The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, Vol. 2 by Stephen Gwynn

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THE LIFE OF THE RT. HON.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

BART., M.P.

BEGUN BY STEPHEN GWYNN, M.P.

COMPLETED AND EDITED BY

GERTRUDE M. TUCKWELL

LITERARY EXECUTRIX OF SIR CHARLES DILKE

WITH PORTRAITS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER

XXXIV. HOME AFFAIRS (OCTOBER, 1883, TO DECEMBER, 1884)

XXXV. EGYPT (1884)

XXXVI. FRANCHISE AND REDISTRIBUTION (JULY TO DECEMBER, 1884)

XXXVII. FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN 1884

XXXVIII. DIVIDED COUNSELS (JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1885)

XXXIX. THE FALL OF KHARTOUM AND THE PENJDEH INCIDENT

XL. REDISTRIBUTION: COERCION AND DEVOLUTION (1885)

XLI. FALL OF ADMINISTRATION (JUNE TO JULY, 1885)

XLII. OUT OF OFFICE (JULY, 1885)

XLIII. THE TURNING-POINT (JULY, 1885, TO JULY, 1886)

XLIV. THE RADICAL PROGRAMME _VERSUS_ HOME RULE (JULY TO DECEMBER, 1885)

XLV. BEGINNING OF THE HOME RULE SPLIT (DECEMBER, 1885, TO FEBRUARY,
1886)

XLVI. THE FIRST HOME RULE BILL (FEBRUARY TO JULY, 1886)

XLVII. LADY DILKE--76, SLOANE STREET

XLVIII. FOREIGN POLICY

XLIX. PUBLIC LIFE AND RETURN TO PARLIAMENT (1886-1894)

L. INDIA AND FRANCE--RHODES AND BISMARCK (1886-1892)

LI. PERSONAL LIFE--IN OPPOSITION (1895-1904)

LII. LABOUR (1870-1911)

LIII. WORK FOR NATIVE RACES (1870-1911)

LIV. THE BRITISH ARMY

LV. IMPERIAL DEFENCE

LVI. ARMY AND NAVY IN PARLIAMENT

LVII. DEATH OF LADY DILKE--PARLIAMENT OF 1905

LVIII. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1890-1910)

LIX. THE LAST YEARS

LX. LITERARY WORK AND INTERESTS

LXI. TABLE TALK

INDEX

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE IN THE YEAR 1908
From a drawing by W. Strang.

MRS. MARK PATTISON
From a photograph taken about 1878.

SIR THOMAS WENTWORTH, 1ST BARON WENTWORTH (DIED
MARCH 3RD, 1550-51)
From a painting ascribed to Theodore Bernardi.

BISMARCK
From a photograph given by him to Sir Charles W. Dilke.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE ROWING
From a photograph reproduced by permission of the _Daily Mirror_.

DOCKETT EDDY
From photographs.

PYRFORD ROUGH
From photographs.

LADY DILKE IN THE YEAR 1903
From a photograph by Thomson.

THE LIFE OF SIR CHARLES DILKE

CHAPTER XXXIV

HOME AFFAIRS

OCTOBER, 1883-DECEMBER, 1884

I.

The interval between the Sessions of 1883 and 1884 was critical for the
question of electoral reform which interested Liberals beyond all other
questions, but involved the risk of bringing dissensions in the Cabinet
to the point of open rupture. As the months went by, Mr. Chamberlain and
Lord Hartington used less and less concealment of their differences,
while it was well known to all the Cabinet that the alliance between
Chamberlain and Dilke was complete and unconditional. Whoever broke with
Chamberlain broke with Dilke. Fortunately a certain bond of personal
sympathy, in spite of divergent views, existed between Lord Hartington
and Sir Charles Dilke, and this bond largely helped to hold Mr.
Gladstone's Government together.

In the negotiations which followed between the leaders of the two great
Parties, Sir Charles Dilke was able to show the full measure of his
value to the State. It was of first-rate importance that the Liberal
Party should possess at that moment a representative with whom Lord
Salisbury found it congenial to treat, and whom the most advanced
Liberals trusted unreservedly to treat with Lord Salisbury.

The same confidence could hardly have been given by them to Lord
Hartington, who held that "equalization of the franchise was pressing
mainly on account of the pledges that had been given, and not much for
any other reason." [Footnote: Letter to Mr. Gladstone of October 24th,
1883, quoted by Mr. Bernard Holland in his _Life of the Duke of
Devonshire_, vol. i., p. 395.] Most Liberals took a very different view
of the need for this reform. Further, Lord Hartington held that
franchise and redistribution should be treated simultaneously, and he
was unwilling to extend the franchise in Ireland.

At a Cabinet on October 25th, 1883, the question of simultaneous or
separate treatment of the problems had been settled. Mr. Gladstone, says
Sir Charles, 'made a speech which meant franchise first and the rest
nowhere.' On the Irish question, Sir Charles was instructed to get
accurate statistics as to the effects of equalizing the franchise
between boroughs and counties, and 'on Friday, November 16th,' he notes,
'I wrote to Chamberlain: "I have some awful figures for poor Hartington
to swallow--700,000 county householders in the Irish counties."' Lord
Hartington still stuck to his point of linking redistribution and
franchise.

But on November 22nd,

'Mr. Gladstone read a long and admirable memorandum in favour of the
views held by him, by Chamberlain, and by me, as to franchise and
redistribution--that is, franchise first, with a promise of
redistribution but no Bill; and Hartington received no support after
this from any members of the Cabinet.'

There were, however, matters in which Lord Hartington's Conservative
tendencies found an ally in the Prime Minister. On November 28th, 1883,
at the Committee of the Cabinet on Local Government,

'Chamberlain noted: "Mr. Gladstone hesitates to disfranchise the
freeholders in boroughs--persons voting as householders in boroughs
and as freeholders in the counties in which the boroughs are
constituted. I am in favour of one man one vote, and told him so."
Our not getting one man one vote was entirely Mr. Gladstone's fault,
for the Cabinet expected and would have taken it, Hartington alone
opposing, as he opposed everything all through.'

The question of widening the franchise in Ireland was still unsettled,
and Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington both made allusion to it in
public speeches at this moment. The speeches, apart from their marked
difference in general tone, were on this point in flat contradiction to
each other, and on December 2nd Lord Hartington wrote to Mr. Gladstone
with a threat of resignation. On that day he delivered at Accrington a
long eulogy of the Whigs, who had 'formed a connecting link between the
advanced party and those classes which, possessing property, powers, and
influence, are naturally averse to change.' The Whigs it was, he
contended, who had by their guidance and their action reduced changes in
the direction of popular reform to the 'calm and peaceful process of
constitutional acts.'

'At this moment there was a conflict raging between Chamberlain and
Hartington, and in their autumn speeches each of them pretty plainly
attacked the other's policy. Chamberlain wrote to me: "Why does
Hartington think _aloud_ when he thinks one thing and is going to do
the other? And why does he snub the Caucus when he has made up his
mind to do exactly what they want? If he cannot learn to be a little
more diplomatic, he will make a devil of a rum leader!" A little
later Chamberlain gave me "passages from a speech which _ought_ to
be delivered: 'Yes, gentlemen, I entirely agree with Lord
Hartington. It is the business and duty of Radicals to lead great
popular movements, and if they are fortunate enough to kindle the
fire of national enthusiasm and to stir the hearts of the people,
then it will be the high prerogative of the great Whig noble who has
been waiting round the corner to direct and guide and moderate the
movement which he has done all in his power to prevent and
discourage.'"

'The storm between Hartington and Chamberlain having broken out
again, Chamberlain wrote to me on December 5th, enclosing a letter
of reproof from Mr. Gladstone, and saying: "I replied casuistically
that I would endeavour to exclude from my speeches the slightest
reference to Hartington, but that he was really too trying. I
reminded Mr. G. that I had asked if I were free to argue the
question, and that he had said: Yes--no one taking exception." In
the following week Chamberlain came to town and dined with me,
and we discussed the matter. Although Mr. Gladstone had blown
Chamberlain up, he was really much more angry with Hartington.'

It appears from the _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_ that Mr. Gladstone
continued through December his attempts to mediate. [Footnote: See _Life
of the Duke of Devonshire_, by Mr. Bernard Holland, vol. i, p. 398 _et
seq_.] The matter is thus related by Sir Charles, though not from first-
hand knowledge, since he went to Toulon in the middle of December, and
stayed there till January 8th, 1884:

'During my absence I had missed one Cabinet, the first that I ever
missed, and perhaps the only one. It was held suddenly on January
3rd, and I could not arrive in time. Mr. Gladstone had come up from
Hawarden under the impression that Hartington was going to resign,
because we would not produce a redistribution scheme along with
franchise. On the morning of the 3rd, however, he received a letter
in which Hartington gave way on the understanding that Mr. Gladstone
would state the general heads of his redistribution scheme. The
subject was not named at the Cabinet of the 3rd, which dealt with
Egypt only. But the Cabinet adjourned to the 4th, and on January 4th
discussed South Africa, and also ... received a statement from Mr.
Gladstone as to his intention to state the heads of our
redistribution scheme in "very general terms." On the 10th I noted:
"The Cabinets have resulted in peace between Lord Hartington and Mr.
Gladstone, but the Reform Bill will be less complete than I had
hoped." "Mr. Gladstone calmed Hartington by promising not to run
away from us after franchise and before redistribution, which was
what Hartington feared he meant to do."'

Discussion upon the detail of the Bill was resumed, and on January 23rd,
1884,

'the Chancellor (Lord Selborne), Hartington, Kimberley, and Dodson,
supported by Mr. Gladstone, forced, against Harcourt, Chamberlain,
and myself, a decision not to attach any condition of residence to
the property vote.'

'On January 28th there was a meeting of the Committee of the Cabinet
on the Franchise Bill in Mr. Gladstone's room. Chamberlain was
anxious to "make Hartington go out on franchise." I asked him how he
thought it was to be done, and he replied: "If he is restive now,
raise the question of Mr. Gladstone's statement on redistribution,
and oppose all limitations in that statement"; and he added that Mr.
Gladstone had only agreed to make the statement unwillingly to quiet
Hartington, and that if Hartington were not quieted Mr. Gladstone
would go back about it. Chamberlain and I on this occasion tried to
make the Franchise Bill more Radical, but failed, Mr. Gladstone
opposing us on old-fashioned grounds.'

'Chamberlain came to me' (on April 26th) 'about a plan which Mr.
Gladstone was to broach at the next Cabinet, for putting off the
operation of the Franchise Act until January 1st, '86, in order to
give time for redistribution to be dealt with. We decided to oppose
it, on the ground that it would not improbably lead to our being
forced into holding an election on the old franchise.'

At the beginning of the Session Sir Charles helped on the general policy
of Radicalism by one of his many minor electoral reforms. This was a
Bill to extend over the United Kingdom the right of keeping the poll
open till eight o'clock at night, which he had secured as a privilege
for Londoners in 1878. He notes that on February 11th he 'fought with
Tory obstructives as to hours of polling, and won'; but the violent
resistance which was offered at first did not continue, and the Bill
passed quietly in July, after time had been given to discuss it in the
constituencies.

'On this day (July 22nd) I had a long and curious conversation with
Healy as to Irish redistribution and as to the hours of poll in
counties, with regard to which he was against extension, but said
that he was forced to support it in public. He told me that his
private opinion was that the Land Act had quieted Ireland.'

The 'Representation of the People' Bill, as the franchise measure was
called, was introduced on February 28th, 1884, and made steady progress,
Liberals finding their task facilitated by the difficulties of their
opponents.

'On May 7th I wrote to Chamberlain to say that I had to speak at a
house dinner of the Devonshire Club that night, and to ask him if
there was anything he wanted said, to which he replied: "Note
Randolph Churchill's letter to Salisbury with reference to the
Conservative Caucus, and the vindication of the Birmingham one." It
was impossible not to notice this important letter, which
revolutionized politics for some time.'

'_May 14th_.--After the Cabinet I was informed by Chamberlain that a
week earlier, on Wednesday, May 7th, Randolph Churchill had sent to
him to know whether, if he broke with the Conservatives, the
Birmingham Liberals would support him as an independent candidate.'

Sir Charles's letter to his agent at this time sums up the political
position:

'The Tory game is to delay the franchise until they have upset us
upon Egypt, before the Franchise Bill has reached the Lords.... Our
side will be in a humour to treat as traitors any who do not insist
that the one Bill and nothing else shall be had in view--in face of
the tremendous struggle impending in the Lords.'

'On _May 13th_ I had received a letter from Mr. Gladstone in answer
to one from me in a matter which afterwards became important, and
but for Chamberlain's strong stand would have forced me to leave the
Government. I had so strong an opinion in favour of woman's suffrage
that I could not undertake to vote against it, even when proposed as
an amendment to a great Government Bill.'

Sir Charles had written as follows:

'ANTIBES,
'_Easter Eve_, '84.

'I had thought till lately that the Woman's Suffrage division in
Committee on the Franchise Bill would have been so hollow that my
absence from it would not have mattered; but as I find that
Grosvenor thinks that it will not be hollow, it becomes my duty to
write to you about it. I myself think Grosvenor wrong; the woman's
suffrage people claim some 250 "friends," but this they do by
counting all who, having voted with them once, have abstained from
voting for many years, and who are really foes. The division can
only be a close one if the Tory party as a body support the view
which is Northcote's, I believe, and was Disraeli's, but many of the
leaders would be bitterly opposed to such a course. Mr. Disraeli
left the woman's suffrage amendment an open question on his own
Reform Bill, and forbade the Government Whips to tell against the
amendment, but the mass of the Tory party voted in the majority. On
this next occasion there will be a larger Liberal vote against the
change than there was last year, and I do not believe that there
will be a larger Tory vote in its favour. But, supposing that I am
wrong and Grosvenor right, I should feel no difficulty in voting
against the amendment on the grounds of tactics which would be
stated, provided that Fawcett and Courtney, who are the only other
thick-and-thin supporters of woman's suffrage in the Government,
voted also, but I cannot vote if they abstain. Under these
circumstances what had I better do?'

Mr. Gladstone wrote back on May 11th:

'The question as to the votes of members of the Government on
woman's suffrage is beyond me, and I have always intended to ask the
Cabinet, and (like the Gordon rescue) at the proper time. The
distinction appears to me as clear as possible between supporting a
thing in its right place and forcing it into its wrong place. To
nail on to the extension of the franchise, founded upon principles
already known and in use, a vast social question, which is surely
entitled to be considered as such, appears to me in principle very
doubtful. When to this is added the admirable pretext--nay, the fair
argument--it would give to the House of Lords for "putting off" the
Bill, I cannot see the ground for hesitation. But I quite understand
what (I believe) is your view, that there should be one rule for all
the members of the Government.'

'This was an important letter. The words "(like the Gordon rescue)
at the proper time" seem to show that Mr. Gladstone had already made
up his mind to send an expedition to Khartoum, although he would not
say so. The body of the letter proved that Mr. Gladstone had a very
strong opinion against me on the main point, and the consultation of
the Cabinet (which was dead against woman suffrage), and the one
rule for all members of the Government, meant that he intended to
force my vote by a Cabinet resolution, and, killing two birds with
one stone, to attack at the same time Fawcett, who had walked out on
several questions, and announced his intention of walking out on
others.

'By May 22nd I had finally made up my mind that I could not vote
against the woman franchise amendment--even as a mere matter of
tactics and deference to others--if Courtney and Fawcett went out on
the matter. I could not speak to them about it because of the
"Cabinet secret" doctrine. Childers had been directed by the Cabinet
to sound Courtney, because he was Courtney's official superior in
the Treasury. Childers was to offer Courtney that if he would vote
against the amendment he should be allowed to speak for woman
franchise on the merits, and that none of its opponents in the
Cabinet (that is, all except myself) should speak against it on the
merits. I noted: "On the whole I think that we shall walk out, and
not be turned out for so doing." I again explained my position to
Mr. Gladstone.... I felt that the majority of those voting for woman
franchise on this occasion would be Tories, voting for party
reasons, and in order to upset the Bill. I was therefore unwilling
to go out on this occasion, but thought I could not do otherwise
than make common cause with Courtney. On the merits of woman
franchise I had and have a strong opinion. I always thought the
refusal of it contrary to the public interest. The refusal of the
franchise also affects the whole position of women most
unfavourably.' [Footnote: Mrs. Fawcett wrote thanking him 'in the
name of the friends of Women's Suffrage. Your being a member of the
Cabinet made your position in the matter one of special difficulty;
but I do assure you that our gratitude is real and unfeigned.']

On May 24th Sir Charles told the Cabinet what 'I had told Mr. Gladstone
in a letter which I had written to him on Easter Eve, and renewed on the
occasion when he made the reply which has been quoted above.'

When the amendment was reached, Dilke, with Fawcett and Courtney,
abstained. This led to serious trouble. Sir Charles wrote on June 12th
in his Diary:

'Hartington is very angry with me for not voting, and wants me
turned out for it. He has to vote every day for things which he
strongly disapproves, and this makes the position difficult. He says
that my position was wholly different from that of Fawcett and
Courtney, because I was a party to the decision of the Cabinet, and
that custom binds the minority in the collective decision of Her
Majesty's servants. This is undoubtedly the accepted theory. Poor
Hibbert was made to vote. [Footnote: Sir John Tomlinson Hibbert (d.
1908), at this time Financial Secretary to the Treasury, was an able
administrator, and held office in Mr. Gladstone's four
administrations. He assisted materially in the passing of the
Execution within Gaols Act, Married Women's Property Act, and Clergy
Disabilities Act, and was keenly interested in the reform of the
Poor Law.] I fear the Cabinet put the yoke, not of political
necessity, but of their personal prejudice against woman suffrage,
on the necks of their followers.'

The matter came up at a Cabinet on June 14th, and was made worse because
a letter from Lord Hartington, 'offensive in tone,' had been circulated
by accident. However, Mr. Gladstone issued a minute about my walking out
on woman's suffrage, which concluded by a proposal, if his colleagues
concurred, to request me to remain in the Government. Thus ended a
personal crisis which, to use the French phrase, had been 'open' since
my letter to Mr. Gladstone dated 'Antibes, Easter Eve.'

'Chamberlain wrote to me: "It is settled"; and I wrote back: "It is
settled. I would not have asked you to stand by me, as I have no
constitutional case, and your conduct in so doing could not be
defended. I always count on your friendship, but this would have
been too much." He replied: "We are both right. You could not ask
me, but if you had been requested to resign I should have gone too."
Chamberlain had previously informed the Cabinet that, though he
differed from me about woman's suffrage, and regretted the course
that I had felt myself obliged to take, he intended to stand by me
"to the fullest extent."' [Footnote: The further negotiations with
regard to Franchise and Redistribution in 1884, and the 'compact'
which ended them, are dealt with in Chapter XXXVI., infra, pp.
63-79.]

II.

While the great measure of the Session went steadily through its stages,
various other questions were also occupying the Cabinet. The search for
a new Speaker in succession to Sir Henry Brand, who had declared at the
beginning of 1883 his unwillingness to retain office beyond that
Session, was one, and not the least important, of these questions. Sir
Henry James was first mentioned, and he refused.

'November, 1883. Some had thought of putting up Dodson, but the
Tories had announced that they should run Ridley in opposition to
him. There was also a difficulty about filling Dodson's place.
Trevelyan was the only man who could be put into the Cabinet without
causing the resignation of Courtney and Fawcett, and Mr. Gladstone
was still in the humour which he had developed at the time of the
offer of the Chief Secretaryship to me, and declared that he would
not have the Chief Secretary in the Cabinet, the Viceroy being in
it, for this would be to have two Kings of Brentford.'

On November 10th 'Childers seemed the favourite for Speakership,' but on
the 12th it was decided that Herschell, Goschen, Arthur Peel, and
Campbell-Bannerman, were to be offered the Speakership--in that order.
It was known that Herschell would refuse, it was thought that Goschen
would refuse on the ground of sight, and Peel on the ground of health,
and it was intended that Campbell-Bannerman should have it. Herschell
did refuse, but Goschen accepted, and had to be shown by his doctor that
he could not see members across the House, that he would be capable of
confusing Healy with Parnell.... Peel accepted, and in spite of his bad
health took it, and has kept it till this day (1891).'

There was also continuous discussion behind the scenes as to the two
important measures of local government reform--for London and for the
country.

'By November 8th, 1883, I had succeeded in bringing Harcourt round
on the London police matter ... to let the City keep their police,
and then went to Mr. Gladstone.... After twelve o'clock at night
Harcourt joined us, and it was agreed to put both London and local
government in the Queen's Speech for 1884.'

Dilke spent much work upon the London Government Bill with Harcourt in
January of that year; but the Bill, having passed its second reading,
was not further proceeded with, owing to House of Commons difficulties.
Sir Charles gives the true reason in a letter to his agent:

'One unfortunate thing about the London Bill is that no one in the
House cares about it except Dilke, Firth, and the Prime Minister,
and no one outside the House except the Liberal electors of Chelsea.
This is the private hidden opinion of Harcourt and of the
Metropolitan Liberal members except Firth. I am personally so strong
for the Bill that I have not at any time admitted this to Harcourt,
and I have only hinted it to Firth....'

When Sir William Harcourt's Bill collapsed, Dilke attempted a minor
improvement for the Metropolis by framing a City Guilds Bill, which he
described to Mr. Gladstone as following the scheme of the Bills by which
the Universities had been reformed. But the Chancellor, Lord Selborne,
fought strongly against this proposal: and nothing came of it.

The great scheme for reforming Local Government in England and Wales was
meanwhile being considered by the Committee to which it had been
referred. Besides Sir Charles Dilke, who naturally acted as Chairman,
the Committee consisted of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Kimberley, Mr.
Childers, Lord Carlingford, and Mr. Dodson (who were members of the
Cabinet), and Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. With them were Sir Henry Thring,
the celebrated Parliamentary draughtsman, and Mr. Hugh Owen, the
Permanent Secretary of the Local Government Board. The task of obtaining
agreement, and even sometimes of maintaining order, in a Committee
composed of persons representing such a variety of opinion, was no easy
one, and it tested to the full the tact and ingenuity of the Chairman.
Mr. Dodson, Sir Charles Dilke's immediate predecessor at the Local
Government Board, and Lord Carlingford represented the views which had
hitherto prevailed in favour of piecemeal and gradual reform. Mr.
Chamberlain, Lord Kimberley, and Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice were, on the
contrary, supporters of the large Bill which the Chairman had prepared;
while Mr. Childers, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was there mainly to
keep a vigilant watch on the local authorities, who were suspected, and
not without reason, of desiring to treat the Treasury as a sort of
"milch cow," a description which Mr. Gladstone had recently made current
in a debate in the House of Commons, Sir Henry Thring was no mere
draughtsman. He had had an immense experience of official life, had
known every man of public importance over a long period of years, and
had very determined views on most subjects, which he never hesitated to
express in clear-cut language and without respect of persons. Mr. Lowe,
it was asserted, had once observed at a Cabinet just before Thring
entered the room: 'I think before he arrives we had better carry a
preliminary resolution that we are all d----d fools.' As it also
happened, Local Government was a subject on which Sir Henry Thring, and
not without reason, prided himself as an expert, and the Committee over
which Sir Charles Dilke presided consequently had Sir Henry Thring's
views conveyed to them in unmistakable terms. One of his special objects
of hostility was the Poor Law Union area, which he hoped ultimately to
destroy. On the other hand, Mr. Hugh Owen, like nearly all the Local
Government Board officials of that time, regarded the Poor Law and
everything connected with it as sacred. The controversies were
frequently fierce, and on one occasion a serious crisis almost arose
owing to Lord Kimberley asking to be informed if Sir Henry Thring was
preparing a Bill of his own or was acting on his instructions.