Life: Its True Genesis by R. W. Wright

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But, at the risk of being tedious, let us extend this argument of the
materialists a little further: The only difference, they will still
insist, between the preA"xisting germs of crystals and plants--or the only
difference essentially worth noticing--is that crystalline particles of
matter are endowed with much less potentiality of undergoing diversified
forms and structural changes than the more highly favored vital particles,
such as the proligerous pellicle, the bioplast, the plastide, etc. The one
represents mere crystallizable matter, the other the more complex
colloidal or albuminoid substance, or that capable of producing a much
greater number of aggregates. The analogies, they concede, end here. But
the difference is world-wide when we come to processes--the true
experimental test in all classification. Crystallizable substances
_crystallize_--that is all. They pass into a fixed and immovable state,
and mostly into one as enduring as adamant; while colloidal or albuminoid
matter (laboratory protoplasm) takes on no fixed forms--only those that
are ephemeral, merely transitory. This is so marked a feature, in respect
to all the primordial forms of life, that Professor Bastian gives them the
more distinctive name of "ephemeromorphs," in place of _infusoria_. But
all these primordial forms grow--develop into vital activity. Not so with
a solitary crystal. Everywhere the statical unit _forms_, the dynamical
unit _grows_; the one aggregates, the other assimilates; the one
solidifies, the other opens up into living tissue; the one rests in the
embrace of eternal silence, the other breaks the adamantine doors, and
makes nature resonant with praise.

Great stress is laid by the materialists on the changeability of certain
microscopic forms, and the startling metamorphoses they apparently undergo
in different infusions, especially those forms having developmental
tendencies towards fungi and certain low forms of algA|. They attribute
their different modes of branching, articulation, segmentation of
filaments, etc., both to intrinsic tendencies and extrinsic causes, the
latter depending, no doubt, in a great measure upon the chemical changes
constantly taking place in their respective infusions. These intrinsic
tendencies, they would have us believe, depend upon the dynamic force of
molecules, rather than any vital unit, or even change in elementary
conditions. But "Dynamism" simply implies that force inheres in, or
appertains to, all material substance, without specifically designating
either the quantity or quality of the inhering force. If these
materialists, therefore, use the terms "dynamic force," in this
connection, in the sense in which we use vital force, or in the sense in
which they use "statical force" as applied to the formation of crystals,
in contradistinction from "dynamical force" as applied to living
organisms, we have no special objection to urge against this particular
formula. It presents no such formidable antagonism as the vitalists would
expect to encounter from them.

M. Dutrochet is approvingly quoted by Professor Bastian, as asserting that
he could produce different genera of mouldiness (low mycological forms)
_at will_, by simply employing different infusions. This is unquestionably
true, with certain limitations. And the chief limitation is as to _his_
(M. Dutrochet's) will. He might "will," for instance, to plant one field
with corn and another with potatoes, but if the husbandman he employed to
do the planting should happen to plant the one crop where he had willed to
plant the other, and corn should grow where potatoes were planted, and
_vice versa_, then he might be said to have produced corn _at will_. And
so of his infusions. No change in their conditions enabled him to produce
one species, much less a genus, of mouldiness in preference to another, by
any change in the infusions employed by him. The power which implants life
in the mycological world, implants it in every other world, from that
without beginning to that without end. And this implanted life is quite as
complete in one form as another,--

"As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns."

All that the materialists can claim respecting man's agency in the
production of life is, that he may take advantage of the uniform laws of
nature, so far as they are known to him, planting seeds here, changing
chemical conditions there, using different infusions in his experimental
flasks,--organic or inorganic, as he may choose--and then await the
action of these uniform laws. He will find them operative everywhere, and
if he studies them deeply enough, he will find that they are not so much
the laws of nature as they are the laws of nature's God.

Professor Bastian thinks he has conclusive evidence that what he calls
"new-born specks of living matter" are produced _de novo_, that is,
independently of any conceivable germ or germinal principle of life
implanted in nature. But he confounds this implanted principle of life
with the living organism it produces. His morphological cells, as well as
plastide particles, are among these living organisms, as is conclusively
shown by his own experiments. These all perish in his super-heated flasks.
But the vital principle that produced them--that which becomes germinal
under the proper conditional incidences--he can no more destroy by
experimentation than he can create a new world or annihilate the old one.
His flask experiments, therefore, prove nothing; and all this talk about
_de novo_ production is the sheerest scientific delusion. For, were it
possible to destroy every plant, tree, shrub, blade of grass, weed, seed,
underground root, nut, and tuber to-day, the earth would teem with just as
diversified a vegetation as ever to-morrow. A few trees, like the gigantic
conifers of the Pacific slope, might not make their appearance again, and
some plants might drop out of the local flora; but the _Pater omnipotens
Ather_ of Virgil, would descend into the bosom of his joyous spouse (the
earth), and, great himself, mingle with her great body, in all the
prodigality, profusion, and wealth of vegetation as before.[27]

But these defiant challengers of the vitalists, who refuse us even the
right to assume the existence of a special "vital force" in nature, are
anything but consistent in their logical deductions. For while they
resolutely deny the invasion of vital germs in their experimental flasks,
they talk as flippantly of the "germs of crystals," and their presence in
saline and other solutions, as if there were no scientific formula more
satisfactorily generalized than that establishing their existence. Even
Professor Bastian speaks of "germs," in a general sense, as if they
thronged the earth, air, water, and even the stratified rocks, in
countless and unlimited numbers. But we fail to see that any of his
accurately obtained results determine their exclusion from the
experimental media employed by him for that purpose. His unit of value is
a morphological cell, a derivative organism rather than a primary vital
unit; and all organisms are, as we have before said, destructible by heat.
Professor Agassiz is pretty good authority for doubting the existence of
such a cell. The difficulty of assigning to it any definitional value is,
that it lies too near the ultimate implications of matter--those shadowy
and inexplicable confines not yet reached--to admit of any scientific
explication necessarily resting on objective data. If they mean by "germs"
primary organic cells, then none exist in their super-heated infusions,
and they are logical enough in rejecting the idea of their invasion. But
in assuming the cell to be the ultimate unit of value, is where they trip
in attribution, and stumble upon a partial judgment only.

The only value attaching to their theory of crystalline germs is, that it
conclusively establishes the law of uniformity by which all structural
forms are determined, whether they originate in organic infusions or
inorganic solutions--in protoplasm or protoprism. The crystalline system
presents no variability in types, but a rigid adherence to specific forms
of definitely determined value. Whatever geometrical figure any particular
crystal assumed at first, it has continued to assume ever since, and will
forever assume hereafter. As a primary conception of the "Divine
Intendment" (to speak after the manner of Leibnitz) it can neither change
itself, nor become subject to any law of change, or variability, from
eternally fixed types. And this is as demonstrably true of all living
types, after reaching the point of heredity, as of the countless
crystalline forms that go to make up the principal bulk of our planet. In
this light, and as affording this conclusive induction, the crystalline
argument of the materialists has its value.

The materialists should not too mincingly chop logic over the validity of
their own reasoning. If they force upon us their conclusions respecting
statical aggregates, or crystalline forms, let them accept the inductions
that inevitably follow in the case of dynamical aggregates, or living
organisms. Beggars of conditions should not be choosers of conditions,
nor should they be al lowed to dodge equivalent judgments where the
validity of one proposition manifestly rests upon that of another. If
they insist upon the presence of a chemical unit, or, worse still, a
crystalline "germ" or unit, in the case of statical aggregations, they
are effectually estopped from denying the presence of vital units in
dynamical aggregations. And if they further force upon us the conviction
that the process of aggregation, when once determined, remains in the one
case, eternally fixed and certain, they should not be permitted to turn
round and insist that, in the other case, there is nothing fixed and
certain, but all is variability, change, uncertainty of specific forms.
If vital units have only a hypothetical existence, then chemical units,
statical units, and morphological units, should fall into the same
categories of judgment.

A great deal of needless ingenuity has been wasted, both by the vitalists
and materialists, in formulating impossible definitions of life--in
attempts to tell us what life is. But Mr. Herbert Spencer is believed, by
his many admirers, to have hit upon the precise explanatory phrases
necessary to convey its true definitional meaning. He defines it as "_the
continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations_." This
definition, when first formulated, was received by all the materialists of
Europe with the wildest enthusiasm. It was absolutely perfect. All the
phenomenal facts of life fitted into it, as one box, in a nest of them,
fitted into another. The universal world was challenged to show that any
other phenomenal fact than the one of life would fit into this prodigious
formula of Mr. Spencer. The London "Times" tried its hand on it, but only
in a playful way. It said: "All the world, or at least all living things,
are nothing but large boxes containing an infinite number of little boxes,
one within the other, and the least and tiniest box of all contains the
germ,"--the elementary principle of life. But this was hardly a legitimate
characterization. A nest of boxes presents no idea of "continuous
adjustment," nor are the internal relations of one box adjusted to the
external relations of another. The definition is really that of a piece of
working machinery--any working machinery--and was designed to cover Mr.
Spencer's theory of "molecular machinery" as run by molecular force.

But the earth presents the most perfect adjustment of internal relations
to those that are external, and it continuously presents them. Even the
upheaval of its fire-spitting mountains affords the highest demonstration
of the adjustment of its inner terrestrial forces to those that are purely
external; and much more does it show the adjustment of its internal to its
external relations. There is a continuous adaptation of means to ends, of
causes to effects, of adjustments to re-adjustments, in respect to the
characteristics of the earth's surface--its physical configuration, the
distribution of its fluids and solids, its fauna and flora, its
hygrometric and thermometric conditions, its ocean, wind, and
electro-magnetic currents, and even its meteorological manifestations--all
showing a continuous adjustment of interior to exterior conditions or
relations. The earth should, therefore, fall under the category of "life,"
according to Herbert Spencer's definitional formula. And so should an
automatic dancing-jack that is made to run by internal adjustments to
external movements or manifestations. There are any number of Professor
Bastian's "ephemoromorphs" that do not live half as long as one of these
automatic dancing-jacks will run, and so long as they run, the adjustment
of their internal to their external relations is continuous.

The success of Mr. Spencer's definition of "life" encouraged Professor
Bastian to try his hand at it, with this definitional result: "Life," he
says, "is an unstable collocation of Matter (with a big M), capable of
growing by selection and interstitial appropriation of new matter (what
new matter?) which then assumes similar qualities, of continually varying
in composition in response to variations of its Medium (another big M),
and which is capable of self-multiplication by the separation of portions
of its own substance."

It shall not be our fault if the reader fails to understand this
definition--to untwist this formidable formula of life. And we can best
aid him by grammatically analyzing its structure. And,

1. "Life is capable of growing." We are glad to know this. As a vitalist
it enables us to take a step towards the front--gets us off the "back
seat" to which we were summarily ordered at the outset of this inquiry. We
let its "unstable collocation" pass for what it is worth, and stick to our
grammatical analysis.

2. "Life grows--is capable of doing something." This assurance positively
encourages us.

3. "It grows by selection and interstitial appropriation." This is still
more encouraging. It emboldens us to take a second step forward. Life, we
feel, is increasing in potentiality.

4. "By appropriation it enables _new matter to assume similar qualities
to old matter_." This makes us more confident than ever; we take another
step forward--are half disposed to take two of them. Life is getting to
be almost a "potentiated potentiality," to adopt the style of
materialistic phrases.

5. "It causes matter _to continually vary in composition._" Bravo! we
unhesitatingly take two steps forward on the strength of this most
comforting assurance. Life is assuredly getting the upperhand of
Matter (with a big M.) It is no longer a mere "undiscovered correlate
of motion"--a hypothetical slave to matter only. It wrestles with
it--throws it into the shade. We involuntarily take several more
steps forward.

6. "Life is capable of self-multiplication"--has almost a creative
faculty. Here we interject a perfect bravura of "bravoes," and,
stepping boldly up to the front, demand of Professor Bastian to "throw
up the sponge," take a back seat, and there--formulate us a new
definition of "life."

But our London University materialist is not entirely satisfied with his
own definition, or at least with the moral effect of it. He thinks that
all these attempts to define life as a non-entity only, tend to keep up
the demoralizing idea that it is an actual entity. We entirely agree with
him in this conclusion. The infelicity and entire inconclusiveness of the
definition he has vouchsafed us can hardly have any other effect. He sees
this himself, and hence this foot-note to his great work on
Ephemeromorphs: "Inasmuch as no life can exist without an organism, of
which it is the phenomenal manifestation, so it seems comparatively
useless to attempt to define this phenomenal manifestation alone--and,
what is worse, such attempts tend to keep up the idea that life is an
independent entity."

It may be objected that our grammatical analysis of the professor's
definition of life is unfair, since he manifestly intended that it should
cover a "living thing," and not "life" as an abstract, term. Our reply to
this is, that he makes no distinction between the two. Life, with him, is
simply a phenomenal manifestation. The two are correlative terms; so that
his definition of the one must necessarily be the definition of the other,
either as an identical or partial judgment. But let us take his definition
entirely out of its abstract sense, and run it into the concrete. The able
pathological anatomist of the London University college is a "living
thing." He is, therefore, presumably a phenomenal manifestation. He is
capable of growing, by "selection and interstitial appropriation," in
reputation at least, if not in the direction of "an independent entity."
His work of twelve hundred pages, covering his laborious delvings into the
ephemeromorphic world, is conclusive on this point. As a phenomenal
manifestation alone, any attempt to define either him or his professional
labors, may be worse than useless, since it would tend to keep up the idea
that he is an actual London entity. We are very confident that he is not a
London non-entity, but are willing to agree that he is either the one or
the other. The flaw that we are after lies in his interstitial logic, not
in the hallucination in which he indulges respecting nonentities. His
assumption that life cannot exist without an organism, of which it is the
phenomenal manifestation, is what we propose to deal with.

Now, directly the reverse of this proposition is what is true. An organism
cannot exist without life or an independent vital principle in nature, any
more than celestial bodies can be held in their place independently of
gravitation. The vital principle that organizes must precede the thing
organized or the living organism, as the great formative principle of the
universe (call it the will of God, gravitation or what you may) must have
existed before the first world-aggregation. In logic, we must either
advance or fall back--insist upon precedence being given to cause over
effect, or deny their relative connection altogether. The organism is the
phenomenal manifestation, not the vital principle which organizes it. To
say that there can be no _manifestation_ of life without an organism is
true; but to assume that the vital principle which organizes is dependent
on its own organism for its manifestation is absurd. It would be the
lesser fallacy to deny the phenomenal fact altogether, and insist that
cause and effect are mere intellectual aberrations, or such absurd mental
processes as find no correlative expression in nature, as that embodying
the idea of either an antecedent or a consequent.

"Plato lived." He ate, he drank, he talked divinely. He was the occupant
of an admirably constructed life-mansion; one that St. Paul would have
looked upon as "the temple of God," and all the world would have
recognized as a god-like temple. His head was a study for the Greek
chisel; none was ever more perfectly modeled, or artistically executed.
All agreed in this. And yet it was not the _habitat_ but the _habitant_
that attracted the admiration of the Greek mind; enkindled its highest
enthusiasm; drew all the schools of philosophy, about him at once. It was
the lordly occupant of the temple, the indwelling _Archeus_, presiding
over all the organic phenomena and directing all the dynamic powers
therein, which was so profoundly present in the living Plato. Even
Professor Haeckel, of the famous University of Jena, would not deny this,
with all that his new terms "ontogeny" and "phylogeny" may imply. When
potential life passed over into actual life in the individual Plato, it
was not the pabulum that assimilated the man, but the man the pabulum. If
this were not so, then the mere potentiality of growing, as in the case
of plants and animals, would be all there is to distinguish the
phenomenal manifestation of a Plato from that of a mole or a
cabbage-stalk. In other words, if the animating principle of life--or, as
the Bible has it, the "animating soul of life"--is not what manifests
itself in material embodiment, but the reverse, what can Professor
Haeckel mean by his new term "phylogeny," which ought to cover the lines
of descent in all organic beings?

If it be a question of mere pabulum, it is altogether _mal posA(C)_. Pabulum
is nothing without a preA"xisting "something" to dispose of it. It is not
so much as a jelly-mass breakfast for one of Professor Haeckel's
"protamoebA|;" for if it were served up in advance, there would be none of
his little non-nucleated jelly-eaters to partake of it, much less any of
his "protogenes." As the famous Mrs. Glass would say, in her "hand-book of
cookery," if you want a delightful "curry," first catch your hare. But our
ingenious professor of Jena dispenses with both the hare and the curry, in
serving up his pabulum to the "protamoebA|." The improvident pabulum
"evolves" its own eaters, and then, spider-like, is eviscerated by them,
as was Actaeon by his own hounds. As Life, therefore, begins in the
tragedy of Mount CithA|ron, it is to be hoped it will end in the delights
of Artemis and her bathing nymphs.

Chapter VIII.

Materialistic Theories of Life Refuted.

The methods by which the advocates of a purely physical origin of life
seek to establish the correctness of their conclusions, are unfortunately
not always attended by uniform results in experimentation. They subject
their solutions of organic matter to a very high temperature by means of
super-heated flasks, the tubes to which are so packed in red-hot materials
that whatever air may enter them shall encounter a much greater degree of
heat than that indicated by boiling water. At this temperature (100A deg.
C--212A deg. F) they assume that all living organisms perish, especially when
the solutions containing them have been kept, for the space of fifteen or
twenty minutes, at this standard point of heat. But, in the light of all
the experiments which have been made in this direction, there is some
doubt as to the entire correctness of their assumption. That many, if not
most living organisms, perish at a temperature of 100A deg. C, there is little
or no doubt; but that there are some which are much more tenacious of
life, that is, possess greater vital resistance to heat, is equally
unquestionable.

M. Pasteur, for instance, mentions the spores of certain fungi which are
capable of germinating after an exposure of some minutes to a temperature
of 120A deg. to 125A deg. C. (248-257A deg. F), while the same spores entirely lose their
germinating power after an exposure for half an hour or more to a slightly
higher temperature. Dr. Grace-Calvert, in a paper on "The Action of Heat
on Protoplasmic Life," recently published in the proceedings of the Royal
Society, asserts that certain "black vibrios" are capable of resisting the
action of fluids at a temperature as high as 300A deg. F, although exposed
therein for half an hour or more. But none of these crucial tests, however
diverse in experimental results, really touch the all-important question
in controversy. They all relate either to living organisms, or to the
seeds and spores of vegetation, not to living indestructible
"germs"--invisible vital units--declared to be in the earth itself.

We use the term "vital unit" in the same restricted sense in which the
materialists speak of "chemical units," "morphological units," etc., which
they admit are invisible in the microscopic field, and hence they can have
no positive information as to their destructibility or indestructibility
by heat. That this vital unit lies, in its true functional tendencies,
between the chemical and morphological units--manifesting itself in the
conditions of the one and resulting in the structural development of the
other--is no new or startling theory, but one that has been more or less
obscurely hinted at by Leibnitz, and even acknowledged as possible by
Herbert Spencer. It is this vital unit that assimilates or aggregates
protoplasmic matter into the morphological cell, or the initial organism
in a vital structure, or an approach towards structural form.
Morphological cells are not therefore "units," considered as the least of
any given whole, nor are they mere structureless matter, or any more
homogeneous in character than in substance. Different chemical solutions
give rise to different morphological cells, as differently constituted
soils produce different vegetal growths. Change the chemical conditions in
any solution or infusion, and you change the entire morphological
character of the infusoria appearing therein.[28] The cells are living
organisms springing from vital units, and can no more manifest themselves
independently of these units than life can manifest itself independently
of an actual organism. And they make their appearance in the proper
environing conditions, just as the oak comes from its primordial germ or
vital unit in the chemically changed conditions of the soil. Everywhere
the vital germ or unit precedes the vital growth as the plant or tree
precedes the natural seeds it bears.

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