. Josephus was
expected to hold it with its own resources, for little help could be
spared from the center of Palestine. Guerrilla fighting was the natural
resource of an insurgent people, which had to win its freedom against
well-trained and veteran armies. It had been the method of Judas
Maccabaeus against Antiochus amid the hills of Judea. Josephus, however,
made no attempt to practise it, and showed no vestige of appreciation of
the needs of the case.

It is difficult to gather the reason of his appointment, unless it be
that in his writings he deliberately kept back from the Romans the more
enthusiastic part he had played at the outset of the struggle. So far as
his own account goes, neither devotion to the national cause, nor
experience, nor prestige, nor power of leadership, nor knowledge of the
country recommended him. His distinguished birth and his friendship for
Rome were hardly sufficient qualifications for the post. The influence
of his friend, the ex-high priest Joshua ben Gamala, may have prevailed,
and one is fain to surmise that those who sent him, as well as he
himself, were anxious to pretend resistance to Rome, but really to work
for resistance to the rebellion.

At all events, at the end of the autumn of 67, Josephus repaired to his
command, taking with him two priests, Joazar and Judas, as
representatives of the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem. In the record which he
gives of his exploits in the _Wars_, he says that his first care was to
gain the good-will of the people, drill his troops, and prepare the
country to meet the threatened invasion. In the _Life_, which he wrote
some twenty years later, when he had perforce to cultivate a more
complete servility of mind, and was anxious to convince the Romans that
he was a double-dealing traitor to his country, he represents that he
set himself from the beginning to betray the province. The record of his
actions points to the conclusion that he fell between the stools of
covert treachery and half-hearted loyalty, that he was neither as
villainous in design nor as heroic in action as he makes himself out to
be. He made some show of preparation at the beginning, but from the
moment the Roman army arrived under Vespasian, and he realized that Rome
was in earnest, he abandoned all hope of success, and set himself to
make his own position secure with the conqueror.

The chief cities of Galilee were Sepphoris, situated on the lower spurs
of the hills near the plain of Esdraelon, which divides the country from
Samaria and Judea; Tiberias, a city founded by Herod Antipas on the
western borders of the Lake of Gennesareth, and Tarichea, also an
Herodian foundation, situate probably at the southeast corner of the
lake. All these Josephus fortified; and he strengthened with walls other
smaller towns and natural fortresses, such as Jotapata, Salamis, and
Gamala.[1] He says also that he appointed a Sanhedrin of seventy members
for the province, and in each town established a court of seven judges,
as though he were come to exercise a civil government. He did, however,
get together an army of more than a hundred thousand young men, and
armed them with the old weapons which he had collected. Though he
despaired of their standing up against the Romans, he ordered them in
the Roman style, appointing a large number of subordinate officers and
teaching them the use of signals and a few elementary military
movements. His army ultimately consisted of 60,000 footmen, 4,500
mercenaries, in whom he put greatest trust, and 600 picked men as his
body-guard. He had little cavalry, but as Galilee was a country of
hills, this deficiency need not have proved fatal, had he been a
strategist or even a loyalist. During the eight months' respite that he
enjoyed before the appearance of the Roman army, he spent most of his
time in civil feud, and succeeded in dividing the population into two
hostile parties. He boasts that, though he took up his command at an age
when, if a man has happily escaped sin, he can scarcely guard himself
against slander, he was perfectly honest, and refrained from stealing
and peculation[2]; but he is at pains to prove that he threw every
obstacle in the way of the patriotic party, and did all that an open
enemy of the Jews could have done to undermine the defense of the
province.

[Footnote 1: B.J. II. xx. 6. His account of his actions in Galilee is,
however, from beginning to end, open to question; and the contemporary
account of Justus has unfortunately disappeared entirely. It is likely
that his rival's narrative would have shown him in a better light than
his own.]

[Footnote 2: Vita, 15.]

Before his arrival in the north, the leader of the national party was
John the son of Levi, a man of Gischala, which was one of the mountain
fastnesses in Northern Galilee, now known as Jish, near the town of
Safed.[1] Josephus heaps every variety of violent abuse upon him in
order, no doubt, to please his patrons. When he introduces him on the
scene, he describes him as "a very knavish and cunning rogue, outdoing
all other rogues, and without his fellow for wicked practices. He was a
ready liar, and yet very sharp in gaining credit for his fictions. He
thought it a point of virtue to deceive, and would delude even those
nearest to him. He had an aptitude for thieving," and so forth. Whenever
the historian mentions the name of his rival, he rattles his box of
abusive epithets until the reader is wearied by the image of the monster
conjured up before him. But, unfortunately for his credit, Josephus also
records John's deeds, and these reveal him as one who, if at times cruel
and intriguing, yet lived and died for his country, while his enemy was
thinking of saving himself.

[Footnote 1: The Hebrew name of the fortress was [Hebrew: Nosh Halav],
meaning "clot of cream"; the place was so called because of the
fertility of the soil on which it stands.]

It is not surprising then that John, having eyes only for the defense of
the land, was not blind to the double-dealing of the priestly governor,
who had been sent by the Romanizing party to organize resistance. The
first event that brought about a collision between them was the
suspicious conduct of Josephus in the matter of some spoil seized from
the steward of King Agrippa and brought to Tarichea. Agrippa had
entirely turned his back on the national rising, and was the faithful
ally of the Romans. He was therefore an open enemy, and Tiberias, which
had been under his dominion, had revolted from him. Josephus upbraided
the captors for the violence they had offered to the king, and declared
his intention to return the spoil to the owner. A little later he
prevented John from destroying the corn in the province stored by the
Romans for themselves. The people were naturally indignant at this
conduct, and led by John and another Zealot, Jesus the son of Sapphias,
the governor of Tiberias, and by Justus of the same city, who was
afterwards to be a rival historian, they rose against Josephus. With
stratagems worthy of a better cause he evaded this onslaught.

More briefly in the _Wars_, and in the _Life_ at wearisome length,
Josephus tells a tale of intrigue and counter-intrigue, mutual attempts
at assassination, wiles and stratagems to undermine the power of each
other, which took place between him and John. The city of Tarichea was
his stronghold, Tiberias the hot-bed of the movement against him. The
part he professes to have played is so extraordinary in its meanness
that we are fain to believe that it is largely fiction, composed to show
that he was only driven in the end by danger of his life to fight
against the sacred power of Rome. However that may be, John reported his
doings to the Sanhedrin at Jerusalem, and that body, which was now, it
seems, in the control of the Pharisees and Zealots, sent a deputation to
recall him. Simon, the celebrated head of the Sanhedrin and leader of
the national party, had pressed for the dismissal of Josephus.[1]
Ananias, the ex-high priest and Sadducee, had at first been his
champion, but he had been overborne. The deputation consisted of two
Pharisees, Jonathan and Ananias, and two priests, Joazar and Simon.
Warned by his friends in Jerusalem of their coming, Josephus had all the
passes watched, seized the embassy, and recaptured the four cities that
had revolted from him: Sepphoris, Gamala, Gischala, and Tiberias.
According to the account in the _Wars_, the cities revolted again, and
were recaptured by similar stratagems; and when the disturbances in
Galilee were quieted in this way, the people, ceasing to prosecute their
civil dissensions, betook themselves to make preparations for the war
against the Romans. The invasion had begun in earnest, and Josephus,
fortified, as he said, by a dream, which told him not to be afraid,
because he was to fight with the Romans, and would live happily
thereafter, decided for the time not to abandon his post.

[Footnote 1: It is notable that this is the only reference in the work
of Josephus to the great Rabbi; the name of his successor in the
headship of the Sanhedrin, Johanan ben Zakkai, does not occur even
once.]

Josephus had displayed his administrative talents in these eight months
of peaceful government by losing all that had been gained in the four
months of the successful rebellion at Jerusalem. He now had an
opportunity of displaying his military abilities. In the spring of 67
C.E., Flavius Vespasian, the veteran commander of the legions in Germany
and Britain, who, on the defeat of Cestius Gallus, had been chosen by
Nero to conduct the Jewish campaign, brought his army of four legions
from Antioch to Ptolemais. He was met there by King Agrippa, who brought
a large force of auxiliaries, and by a deputation of citizens from
Sepphoris, the chief city of Galilee, who tendered their submission and
invited him to send a garrison. Josephus, though he knew of the city's
Romanizing leanings, had negligently or deliberately failed to occupy
it, so that the place was lost without a blow. He made a feeble effort
to recapture it, for appearance sake it would seem, and then, though he
had an unlimited choice of favorable positions, and the Roman forces
were not very large at the time, he abandoned the attempt of meeting the
enemy in the field. Titus arrived from Alexandria, with two more
legions, the fifth and the tenth, and then the Roman army, numbering
with auxiliaries 60,000 men, set out from Ptolemais, and proceeded to
occupy Galilee.

The Jewish forces were encamped on the hills above Sepphoris. Josephus
describes the wonderful array and order of the Roman army on the march.
The sight seems to have led a large part of his army to run away. He
himself, when he saw that he had not an army sufficient to engage the
enemy, despaired of the success of the war, and determined to place
himself as far as he could out of danger. In this inspiring mood he
abandoned the rest of the country, sent a dispatch to Jerusalem
demanding help, and threw himself into the fortress of Jotapata,
situated on the crest of a mountain in Northern Galilee, which he chose
as the most fit for his security. Vespasian, hearing of this step, and,
as Josephus modestly suggests, "supposing that, could he only get
Josephus into his power, he would have conquered all Judea," straightway
laid siege to the town (Iyar 16). For forty-two days the place was
besieged, and during that period every resource that heroic resistance
could suggest, according to the narrative of its commandant, was
exhausted. The height of the wall was raised to meet the Roman
embankments, provisions were brought in by soldiers disguised in
sheep-skins, the Roman works were destroyed by fire, boiling oil was
poured on the assailants, and finally the city was not stormed till the
garrison was worn out with famine and fatigue. But, as has been pointed
out, the details recorded are "the commonplaces of poliorcetics," and
may have been borrowed by Josephus from some military text-book and
neatly applied. Jotapata fell on the first day of Tammuz, and whatever
the heroism of his army, the general did not shine in the last days of
his command or in the manner of his surrender. Suspected by his men and
threatened by them with death, he was unable to give himself up openly.
He took refuge with some of his comrades in a deep pit, where they were
discovered by an old woman, who informed the Romans. Vespasian, who, we
are again told, believed that, if he captured Josephus, the greater part
of the war would be over, sent one Nicanor, well known to the Jewish
commandant, to take him. Josephus, professing prophetical powers,
offered to surrender, and quieted his conscience by a secret prayer to
God, which is a sad compound of cant and cowardice:

"Since it pleaseth Thee, who hast created the Jewish nation, now to
bring them low, and since their good fortune is gone over to the Romans,
and since Thou hast chosen my soul to foretell what is to come to pass
hereafter, I willingly surrender, and am content to live. I solemnly
protest that I do not go over to the Romans as a deserter, but as Thy
minister."

It may be that Josephus really believed he had prophetic powers, and
thought he was imitating the great prophets of Israel and Judah who had
proclaimed the uselessness of resistance to Assyria and Babylon. But
they, while denouncing the wickedness of the people, had shared their
lot with them. And Josephus, who weakly sought a refuge for himself
after defeat, resembles rather the prophets whom Jeremiah denounced:
"They speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the
Lord. They say still unto them that despise me, The Lord hath said, Ye
shall have peace; and they say unto everyone that walketh after the
imagination of his own heart, No evil shall come upon you."[1] His
comrades however prevented him from giving himself up, and called on him
to play a braver part and die with them, each by his own hand. He put
them off by talking philosophically, as he has it, about the sin of
suicide, a euphemism for a collection of commonplaces on the duty of
preserving their lives. But when this enraged them, he bethought him of
another device, and proposed that they should cast lots to kill each
other. They assented, and by Divine Providence he was left to the last
with one other, whom he persuaded to break his oath and live
likewise.[2] Having thus escaped, he was led by Nicanor to Vespasian,
the whole Roman army gathering around to gaze on the hero. Continuing
his prophetical function, when he found that he was like to be sent to
Nero, he announced to Vespasian, "Thou art Caesar and Emperor, thou, and
this thy son.... thou art not only lord over me, but over the land and
the sea and all mankind." The Roman general was incredulous, till,
hearing that his prisoner had foretold the length of the siege of
Jotapata--a prophecy which, of course, he had the ability to fulfil--and
further, on the report of the death of Nero, having conceived the
possibility of becoming Emperor, he had regard to the Jewish prophet,
and, without setting him at liberty, bestowed favors on him, and made
him easy about his future. Such was the end of the military career of
Josephus.

[Footnote 1: Jer. 23: 16-17.]

[Footnote 2: A charitable explanation of this self-debasing account of
Josephus is that he was driven to invent some story to extenuate his
resistance to the Romans, and had to blacken his reputation as a patriot
to save his skin. The fact that he was kept prisoner some time by
Vespasian suggests that he was not so big a traitor as he pretends.]

The Talmud relates that Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai, the head of the
Pharisees, was carried in a coffin outside the walls of Jerusalem by his
disciples, and was brought to the Roman camp, where he hailed Vespasian
as Emperor and Caesar, and thereby gained his favor. If not apocryphal,
the event must have happened in 69 C.E., when the Roman commander was
generally expected to aim at the Imperial throne, then the object of
strife between rival commanders. The rabbi belonged to the peace party,
and from the beginning had opposed the war. And though his action was
disapproved by the later generations, it was justified by his subsequent
conduct; for it was he who, by founding the famous college at Jabneh,
kept alive the Jewish spirit after the fall of the nation. For him
surrender was a valid means to the preservation of the nation. The
action of Josephus hardly bears the same justification. His desire for
self-preservation was natural enough, but his manner of effecting it was
not honorable. He was a general who, having taken a lead in the struggle
for independence, had seen all his men fall, and had at the end invited
the last of his comrades to kill each other, and he saved his life by
sacrificing his honor. His mind was from the beginning of the struggle
subjugated to Rome, but unhappily he accepted the most responsible post
in the national defense and betrayed it. His address to Vespasian was
mere flattery, designed to impose on a superstitious man's credulity;
for the ear of Vespasian, says Merivale, "was always open to pretenders
to supernatural knowledge." Lastly Josephus used his safety, not for the
purpose of preserving the Jewish heritage, but for personal ends. He
became a flunkey of the Flavian house, and straightway started on the
transformation from a Jewish priest and soldier into a Roman courtier
and literary hireling. Hard circumstances compelled him to choose
between a noble and an ignoble part, between heroic action and weak
submission. He was a mediocre man, and chose the way that was not heroic
and glorious. Posterity gained something by his choice; his own
reputation was fatally marred by it.

III

THE LIFE OF JOSEPHUS FROM THE TIME OF HIS SURRENDER

Josephus was little more than thirty years old at the time of his
surrender. At an age when men usually begin to realize their ambition
and ideal, his whole life's course was changed: he had to abandon all
his old associations, and accommodate himself to a different and indeed
a hostile society. Henceforth he was a liege of the Roman conqueror, and
had to submit to be Romanized not only in name but in spirit. His
condition was indeed a thinly-disguised servitude. The Romans were an
imperious as well as an Imperial people, and though in some
circumstances they were ready to spare the lives of those who yielded,
they required of them a surrender of opinion and an abasement of soul.
For the rest of his years, which comprehended the whole of his literary
activity, Josephus was not therefore a free man. He acted, spoke, and
wrote to order, compelled, whenever called upon, to do the will of his
masters. His legal condition was first that of a _libertus_ (a freedman)
of Vespasian, and as such he owed by law certain definite obligations to
his patron's family. But the moral subservience of the favored prisoner
of a subjugated people must have been a far profounder thing than the
legal obligation arising from his status; and this enforced moral and
mental subservience is a cardinal point to be remembered in forming a
judgment upon Josephus. His expressed opinions are often not the
revelation of his own mind, but the galling tribute which he was
compelled to pay for his life. And apart from the involuntary and
undeliberate adoption of Roman standards, which, living isolated from
Jewish life in Rome, he could not escape, he had in writing, and no
doubt in conversation, deliberately and consciously to assume the
deepest-seated of the Roman prejudices towards his own people. Liberty
has been defined as the power of a man to call his soul his own. And in
that sense Josephus emphatically did not possess liberty. We must be on
our guard, therefore, against regarding him as an independent historian,
much less as writing from an independent Jewish point of view. From the
time of his surrender till his death he lived and wrote as the client of
the Flavian house, and all his works had to pass the Imperial
censorship.

His domestic life is characteristic of his subservience. At the bidding
of Vespasian, when in the Roman camp at Caesarea, he divorced his first
wife, who was locked up in Jerusalem during the siege. Though by Jewish
law it was forbidden to a priest to marry a captive woman, he took as
his second wife a Jewess that had been brought into the Roman camp.
Having no children by her, he divorced her after a year, and married
again at Alexandria. By his third wife he had three sons, but with a
Roman's carelessness of the marriage bond he divorced her late in life,
and married finally a noble Jewess of Crete, by whom he had two more
sons, Justus and Simon Agrippa. His last two wives, be it noted, came
from Hellenistic-Jewish communities, and were doubtless able to assist
him in acquiring Greek.

The public as well as the domestic life of Josephus was controlled by
the Roman commander. Till the end of the Jewish struggle it followed the
progress of the Roman arms. He continued to play an active part in the
war, not, however, as a leader of the Jews, but as the adviser of their
enemies. He was attached to the staff of Titus, and after witnessing the
fall of the two fortresses of Galilee, Gamala and Gischala, which held
out bravely under John after the capture of Jotapata, he accompanied the
Roman at the end of the year 68 to Alexandria. There he spent a year,
till a change of fortune came to him.

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