The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke V1 by Stephen Gwynn

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In this Sir Charles was with Lord Ripon, but a draft treaty of Lord
Ripon's, which proposed to surrender Merv ('not ours to give'), roused his
fierce opposition, and was rejected by the Cabinet. He was always resolute
for a strong frontier policy in Central Asia.

The assassination of the Emperor of Russia on March 13th in this year
roused all the Home Offices into activity, and England was as usual taxed
with being the asylum of every desperado. Sir William Harcourt inclined
strongly to the demands of the police, including the prosecution of
Socialist publications, and he carried the Cabinet with him.

'On March 26th I noted in my diary: "...At to-day's Cabinet Bright was
the only Minister who opposed the prosecution of the _Freiheit_, and
Chamberlain positively supported it."'

It may be added that Sir Charles was charged by a certain Mr. Maltman
Barry with having subscribed to the funds of the _Freiheit_, which was an
anarchist publication. The charge was met by an absolute denial, and was
supported by no evidence. It was, however, fathered in the House by Lord
Randolph Churchill, and this led to a breach of friendly relations with
the latter, which lasted for some time.

'On April 9th I was in Paris, and breakfasted with Gambetta, who told
me that Bismarck was about to propose a Conference, which was insisted
on by Russia, concerning the right of asylum, and we agreed that
England and France should refuse together to take part in it.'

A fortnight later Sir Charles, returning from Toulon, was able to offer
his congratulations to Gambetta, because France had declined to attend the
Conference. But the matter was still open as regarded England, and

'on April 30th, and again on May 3rd, I noted that Sir William was
"wrongheaded about the right of asylum," but that I hoped he would not
be allowed by his colleagues to offer to legislate on extradition to
please the Russians.'

At the Cabinet on May 4th

'there was a long debate upon nihilism. Lord Granville some time
before had told the Russians that legislation was intended. That was
so, for a Bill had been prepared. But it was clear that it would be
foolish to introduce it. Kimberley and Chamberlain were against all
proposals to meet the Russians. Then came before the Cabinet the
question of Harcourt's reply to Cowen's question to be put on the next
day, whether information was given by the English police to the
Austrian police as to Socialist addresses in Vienna, which had led to
arrests. Our police say that they only told the Austrians of a place
where dynamite was stored. This seemed to me a cock and bull of Howard
Vincent's. Harcourt had drafted a reply about Napoleon Bonaparte,
which the Cabinet wanted him to alter, but when he is pleased with an
answer it is not easy to make him alter it, as I noted. As our police
virtually denied the charge, Harcourt might have given their denial,
as theirs, in their own words, but nothing would induce him to do
this.'

As regarded Russia, Lord Granville based himself on the fact that a
similar arrangement existed between England and Germany, and he questioned
whether political offenders would be much safer in a German than in a
Russian court of law. To the promise of backing from France, he objected
that M. Saint-Hilaire had already pledged himself to an extradition treaty
with Russia. On the latter point Sir Charles answered that for this
amongst other reasons M. Saint-Hilaire was about to be removed from the
French Foreign Office. In the end of October, 1881, Sir Charles was seeing
Gambetta frequently, and observes that he was

'much excited about the question of the extradition treaty with
Russia....

'Curious though it seems to us (in 1890-1895), when we know how
intensely pro-Russian Gambetta's friends now are, Gambetta was
intensely anti-Russian and pro-Turk....

'There is the same difference of opinion in the French Cabinet as to
the making of an extradition treaty with Russia as there is in ours,
where Harcourt wants it and his colleagues do not. This was the only
subject discussed at the interview of the Russian and German Emperors
at Danzig' (September, 1881), 'and England and France are in their
black books.'

Lord Granville constantly referred to Sir Charles for advice as to the
temper of the House of Commons, though in this case he supported Sir
William Harcourt, and might be excused for failing to see what was plain
to Sir Charles as a practical House of Commons politician, that, apart
from principles, a Liberal Ministry would be sadly embarrassed if it had
to defend the handing over of political refugees to the Russian police,
and that the Tories would probably support the Radical wing in a vote of
censure.

The combination at the Foreign Office of the two Ministers, the old and
the young, the Whig and the democrat, worked excellently, and Lord
Granville, in telling Sir Charles that in his absence in France during the
Session Hartington must answer his questions, said that 'picking out any
of those who are not in the Cabinet is an indication of what would be done
when that terrible moment may come to me of your leaving the P.O.' One
matter had, however, caused Sir Charles uneasiness.

In the close of the year 1880 there was a proposal to give a charter to
the North Borneo Company. No ordinary politician knew anything of this
Company, but Sir Charles, while in Opposition, had grounds for asking
questions hostile to it, and had stirred up Mr. Rylands to do the same.
This fact Dilke mentioned to Lord Granville. But, finding Foreign Office
opinion in favour of the concession, he promised that

'I would not take an active part in opposition to the Charter scheme
if and providing the Cabinet approved of it.... On November 19th,
1880, the box, which had been round the Cabinet on the North Borneo
business, having returned without any comment by Mr. Gladstone, I got
it sent again to Mr. Gladstone, who finally decided, I was informed by
Lord Granville, against Herbert of the Colonial Office, Harcourt,
Chamberlain, Bright, Childers, and myself, and with Lord Kimberley,
the Chancellor, and Lord Granville. So it was settled that the Charter
was to be granted; but a little later Mr. Gladstone forgot the
decision which he had given, insisted that he had never heard of the
matter at all, went the other way and would have stopped the Charter,
but for the fact that it was too late.'

This made Sir Charles exceedingly indisposed to undertake the defence of
it in a House of Commons where his own questions asked in Opposition would
assuredly be quoted against him by Sir John Gorst, who, when the Charter
was published in December, tabled a motion against it. 'It was not so much
to the thing itself I was opposed as to the manner in which it was done.'
He therefore wrote to Lord Granville that he had made full search for
precedents, 'the first thing which occurs to a Radical in distress,' and
that finding no modern precedent, he simply could not undertake to defend
the Charter, his objections being that to make such a grant without the
knowledge of Parliament strained the prerogative of the Crown, and,
further, that the Foreign Office was not the fit department to control a
colony (as had been urged in the case of Cyprus). He notes: 'Gambetta
tells me that he has at once had an application from a similar French
Company--for the New Hebrides.' Lord Granville made official reply, with
some asperity. But he sent a separate unofficial letter, in which, after
treating of other matters, he smoothed over his more formal communication.
These letters were received by Sir Charles on December 27th, 1881, on his
return to Paris from Toulon.[Footnote: Later Sir Charles notes: 'My own
objections (besides those to the form in which the matter had been
considered) were to the absence of sufficient provisions with regard to
domestic slavery and opium, but as regards these two latter points I
succeeded in getting the gap filled in.'] The unofficial letter ran:

"I have sent you an answer on a separate piece of paper to your rather
blowing-up letter about Borneo. You have been misled by Spencer's
ignorance and Gladstone's very natural forgetfulness of the
particulars. It was more inexcusable of me to have forgotten what it
appears you told me about your and Rylands' previous action. When my
liver does not act and official work becomes unusually irksome, I
sometimes ask myself upon what question I should like to be beaten and
turned out. The first would be fair trade. The second, which the _St.
James's_ and Raikes, the late Chairman of Committees, seem to
anticipate, is failure to reform the procedure of the Commons owing to
Tory and Home Rule obstruction. I should not think Borneo a fatal
question for this purpose.... There is a great run upon us now as to
Ireland, but do you remember a December when it was not generally
supposed that the Government of the day was going to the dogs?"

The matter passed over, but was serious enough for Mr. Chamberlain to say
in January of the following year:

"If, what I do not expect, the affair should proceed to extremities, I
shall stand or fall with you."

One other matter of this period is interesting as showing Sir Charles and
his chief at work. A draft was on its way to the Colonial Office, 'laying
down the law for dealing with fugitive slaves who escaped into the British
sphere of influence'--a case of constant occurrence at Zanzibar. Sir
Charles's views on this and kindred subjects were strong, and he worked
then, as always, with the Aborigines Protection Society. He stopped it--

'and Lord Granville wrote upon my views a characteristic minute': "I
think our proposed draft is right and defensible in argument. I also
am of opinion that your condemnation of it is right, because the fact
is that the national sentiment is so strongly opposed to what is
enjoined by international law that it is better not to wake the cat as
long as she is asleep!"'

At the end of July, 1881, Lord Granville's health seemed seriously
affected, and Sir Charles noted that, apart from his own personal feeling,
his chief's enforced retirement would be 'a great misfortune.' The choice
would be between Lords Derby, Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook. Lord
Derby seemed to him 'undecided and weak,' Lord Northbrook still weaker,
while Lord Hartington 'knew no French and nothing of foreign affairs.' Of
Lord Kimberley's ability he had not then formed a high estimate; but he
adds that, having afterwards sat with him in the Cabinet, he changed that
opinion, finding him 'a wise man,' who never did himself justice in
conversation.

CHAPTER XXV

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Although in the course of 1881 Sir Charles had refused to defend in the
House of Commons a special grant for defraying the Prince of Wales's
expenses on a Garter Mission to St. Petersburg, and Lord Frederick
Cavendish, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, had to undertake this
task, which more properly belonged to the Foreign Office, the Prince's
relations with him were cordial. The Prince was increasingly inclined to
interest himself in foreign politics, but received very little
encouragement from the Court. In June, 1880 (when the rumours as to
Challemel-Lacour were being set afloat [Footnote: For an account of these
rumours see Chapter XXII., p. 353.]), Sir Charles noted that, as far as he
could ascertain, the Prince of Wales,

'being not at this time admitted by the Queen to "official knowledge,"
got the whole of his modern history from the _Figaro_....

'On the evening of February 19th, 1881, I dined with Lord and Lady
Spencer to meet the Prince and Princess of Wales. The Prince spoke to
me about his anxiety to be kept informed of foreign affairs, and the
Princess spoke to me in the same sense, telling me how fond she was of
her brother the "King of Greece," and how anxious therefore about his
business. The Prince asked me whether he could, while in Paris, do
anything to help on the negotiation of a new treaty of commerce, and I
wrote to him next morning to suggest the language that he should hold.
Ferry, the Prime Minister, I pointed out, was a Protectionist, and I
suggested that the Prince should say to Ferry how important for the
good understanding of the two countries it would be to conclude a fair
treaty at once....

'On the 18th I had written to Gambetta to tell him that I should be in
Paris on April 9th and on April 24th, and that I was to see him, but
that no one was to know; and on March 20th I received his answer
accepting my conditions. The Prince of Wales had carried out the
suggestion which I had made, having taken my letter with him, and read
it over immediately before seeing Jules Ferry, upon whom he seemed to
have made some impression.'

This Sir Charles learnt from a letter of Gambetta's of March 30th, which
ended: "Je vous attends le 9 avril au matin, incognito strict
impénétrable, ou le 24 au retour Á votre choix." At this meeting Sir
Charles received from Gambetta the assurance that delegates would be sent
to London to attempt the negotiation of a treaty.

Sir Charles did not believe that a treaty would be concluded. In his
judgment England would not consent to accept a treaty unless it were an
improvement on the existing position, and such a treaty France was not
likely to give. But he believed that by negotiating better terms could be
obtained, not indeed by treaty, but under the tariff which the French
legislature would introduce by Bill. [Footnote: Gambetta kept in touch
with Sir Charles throughout on this matter, writing April 16th: "Nous
causerons de toutes ces sottes affaires, que je ne peux m'imaginer aussi
mal conduites, mais il y a encore de l'espoir, croyez-moi."]

A joint Commission was nominated to sit in London, with Challemel-
Lacour and Dilke for its respective heads. The other English Commissioners
were Sir C. Rivers Wilson, who was a Treasury official before he became
Finance Minister in Egypt; Mr. C. M. Kennedy, head of the Commercial
Department of the Foreign Office; and Mr. W. E. Baxter, the member for
Dundee. Sir Charles says of the preliminary meetings, which were concerned
with a wrangle between him and Challemel-Lacour as to the extent to which
M. Léon Say had committed his Government:

'We got no further, but we were both very much pleased with ourselves
for the manner in which we argued. Challemel, being an orator and
having the use of his own tongue, was at an advantage, but I managed
to hold my own, I think, pretty well.'

'At the second meeting, May 30th, I began a course of speeches on pig
iron and such matters which was destined to continue for many months.
I used to get up my technical terms in the morning (the "jargon," as
the French call it), and to forget them immediately after. I believe
that on this day I forgot the French for "steel blooms" within five
minutes after being most learned in regard to them.'

The sittings went on throughout June, 1881, with results in some respects
favourable. But the matter had now a political as well as a commercial
aspect. It was probable that Gambetta was about to form a Government,
though it was unlikely to come into being before the late autumn, after
the French general election. On both sides there was a desire to have
friendly relations, but public feeling was extremely sensitive in both
countries. The occupation of Tunis had produced a certain tension with the
Foreign Office; and in France the growing Protectionist movement made it
certain that if England, which from 1860 onward had enjoyed special terms
in her commerce with France, was again to have a special treaty, it would
not be so favourable.

The position in July was that a treaty giving certain advantages to
England could be secured at once from M. Ferry's Ministry, and that a
total failure of the negotiations was in itself to be deprecated. Lord
Lyons was for concluding the treaty which might be made at once, fearing
lest England should be put under the general tariff. Here Sir Charles's
familiarity with Parliament made him invaluable. He perceived that any
treaty which could be made at this moment would leave certain leading
British industries--notably cottons and woollens--worse off than they had
been under the expiring arrangement, and therefore would probably be upset
by a vote in the House of Commons. This would be disastrous. It seemed to
him better to wait till Gambetta came in, and to do the best he could with
the new Government. This decision prevailed, Sir Charles persuading Mr.
Chamberlain to support his view in the Cabinet.

It was decided, however, to insist on prolongation of the existing treaty
as a condition of continuing the negotiations, and Sir Charles now
proposed to strengthen his hand by a threat of retaliation. He was invited
by the Prime Minister to attend a meeting of the Cabinet in regard to
commercial treaties on August 6th.

'The result was a despatch from myself to Mr. Adams [Footnote:
Afterwards Sir Francis Adams. He was then Chargé d'Affaires in Paris,
and later Minister in Switzerland. He was at this moment in charge of
the Embassy during Lord Lyons's absence.] which was not included in
the Blue-Book afterwards laid before Parliament. It ended by relating
a conversation with the French Ambassador on the previous day, in
which I threatened (and this was the reason for not placing the
despatch before Parliament) that if we did not come to a satisfactory
understanding with France, we should make treaties with Spain,
Portugal, and Italy, in which we should reduce the rate of duty on the
dear wines produced by those countries, and raise the rate of duty on
the less strong wines produced by France. I have always been a
reciprocitarian to this extent, and was always backed in using such
arguments by Chamberlain, who held the same view in a still stronger
form. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville always prevented any public
reference to such matters, but they allowed me to put them in
despatches, although not to lay them before Parliament.'

On August 17th Gambetta again suggested a private interview, and it was
decided that Dilke should cross, ostensibly on a visit to La Bourboule,
and hold the interview on his way. [Footnote: Gambetta wrote: "Nons serons
strictement seuls. Si! les choses électorales ont fort bien tourné, non
sans peine, mais pas de guerre sans blessures." (22 août, 1881).] On
August 22nd Mr. Adams reported that--

'Gambetta was determined that Tirard' (Minister of Commerce in M.
Ferry's Cabinet) 'should fail, in order that his Government should
have the glory of succeeding in our negotiations....

'On Thursday, August 25th, I breakfasted with Gambetta, and then went
on to La Bourboule. He told me that he was prepared to take office
without portfolio, "in order to be able to watch all the others."'

"Tuesday, August 30th, '81.--As to the treaty, Gambetta said that M.
Tirard would not be got rid of in time; some mode must be found of
turning the difficulty which he had created. He would see him, and
Tirard would probably propose some plan to me when I called on
Tuesday" (this might be Thursday). "_I suggested... a treaty with some
small country, and the most-favoured-nation clause with us--we giving
nothing...._ This was the excellent ultimate outcome." [Footnote: This
paragraph is from a note made at the time.]

On September 5th, on his way back from La Bourboule, 'I was officially in
Paris, and saw the Ministers, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Jules Ferry, and
Tirard; and on the next day, Tuesday the 6th, saw Gambetta privately
without their knowledge.'

At this moment prolongation of the existing treaty had not been accorded,
and negotiations were in suspense. Sir Charles frankly "told the Ministers
that I did not expect we should be able to agree," and suggested a plan
which, without a special commercial treaty, should secure what had up till
then been settled in negotiation. France was obliged to renew her treaties
with Switzerland and Belgium, and might concede to these countries in
detail 'those things which up to this point we had obtained in
negotiation.'

Prolongation of the existing treaty was, however, at last accorded, and
conferences were resumed on September 19th in Paris-a change of scene
greatly to the Commission's advantage.

'We now continued to sit day by day in state at the French Foreign
Office, which contrasted with the simplicity of Downing Street under
the rule of a parsimonious Treasury. The French certainly know how to
spend their money, and I fancy that the United Kingdom must suffer in
negotiations both from the superior style in which foreign Governments
treat negotiators and from our abstention from the practice pursued by
foreign Governments of showering decorations upon negotiators. At the
French Foreign Office, outside the magnificent room in which the
conferences are held, was a great buffet covered with the most costly
luxuries, behind which stood tall footmen dressed in the national
livery of red and blue, and I think that our manufacturers who came in
to give evidence were in some cases not altogether insensible to the
attractions offered them. Some of our witnesses, however, were really
first-class men, and it was a pleasure to hear Mr. Joseph Lee of
Manchester, who was afterwards knighted on my suggestion, hammering
the French.... When I called the name of Wedgwood as that of my
witness upon pottery I noticed the sensation that ran round the French
Commission, who were under the impression that "Wedgwood" was a
contemporary of Michael Angelo; but, of course, my Wedgwood was not
the original, though he was a descendant....

'During my first long visit to Paris the French Government gave me
every night the official box at either the Opera or one of the great
theatres, and I used to go, not that I cared about the theatre, but
because I was able to give hospitality in this way to our leading
manufacturers, who were over as our witnesses. We used, indeed, to do
a good deal of our business at the theatre. The official boxes having
drawing-rooms at the back, we retired into these, and discussed what
we were going to say at the Conference the next morning.'

But after many sittings negotiations did not seem likely to lead to any
settlement, and Sir Charles was anxious to break them off. The French
opposed this, urging that prolongation of the treaty would then have been
gained for nothing; and they made a good many small concessions on the
numerous articles subject to their tariff.

During the sittings Sir Charles Dilke kept Lord Granville posted in a mass
of detail: Ivory and pearl buttons reduced to half; vulcanite goods, an
improvement on the _status quo_; great and wholly unexpected reduction on
biscuits; but starch very bad (this was on "an excellent day for the small
things"). Other reports dealt with steel scrap, phosphorus, faience, and
so forth, and by tabulated figures set off the total of losses and gains.
Lord Granville, thanking him for these constant reports, remarked with
serene detachment that they were "as interesting as lists of the betting
in the newspapers just before the Derby. I hope you will win the race." He
added that in his opinion "Tirard and the Temps were only playing a game
of brag."

'At my conference on October 24th I had found Tirard very cross, he
apparently having made up his mind that Gambetta intended to turn him
out, and having therefore resolved to make the conclusion of a treaty
impossible in order to attack his successor and to destroy the treaty
if one were made. He suddenly asked for a vast reduction in the
English wine duties, and on my refusing to discuss the matter, he
replied that after the "enormous concessions" which had been made to
us, any French Minister who did not obtain similar concessions from us
would be worthy of impeachment. He was very rude to me, and evidently
wanted to provoke an immediate rupture.'

On this Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Gladstone:

"The Commissioners are in the singular position of trying to arrange
the terms of a treaty with a Minister who, if the treaty is made, is
likely to become the private member to move its rejection."

'I was not much hampered from London at this time. Mr. Gladstone
wrote: "I have nothing to do but commend and concur."'

'On October 28th I determined not to break off negotiations, but
simply to finish--that is to say, to go clean through the tariff, and
stop when we had no more to say. We then could leave matters open, and
begin again in the following month with the new Government which
Gambetta was about to form.'