The Tattva Muktavali by Purnananda Chakravartin
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THE TATTVA-MUKTAVALI
by Pur.nananda Chakravartin
JOURNAL
OF
THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
[New Series, Volume XV]
[London, Trubner and Company]
[1883]
{Scanned and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, April 2002}
ART. IV.--__The Tattva-muktavali of Gau.da-pur.nananda-chakra-
vartin__. Edited and Translated by Prof. E. B. COWELL.
The following poem was written by a native of Bengal, named
Pur.nananda Chakravartin. Nothing is known as to his date; if
the work were identical with the poem of the same name mentioned
in the account of the Ramanuja system in Madhava's
Sarvadarsanasa.mgraha, it would be, of course, older than the
fourteenth century, but this is very uncertain; I should be
inclined to assign it to a later date. The chief interest of the
poem consists in its being a vigorous attack on the Vedanta
system by a follower of the Pur.naprajna school, which was
founded by Madhva (or Anandatirtha) in the thirteenth century in
the South of India. Some account of his system (which in many
respects agrees with that of Ramanuja) is given in Wilson's
"Hindu Sects;" [Footnote: Works, vol. i. pp. 139-150. See also
Prof. Monier Williams, J.R.A.S. Vol. XIV. N.S. p. 304.] but the
fullest account is to be found in the fifth chapter of the
Sarvadarsanasa.mgraha. Both the Ramanujas and the Pur.naprajnas
hold in opposition to the Vedanta [Footnote: As the different
systems are arranged in the Sarva D. S. according to the
irrespective relation to the Vedanta, we can easily understand why
Madhava there places these two systems so low down in the scale,
and only just above the atheistic schools of the Charvakas,
Buddhists, and Jainas.] that individual souls are distinct from
Brahman; but they differ as to the sense in which they are thus
distinct. The former maintain that "unity" and "plurality" are
equally true from different points of view; the latter hold that
the relation between the individual soul and Brahman is that of a
master and a servant, and consequently that they are absolutely
separate. It need not surprise us, therefore, to see that,
although Ramanuja is praised in the fifty-third sloka of this
poem as "the foremost of the learned," some of his tenets are
attacked in the eightieth.
The Sanskrit text of this poem was published in the Benares
Pa.n.dit for Sept. 1871, by Pa.n.dit Vecharama Sarman. An edition,
with a Bengali translation, was also published some years ago in
Calcutta, by Jagadananda Goswamin; [Footnote: No date is given.]
but the text is so full of false readings of every kind, and the
translation in consequence goes so often astray, that I have not
found much help from it. I have collated the text in the Benares
Pa.n.dit (A.) with a MS. (B.) sent to me by my friend, Pa.n.dit
Mahesachandra Nyayaratna, the Principal of the Calcutta Sanskrit
College. He has also sent me the readings in certain passages from
two MSS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library (C.D.); and I
have to thank him for his help in explaining some obscure allusions.
The poem itself seems to me an interesting contribution to the
history of Hindu philosophical controversy, [Footnote: Dr. Banerjea
has quoted and translated several stanzas in his 'Dialogues on Hindu
Philosophy.'] and so I have subjoined a literal English translation.
I would venture to remind my readers of the words of the manager in
the prologue of the Malavikagnimitra, "Every old poem is not good
because it is old, nor is every modern poem to be blamed simply
because it is modern."
TRANSLATION.
1. Victorious is the garland-wearing foster-son of Nanda,--the
protector of his devotees,--the destroyer of the cruel king,--
dark-blue like the delicate tamala blossoms,--formidable with his
many outspread rays,--mighty with all his attendant powers,
[Footnote: The Bengali translation explains these as the internal
powers (__antara"nga__) Hladini, etc., and the external
(__bahira"nga__) Prahva, etc.]--and having his forehead radiant
like the moon.
2. This follower of the Pura.nas, who holds by his own belief,
reads to his heart's content the Pura.na in the morning, and he
listens devotedly with profound meditation, his whole mind intent
on the meaning of the book.
3. Having abandoned the doctrine of the oneness of the individual
and the Supreme Soul, he establishes by argument their mutual
difference; having used Sruti and Sm.riti as a manifold proof, he
employs Inference in many ways in the controversy.
4. This individual soul must be different from Brahman because it
is always circumscribed,--many are the similar arguments which are
to be acknowledged in the course of our reasonings.
5. "Might we not say that a jar and a web could be called identical
because both are cognizable?" [Footnote: There is a favourite
Naiyayik example of a __kevalanvayi__ middle term, "a jar is
nameable because it is cognizable as a web is."] But we cannot say
so in regard to these two things in question, for Brahman alone is
that which cannot be cognized.
6. The sentence "Thou art That" (__tat tvam asi__) which is
understood in its primary meaning as referring to the object of the
Veda, [Footnote: Or __vedavishaye__ may perhaps simply mean __vede__,
cf. sl. 112.]--the author thus explains its meaning, as he knows his
own doctrine, and has fixed his mind on the system of Duality; since
the word 'that' (__tat__) is here indeclinable and implies a
difference, and the word 'thou' (__tvam__) means that which is to be
differentiated, the sign of the genitive case has been elided;
[Footnote: The author here explains the sentence __tat tvam asi__, as
really meaning __tasya tvam asi__ "thou art Its."] "thou only," such
is not the meaning of the sentence [Footnote: In "Thou art that,"
'thou' and 'that' would refer to the same subject
(__samanadhikara.nya__)].
7. He is all-knowing, all-seeing, Himself the three worlds, in whose
belly thou art thyself contained,--He causes at once by a movement of
the brow the creation, preservation, and absorption of all beings!
Thou art ignorant, and only seest relatively, He is the adorable, the
one Witness of all worlds; thou art changing, He is One; thou art all
dull and stained, not such is He.
8. As for the text "I am Brahman," you must take the nominative case
as only used there for the genitive by the licence of an inspired
speaker. How, if it were otherwise, would there be a genitive in the
illustration, [Footnote: This is often used as an illustration in
Vedanta works, as __e.g.__ B.rihad Ara.ny. Up. ii. 1. 20, "as the
spider proceeds with his web, as the little sparks proceed from fire,
so from this Soul proceed all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, all
beings."] as in the sentence "as the sparks of the fire"?
9. The poets call a lad fire (from his hot temper), the face the orb
of a full moon, the eye a blue lotus, the bosom mount Meru, and the
hand a young shoot; by a confusion of the superimposed appearance we
may thus have the idea of identity where there is still a real
difference; and so too must we deal with those words of Sruti "I am
Brahman." [Footnote: This is another suggested method of interpreting
the words "I am Brahman." It may be only a common case of "qualified
superimponent indication," as "the man of the Panjab is an ox" (cf.
Kavya Prakasa, ii. 10-12). Cf. the definition of upachara in the
Sahitya Darpa.na: __upacharo hi namatyanta.m visakalitayoh
sad.risyatisayamahimna bhedapratitisthaganamatram__].
10. As there are many waves in the sea, so are we many individual
souls in Brahman; the wave can never become the sea; how then wilt
thou, the individual soul, become Brahman?
11. In the depths of all Sastras the two things are both recognized,
knowledge and ignorance; so too virtue and vice; and thus also
science, and next to it closely clinging behind, but other than it,
appears false science; thus everywhere there are opposite pairs, and
similar is the notorious pair, Brahman and the soul. How can these
two have oneness? Let the good answer with an upright mind.
12. Thou, O Soul, art the reflection of the Supreme Being, who
possesses the power of illusion and is the substratum of all, while
He, the adorable, shines forth as Himself the original; the one moon
in the sky is seen manifold in water and the like; therefore there
is a difference between thee and Brahman as between the reflection
and its original.
13. Yonder Brahman is described by the words of the sacred texts as
not to be known, nor to be reasoned about, and as devoid of all
desire; but thou art within the range of speech and of thought; how
shall there be oneness of thee and Brahman?
14. Thou art verily bereft of thy understanding, O individual Soul,
by the darkness of this doctrine of Maya, while thou constantly
proclaimest like a madman "I am Brahman"; where is thy sovereignty,
where thy empire, where thy omniscience? There is as vast a
difference between Brahman and thee as between mount Meru and a
mustard-seed!
15. Thou art a finite soul, He is indeed all-pervading; thou
standest only on one spot, while He is everywhere always; thou,
being of a moment, art happy and unhappy; He is happy at all times;
how canst thou say "I am He"? Fie! art thou not ashamed?
16. Glass is glass, and a gem is a gem; a shell is but a shell,
and silver is silver; there is never seen a transposition
[Footnote: Dr. Banerjea (__Dialogues__, p. 379) reads __kadapy
atyayajnanam, i.e.__ vyabhichara; but all the MSS. which I have
compared read __na kada vyatyaya__ (or __vyatyaya.m__) __jnanam;
kada__ seems irregularly used for __kadapi__, as it is also in
sl. 113, __c.__] among them. But wherever other things are
imagined, to be found in something else, it is through an error;
and so it is when the soul utters such words as "that art thou!"
17. The meaning of the word "__that__" (__tat__) is an ocean of
immortality, filled with manifest and supreme felicity; the
meaning of the word "__thou__" is a most miserable being,
bewildered in mind through the burden of the fear of existence;
these two can never be one, they are divided by the nature of
things; the doctrine of Non-unity is the truth for all worlds,
thou art but His slave.
18. If Brahman were meant by these words, the power employed
would not be Denotation, for their literal meaning does not apply;
[Footnote: In such sentences as "That art thou," "I am Brahman,"
etc., the primary power of the words, __i.e.__ " Denotation"
(__abhidha__), could not express the unconditioned Brahman
destitute of all attributes; for Denotation rests upon the ordinary
conventional meaning, and how could this take in an idea so far
removed from ordinary experience? Nor could it be the secondary
power "Indication" (__laksha.na__), as in the well- known instance
of "the herd-station on the Ganges," where the Ganges, by
"indication," means the shore and not the stream. For "indication"
must be based on some connexion between the primary and the
indicated secondary meaning; but how can that which is "without a
second" be connected with anything?] consequently it must be the
second power of a word, Indication.
19. Yet if so, why should it be Indication? for this arises from
some association with the primary meaning; but with what can that
substance be associated which is disconnected with everything and
without a second?
20. That power of a word is Indication, by which, when the primary
meaning is precluded, some other meaning is indicated in connexion
therewith, through some motive or through common currency; and its
causes are thus three [Footnote: I suppose that these are (1) the
incompatibility of the primary sense; (2) the common currency of the
secondary meaning, __e.g.__ when "Europe" is used to imply its
inhabitants in the phrase "Europe makes war:" (3) a motive, as in
"a herd-station on the Ganges," where "Ganges" is used instead of
"the bank of the Ganges," in order to imply the coolness and purity
of the spot].
21. Now if there is no Denotation in a phrase, how can there arise
any Indication? First there should be some primary meaning
precluded, and then there may be the Indication of something else.
22. Where there is no accepted Denotation, how can you there have
Indication? If there is no village, how can there be a boundary?--
there is no child without a father [Footnote: Cf. the Bengali proverb
__matha nai tar mathabyatha__, "he has no head and yet he has a
headache."]
23. "The lances enter, the swords, the bows and arrows,"--here we
have Indication; for the sentence must suggest something else to
complete itself, as there cannot be "entrance" in the case of an
inanimate subject.
24. "A herd-station on the Ganges,"--here we have the self-sacrifice
of the primary to another meaning, since the Ganges, as being in the
form of water, cannot be the site of a herd-station.
25. In the example "ghi is life" there is produced the idea of
sameness of form; in the example "this is life" there arises the
idea of identity [Footnote: In the first ex. there is __suddha-
saropa-laksha.na__ or "pure superimponent indication," in the second
there is __suddha-sadhyavasana-l.__ or "pure introspeceptive
indication," where the ghi is swallowed up in the "life." Most
writers, however, disallow __upachara__ in __suddha-laksha.na__];
but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences will be produced
by a metaphor,--there is not brought about a real oneness.
26. The doctrine of Identity is established with a desperate effort,
and men have recourse to the power "Indication"; but there are three
things which should rise to our view,--the primary meaning, the
indicated meaning, and their connexion [Footnote: He seems to imply
that each of these three requisites fails in the present case,--
there is no primary meaning, and still less a secondary, and there is
no connexion with any other object.].
27. There is here no Denotation from the absence of conventional
agreement; there is no Indication from the absence of any reason [to
establish it]; by what reason, on the theory of Maya, can Brahman be
ever made known?
28. He is described [Footnote: He now proceeds to declare his own
opinions] in the Veda by the primary power of words [Denotation] as
the Maker of the Universe; and by Inference we establish the
conclusion that all these things have a Maker.
29. The Vedas are a proof, the Sm.ritis are a proof; there is a being
to be proved and known there in many passages; it is the great
Personality which is to be made known by all the Vedas,--therefore it
is this which the Veda takes as its subject.
30. True verbal testimony produces knowledge even in regard to that
which is absolutely non-existent,--then how much more in regard to
Brahman the Lord, the maker of all that moves or is motionless!
31. It is said, [Footnote: Taitt. Upanish. ii. 4.] "Speech retires
therefrom together with the Mind,"--but this is its explanation,--
give ear: Together with the Mind Speech makes Him its object, and
then retires, because His nature is not to be fathomed.
32. "Brahman is not to be made the object of mind or of words,"
[Footnote: Cf. the Ka.tha Up. vi. 12, "The soul is not to be reached
by speech nor by the mind nor by the eye."]--from this saying it is
understood that he is only to be declared by Revelation, Revelation
has no faltering action [Footnote: For __skhaladgati__, cf.
__Kavyaprakasa__, ii. 16.].
33. "He who is versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the highest
Brahman," [Footnote: This line is quoted from Sruti in the Maitri
Upanishad, vi. 22.]--surely such words of inspired sages are not
mistaken babble.
34. Assuredly the conventional meaning of the words "existent,"
"thought," and "joy" applies to Brahman, just as the words "pot,"
"cloth," etc., refer to those particular objects.
35. The perception of the conventional meaning of words is aroused
by the dialogue of the orderer and the ordered; and afterwards by
insertion and omission the child becomes thoroughly skilled in the
use of the words. [Footnote: Cf. Sahityadarpa.na, ii. "On the old
man's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man," etc.
The Sahitya D. uses the terms __avapoddharau__, the
Siddhantamuktavali (p. 80) uses __avapodvapan__].
36. So through hearing the words of the teacher and repeated study
of the sastras the conventional meaning of such words as Brahman,
etc., is assuredly produced in the pupil.
37. This earth must surely have had a maker; for its having the
nature of an effect is a sign, just as we see to be the case in
pots, etc.
38. If it is established that the supreme Lord is the maker, then
his having a body follows as a matter of course [Footnote: This is
one of the tenets of Ramanujas as well as Pur.naprajnas.]; for in
all effects, as pots and the like, the maker is seen to have a body
and not to be bodiless.
39. [The objector urges] "If the supreme Lord has a body, then he
will be like to beings such as we are; there cannot be a maker
without an intermediate agency [Footnote: The __vyapara__ or
intermediate agency is defined as __taj-janyatve sati taj-janya-
janako hi vyapara.h__],--I see no difference whatever."
40. But great is the difference which is declared to exist between
the Adorable Lord and men working with spades, sickles, ploughshares,
and hands; these are helpless in the six waves [Footnote: Compare
the memorial line, __Sokamohau jaram.rityu kshutpipase
sha.durmaya.h__.] (of human infirmity,) and wearied with the burden
of labour,--He effects everything by a mere motion of his brow.
41. The Master can make, not make [Footnote: With this curious use
of __akartum__ (extending the analogy of such forms as __akurvan,
ak.ritva__, etc.) cf. Theognis, 621: {Greek: __pas tis plousion
andpa tiei atiei de penixron__}. Cf. Shilleto, Cambridge Journ. of
Philology, 1876, p. 161.], and alter; hence one may learn that vast
is the interval between the two.
42. If the body is called the site of enjoyment, it is well known
that this definition will hold good (even in this highest case
[Footnote: Could __loke__ mean that it will hold good "of the world"
as his body?]),--there is nothing deficient but everything is present
in the Lord's body [Footnote: Cf. "Whose body nature is and God the
soul."], since He is the husband of Lakshmi.
43. "Every body is influenced by deserts,"--if this universal law is
accepted, then He who is the Maker of all must be impelled [to create
the world] by the deserts which dominate over beings like us
[Footnote: __I.e.__ he creates the world to give their deserts to the
different souls.]
44. "Every body must be non-eternal,"--this is a general law, yet
still Isvara's body may be eternal; for earth is everywhere seen to
be non-eternal, while in the form of its atoms it is eternal.
45. One must not say, "why should the desert of one attach itself to
another?" For it was in consequence of the respective merits and
demerits of the elephant and the crocodile that the holder of the
discus made all haste to interfere in the battle [Footnote: The
objector urges "why should our good or evil deserts oblige God to
act in a certain way?" He answers by referring to the well-known
legend given in the Bhagavata Pura.na, viii. ch. 2-4. A certain
king, named Indradyumna, became an elephant through Agastya's curse.
One day, while drinking in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, and
the struggle lasted for a thousand years. At last, in despair, he
prayed to Vish.nu, who came down mounted on Garu.da and killed the
crocodile. Thus we see that, although in one sense the deserts of one
being cannot attach themselves to another, still they must cause
certain actions in another being, or it would be impossible that each
should receive its due reward or punishment.]
46. It has been heard of old that all this universe proceeded from
the lotus of the navel of the Lord; hence is it established that be
has a body, for how can there be a navel without a body?
47. The body of God is very pure,--to be enjoyed by all the senses,
as being richly endowed with the six qualities [Footnote: These six
qualities, according to the Commentator on the Bhagavata P. i. 3. 36,
are sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion, and
virtue; a different list is given in the Sarva Dars. S. p. 54, l. 22
(but cf. p. 69, l. 18). See also __infra__ in sl. 95.],--and to be
discovered by means of all the Vedas,--Ganga verily is the water
wherewith he washes his feet.
48. Whenever by the influence of time there comes the increase of evil
and the diminution of right, then the adorable Lord accomplishes the
preservation of the good and the destruction of the wicked.
49. The Lord is said to be twofold, as the Incarnation and He who
becomes incarnate; so too the souls are twofold, as divided into
faithful and faithless.
50. Now some say that the personal soul is only the reflection of the
Supreme; but their opinion does not at all hold, since it cannot be
established.
51. For how could there arise a reflection of that Infinite and
stainless one? and how could an insentient [reflection] enjoy the pain
and pleasure arising from the merit and demerit declared in the Veda?
52. There may indeed be a reflection of that which is limited; but how
shall there be one of Him whose attribute is infinity?
53. Ramanuja, the foremost of the learned, condemned this theory of an
original and its reflection; the fact that this doctrine is not
accepted by the learned, will not make it seem more plausible.
54. There is an eternal division between the two, from the words of
the Veda, "two birds;" [Footnote: Rig V. i. 164, 20, "Two birds
associated together, two friends, take refuge in the same tree; one
of them eats the sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merely
looks on."] from the mention there of "two friends," how can there
be identity between them?
55. I become Brahman, that is, I cease to have mundane existence
through beholding the soul in Brahman; the result of this would be
the abolition of sorrow, etc., but in no way absolute Oneness.
56. I become Brahman also through beholding Brahman in the soul
[Footnote: Another reading is __brahma.ny atmaniriksha.nat__]; the
result would be the abolition of His being out of sight [Footnote:
__I.e.__ it would be always __videre videntem__], but in no way
Oneness.
57. It must not be said that by continued meditation with intent
thought a man becomes Brahman; there will only enter into him a
little merit; as we see indeed in the case of worms, bees, and the
like [Footnote: Cf. Hitopadesa, Introd. sl. 45.];
58. By devotedly worshipping Brahmans without ceasing, a Sudra will
never become a Brahman; there may enter into him a little merit, but
one of the Sudra caste will never become a Brahman.
59. The venerable author of the Aphorisms himself established a
duality when he spoke of the application of the terms "object" and
"agent" [Footnote: In Vedanta S. i. 2. 4, it is shown that certain
passages in the Upanishads refer to Brahman and not the embodied
soul, "because of the application therein of the terms object
and agent;" as __e.g.__ in the passage of the Chhandogya Upan. iii.
14, "I shall attain it when I have departed from hence." These
words imply an agent who attains and also an object which is
attained, __i.e.__ Brahman. Sa"nkara in his comment on i. 2. 11
illustrates this by the passage in the Katha Upanishad iii. 1, "The
two, drinking the due reward from their works, in this world
entered the cave, in the highest place of the supreme soul" (sc.
the heart)]; and thus has it been explained by the author of the
commentary by quoting passages of the Veda which imply duality, as
that which says "the two entered the cave."
60. The soul is also shown to be different [from Brahman] by the
evidence of Sm.riti [Footnote: Cf. Vedanta Sutras i. 2. 6, where
Sa"nkara quotes the passage from the Bhagavad Gita (xviii. 61),
"The Lord of all beings abides in the region of the heart,--causing
all beings to revolve by his illusion as though mounted on a
machine."]; thus their difference is proved to be essential. If it
were not so, how could the Commentator have used such an expression
as "the worshipper" and "the worshipped" [Footnote: He uses this
very expression __upasyopasakabhava__ in his Comment. on i. 2. 4.]?
61. I am sometimes happy, sometimes miserable; He, the supreme Soul,
is always essentially happy. Such is the difference,--then how can
there be identity between these two different substances?
62. He is eternally self-luminous and unobscured,-- intensely pure,
the one witness of the world; not so is the individual soul,--thus
a thunderbolt falls on the tree of the theory of Identity.
63. For those who maintain the identity of the individual and supreme
soul, the hypothesis of a __dvandva compound__ [Footnote: __I.e.__ in
the word __jivatmanau__] is precluded; or they bring forward such
words as __d.rishadupala__ as parallel cases [Footnote: I suppose that
this means that the __dvandva__ compound __d.rishadupala__ has some
analogy to one like __jivatmanau__, which involves identity, as the
upper and lower millstone form one instrument; but there (in
accordance with Pa.n. 2. 2. 34, __vartt.__) the less important word
meaning the upper and smaller stone (__upala__) is placed last
(cf. 2. 2. 31)]; the __dvandva__ is only consistent with "difference,"
but in no way with "identity."