The Naval War of 1812 by Theodore Roosevelt

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The Naval War of 1812

or the
History of the United States Navy during
the Last War with Great Britain
to Which Is Appended an Account of
the Battle of New Orleans

By Theodore Roosevelt

With an Introduction by
Edward K. Eckert

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

Introduction

_The Naval War of 1812_

Index

ILLUSTRATIONS

Captain Isaac Hull

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerriere_: "The Engagement"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerriere_: "In Action"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerriere_: "Dropping Astern"

_Constitution_ vs. _Guerriere_: "She Fell in the Sea"

_Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_

Captain Stephen Decatur

Captain William Bainbridge

_Constitution_ vs. _Java_

Captain James Lawrence

_Chesapeake_ vs. _Shannon_

_Argus_ vs. _Pelican_

The Battle of Lake Erie

The _Essex_

Captain David Porter

Master Commandant Lewis Warrington

Captain Samuel C. Reid

The Battle of Lake Borgne

Commodore Thomas Macdonough

Capture of the _President_

Captain Charles Stewart

_Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_

Master Commandant James Biddle

_Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their amiable and expert assistance in the selection of the
illustrations in this volume, thanks are due to Mr. James W. Cheevers,
curator of the U.S. Naval Academy Museum; Ms. Sigrid Trumpy, curator of
the museum's Beverley R. Robinson Collection of naval prints; and Mrs.
Patty Maddocks, director of the Naval Institute Library and Photographic
Service.

JS

PREFACE

The history of the naval events of the War of 1812 has been repeatedly
presented both to the American and the English reader. Historical
writers have treated it either in connection with a general account of
the contest on land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete record
of the navies of the two nations. A few monographs, which confine
themselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But
none of these works can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full or
impartial account of the war--some of them being of he "popular" and
loosely-constructed order, while others treat it from a purely partisan
standpoint. No single book can be quoted which would be accepted by the
modern reader as doing justice to both sides, or, indeed, as telling
the whole story. Any one specially interested in the subject must read
all; and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile the
many and widely contradictory statements he will meet with.

There appear to be three works which, taken in combination, give the
best satisfaction on the subject. First, in James' "Naval History of
Great Britain" (which supplies both the material and the opinions of
almost every subsequent English or Canadian historian) can be found
the British view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written with
fulness and care; on the other hand it is also a piece of special
pleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the
second place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's
"Naval History of the United States." The latter gives the American
view of the cruises and battles; but it is much less of an authority
than James', both because it is written without great regard for
exactness, and because all figures for the American side need to be
supplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical
"History of the United States Navy," which is the third of the works
in question.

But even after comparing these three authors, many contradictions
remain unexplained, and the truth can only be reached in such cases
by a careful examination of the navy "Records," the London "Naval
Chronicle," "Niles' Register," and other similar documentary
publications. Almost the only good criticisms on the actions are
those incidentally given in standard works on other subjects, such as
Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery," and Admiral Jurien de la
Graviere's "Guerres Maritimes." Much of the material in our Navy
Department has never been touched at all. In short, no full, accurate,
and unprejudiced history of the war has ever been written.

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has received. At present
people are beginning to realize that it is folly for the great
English-speaking Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composed
partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather more
worthless than the old. It is worth while to study with some care
that period of our history during which our navy stood at the highest
pitch of its fame; and to learn any thing from the past it is necessary
to know, as near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly the work
should be written impartially, if only from the narrowest motives.
Without abating a jot from one's devotion to his country and flag,
I think a history can be made just enough to warrant its being
received as an authority equally among Americans and Englishmen. I
have endeavored to supply such a work. It is impossible that errors,
both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; and
although I have sought to make it in character as non-partisan as
possible, these errors will probably be in favor of the American
side.

As my only object is to give an accurate narrative of events, I shall
esteem it a particular favor if any one will furnish me with the
means of rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done injustice to
any commander, or officer of any grade, whether American or British,
I shall consider myself under great obligations to those who will set
me right.

I have been unable to get access to the original reports of the
British commanders, the logs of the British ships, or their
muster-rolls, and so have been obliged to take them at second hand
from the "Gazette," or "Naval Chronicle," or some standard history.
The American official letters, log-books, original contracts,
muster-rolls, etc., however, being preserved in the Archives at
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon.
Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. The set of
letters from the officers is very complete, in three series,--"Captains'
Letters," "Masters' Commandant Letters," and "Officers' Letters,"
there being several volumes for each year. The books of contracts
contain valuable information as to the size and build of some of
the vessels. The log-books are rather exasperating, often being very
incomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague
official letter describing the capture of the Macedonian to the
log-book of the Frigate _United States_, not a fact about the fight
could be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of the fight
is "strange sail discovered to be a frigate under English colors,"
and the next entry (on the following day) relates to the removal
of the prisoners. The log of the _Enterprise_ is very full indeed,
for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period during
which she was commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, and in which she
fought the Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's log
at all, though there is a very full set of letters from her commander.
Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable material.
When ever it was possible I have referred to printed matter in
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in most cases,
be easily consulted. In conclusion I desire to express my sincerest
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of the United States
Navy, and Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the German Navy,
without whose advice and sympathy this work would probably never
have been written or even begun.

NEW YORK CITY, 1882.

PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION

I originally intended to write a companion volume to this, which
should deal with the operations on land. But a short examination
showed that these operations were hardly worth serious study.
They teach nothing new; it is the old, old lesson, that a miserly
economy in preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay of
men and money, which, after all, comes too late to more than partially
offset the evils produced by the original short-sighted parsimony.
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any practical
bearing on the issues of the present day; but it has none, as far
as the army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, and
his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of regulars
or of well-trained volunteers during the twelve years they had in
which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see was
inevitable; but there is now far less need of an army than there was
then. Circumstances have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, we have the still
weaker power of Mexico. Instead of the great Indian nations of the
interior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check strong
armies, to ravage large stretches of territory, and needing
formidable military expeditions to overcome them, there are now only
left broken and scattered bands, which are sources of annoyance
merely. To the north we are still hemmed in by the Canadian
possessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength has
increased so prodigiously, both absolutely and relatively, while
England's military power has remained almost stationary, that we
need now be under no apprehensions from her land-forces; for, even
if checked in the beginning, we could not help conquering in the
end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing else. So that there
is now no cause for our keeping up a large army; while, on the
contrary, the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible short-sightedness prevents our at once
preparing one.

Not only do the events of the war on land teach very little to the
statesman who studies history in order to avoid in the present the
mistakes of the past, but besides this, the battles and campaigns
are of little interest to the student of military matters. The British
regulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed to
them whenever they had any thing like a fair chance; but this is not
to be wondered at, for the same thing has always happened the world
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were exactly such as
any man might have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learned
from the follies committed by incompetent commanders and untrained
troops when in the presence of skilled officers having under them
disciplined soldiers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks,
and panic routs of our armies can all be paralleled in the campaigns
waged by Napoleon's marshals against the Spaniards and Portuguese
in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of our own war. The
Peninsular troops were as little able to withstand the French veterans
as were our militia to hold their own against the British regulars.
But it must always be remembered, to our credit, that while seven
years of fighting failed to make the Spaniards able to face the
French,[Footnote: At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between
the allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so rapid
and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington the bitter
observation, that "though he had seen a good many remarkable things
in the course of his life, yet this was the first time he had ever
seen ten thousand men running a race."] two years of warfare gave us
soldiers who could stand against the best men of Britain. On the
northern frontier we never developed a great general,--Brown's claim
to the title rests only on his not having committed the phenomenal
follies of his predecessors,--but by 1814 our soldiers had become
seasoned, and we had acquired some good brigade commanders, notably
Scott, so that in that year we played on even terms with the British.
But the battles, though marked by as bloody and obstinate fighting
as ever took place, were waged between small bodies of men, and were
not distinguished by any feats of generalship, so that they are not
of any special interest to the historian. In fact, the only really
noteworthy feat of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, and
the only military genius that the struggle developed was Andrew
Jackson. His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he won
was in many ways so peculiar as to make it well worth a much closer
study than it has yet received. It was by far the most prominent
event of the war; it was a victory which reflected high honor on
the general and soldiers who won it, and it was in its way as
remarkable as any of the great battles that took place about the
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I have devoted a chapter
to its consideration at the conclusion of the chapters devoted to
the naval operations.

As before said, the other campaigns on land do not deserve very
minute attention; but, for the sake of rendering the account of the
battle of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketch
of the principal engagements that took place elsewhere.

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the campaign of General
Hull on the Michigan frontier. With two or three thousand raw
troops he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw was
surrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a British and Indian
force of 600. Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the beginning.
Near Brownstown the American Colonel Van Horne, with some 200 men,
was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revenge
Col. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 British
and Canadians under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under Tecumseh,
and whipped them,--Tecumseh's Indians standing their ground longest.
The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the small
force of 66 Americans was surprised and massacred by the Indians.
Meanwhile, General Brock, the British commander, advanced against
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze his
senile and irresolute opponent. The latter retreated to Detroit,
where, without striking a blow, he surrendered 1,400 men to Brock's
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one half of Indians under
Tecumseh. On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and honest old
gentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military matters,
Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British at
Queenstown; 1,100 Americans got across and were almost all killed or
captured by a nearly equal number of British, Canadians, and Indians,
while on the opposite side a large number of their countrymen looked
on, and with abject cowardice refused to cross to their assistance.
The command of the army was then handed over to a ridiculous
personage named Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic that
they really must have come from an unsound mind, and then made a
ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which failed almost of
its own accord. A British and Canadian force of less than 400 men
was foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirmish,
by about 1,000 Americans under Brown; and with this trifling
success the military operations of the year came to an end.

Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, this time by between
500 and 600 British, who took it after a brisk resistance from some
300 militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killed
and wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the campaign
in the Northwest. At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's
command of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a force of
1,100 men, half of them Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor.
The right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; the left
division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in houses
and stockaded enclosures, made a stout resistance, and only
surrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180 British and about
half as many Indians were killed or wounded. Over 300 Americans
were slain, some in battle, but most in the bloody massacre that
followed. After this, General Harrison went into camp at Fort Meigs,
where, with about 1,100 men, he was besieged by 1,000 British and
Canadians under Proctor and 1,200 Indians under Tecumseh. A force
of 1,200 Kentucky militia advanced to his relief and tried to cut
its way into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortie
was fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scattered like
chaff by the British regulars in the open, and when broken were
cut to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly two thirds of
the relieving troops were killed or captured; about 400 got into
the fort. Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort Stephenson,
garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was attacked by a force
of 391 British regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. Some four
thousand Indians joined Proctor, but most of them left him after
Perry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having received large
reinforcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames his army of 3,500
men encountered and routed between 600 and 700 British under Proctor,
and about 1,000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle was decided at
once by a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who broke through
the regulars, took them in rear, and captured them, and then
dismounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who were also
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin of his teeth
and Tecumseh died fighting, like the hero that he was. This battle
ended the campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must be
remembered that the war was, on the part of the Americans, mainly
one against Indians; the latter always forming over half of the
British forces. Many of the remainder were French Canadians, and
the others were regulars. The American armies, on the contrary,
were composed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and Ohio, native
Americans, of English speech and blood, who were battling for lands
that were to form the heritage of their children. In the West the
war was only the closing act of the struggle that for many years
had been waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our race, as
with rifle and axe they carved out the mighty empire that we their
children inherit; it was but the final effort with which they wrested
from the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that now
forms the heart of our great Republic. It was the breaking down of
the last barrier that stayed the flood of our civilization; it
settled, once and for ever, that henceforth the law, the tongue,
and the blood of the land should be neither Indian, nor yet French,
but English. The few French of the West were fighting against a
race that was to leave as little trace of them as of the doomed
Indian peoples with whom they made common cause. The presence of
the British mercenaries did not alter the character of the contest;
it merely served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with which
the Mother-Island regarded her greater daughter, predestined as
the latter was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic.

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans made successful descents
on York and Fort George, scattering or capturing their comparatively
small garrisons; while a counter descent by the British on Sackett's
Harbor failed, the attacking force being too small. After the capture
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance guard,
1,400 strong, under Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with the bayonet, broke up
the camp, capturing both the generals and half the artillery. Though
the assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, suffered much
more than the Americans, yet the latter were completely demoralized,
and at once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstler
with about 600 men surrendered with shamefully brief resistance to
a somewhat smaller force of British and Indians. Then about 300
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which they took,
but were afterward driven off by a large body of militia with the
loss of 40 men. Later in the season the American General McClure
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then retreated in panic
flight across the Niagara. In retaliation the British in turn crossed
the river; 600 regulars surprised and captured in the night Fort
Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troops attacked
Black Rock, and after losing over a hundred men in a smart engagement
with somewhat over 1,500 militia whom they easily dispersed, captured
and burned both it and Buffalo. Before these last events took place
another invasion of Canada had been attempted, this time under General
Wilkinson, "an unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible way, and was a
total failure; it was attended with but one battle, that of Chrystler's
Farm, in which 1,000 British, with the loss of less than 200 men,
beat back double their number of Americans, who lost nearly 500 men
and also one piece of artillery. The American army near Lake
Champlain had done nothing, its commander, General Wade Hampton,
being, if possible, even more incompetent than Wilkinson. He remained
stationary while a small force of British plundered Plattsburg and
Burlington; then, with 5,000 men he crossed into Canada, but returned
almost immediately, after a small skirmish at Chauteaugay between
his advance guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost
41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of
the American force was engaged, has been, absurdly enough, designated
a "battle" by most British and Canadian historians. In reality it
was the incompetency of their general and not the valor of their
foes that caused the retreat of the Americans. The same comment,
by the way, applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in the
following year, which may have been lost by Sir George Prevost, but
was certainly not won by the Americans. And, again, a similar
criticism should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on La
Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither one of the
three affairs was a stand-up fight; in each a greatly superior
force, led by an utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have been a matter of
certainty had the engagement been permitted to grow serious.

In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160 American regulars,
under Captain Holmes, fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200
British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. On
Lake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego and took it by
fair assault; and afterward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some
American transports, and were killed or captured to a man. All
through the spring and early summer the army on the Niagara frontier
was carefully drilled by Brown, and more especially by Scott, and
the results of this drilling were seen in the immensely improved
effectiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened in July.
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and on the 4th of
July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with two brigades of regulars,
each about 1,200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a total of about 3,200
men, won a stand-up fight against the British General Riall, who
had nearly 2,500 men, 1,800 of them regulars. Porter's brigade
opened by driving in the Canadian militia and the Indians; but was
itself checked by the British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took
very little part in the battle, three of the regiments not being
engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five men.
The entire brunt of the action was borne by Scott's brigade, which
was fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regulars under
Riall. The latter advanced with great bravery, but were terribly
cut up by the fire of Scott's regulars; and when they had come
nearly up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and drove them
clean off the field. The American loss was 322, including 23 Indians;
the British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The number
of Americans actually engaged did not exceed that of the British;
and Scott's brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge,
defeated an equal force of British regulars.

On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or Lundy's Lane, fought
between General Brown with 3,100 [Footnote: As near as can be found
out; most American authorities make it much less; Lossing, for
example, says only 2,400.] Americans and General Drummond with
3,500 [Footnote: General Drummond in his official letter makes it
but 2,800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3,000 rank and
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and drummers,
brings it up to 3,400; and we still have to count in the artillery
drivers, etc.] British. It was brought on by accident in the evening,
and was waged with obstinate courage and savage slaughter till
midnight. On both sides the forces straggled into action by
detachments. The Americans formed the attacking party. As before,
Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, and over half of his
men were killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and borne from
the field. The struggle was of the most desperate character, the
combatants showing a stubborn courage that could not be surpassed.
[Footnote: General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner were
their attacks directed against our guns that our artillerymen were
bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy's
guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." Even James says:
"Upon the whole, however, the American troops fought bravely; and the
conduct of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially,
would have done honor to any service."] Charge after charge was made
with the bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken once and
again. The loss was nearly equal; on the side of the Americans,
854 men (including Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two guns;
on that of the British, 878 men (including General Riall captured)
and one gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers.
The truth is beyond question that the British had the advantage in
numbers, and a still greater advantage in position; while it is
equally beyond question that it was a defeat and not a victory for
the Americans. They left the field and retired in perfect order to
Fort Erie, while the British held the field and the next day pursued
their foes.

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