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The Master Detective by Percy James Brebner

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THE MASTER DETECTIVE

_Being Some Further Investigations of Christopher Quarles_



BY PERCY JAMES BREBNER

AUTHOR OF "CHRISTOPHER QUARLES."

1916




CONTENTS


CHAPTER

I. THE STRANGE CASE OF SIR GRENVILLE RUSHOLM
II. THE KIDNAPING OF EVA WILKINSON
III. THE DELVERTON AFFAIR
IV. THE MYSTERIOUS HOUSE IN MANLEIGH ROAD
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF BROTHER PYTHAGORAS
VI. THE TRAGEDY IN DUKE'S MANSIONS
VII. THE STOLEN AEROPLANE MODEL
VIII. THE AFFAIR OF THE CONTESSA'S PEARLS
IX. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MADAME VATROTSKI
X. THE MYSTERY OF THE MAN AT WARBURTON'S
XI. THE STRANGE CASE OF DANIEL HARDIMAN
XII. THE CRIME IN THE YELLOW TAXI
XIII. THE AFFAIR OF THE JEWELED CHALICE
XIV. THE ADVENTURE OF THE FORTY-TON YAWL
XV. THE SOLUTION OF THE GRANGE PARK MYSTERY




THE MASTER DETECTIVE




CHAPTER I

THE STRANGE CASE OF SIR GRENVILLE RUSHOLM


Sir Grenville Rusholm, Baronet, was dead. The blinds were down at the
Lodge, Queen's Square. For the last few days lengthy obituary notices had
appeared in all the papers, innumerable wreaths and crosses had arrived
at the house, and letters of sympathy and condolence had poured in upon
Lady Rusholm. The dead man had filled a considerable space in the social
world, although politically he had counted for little. Politics were not
his metier, he had said. He had consistently refused to stand for
parliament, his wealth had supported neither party, and perhaps his
social success was due more to his wife's charm than to his own
importance.

To-day the funeral was to take place. By his own desire his body was not
being taken to Moorlands, the family seat in Gloucestershire, but was to
be buried at Woking. The family chapel did not appeal to him. Indeed, he
had never spent much of his time at Moorlands, preferring his yacht or
the Continent when he was not at Queen's Square.

Last night the coffin had been brought downstairs and placed in the large
drawing-room, the scene of many a brilliant function, although by day it
was a somewhat dreary apartment. The presence of the coffin there added
to the depression, and the scent of the flowers was almost overpowering.

Many of the mourners were going direct to Woking, but there was a large
number of guests at the house who were received by the young baronet.
Naturally, Sir Arthur was of a sunny disposition, and his personality and
expectations had made him a favorite in society since he had left
Cambridge a year ago. To-day his face was more than grave. It was drawn
as if he were in physical pain, and it was evident how keenly he felt his
father's death. Lady Rusholm did not appear until the undertakers entered
the house. She came down the wide stairs, a pathetic figure in her deep
mourning, heavier than present-day fashion has made customary. She spoke
to no one, but went straight to the drawing-room and, standing just
inside the doorway, watched the men whose business is with death, as if
she feared some indignity might be offered to her dear one. In a few
moments her husband must pass out of that room for ever, and it was
hardly wonderful if she visualized for an instant the many occasions on
which he had been a central figure there.

The bearers stooped to lift the coffin from the trestles on to their
shoulders, then they straightened themselves under their burden, but they
did not move, at least only to start slightly, while their faces changed
from gravity to horror. Lady Rusholm uttered a short cry, and there was
consternation in the faces of the guests in the hall. There could be no
mistake; the sound, though dull and muffled, was too loud for that. It
was a knock from inside the coffin.

The man in charge whispered to the bearers. No, none of them had
inadvertently caused the sound. The coffin was replaced on the trestles,
and for a moment there was silence. No one moved; every one was waiting
for that knock again. It did not come.

The chief man stood looking at the coffin, then at the carpet, and, after
some hesitation, he crossed the room to Sir Arthur, who stood in the
doorway beside his mother.

"Was--was anything put into the coffin?" he whispered. "Something which
Sir Grenville wished buried with him, something which may have slipped?"

"No."

"I think--I think the coffin should be opened," whispered Dr. Coles, the
family physician.

"But he is dead! You know he is dead, doctor!"

"A trance--sometimes a mistake may happen, Sir Arthur. It was a distinct
knock. The coffin should certainly be opened."

"And quickly--quickly!"

It was Lady Rusholm who spoke, in a strained and unnatural voice.

Sir Arthur tried to persuade his mother to leave the room while this
was done, but she would not go. With a great effort she calmed herself
and remained with her son, the doctor, and two or three guests while
the coffin was unscrewed. The lid was lifted off, and for a moment no
one spoke.

"Empty!" the doctor cried.

As he spoke Lady Rusholm swayed backwards, and would have fallen had not
her son caught her.

There were two masses of lead in the coffin. There was no body.

Sir Arthur Rusholm immediately communicated with Scotland Yard, and the
utter confusion which followed this gruesome discovery had only partially
subsided when I, Murray Wigan, entered the house to enquire into a
mystery which was certainly amongst the most remarkable I have ever had
to investigate.

Some of those invited to the funeral had left the house before I
arrived, but the more personal friends were still there, and the story
as I have set it down was corroborated by different people with a wealth
of detail which seemed to leave nothing unsaid. Besides interviewing Sir
Arthur and the doctor, I saw Lady Rusholm for a few moments. She was
exceedingly agitated, as was natural, and I only asked her one or two
questions of a quite unimportant nature, but I was glad to see her. I
like to get into personal touch with the various people connected with
my cases as soon as possible.

I was in the house two hours or more, questioning servants, examining
doors and windows, and, to be candid, my investigations told me little.
When I left Queen's Square I knew I had a complex affair to deal with,
and it was natural my thoughts should fly to the one man who might help
me. If I could only interest Christopher Quarles in the case!

I remember speaking casually of a well-known person once and being met
with the question: Who is he? It may be that some of you have never heard
of Christopher Quarles, professor of philosophy, and one of the most
astute crime investigators of this or any other time. It has been my
privilege to chronicle some of our adventures together, and his help has
been of infinite benefit to me. Without it, not only should I have failed
to elucidate some of those mysteries the solving of which have made me a
power in the detective force, but I should never have seen his
granddaughter, Zena, who is shortly to become my wife.

For some months past the professor had given me no assistance at all.
He would not be interested in my cases, and would not enter the empty
room in his house in Chelsea where we had had so many discussions. It
was a fad of his that he could think more clearly in this room, which
had only three chairs and an old writing table in it, yet perhaps I
ought not to call it a fad, remembering the results of some of our
consultations there.

Months ago we had investigated a curious case in which jewels had been
concealed in a wooden leg. The solution had brought us a considerable
reward, and upon receiving the money Quarles had declared he would
investigate no more crimes. He had kept his word, had locked up the empty
room, and although I think I had sorely tempted him to break his vow on
more than one occasion, I had never quite succeeded.

As I got into a taxi I considered how very seldom it is that the ruling
passion ever dies. The Queen's Square mystery ought to shake Quarles's
resolution if anything could.

Zena was out when I got to Chelsea, but the professor seemed pleased
to see me.

"Are you out of work, Wigan?" he asked, looking at the clock.

I did not want him to think I had come with any deliberate intention, so
I answered casually:

"No. As a fact I am rather busy. I came out to Chelsea to think. Chelsea
air is rather good for thinking, you know."

"It used to be," he answered. "I'm glad I have given up criminal
hunting, Wigan."

"I still find excitement in it," I answered carelessly, "and really I
think criminals have grown cleverer since your time."

He looked at me sharply. I thought the remark would pique his curiosity.

"That means you have had some failures lately."

"On the contrary, I have been remarkably successful."

"Glad to hear it," he returned. "What makes you say criminals are more
clever then?"

"The Queen's Square Mystery."

"I don't read the papers as carefully as I did," he remarked.

"It only happened this morning," I answered. "I daresay you noticed that
Sir Grenville Rusholm died the other day. Some one has stolen his body,
that is all."

"Stolen his--"

"Yes, it is rather a curious case, but we won't talk about it. I know
that sort of thing doesn't interest you now."

I talked of other things--anything and everything--but I noted that he
was restless and uninterested.

"What did Sir Grenville die of?" he asked suddenly.

"A sudden and most unexpected collapse after influenza."

"And the body has been stolen?"

"Yes."

"I should like to hear about it, Wigan."

I hesitated until he began to get angry, and then I told him the story as
I have told it here. I had just finished when Zena came in.

"You, Murray! What has brought you here at this hour of the day?" she
asked in astonishment.

"Two pieces of lead," murmured Quarles.

"A case! Have you got interested in a case, dear? I am glad. What is the
mystery, Murray?"

"Where is the key of my room, Zena?" Quarles asked.

She took it from the drawer in a cabinet.

"I am not going to begin again," said the professor, "but this--this
is an exception. Come with us, Zena. Come and ask some of your absurd
questions. I wonder whether my brain is atrophied. There are cleverer
criminals than there used to be in my time, are there, Wigan? We
shall see."

He led the way to the empty room at the back of the house, muttering to
himself the while, and Zena and I smiled at each other behind his back as
we followed him. He was like an old dog on the trail again, and I did not
believe for a moment this case would be an exception.

"Tell the story, Wigan," he said when we were seated. "All the details,
mind, great and small."

So I went through the facts again.

"I made a careful study of the house and garden," I went on. "The Lodge
is a corner house, the garden is small, and a garage with an opening into
the other road--Connaught Road--has been built there. A 'Napier' car was
in the garage."

"Did you see the chauffeur?" asked Quarles.

"Yes. The car had not been used for a week. I could find no trace of an
entry having been made from the garden, but the latch of one of the
French windows of the drawing-room was unfastened. When I saw it this
window could be pushed open from outside. No one seems to have undone it
that morning, so the fact is significant."

Quarles nodded.

"Besides the servants only five people slept in the house that
night--Lady Rusholm, her son, two elderly ladies--cousins of Sir
Grenville's who had come from Yorkshire for the funeral--and a Mr.
Thompson, a friend of the family who was staying in the house when Sir
Grenville died."

"Who closed the windows after the body was taken to the drawing-room?"
asked Quarles.

"One of the undertaker's men."

"Is he positive he fastened them?"

"He is, but under the circumstances he is not anxious to swear to it."

"And the door of the room, had that been kept locked?"

"Yes. The key was in Sir Arthur's possession."

"Who first entered the room this morning?"

"Sir Arthur when he took in two or three wreaths which arrived late last
night. The room was just as it had been left on the previous day. The
wreaths and crosses were not disarranged in any way."

"And there were only two pieces of lead in the coffin when it was
opened?" queried Zena.

"A large lump and a small one," I answered.

"Couldn't they have been packed in such a way that they would not
have slipped?"

"Of course they could. No doubt that was the intention, but the work was
badly done because the thieves did it hurriedly," I answered.

"One of your foolish questions, Zena," said Quarles, looking keenly at
her. He always declared that her foolish inquiries put him on the
right road.

"It is a good thing the lead did slip, or the gruesome theft might never
have been discovered," she said.

"Was the coffin a very elaborate one?" Quarles asked, after nodding an
acquiescence to Zena's remark.

"No, quite a plain one."

"Has the drawing-room more than one door?"

"Only one into the hall. There is a small room out of the
drawing-room--a small drawing-room in fact. Lady Rusholm does her
correspondence there. It can only be reached by going through the large
room, and the door between the rooms was locked. Sir Arthur got the key
from his mother and opened the door for me."

"What could any one want with a dead body?" asked Zena.

"If we could answer that question we should be nearing the end of the
affair," said Quarles. "Years ago there were two men--Burke and
Hare--who--"

"Oh, the day of resurrectionists is past," I said.

"Don't be so dogmatic," returned Quarles sharply. "A corpse has been
stolen; can you suggest any use a corpse can be put to if it is not to
serve some anatomical or medical purpose? Remember, Wigan, that mentally
and materially there is always a tendency to move in a circle. What has
been will be again--altered according to environment--but practically the
same. Always start with the assumption that a similar case has happened
before. Our difficulties would be much greater if Solomon had been wrong,
and there were constantly new things under the sun. Undoubtedly there are
some interesting points in this case. Have you arrived at a theory?"

"No, at least only a very vague one. Sir Arthur seems certain that his
father had no enemies, and my theory would require an enemy; some one
who, having failed to injure him in life, had found an opportunity of
wreaking vengeance on the dead clay by preventing the body having
Christian burial."

"That is a very interesting idea, Wigan; go on."

"I daresay you remember that the Rusholm baronetcy caused some excitement
about twenty years ago. The papers have recalled it in connection with
Sir Grenville's death. Sir John Rusholm--the baronet at that time--was a
very old man, and during the two years before his death several relations
died. He had no son living, so the heir was a nephew, the son of a much
younger brother who had gone to Australia and died there. This nephew had
not been heard of for a long time, and as soon as he became the heir, Sir
John advertised for him in the Australian papers. There was no answer,
and the Yorkshire Rusholms, who are poor, expected to inherit. Then at
the very time when Sir John was on his death-bed news came of the nephew.
He had been in India for some years, had proposed there, had married and
had a son. There had been so many lives between him and the title that he
had thought nothing about it until a chance acquaintance had shown him
the advertisement in an old Australian paper. He wrote that he was
starting for England at once, but Sir John was dead when he arrived. That
is how Sir Grenville came into the property."

"Was his claim disputed?" asked Zena.

"Oh, no, there was no question about it. He had family papers which only
the nephew could possibly have, and you may depend the Yorkshire Rusholms
would have found a flaw in the title if they could. Their disappointment
must have been great, and if I could discover that Sir Grenville had an
enemy amongst them--some relation he had refused to help, for instance--I
should want to know all about him."

"Yours is a very interesting idea," said Quarles. "Do you happen to know
who Lady Rusholm was?"

"The daughter of a tea planter in Ceylon. Her social success here has
been very great, as you know."

"A very charming woman I should say," said the professor. "I saw her
once--not many months ago. She was distributing the prizes at a technical
institute in North London. I remember how well she spoke, and what an
exceedingly poor second the chairman was in spite of his being a Member
of Parliament. You have got a constable at The Lodge, I suppose?"

"Two. I have given instructions that no one is to be allowed in the room,
on any pretext whatever."

"Good. You and I will go there to-morrow. I'll be your assistant,
Wigan--say an expert in finger prints. I'll meet you outside The Lodge at
ten o'clock. There are so many clues in this case, the difficulty is to
know which one to follow, I must have a few quiet hours to decide."

I smiled. It was like Quarles to make such a statement, especially after
I had declared that criminals were becoming cleverer. Never were clues
more conspicuous by their absence, I imagine. I was, however, delighted
to have the professor's help. It was like old times.

The next morning I met Quarles in Queen's Square, and his appearance was
proof of his enthusiasm. He posed as rather a feeble, inquisitive old man
who could talk of nothing but finger prints and their significance. Sir
Arthur was evidently not impressed with his ability to solve any mystery.
When we entered the drawing-room he seemed lost in admiration of the
apartment, and did not even glance at the open coffin which stood on the
trestles. He walked to the window, drew aside the blind, and looked into
the garden. Then he looked into the small room.

"No other exit here but the window. An entrance might have been made by
that window."

"The door between the two rooms was locked," said Sir Arthur. "I had to
get the key from my mother when Mr. Wigan wanted to go in. It is my
mother's special room, but she had been so occupied in nursing my father
that she had not used it for more than a week."

Then Quarles looked at the wreaths, wanted to know which ones had been
left near the coffin when the room was locked for the night, and the
wreaths which Sir Arthur pointed out he examined carefully. Then he
pointed to a large cross lying on an armchair.

"Has that one been there all the time?"

Sir Arthur explained that two or three wreaths had come late in the
evening. He had himself brought them into the room on the morning of the
funeral. That cross was one of them.

"Ah, it is a pity you didn't bring them in that night. You might have
surprised the villains at work."

"We were in bed by eleven. Do you imagine they began before that?"

"Possibly," said Quarles, as he turned his attention to the coffin. He
examined the lid with a lens, for the finger marks, he said, which one
might expect to find near the screw holes. Then he studied the sides of
the coffin. The two pieces of lead did not appear to interest him very
much, but he asked me to push the smaller piece from the foot of the
coffin. He examined the lining, felt the padding, tried its thickness
with the point of a penknife, and in doing so he slit the lining.

"Sorry," he said. "My old hands are not as steady as they used to be.
Quite a thick padding, and quite a substantial coffin."

He had brought out some of the padding with his knife, and this left part
of the floor of the coffin near the foot visible. This he tapped with the
handle of his penknife to test its thickness.

"Quite an ordinary coffin--plain but good," he went on, looking at the
brass fittings.

"It was my father's wish that it should be so," said Sir Arthur.

"Strange what a lot of trouble some men take about their funerals,
while others never trouble at all," said the professor, looking round
the room again. "I suppose, Sir Arthur, like the rest of us your father
had enemies."

"Not that I know of."

"An old rival, for instance, in your mother's affections."

"There was nothing of the kind. Mr. Thompson, who is still in the
house--you saw him yesterday, Mr. Wigan--will endorse this. He knew my
mother before her marriage."

"Still, some people must have envied your father. But for him, another
branch of the family would have inherited the estates, I understand. Has
he always been on friendly terms with this branch of the family?"

"Always, and has helped them considerably."

"Experience teaches us that it is often the most difficult thing to
forgive those who do us favors," said Quarles sententiously.

"Do you believe that some one out of wanton cruelty has stolen the body
with no purpose beyond mere revenge?"

"It looks like it, Sir Arthur. The body will probably be discovered
presently. Possibly the thief will furnish you with a clue so that you
may know he or she has taken revenge. I am afraid there is nothing to be
done but to wait. I feel greatly for Lady Rusholm."

"The waiting will be dreadful. I am trying to persuade my mother to go
away at once."

"Why not? You will remain in London, of course. Your father's papers may
throw some light on the mystery."

"I have interviewed lawyers, and I have already gone through some of his
private papers. I do not think any light will come that way. Do you want
to look at anything else in the house?"

"I think not," I said.

"My specialty is finger prints," said Quarles, "nothing else. In this
case my specialty has proved useless." When we left the house Quarles
turned toward Connaught Road.

"Is it your real opinion that the only thing to do is to wait?" I asked.

"Let's go and see if we can find any more finger prints," he chuckled.

The garage was shut. Cut into the big gates was a small door.

"Not a difficult lock," said Quarles. "I may have a key that will fit it.
We must get in somehow."

"There is a door into the garage from the garden. We could have gone
that way."

"And advertised ourselves to the servants. I wanted to avoid that."

He found a key to open the door, and he made no pretense of looking for
finger prints now. He examined the car. It was a big one--open--with a
cape hood--capable of carrying five or six persons besides the driver.
He was interested in the seating accommodation, and the make of the car
generally. There was a window which had a shutter to it high up in the
garage looking into the side road, and a small window at the back
looking into the garden which had no shutter. Quarles got on a stool to
examine the frame of this window, and then inspected the cloths for
cleaning and the towels which were in the garage.

"Come on. The interest of this place is soon exhausted," he said.

In less than a quarter of an hour we were walking along Connaught
Road again.

"By the way, what is Dr. Coles's address?" asked Quarles.

I gave it to him. It was a turning off Connaught Road.

"I shall go and see him, and then I have a call to make elsewhere. Come
to Chelsea to-night, Wigan. Take my word for it, criminals are no
cleverer than they used to be."

When I went to Chelsea that evening I found the professor and Zena
waiting for me in the empty room. He was evidently impatient to talk.

"My brain may possibly require oiling, Wigan, but Zena's questions are
just as absurd as they ever were," he began. "She wanted to know why the
lead had been packed so carelessly, and what use a dead body could be to
any one. No bad points of departure for an inquiry. Now, when the coffin
was opened after the knock had been heard, a little sawdust from the
screw holes fell on the carpet. It was there when we went into the room
this morning. We may reasonably argue that some sawdust must have fallen
when the coffin was opened during the night. But no one seems to have
noticed it."

"It might easily have escaped casual notice even if the thieves neglected
to remove it, which is unlikely," I returned.

"It would not be so easy to remove, for the carpet is a thick one, and
the thieves would be in a hurry, you know. Also there were wreaths about
and I could find no trace of sawdust in them. But further, the screw
holes show a clear, perfect thread which one would hardly expect if the
coffin had been opened and closed again. Small points, but they promote
speculation. Yesterday, before I met you in Queen's Square, I went to see
the undertakers, and the man who was in charge of the arrangements says
emphatically that there was no sign of the coffin having been opened. A
little sawdust was the first thing he looked for."

"Are you trying to prove that the lead was already in the coffin when it
was taken to the drawing-room?" I asked.

"No. I am only trying to show that it is doubtful whether the coffin was
opened in the drawing-room."

"The change could not have been made in the bedroom, or the lead would
have slipped during the journey downstairs," I said.

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Under the Sun: The Letters of Bruce Chatwin

We all want to be happy, we want our children to be happy, and there are countless books advising us how to achieve happiness. But is this really what we should be aiming for?

"A fly bothers me, I kill it: you kill what bothers you. If I had not killed the fly, it would have been out of pure liberalism: I am liberal in order not to be a killer."

Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes

'He was not to be described as a happy person," Diana Trilling wrote in a memoir about her husband, the critic Lionel Trilling. "Indeed, he thought poorly of happiness and of people who claimed to be happy or desired happiness above other gratifications in life . . . seriousness was the desirable condition of man." It is easy to make all sorts of assumptions about why an unhappy person would not value happiness; and indeed why seriousness might be seen as an alternative to happiness; or just to say that it was seriousness that made Trilling happy. One of the ways in which happiness is made to seem like an inclusive ideal – the ways it charms us – is by our asserting that by definition the things that matter most to us must make us happy, that that is how we know they are good. It's as though one word could do the work of the moral imagination.

Or can we just say that if happiness is one's aspiration, then learning about the history of the slave trade, say, or watching the news, or indeed ageing are all to be avoided. And yet learning about the terrible things people can do to each other, and the history of the terrible things people have done to each other, is important – we can't imagine a life without it – and gives some people a great deal of pleasure; pleasure, as psychoanalysts might say, of various kinds. Anyone who has or knows children, or remembers being a child, will know how happy it can make them tormenting their siblings. And so if we value happiness we can't help but wonder what morality it entails, what kind of morality it might involve us in.

It is not surprising, in other words, that happiness has always had rather a mixed reception. No one in their right minds we might think, especially now, would be promoting unhappiness; and yet the promotion, the preferring of happiness – the assumption of a right to happiness – brings with it a lot of things we might not like. And the desire for happiness may reveal things about ourselves that we like even less. "A people who conceive life to be the pursuit of happiness must be chronically unhappy," the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins wrote.

What are we going to have to do, what are we going to have to become, what are we going to have to renounce or ignore if we want to be happy? Or if we are to propose happiness, or its pursuit, as some kind of right? We tend to make rights of things we assume to be in short supply, things perpetually under threat. Wherever there is scarcity now human rights are asserted; and the assertion of rights is reactive to a sense of scarcity deemed to be needless. Or, to put it slightly differently, calling something a right can be a way of rhetorically enforcing an important wish, a way of making a wish sound important.

I want to begin with three fairly obvious propositions that are also misgivings about the right to happiness or its pursuit. And I'd like to suggest that the right to frustration may be more useful and interesting – more enlivening – than the right to happiness. That's to say I want to waylay the common, all-too-plausible idea that the solution to frustration is satisfaction, or that happiness is the answer to unhappiness, or that if we get rid of the bad things, the good things will start happening. Happiness and the right to pursue it are sometimes wildly unrealistic as ideals; and, because wildly unrealistic, unconsciously self-destructive.

Because happiness is not always the kind of thing that can be pursued, we should view it, more often than not, as a lucky side effect but not a calculable or calculated end. Making it such an end all too easily brings out the worst in us. If this is a version, to rewrite John Lennon's famous line, of "happiness is what happens to you when you are doing something else", it also suggests that scarcity is integral to a sense of reality; that we should be thinking of what Philip Larkin in "Born Yesterday" called "a skilled, / Vigilant, flexible, / Unemphasised, enthralled / Catching of happiness" rather than the engineering of it.

Our relation to happiness often betrays an unconscious desire for disillusionment. The wanting of it and the having of it can seem like two quite different things. And this is what makes wishing so interesting; because wishing is always too knowing. When we wish we are too convinced of our pleasures, too certain that we know what we want. The belief that we can arrange our happiness – as though happiness were akin to justice, which we can work towards – may be to misrecognise the very thing that concerns us.

My three fairly obvious propositions are: first, in Freud's formulation from Civilisation and its Discontents, "happiness is something essentially subjective" (subjective I take it, in the sense of being not only personal but idiosyncratic). We can be surprised by what makes us happy, and it will not necessarily be something that makes other people happy. This has significant consequences not least in the area of our lives that is sometimes conducive to happiness, sexuality. And this makes happiness as a social or communal pursuit complicated. We have only to imagine what it would be for someone to propose that we had a right to sexual satisfaction to imagine both how we might contrive this and what terrible things might be done in its name.

Second, bad things can make us happy – and by bad things I mean things consensually agreed to be unacceptable. It clearly makes some people happy to live in a world without Jews, or homosexuals, or immigrants, and so on. There are also what we might call genuinely bad things, like seriously harming people and other animals, that gives some people the pleasure they most crave. I remember a very unhappy boy of 10 telling me in a psychotherapy session that he was only happy when he was cutting the feet off rats that he had caught. He said it made him feel "really awake", that it was like "turning on the light in your favourite room in the world". Cruelty and humiliation make some people happy, perhaps lots of people happy some of the time; and this issue is not dealt with merely by saying that they are not really happy or that they are in some way perverse or sick. We tend to pathologise the forms of happiness we cannot bear. If we are to have a right to happiness or to its pursuit – two different things – we must then acknowledge the full range of things that make people happy. This means taking them at their word. Cruelty can make people happy. And we might then want to think about what problem, or rather problems, happiness is deemed to be the solution to. It is not, for example, incidental to our predicament that so many of our pleasures are, or are felt to be, forbidden (this is what Freud's account of the Oedipus complex is a way of thinking about). So put briefly – as every child and therefore every adult knows – being bad can make you happy. Happiness is subjective, it takes many forms, and one of its forms is immorality.

Last but not least – though the least exciting – is the third point: some people like being unhappy. Indeed for some people their lives can be construed as the pursuit of unhappiness. It is astounding the lengths to which some people will go to be unhappy, to contrive their own misery, as though happiness itself were a phobic object and held terrors. And we don't talk of the right to be unhappy, when we should. Unhappiness can, after all, among many other things, be the registration of injustice or loss. At its best, a culture committed to the pursuit of happiness might be committed, say, to the diminishing of injustice; but at its worst, the culture of happiness may proscribe a whole range of feelings and perceptions.

It is sometimes said that psychoanalysis is one of the last places in the culture where people are allowed to be unhappy. And clearly psychoanalysis protects, if it does not actually foster, a person's right to be unhappy. The subjectivity of happiness, what it is that the individual really loves and gets pleasure from, the immorality of pleasures and the lure of transgression, happiness as a perversion, the fear of pleasure and the masochistic solution – all this is the material of psychoanalysis, and not only of psychoanalysis.

Yet, historically, psychoanalysis is the inheritor of a set of political propositions it would seem to be at odds with; or at least at a very odd angle to. If Freud and happiness doesn't sound like a very promising subject, Freud and rights seems even less so (there's only one reference to the rights of man in Freud's work). Rights, like class, have never really been the thing for psychoanalysis; omissions, one would think, of some significance. Don't have much confidence in the so-called rights of man, Freud seems to say in his New Introductory Lectures; they are no match for the ferocity of inner morality – the super-ego, or "conscience". The whole business of rights only turns up when the individual, the melancholic individual, is briefly released from his internal regime ("For after a certain number of months the whole moral fuss is over, the criticism of the superego is silent, the ego is rehabilitated and again enjoys all the rights of man till the next attack.") Morality, at least in these patients, is periodic, as are the rights of man, the gift, as it were of a higher power.

"Our normal sense of guilt," Freud writes, "is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego". This translates as: our happiness depends on the distance between who we are and who we should be according to the dictates of our internalised morality. We are mostly unhappy because we are rarely as we should be. When the internal authorities are so implacable and sadistic — over-severe, abusive, humiliating, as Freud writes — what are the possibilities for happiness?

The right to happiness, or to its pursuit, would mean the right to a generous super-ego, the right to a super-ego that was on the side of one's pleasure: one that promoted the view that feeling alive was more important than being right or good. It is one of Freud's more horrifying ironies that the pursuit of pleasure incites, calls up, the super-ego. And, of course, when and if pleasure is forbidden its pursuit requires punishment. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Virtue has to be its own reward. To pursue pleasure is to be pursued by punishment. There is no one more moralistic, more coercive, than a hedonist.

As the right to happiness or its pursuit is my subject, and I am by training a child psychotherapist, all this is by way of a lengthy preamble to putting together the famous sentence from Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence with something from the paediatrician and psychoanalyst DW Winnicott's story about child development. I want to ask what, if anything, the right to happiness or its pursuit has to do with the child's development; whether Jefferson's founding declaration has anything to do with the declaration of independence that is the child's personal development.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness". Some of us might not believe in the Creator part now, and some of us might find more and more difficult the idea that people are born equal when the conditions in which they are born are manifestly so unequal; and most of us would want to assume that by "men" Jefferson meant "people". And yet, as many people have noted, the pursuit of happiness – something not mentioned in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, nor in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – seems peculiarly salient; it is the only one of the things listed that is a pursuit.

What exactly might it mean to have an "unalienable right" to "the pursuit of happiness", given that it is fairly obvious that the pursuit of happiness is so morally equivocal – could be, among other things, a threat to the society that promoted it? At first sight it seems to be a pretty good idea; if we are convinced of anything now we are convinced that we are pleasure-seeking creatures, who want to minimise the pain and frustration of our lives. Or at least a "we" could be consolidated around these beliefs. We are the creatures who, possibly unlike any other animal, pursue happiness. But the pursuit of happiness, like the pursuit of liberty – the utopian political projects of the 20th century – has legitimated some of the worst crimes of contemporary history across the political spectrum.

In Jefferson's Declaration, the art critic Dave Hickey has noted, "Happiness is not assured, but its pursuit is protected . . . the government will act to ensure our safety, and it will stand back as we act on our own behalf in the 'pursuit of happiness'. When that pursuit putatively threatens our safety the government invariably steps in. Safety trumps happiness, the government always wins." It is not too much of a stretch here to see, in this account, the government as the parents, and the citizens as adolescent children; the governmental parents protect the pursuit of happiness, but prioritise safety. The developing child pursues his own happiness under the rules and conditions provided by the adults. Children cannot bring themselves up, and children cannot bring up children (in Lord of the Flies the question recurs: "are there any adults?").

If it is said, or written, that we have a right to be happy or to pursue happiness, it is assumed that happiness is something we are capable of, something that is available, if certain obstacles are removed. If liberty is there when tyranny is taken away, happiness is there when whatever makes us unhappy is removed. From a pragmatic point of view the art of a good life involves removing the obstacles to happiness; the picture, if we visualise it, is of something looked for, something looked forward to, and of there being something in the way. And this something in the way could be called an unavailable mother, a prohibitive father, competing sibling, not having enough brains or beauty, or charm, or money, or education, or luck. We would get closer to our happiness were these things acquired; and a reality sense would be something to do with acknowledging which of these things cannot be acquired. It is all about, in short, our relation to obstacles; our distinguishing the intractable from the changeable, what we have to acknowledge from what we can influence; whether our desire is forbidden or not – whether we want a cream cake or another man's wife. It is, in pragmatic terms, about knowing what is possible. And everybody, it seems, is shadowed by an imaginary other person, a lucky counterpart, who gets all the happiness going; Lacan writes of "the jealousy born in a subject in his relation to an other, insofar as this other is held to enjoy a certain form of jouissance or superabundant vitality". This other person presumably enjoys his happiness, his super-abundant vitality with no conflict, with no thought of safety, with no consideration of the rules and conditions required by the good of the rest.

A right to the pursuit of happiness must be a right to remove the obstacles to happiness. This, at least, is the logic of the case. The man called the happiness tsar, Lord Layard, says we now know what makes children happy (the book he co-authored last year is called A Good Childhood). What, then, are the obstacles to the child's happiness, and why can't we set about trying to remove them? And some of them we can remove. But what if the so-called obstacles to happiness are, or sometimes are, among the things that matter most to us? If, say, we love both luxury and justice? What if two mutually exclusive things make us happy, and one has to be abrogated? And what if some obstacles are immovable, untransformable into anything other than obstacles?

There is something about the sexual drive, Freud suggested, that makes it intrinsically unsatisfiable. There are not infinite resources of food, of energy, of medicine. It is, for example, true, as every mother knows, that the mother cannot give the child everything that he wants, and that if she could it wouldn't be what he wanted. That everyone feels left out of something. It is misleading to think that one's parents have been the obstacle to one's happiness, even if they have radically thwarted it. Indeed we might end up thinking that a right to irresolvable conflict might be the most realistic right we could come up with. That the attempt to resolve at least some conflicts was a distraction from finding better ways of living them; that the right to pursue happiness has seduced us into pursuing happiness when we could have been doing something better.

If the alternative to happiness is not, in the binary way, unhappiness; and if happiness has become so insidious, so hypnotic a single end for a good life, why have we wanted this strange narrowing of our intent? What have we lost, or forgotten, or ignored, or paid insufficient attention to, or protected ourselves from by wanting happiness? Happiness, it would seem, is the most plausible of our aims in life. But what psychoanalysis can chip in with here is that we are at our most defensive when we are at our most plausible.

One of the other things we most want is to be able to feel frustrated; to register what we feel deprived of. Frustration issues in many things only one of which is happiness; and happiness can be, at its worst, a pre-emptive strike against frustration, a refuge from it rather than any kind of productive, unpredictable transformation of it. If we want to talk of a right to pursue happiness there needs to be a prior right, as it were, to feel frustration; to be able to bear and to bear with a sense of what is lacking in one's life. And not simply because frustration makes satisfaction possible in the way that hunger can make a meal delicious. But because frustration and satisfaction do not only or always have a logical, a causal, a pragmatic relationship with one another. Or to put it rather more obviously, what we are lacking when we are unhappy is not always happiness, any more than what an alcoholic is lacking is a drink. And proposing a right to the pursuit of happiness may seduce us, by a kind of word-magic, into thinking that happiness is just the thing.

It is of interest that when Winnicott writes about deprivation in children he too talks about rights. "Let us consider the meaning of the anti-social act," he writes in a paper called "The Deprived Child": "for instance, stealing. When a child steals what is sought . . . is not the object stolen; what is sought is the person, the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother. In fact every infant at the start can truly claim the right to steal from the mother because the infant invented the mother, thought her up, created her out of an innate capacity to love."

For Winnicott, the child makes the mother he needs and gradually, through disillusionment and hatred, disentangles her, to some extent, from the mother she happens to be. But it is "the mother from whom the child has the right to steal because she is the mother" that I want to consider. Because the thing stolen is not quite or even nearly the thing wanted – which is not a thing, but a mother – it can never satisfy. What we have is a picture of the right to pursue happiness getting stuck, something I think it is prone to do; as though there is something about the pursuit of happiness that sponsors and endorses addiction. In this sense, consumer capitalism is a system tailor-made for deprived children.

The theft requires communicable translation; it requires, as it were, someone to be able to say, or otherwise communicate what it is that is really being pursued. In Winnicott's declaration the child has a right to the pursuit of a mother to get what he needs for his development. He is entitled to a mother; she belongs to him in the sense that his own development belongs to him. A good-enough mother or parents might give you the wherewithal for your pursuit of happiness; they might have backed your desire, helped you to believe in and not only be fearful of your pleasures. But it is more complicated than this. Lives are not the kind of things that can be guaranteed by mothers. And this is where the idea of a right to pursue one's own happiness becomes more interesting.

Do children want to be happy? And if they don't want to be happy what else might they want to be? This would seem to be of some importance because they are growing up in a world in which their parents mostly want them to be happy, or at least don't like them being unhappy, admittedly for a variety of different reasons. And by a world I mean the particular cultures for whom happiness has become the preferred object, or the preferred fetish. Children are supposed to be anti-depressants for their parents.

Happiness is something parents often demand of their children; we, as we say, want our children to be happy; we were once children who's parents wanted us to be happy. And that means the whole spectrum, from not being a worry to them, not making their lives more difficult, being curative of their woes, to the pleasure our parents could take in our pleasure and our wellbeing. We are more dependent on our children than they are on us; and we are dependent, in brief, on their happiness. What makes the child happy is not going to be unlinked to what makes the parents happy. Clearly if a parent lives as if their child has a right to happiness, or a right to its pursuit, and that they are the guardians of this right, they are going to have a difficult, an even more difficult, task on their hands. Lovers often feel that they should be making each other happy when they are in fact making themselves a problem to each other.

So by way of conclusion I want to suggest that a right to the pursuit of happiness is asserted when a capacity for absorption has been sabotaged, when there is a loss of confidence in people's passions. Happiness becomes important when the possibility for absorption is under threat. That the child does not want to be happy – or perhaps, more exactly, the child doesn't want only to be happy – the child wants first to be safe, and then to be absorbed. There are, for example, only two reasons for children to go to school – apart, that is, from acquiring the werewithal to earn a living: to make friends, and to see if they can find something of absorbing interest to themselves.

There is an interesting moment in Lord of the Flies when Henry, one of the "littluns", wanders away from the main group of children. "He went down to the beach and busied himself at the water's edge." William Golding writes: "There were creatures that lived in this last fling of the sea, tiny transparencies that came questing in with the water over the hot, dry sand. With impalpable organs of sense they examined this new field. Perhaps food had appeared where the last incursion there had been none . . . This was fascinating to Henry. He poked about with a bit of stick, that itself was wave-worn and whitened and a vagrant, and tried to control the motions of the scavengers . . . He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things."

The adult narrator can see Henry as in some way identified with these rudimentary scavengers; and the narrator intimates that without adults the children feel how much is out of control or under-controlled. And then there is the remarkable sentence: "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness as he felt himself exercising control over living things." He feels himself exercising control, but he is not, and his absorption is beyond, in excess of, mere happiness. Something else is wanted more than happiness by Henry, and it seems to be the exercise of control over living things, one of which is himself. It would be easy, and partly true, to say that what Henry is absorbed by here, what is beyond mere happiness, is power, control over living things. But Golding is clear about two things; it is an illusion of power – Golding refers to Henry having "the illusion of mastery" – and it is also the absorption itself that is beyond mere happiness. "He became absorbed beyond mere happiness." It is an illusion that absorbs him beyond happiness; in other words, he is playing. Absorption is not in and of itself a moral good; in the novel the tyrannical, sadistic Jack absorbs the attention of a lot of the children who do his bidding. But in proposing, in the context of the novel, that there is a beyond to mere happiness, something else or further that is wanted; and that indeed happiness may be a poor substitute for something else, that happiness may be something that can get in the way of whatever is beyond it; by proposing this Golding is saying something about what can override the pursuit of happiness, and what may be lost in its pursuit. For better and for worse, being able to feel our frustration is the precondition for becoming absorbed. When this is impossible the pursuit of happiness tends to take over. The right to pursue happiness may be, at its worst, the right not to feel frustrated. And if frustration is not allowed to take its course, to take its time, there is no absorption, only refuges from unhappiness. The child is fobbed off with happiness when what she really wants is to get her appetite back. The right to the pursuit of happiness can be a cover story for the wish to hide.


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Author, author: Sue Townsend aka Adrian Mole

Gabriel Josipovici's essay is a welcome counterblast in conservative times, says Tom McCarthy

That modernism represents one of the great seismic shifts in the history of western literature wouldn't be disputed by any literary professors who know their onions. What they find it harder to agree on is when that shift begins and what exactly it consists of – in short, what modernism, properly speaking, is. Gabriel Josipovici, former Weidenfeld professor of comparative literature at Oxford and currently a star turn in the graduate school of humanities at Sussex, eschews both the definitions usually proffered by cultural historians of a Marxist bent (that it was a reaction to industrialisation or to a crisis among the bourgeoisie) and the humanist ones given by liberals (that it was an era of unbridled self-expression), not to mention the dismissive ones put out by conservatives (that it was all a bit of silliness we've thankfully got over now). In their stead he ventures, at the outset of this book-length essay, a more essential formula: that modernism should be understood as "a coming into awareness by art of its precarious status and responsibilities".

Herein lie both the strength and weakness of the argument that follows. The disadvantage of such a general characterisation is that these terms apply as much to Shakespeare as to Joyce: think of the self-reflectiveness of so much of the former's work, from Hamlet's disruptive (and disrupted) play-within-a-play to the sonnets' constant awareness of form and its limits. They apply even to Ovid: what do the "Pygmalion" or "Orpheus" sequences of Metamorphoses enact if not allegories of art's fragile status and responsibilities? The advantage is that Josipovici knows this, and uses the knowledge as a cue to drag the cursor way back, tracing the tendency that comes to a head in the "high" modernist period (the early 20th century) through the Romantics to the reformation and beyond.

Thus Cervantes's Don Quixote is, both lucidly and utterly correctly, identified as a far more "modern" work than many more recent offerings – modern in the fraught relationship it maintains with its own narrative modes, the way it orchestrates a sense of disenchantment or erosion of the sacred, and, most of all, the way its main "adventure" becomes one of reading and writing. Aeschylus's Oresteia is held up – again in spot-on fashion – as a template for an anti-humanist worldview: what matters is not the individual but the house, or oikos, from which he emerges and of which he forms no more than an iteration. It's an insight that helps us to understand (although Josipovici doesn't mention him) why that arch-modernist William Faulkner delves, in Attic style, through generations of the Compson family, trawling their dwindling estate for residues of buried history. From that other Greek unit of measure, the polis or city-state, Josipovici derives a modern aesthetic of interconnectedness, of man as a diminished agent operating within systems that exceed him.

Interconnectedness is a feature of this book, providing not only one of its central themes but also its discursive method. A typical paragraph will zap us from Dürer to Mann to Flaubert to Dostoevsky in order to make a point about Kierkegaard. It can disorient at times, but the associative or digressive approach is the right one for the task. What I'm not so sure about is the overall "pitch". Josipovici is a formidable scholar whose The World and the Book I remember being a landmark text when I was studying literature. But there he was writing in academic mode, with a certain critical framework and its attendant permissions taken for granted; here, he's shifted into a more populist mode, and it doesn't always play to his advantage. Adopting the vocabulary of the middlebrow in order to legitimise the vanguard merely robs it of what animates it most. Rather than celebrate the subversive energies of Luigi Nono's opera Prometeo, for example, he tries to sell it to the Glyndebourne crowd by claiming that it leaves us "with a sense of sorrow and of wonder and, at an even deeper level, a sense of having bathed in the waters of life". The sentiment is just that: sentimental. While the impetus behind it is profound, it ends up sounding trite.

Josipovici has never been a fellow traveller of any school or fashion. His points of contact here, as in his other work, are original, at times idiosyncratic. To use Kierkegaard rather than the more obvious Nietzsche to explain the vertiginous, abyss-gazing disposition of most modernist works is refreshing. To choose Wordsworth as a historical model for what a truly modernist-inspired contemporary literature might be seems odd, to say the least; wouldn't Laurence Sterne or Gerard Manley Hopkins make much better heroes? And to trot out the old canard that equates Flaubert with naturalist realism is just wrong. The Flaubert who wrote Bouvard and Pécuchet, in which two Quixotic figures re-enact gestures from book illustrations in vain bids for imagined authenticity, before the narrative gives over to a "dictionary of received ideas" whose authorship is never clear? The Flaubert who wrote The Temptation of Saint Anthony, in which phantasms shake and rivet a disintegrating consciousness that yearns "to become matter"? Come on.

What can't be faulted is the plaintive logic running through this book. In cultural terms, we live in deeply conservative times. Editors at several major publishing houses have to run novels' synopses past reader focus groups before being allowed to publish them; "literary" festivals feature newsreaders and other media personalities. We shouldn't imagine, though, that things were that different in the golden age of modernism. Ulysses was printed, in 1922, on a small, private press in Paris, in a run of 1,000; Kafka's Metamorphosis, on its small-press publication in 1915, sold 11 copies – of which 10 were bought by Kafka. Yet can anyone, now, name the successful middlebrow writers of 1922 or 1915? Of course not. That alone should give Josipovici comfort.

Tom McCarthy's C (Cape) is on the Booker longlist.


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David Grossman and the new publishing season

'I read Tony Blair A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males'

Wednesday 1st September

Dear Diary,

Woken early by an employee of Parcel Force. He was a Chinese bloke and asked if I was "Mr Occupier!" I said I was Mr Adrian Albert Mole. He was holding a squarish, heavy-looking parcel. I hoped it was the wooden Japanese neck-pillow I had ordered from Innovations many months ago.

After a chilly doorstep wrangle (the wind was blowing through the fly of my pyjamas, directly on to my prostate), I managed to persuade him to hand the package over and went inside. When I opened it at the kitchen table I was shocked to find Tony Blair's face staring up at me with the words, Tony Blair A Journey. Inside was a House of Commons acknowledgments slip from Pandora:

Aidy darling,

Had a brief disastrous affair with a bookshop manager – he left his wife and turned up at my apartment with his ghastly suitcases and a hyperactive boy-child called Plato. He has promised me free books for life. I know you are obsessed with TB so enjoy this advance copy.

After a struggle to control my jealous rage I started to read.

As I ploughed through the acknowledgments I could not help but reflect that, had I had 26 people to help me with my own books I might have had at least one published by now.

My own semi-autobiographical novel, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland has been with Hutchinson for two and a half years.

At 11am my mother came in from next door to "borrow" yet more teabags (she already owes me 17). On seeing Mr Blair's cover photograph she began to sniffle: "He was so full of promise," she said, "And look at him now, he's a broken bulrush in the River Nile of life."

I went to the lavatory and was in there for some time. When I returned my mother was engrossed in the book and my father had let himself into the house and was rummaging through my fridge (God! I should never have installed those wheelchair ramps which allow him easy access to my house).

I went into my bedroom to get dressed and came back to find my father eating the cold custard from last night's dinner. My mother looked up from A Journey and said: "He writes that he came very near to having a drinking problem."

My father said: "A pisshead yeah? What was he on?"

My mother said: "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine over dinner."

My father sneered. "A gin and tonic and two glasses of wine? He's a bleedin' amateur." He put the empty custard jug back in the fridge and lit a cigarette.

He said: "Now, if he was crawling in the gutter in Downing Street, screaming at the moon and trying to fight a policeman on the door of Number 10, then yes, I'd agree he did have a drink problem."

He tapped cigarette ash into the ashtray that had been welded on to the arm of his wheelchair.

Thursday 2nd September

Dear Diary,

I read A Journey all night and into the early hours. At 5.10am I had a revelation. Mr Blair surrounded himself with Alpha Males: Alastair Campbell, Gordon Brown, John Prescott, Margaret Beckett, Philip Gould, Jonathan Powell and Peter Mandelson, yet he was not an Alpha Male himself. He was a receptacle and a conduit of their wishes and opinions. Mr Blair had as much self-belief as a chameleon.

I remembered that when he returned to London after a long period in the United States he had an American accent, much like that of his fellow Christian and friend, Sir Cliff Richard.

I am not a trained psychologist but I am wise beyond my 40 years and think that I have discovered why Mr Blair was so keen to become a war leader and to swagger alongside George Bush. He thought it would give him another pair of testicles and would promote him to Alpha Maleness.

At 1.30pm I took A Journey round to my parents' house and said: "I've finished it."

"What?" said my mother, "You've read all 718 pages? It's impossible."

I reminded her that I was a speed reader and had read War and Peace in two days.

"What's your method?" she said suspiciously.

"I skip over the adverbs and adjectives," I said.

I left them fighting over who was to read A Journey first and went to my desk to write a stern letter to Hutchinson, demanding that my own book, Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland, be published tout suite:

Dear Hutchinson,

My friend and confidante Dr Pandora Braithwaite BA, MA, D phil, advanced me a copy of Tony Blair A Journey (incidentally I notice with sorrow that Dr Braithwaite's name does not appear in the index, though she has spoken to me at length many times about the long and intimate conversations she had with Mr Blair into the early hours). I congratulate you on your sales of the above book, which brings me to the subject of Lo! The Flat Hills of My Homeland. Apart from an acknowledgment slip some time in 2007 which said: 'Your manuscript arrived at our office today. However, it may be sometime before we can get back to you', I have heard nothing from you and warn you that unless you promise me a publication date, I will take the manuscript back and offer it to Penguin.

Yours,

Adrian A Mole

PS Mr Blair uses too many emotive adjectives and he could do with taking a red pen to his adverbs also.


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